

THE STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD

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VOLUME XIV

(1914–1916)

**On the History of the Psycho-Analytic
Movement**

Papers on Metapsychology


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SIGMUND FREUD WITH A GROUP OF HIS CLOSEST SUPPORTERS

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FRONTISPIECE Sigmund Freud with a Group of his Closest Supporters

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ON THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC MOVEMENT
(1914)

EDITOR'S NOTE

ZUR GESCHICHTE DER PSYCHOANALYTISCHEN BEWEGUNG

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1914 *Jb. Psychoan.*, 6, 207-260.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 1-77. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 4, 411-480.
1924 Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Pp. 72.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 44-113.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

'The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement'

- 1916 *Psychoan. Rev.*, 3, 406-454. (Tr. A. A. Brill.)
1917 New York: Nervous & Mental Disease Publishing Co. (Monograph Series No. 25). Pp. 58. (Same translator.)
1938 In *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*. New York. Modern Library. Pp. 933-977. (Same translator.)

'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement'

- 1924 *C.P.*, 1, 287-359. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)

The present translation is a modified version of the one published in 1924.

In the German editions before 1924 the date 'February, 1914' appears at the end of the work. It seems in fact to have been written in January and February of that year. A few alterations of a minor character were made in the 1924 edition and the long footnote on pp. 33-4 was added. This has not hitherto appeared in English.

A full account of the situation which led to the writing of this work is given in Chapter V of the second volume of Ernest Jones's Freud biography (1955, 142 ff.). Here it is enough to

summarize the position very shortly. Adler's disagreements with the views of Freud had come to a head in 1910, and Jung's some three years later. In spite of the divergences which separated them from Freud, they had both long persisted, however, in describing their theories as 'psycho-analysis'. The aim of the present paper was to state clearly the fundamental postulates and hypotheses of psycho-analysis, to show that the theories of Adler and Jung were totally incompatible with them, and to draw the inference that it would lead to nothing but general confusion if these contradictory sets of views were all given the same name. And although for many years popular opinion continued to insist that there were 'three schools of psycho-analysis', Freud's argument eventually prevailed. Adler had already chosen the name of 'Individual Psychology' for his theories, and soon afterwards Jung adopted that of 'Analytical Psychology' for his.

In order to make the essential principles of psycho-analysis perfectly plain. Freud traced the history of their development from their pre-analytic beginnings. The first section of the paper covers the period during which he himself was the only person concerned—that is, up till about 1902. The second section takes the story on till about 1910—the time during which psycho-analytic views first began to extend to wider circles. It is only in the third section that Freud comes to a discussion of the dissident views, first of Adler and then of Jung, and points out the fundamental respects in which they depart from the findings of psycho-analysis. In this last section, and also to some extent in the rest of the paper, we find Freud adopting a far more belligerent tone than in any of his other writings. And in view of his experiences during the preceding three or four years, this unusual mood cannot be considered surprising.

Discussions of the views of Adler and Jung will be found in two other works of Freud contemporary with the present one. In the paper on 'Narcissism (1914c)', which was being composed at almost exactly the same time as the 'History', some paragraphs of controversy with Jung appear at the end of Section I (p. 79 ff. below) and a similar passage about Adler at the beginning of Section III (p. 92). The case history of the 'Wolf Man' (1918b), which was written in the main at the end of 1914 though only published (with two additional passages) in 1918, was largely designed as an empirical refutation of

Adler and Jung, and contains many attacks on their theories. In Freud's later works there are a number of scattered references to these controversies (chiefly in expository or semi-autobiographical writings), but these are always in a drier tone and never very extensive. Special mention must, however, be made of a closely reasoned discussion of Adler's views on the motive forces leading to repression in the final section of Freud's paper on beating-phantasies (1919e), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 201 ff.

As regards the purely historical and autobiographical portions of the work, it must be remarked that Freud went over more or less the same ground in his *Autobiographical Study* (1925d) though it supplements the present paper at some points. For a very much fuller treatment of the subject the reader must, of course, be referred to Ernest Jones's three-volume biography of Freud. No attempt has been made in the footnotes to the present translation to go over the same ground as is covered in that work.

ON THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC MOVEMENT

Fluctuat nec mergitur
(On the coat of arms of the City of Paris ¹)

I

No one need be surprised at the subjective character of the contribution I propose to make here to the history of the psycho-analytic movement, nor need anyone wonder at the part I play in it. For psycho-analysis is my creation; for ten years I was the only person who concerned himself with it, and all the dissatisfaction which the new phenomenon aroused in my contemporaries has been poured out in the form of criticisms on my head. Although it is a long time now since I was the only psycho-analyst, I consider myself justified in maintaining that even to-day no one can know better than I do what psycho-analysis is, how it differs from other ways of investigating the life of the mind, and precisely what should be called psycho-analysis and what would better be described by some other name. In thus repudiating what seems to me a cool act of usurpation, I am indirectly informing the readers of this *Jahrbuch* of the events that have led to the changes in its editorship and format.²

In 1909, in the lecture-room of an American university, I had my first opportunity of speaking in public about psycho-analysis.³ The occasion was a momentous one for my work, and moved by this thought I then declared that it was not I who had

¹ [The coat of arms represents a ship, and the device may be rendered 'it is tossed by the waves, but does not sink'. Freud quoted this motto twice in his correspondence with Fliess, in connection with his own state of mind (Letters 119 and 143, Freud, 1950a).]

² [The *Jahrbuch* had hitherto been under the direction of Bleuler and Freud and edited by Jung. Freud himself now became sole director and the editorship was taken over by Abraham and Hitschmann. Cf. also p. 46 below.]

³ In my 'Five Lectures' (1910a), delivered at Clark University. [See below, pp. 30-1.]

brought psycho-analysis into existence: the credit for this was due to someone else, to Josef Breuer, whose work had been done at a time when I was still a student engaged in passing my examinations (1880-2). Since I gave those lectures, however, some well-disposed friends have suggested to me a doubt whether my gratitude was not expressed too extravagantly on that occasion. In their view I ought to have done as I had previously been accustomed to do: treated Breuer's 'cathartic procedure' as a preliminary stage of psycho-analysis, and represented psycho-analysis itself as beginning with my discarding the hypnotic technique and introducing free associations. It is of no great importance in any case whether the history of psycho-analysis is reckoned as beginning with the cathartic method or with my modification of it; I refer to this uninteresting point merely because certain opponents of psycho-analysis have a habit of occasionally recollecting that after all the art of psycho-analysis was not invented by me, but by Breuer. This only happens, of course, if their views allow them to find something in it deserving attention; if they set no such limits to their rejection of it, psycho-analysis is always without question my work alone. I have never heard that Breuer's great share in psycho-analysis has earned him a proportionate measure of criticism and abuse. As I have long recognized that to stir up contradiction and arouse bitterness is the inevitable fate of psycho-analysis, I have come to the conclusion that I must be the true originator of all that is particularly characteristic in it. I am happy to be able to add that none of the efforts to minimize my part in creating this much-abused analysis have ever come from Breuer himself or could claim any support from him.

Breuer's discoveries have so often been described that I can dispense with discussing them in detail here. These were the fundamental fact that the symptoms of hysterical patients are founded upon scenes in their past lives which have made a great impression on them but have been forgotten (traumas); the therapy founded upon this, which consisted in causing them to remember and reproduce these experiences in a state of hypnosis (catharsis); and the fragment of theory inferred from it, which was that these symptoms represented an abnormal employment of amounts of excitation which had not been disposed of (conversion). Whenever Breuer, in his theoretical contribution to the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), referred to this process of conver-

sion, he always added my name in brackets after it,¹ as though the priority for this first attempt at theoretical evaluation belonged to me. I believe that actually this distinction relates only to the name, and that the conception came to us simultaneously and together.

It is well known, too, that after Breuer made his first discovery of the cathartic method he let it rest for a number of years, and only took it up again at my instigation, on my return from my studies under Charcot.² He had a large consulting practice in medicine which made great claims on him; I myself had only unwillingly taken up the profession of medicine, but I had at that time a strong motive for helping people suffering from nervous affections or at least for wishing to understand something about their states. I had embarked upon physical therapy, and had felt absolutely helpless after the disappointing results from my study of Erb's *Elektrotherapie* [1882], which put forward such a number of indications and recommendations. If I did not at the time arrive on my own account at the conclusion which Möbius established later, that the successes of electrical treatment in nervous patients are the effects of suggestion, there is no doubt that only the total absence of these promised successes was to blame. Treatment by suggestion during deep hypnosis, which I learned from Liébeault's and Bernheim's highly impressive demonstrations,³ then seemed to offer a satisfactory substitute for the failure of electrical treatment. But the practice of *investigating* patients in a state of hypnosis, with which Breuer made me acquainted—a practice which combined an automatic mode of operation with the satisfaction of scientific curiosity—was bound to be incomparably more attractive than the monotonous, forcible prohibitions used in treatment by suggestion, prohibitions which stood in the way of all research.

¹ [There seems to be some mistake here. In the course of Breuer's contribution he uses the term 'conversion' (or its derivatives) at least fifteen times. But only once (the first time he uses it, *Standard Ed.*, 2, 206) does he add Freud's name in brackets. It seems possible that Freud saw some preliminary version of Breuer's manuscript and dissuaded him from adding his name more than once in the printed book. The first published use of the term was before the *Studies on Hysteria*, in Freud's first paper on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894a).]

² [Freud worked at the Salpêtrière in Paris during the winter of 1885-6. See his 'Report on my Studies' (1956a [1886]).]

³ [Freud spent some weeks at Nancy in 1889.]

We have recently received a piece of advice, purporting to represent one of the latest developments of psycho-analysis, to the effect that the current conflict and the exciting cause of illness are to be brought into the foreground in analysis.¹ Now this is exactly what Breuer and I used to do at the beginning of our work with the cathartic method. We led the patient's attention directly to the traumatic scene in which the symptom had arisen, and we endeavoured to discover the mental conflict in that scene and to release the suppressed affect in it. In the course of this we discovered the mental process, characteristic of the neuroses, which I later named 'regression'. The patient's associations moved back from the scene which we were trying to elucidate to earlier experiences, and compelled the analysis, which was supposed to correct the present, to occupy itself with the past. This regression led constantly further backwards; at first it seemed regularly to bring us to puberty; later on, failures and points which still eluded explanation drew the analytic work still further back into years of childhood which had hitherto been inaccessible to any kind of exploration. This regressive direction became an important characteristic of analysis. It appeared that psycho-analysis could explain nothing belonging to the present without referring back to something past; indeed, that every pathogenic experience implied a previous experience which, though not in itself pathogenic, had yet endowed the later one with its pathogenic quality. The temptation to confine one's attention to the known present exciting cause was so strong, however, that even in later analyses I gave way to it. In the analysis of the patient I named 'Dora' [1905e], carried out in 1899,² I had knowledge of the scene which occasioned the outbreak of the current illness. I tried innumerable times to submit this experience to analysis, but even direct demands always failed to produce from her anything more than the same meagre and incomplete description of it. Not until a long détour, leading back over her earliest childhood, had been made, did a dream present itself which on analysis brought to her mind the hitherto forgotten details of this scene, so that a comprehension and a solution of the current conflict became possible.

This one example shows how very misleading is the advice

¹ [Cf. below, p. 63.]

² [This is a slip for '1900'. See *Standard Ed.*, 7, 5.]

referred to above, and what a degree of scientific regression is represented by the neglect of regression in analytic technique which is thus recommended to us.

The first difference between Breuer and myself came to light on a question concerning the finer psychical mechanism of hysteria. He gave preference to a theory which was still to some extent physiological, as one might say; he tried to explain the mental splitting in hysterical patients by the absence of communication between various mental states ('states of consciousness', as we called them at that time), and he therefore constructed the theory of 'hypnoid states', the products of which were supposed to penetrate into 'waking consciousness' like unassimilated foreign bodies. I had taken the matter less scientifically; everywhere I seemed to discern motives and tendencies analogous to those of everyday life, and I looked upon psychical splitting itself as an effect of a process of repelling which at that time I called 'defence', and later, 'repression'.¹ I made a shortlived attempt to allow the two mechanisms a separate existence side by side, but as observation showed me always and only one thing, it was not long before my 'defence' theory took up its stand opposite his 'hypnoid' one.

I am quite sure, however, that this opposition between our views had nothing to do with the breach in our relations which followed shortly after. This had deeper causes, but it came about in such a way that at first I did not understand it; it was only later that I learnt from many clear indications how to interpret it. It will be remembered that Breuer said of his famous first patient that the element of sexuality was astonishingly undeveloped in her ² and had contributed nothing to the very rich clinical picture of the case. I have always wondered why the critics did not more often cite this assertion of Breuer's as an argument against my contention of a sexual aetiology in the neuroses, and even to-day I do not know whether I ought to regard the omission as evidence of tact or of carelessness on their part. Anyone who reads the history of Breuer's case now in the light of the knowledge gained in the last twenty years will at

¹ [In his *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926d). Freud revived the term 'defence' to express a general concept of which 'repression' would denote a sub-species.]

² [See the second paragraph of his case history of Anna O. in Breuer and Freud (1895), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 21.]

once perceive the symbolism in it—the snakes, the stiffening, the paralysis of the arm—and, on taking into account the situation at the bedside of the young woman's sick father, will easily guess the real interpretation of her symptoms; his opinion of the part played by sexuality in her mental life will therefore be very different from that of her doctor. In his treatment of her case, Breuer was able to make use of a very intense suggestive *rapprochement* with the patient, which may serve us as a complete prototype of what we call 'transference' to-day. Now I have strong reasons for suspecting that after all her symptoms had been relieved Breuer must have discovered from further indications the sexual motivation of this transference, but that the universal nature of this unexpected phenomenon escaped him, with the result that, as though confronted by an 'unforward event',¹ he broke off all further investigation. He never said this to me in so many words, but he told me enough at different times to justify this reconstruction of what happened. When I later began more and more resolutely to put forward the significance of sexuality in the aetiology of neuroses, he was the first to show the reaction of distaste and repudiation which was later to become so familiar to me, but which at that time I had not yet learnt to recognize as my inevitable fate.²

The fact of the emergence of the transference in its crudely sexual form, whether affectionate or hostile, in every treatment of a neurosis, although this is neither desired nor induced by either doctor or patient, has always seemed to me the most irrefragable proof that the source of the driving forces of neurosis lies in sexual life. This argument has never received anything approaching the degree of attention that it merits, for if it had, investigations in this field would leave no other conclusion open. As far as I am concerned, this argument has remained the decisive one, over and above the more specific findings of analytic work.

There was some consolation for the bad reception accorded to my contention of a sexual aetiology in the neuroses even by my more intimate circle of friends—for a vacuum rapidly

¹ [In English in the original. A fuller account of this will be found in the first volume of Ernest Jones's biography (1953, 246 f.).]

² [A discussion of Freud's relations with Breuer will be found in the Editor's Introduction to Volume II of the *Standard Edition*.]

formed itself about my person—in the thought that I was taking up the fight for a new and original idea. But, one day, certain memories gathered in my mind which disturbed this pleasing notion, but which gave me in exchange a valuable insight into the processes of human creative activity and the nature of human knowledge. The idea for which I was being made responsible had by no means originated with me. It had been imparted to me by three people whose opinion had commanded my deepest respect—by Breuer himself, by Charcot, and by Chrobak, the gynaecologist at the University, perhaps the most eminent of all our Vienna physicians.¹ These three men had all communicated to me a piece of knowledge which, strictly speaking, they themselves did not possess. Two of them later denied having done so when I reminded them of the fact; the third (the great Charcot) would probably have done the same if it had been granted me to see him again. But these three identical opinions, which I had heard without understanding, had lain dormant in my mind for years, until one day they awoke in the form of an apparently original discovery.

One day, when I was a young house-physician, I was walking across the town with Breuer, when a man came up who evidently wanted to speak to him urgently. I fell behind. As soon as Breuer was free, he told me in his friendly, instructive way that this man was the husband of a patient of his and had brought him some news of her. The wife, he added, was behaving in such a peculiar way in society that she had been brought to him for treatment as a nervous case. He concluded: 'These things are always *secrets d'alcôve*!' I asked him in astonishment what he meant, and he answered by explaining the word *alcôve* ('marriage-bed') to me, for he failed to realize how extraordinary the *matter* of his statement seemed to me.

Some years later, at one of Charcot's evening receptions, I happened to be standing near the great teacher at a moment when he appeared to be telling Brouardel² a very interesting

¹ [Rudolf Chrobak (1843–1910) was Professor of Gynaecology at Vienna from 1880–1908.]

² [P. C. H. Brouardel (1837–1906) was appointed Professor of Forensic Medicine in Paris in 1879. Freud mentions him appreciatively in his 'Report on my Studies in Paris and Berlin' (1956a [1886]) and also in his preface to Bourke's *Scatalogic Rites of all Nations* (Freud, 1913k).]

story about something that had happened during his day's work. I hardly heard the beginning, but gradually my attention was seized by what he was talking of: a young married couple from a distant country in the East—the woman a severe sufferer, the man either impotent or exceedingly awkward. '*Tâchez donc,*' I heard Charcot repeating, '*je vous assure, vous y arriverez.*'¹ Brouardel, who spoke less loudly, must have expressed his astonishment that symptoms like the wife's could have been produced by such circumstances. For Charcot suddenly broke out with great animation: '*Mais, dans des cas pareils c'est toujours la chose génitale, toujours . . . toujours . . . toujours*';² and he crossed his arms over his stomach, hugging himself and jumping up and down on his toes several times in his own characteristically lively way. I know that for a moment I was almost paralysed with amazement and said to myself: 'Well, but if he knows that, why does he never say so?' But the impression was soon forgotten; brain anatomy and the experimental induction of hysterical paralyses absorbed all my interest.

A year later, I had begun my medical career in Vienna as a lecturer in nervous diseases, and in everything relating to the aetiology of the neuroses I was still as ignorant and innocent as one could expect of a promising student trained at a university. One day I had a friendly message from Chrobak, asking me to take a woman patient of his to whom he could not give enough time, owing to his new appointment as a University teacher. I arrived at the patient's house before he did and found that she was suffering from attacks of meaningless anxiety, and could only be soothed by the most precise information about where her doctor was at every moment of the day. When Chrobak arrived he took me aside and told me that the patient's anxiety was due to the fact that although she had been married for eighteen years she was still *virgo intacta*. The husband was absolutely impotent. In such cases, he said, there was nothing for a medical man to do but to shield this domestic misfortune with his own reputation, and put up with it if people shrugged their shoulders and said of him: 'He's no good if he can't cure her after so many years.' The sole prescription for such a

¹ ['Go on trying! I promise you, you'll succeed.']

² ['But in this sort of case it's always a question of the genitals—always, always, always.']

malady, he added, is familiar enough to us, but we cannot order it. It runs:

‘R. Penis normalis
dosim
repetatur!’

I had never heard of such a prescription, and felt inclined to shake my head over my kind friend’s cynicism.

I have not of course disclosed the illustrious parentage of this scandalous idea in order to saddle other people with the responsibility for it. I am well aware that it is one thing to give utterance to an idea once or twice in the form of a passing *aperçu*, and quite another to mean it seriously—to take it literally and pursue it in the face of every contradictory detail, and to win it a place among accepted truths. It is the difference between a casual flirtation and a legal marriage with all its duties and difficulties. ‘*Épouser les idées de . . .*’¹ is no uncommon figure of speech, at any rate in French.

Among the other new factors which were added to the cathartic procedure as a result of my work and which transformed it into psycho-analysis, I may mention in particular the theory of repression and resistance, the recognition of infantile sexuality, and the interpreting and exploiting of dreams as a source of knowledge of the unconscious.

The theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source; I know of no outside impression which might have suggested it to me, and for a long time I imagined it to be entirely original, until Otto Rank (1911a) showed us a passage in Schopenhauer’s *World as Will and Idea* in which the philosopher seeks to give an explanation of insanity. What he says there about the struggle against accepting a distressing piece of reality coincides with my concept of repression so completely that once again I owe the chance of making a discovery to my not being well-read. Yet others have read the passage and passed it by without making this discovery, and perhaps the same would have happened to me if in my young days I had had more taste for reading philosophical works. In later years I have denied myself the very great pleasure of reading the works of Nietzsche, with the deliberate object of not

¹ [‘To espouse an idea.’]

being hampered in working out the impressions received in psycho-analysis by any sort of anticipatory ideas. I had therefore to be prepared—and I am so, gladly—to forgo all claims to priority in the many instances in which laborious psycho-analytic investigation can merely confirm the truths which the philosopher recognized by intuition.¹

The theory of repression is the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests. It is the most essential part of it; and yet it is nothing but a theoretical formulation of a phenomenon which may be observed as often as one pleases if one undertakes an analysis of a neurotic without resorting to hypnosis. In such cases one comes across a resistance which opposes the work of analysis and in order to frustrate it pleads a failure of memory. The use of hypnosis was bound to hide this resistance; the history of psycho-analysis proper, therefore, only begins with the new technique that dispenses with hypnosis. The theoretical consideration of the fact that this resistance coincides with an amnesia leads inevitably to the view of unconscious mental activity which is peculiar to psycho-analysis and which, too, distinguishes it quite clearly from philosophical speculations about the unconscious. It may thus be said that the theory of psycho-analysis is an attempt to account for two striking and unexpected facts of observation which emerge whenever an attempt is made to trace the symptoms of a neurotic back to their sources in his past life: the facts of transference and of resistance. Any line of investigation which recognizes these two facts and takes them as the starting-point of its work has a right to call itself psycho-analysis, even though it arrives at results other than my own. But anyone who takes up other sides of the problem while avoiding these two hypotheses will hardly escape a charge of misappropriation of property by attempted impersonation, if he persists in calling himself a psycho-analyst.

If anyone sought to place the theory of repression and resis-

¹ [Other instances of the anticipation of Freud's ideas are discussed by him in his 'Note on the Prehistory of the Technique of Analysis' (1920*b*). See also the remarks on Popper-Lynkeus below (p. 20).—The possibility that Freud derived the term 'repression' indirectly from the early nineteenth-century philosopher Herbart is discussed by Ernest Jones (1953, 407 ff.). Cf. the Editor's Note to the paper on repression, below, p. 143.]

tance among the *premisses* instead of the *findings* of psychoanalysis, I should oppose him most emphatically. Such premisses of a general psychological and biological nature do exist, and it would be useful to consider them on some other occasion; but the theory of repression is a product of psycho-analytic work, a theoretical inference legitimately drawn from innumerable observations.

Another product of this sort was the hypothesis of infantile sexuality. This, however, was made at a much later date. In the early days of tentative investigation by analysis no such thing was thought of. At first it was merely observed that the effects of present-day experiences had to be traced back to something in the past. But enquirers often find more than they bargain for. One was drawn further and further back into the past; one hoped at last to be able to stop at puberty, the period in which the sexual impulses are traditionally supposed to awake. But in vain; the tracks led still further back into childhood and into its earlier years. On the way, a mistaken idea had to be overcome which might have been almost fatal to the young science. Influenced by Charcot's view of the traumatic origin of hysteria, one was readily inclined to accept as true and aetiologically significant the statements made by patients in which they ascribed their symptoms to passive sexual experiences in the first years of childhood—to put it bluntly, to seduction. When this aetiology broke down under the weight of its own improbability and contradiction in definitely ascertainable circumstances, the result at first was helpless bewilderment. Analysis had led back to these infantile sexual traumas by the right path, and yet they were not true. The firm ground of reality was gone. At that time I would gladly have given up the whole work, just as my esteemed predecessor, Breuer, had done when he made his unwelcome discovery. Perhaps I persevered only because I no longer had any choice and could not then begin again at anything else. At last came the reflection that, after all, one had no right to despair because one has been deceived in one's expectations; one must revise those expectations. If hysterical subjects trace back their symptoms to traumas that are fictitious, then the new fact which emerges is precisely that they create such scenes in *phantasy*, and this psychical reality requires to be taken into account alongside

practical reality. This reflection was soon followed by the discovery that these phantasies were intended to cover up the autoerotic activity of the first years of childhood, to embellish it and raise it to a higher plane. And now, from behind the phantasies, the whole range of a child's sexual life came to light.¹

With this sexual activity of the first years of childhood the inherited constitution of the individual also came into its own. Disposition and experience are here linked up in an indissoluble aetiological unity. For *disposition* exaggerates impressions which would otherwise have been completely commonplace and have had no effect, so that they become traumas giving rise to stimulations and fixations; while *experiences* awaken factors in the disposition which, without them, might have long remained dormant and perhaps never have developed. The last word on the subject of traumatic aetiology was spoken later by Abraham [1907], when he pointed out that the sexual constitution which is peculiar to children is precisely calculated to provoke sexual experiences of a particular kind—namely traumas.

In the beginning, my statements about infantile sexuality were founded almost exclusively on the findings of analysis in adults which led back into the past. I had no opportunity of direct observations on children. It was therefore a very great triumph when it became possible years later to confirm almost all my inferences by direct observation and the analysis of very young children—a triumph that lost some of its magnitude as one gradually realized that the nature of the discovery was such that one should really be ashamed of having had to make it. The further one carried these observations on children, the more self-evident the facts became; but the more astonishing, too, did it become that one had taken so much trouble to overlook them.

Such a certain conviction of the existence and importance of infantile sexuality can, however, only be obtained by the method of analysis, by pursuing the symptoms and peculiarities of neurotics back to their ultimate sources, the discovery of

¹ [Freud's contemporary account of this rectification of his theory will be found in his letter to Fliess of September 21, 1897 (1950a, Letter 69). His first explicit published acknowledgement of it was made almost ten years later in a paper on sexuality in the neuroses (1906a), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 275. Cf. also the Editor's Note to the *Three Essays* (1905d), *ibid.*, 127 ff.]

which then explains whatever is explicable in them and enables whatever is modifiable to be changed. I can understand that one would arrive at different results if, as C. G. Jung has recently done, one first forms a theoretical conception of the nature of the sexual instinct and then seeks to explain the life of children on that basis. A conception of this kind is bound to be selected arbitrarily or in accordance with irrelevant considerations, and runs the risk of proving inadequate for the field to which one is seeking to apply it. It is true that the analytic method, too, leads to certain ultimate difficulties and obscurities in regard to sexuality and its relation to the total life of the individual. But these problems cannot be got rid of by speculation; they must await solution through other observations or through observations in other fields.

I need say little about the interpretation of dreams. It came as the first-fruits of the technical innovation I had adopted when, following a dim presentiment, I decided to replace hypnosis by free association. My desire for knowledge had not at the start been directed towards understanding dreams. I do not know of any outside influence which drew my interest to them or inspired me with any helpful expectations. Before Breuer and I ceased to meet I only just had time to tell him in a single sentence that I now understood how to translate dreams. Since this was how the discovery came about, it followed that the *symbolism* in the language of dreams was almost the last thing to become accessible to me, for the dreamer's associations help very little towards understanding symbols. I have held fast to the habit of always studying things themselves before looking for information about them in books, and therefore I was able to establish the symbolism of dreams for myself before I was led to it by Scherner's work on the subject [1861]. It was only later that I came to appreciate to its full extent this mode of expression of dreams. This was partly through the influence of the works of Stekel, who at first did such very creditable work but afterwards went totally astray.¹ The close connection between psycho-analytic dream-interpretation and the art of interpreting dreams as practised and held in such high esteem in

¹ [A longer discussion of Stekel's influence is contained in a passage added by Freud in 1925 to the section on symbolism, Chapter VI (E), in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 350-1.]

antiquity only became clear to me much later. Later on I found the essential characteristic and most important part of my dream theory—the derivation of dream-distortion from an internal conflict, a kind of inner dishonesty—in a writer who was ignorant, it is true, of medicine, though not of philosophy, the famous engineer J. Popper, who published his *Phantasien eines Realisten* [1899] under the name of Lynkeus.¹

The interpretation of dreams became a solace and a support to me in those arduous first years of analysis, when I had to master the technique, clinical phenomena and therapy of the neuroses all at the same time. At that period I was completely isolated and in the network of problems and accumulation of difficulties I often dreaded losing my bearings and also my confidence. There were often patients with whom an unaccountably long time elapsed before my hypothesis, that a neurosis was bound to become intelligible through analysis, proved true; but these patients' dreams, which might be regarded as analogues of their symptoms, almost always confirmed the hypothesis.

It was only my success in this direction that enabled me to persevere. The result is that I have acquired a habit of gauging the measure of a psychologist's understanding by his attitude to dream-interpretation; and I have observed with satisfaction that most of the opponents of psycho-analysis avoid this field altogether or else display remarkable clumsiness if they attempt to deal with it. Moreover, I soon saw the necessity of carrying out a self-analysis, and this I did with the help of a series of my own dreams which led me back through all the events of my childhood; and I am still of the opinion to-day that this kind of analysis may suffice for anyone who is a good dreamer and not too abnormal.²

I think that by thus unrolling the story of the development of psycho-analysis I have shown what it is, better than by a

¹ [See Freud's two papers on this, 1923*f* and 1932*c*.—The word 'famous' in this sentence was added in 1924.]

² [Freud's contemporary account of important parts of his self-analysis will be found in the Fliess correspondence (1950*a*), particularly in Letters 70 and 71, written in October, 1897.—He did not always take such a favourable view of self-analysis as in the text above. For instance, in a letter to Fliess of November 14, 1897 (1950*a*, Letter 75), he wrote: 'My self-analysis is still interrupted and I have realized the

systematic description of it. I did not at first perceive the peculiar nature of what I had discovered. I unhesitatingly sacrificed my growing popularity as a doctor, and the increase in attendance during my consulting hours, by making a systematic enquiry into the sexual factors involved in the causation of my patients' neuroses; and this brought me a great many new facts which finally confirmed my conviction of the practical importance of the sexual factor. I innocently addressed a meeting of the Vienna Society for Psychiatry and Neurology with Krafft-Ebing¹ in the chair [cf. Freud, 1896c], expecting that the material losses I had willingly undergone would be made up for by the interest and recognition of my colleagues. I treated my discoveries as ordinary contributions to science and hoped they would be received in the same spirit. But the silence which my communications met with, the void which formed itself about me, the hints that were conveyed to me, gradually made me realize that assertions on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses cannot count upon meeting with the same kind of treatment as other communications. I understood that from now onwards I was one of those who have 'disturbed the sleep of the world', as Hebbel says,² and that I could not

reason. I can only analyse myself with the help of knowledge obtained objectively (like an outsider). Genuine self-analysis is impossible; otherwise there would be no [neurotic] illness. Since I still find some puzzles in my patients, they are bound to hold me up in my self-analysis.' Similarly, near the end of his life, in a short note on a parapraxis (1935b), he remarked in passing: 'In self-analysis the danger of incompleteness is particularly great. One is too soon satisfied with a part explanation, behind which resistance may easily be keeping back something that is more important perhaps.' Against these may be set the cautiously appreciative words which he prefaced to a paper by E. Pickworth Farrow (1926) giving the findings of a self-analysis (Freud, 1926c). In the case of *training* analyses at all events, he speaks strongly in favour of the need for analysis by some other person—for instance, in one of his papers on technique written not long before the present paper (1912e) and again in the very much later 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937c).]

¹ [R. von Krafft-Ebing (1840–1903) was Professor of Psychiatry at Strasbourg 1872–3, at Graz 1873–89, where he also directed the provincial mental hospital, and at Vienna 1889–1902. He was also distinguished for his work on criminology, neurology and psychopathia sexualis.]

² [A reference to Kandaules' words to Gyges in Hebbel's *Gyges und sein Ring*, Act V, Scene 1.]

reckon upon objectivity and tolerance. Since, however, my conviction of the general accuracy of my observations and conclusions grew even stronger, and since neither my confidence in my own judgement nor my moral courage were precisely small, the outcome of the situation could not be in doubt. I made up my mind to believe that it had been my fortune to discover some particularly important facts and connections, and I was prepared to accept the fate that sometimes accompanies such discoveries.

I pictured the future as follows:—I should probably succeed in maintaining myself by means of the therapeutic success of the new procedure, but science would ignore me entirely during my lifetime; some decades later, someone else would infallibly come upon the same things—for which the time was not now ripe—would achieve recognition for them and bring me honour as a forerunner whose failure had been inevitable. Meanwhile, like Robinson Crusoe, I settled down as comfortably as possible on my desert island. When I look back to those lonely years, away from the pressures and confusions of to-day, it seems like a glorious heroic age. My 'splendid isolation' ¹ was not without its advantages and charms. I did not have to read any publications, nor listen to any ill-informed opponents; I was not subject to influence from any quarter; there was nothing to hustle me. I learnt to restrain speculative tendencies and to follow the unforgotten advice of my master, Charcot: to look at the same things again and again until they themselves begin to speak. ² My publications, which I was able to place with a little trouble, could always lag far behind my knowledge, and could be postponed as long as I pleased, since there was no doubtful 'priority' to be defended. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for instance, was finished in all essentials at the beginning of 1896 ³ but was not written out until the summer of 1899. The analysis of 'Dora' was over at the end of 1899 [1900]; ⁴ the case history was written in the next two weeks, but was not published until 1905. Meanwhile my writings were not reviewed in the medical journals, or, if as an exception they *were* reviewed, they were dismissed with

¹ [In English in the original.]

² [The sentence appears, in slightly different words, in Freud's obituary of Charcot (1893f).]

³ [See, however, the Editor's Introduction to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, xiv ff.]

⁴ [See footnote 2, p. 10.]

expressions of scornful or pitying superiority. Occasionally a colleague would make some reference to me in one of his publications; it would be very short and not at all flattering—words such as ‘eccentric’, ‘extreme’, or ‘very peculiar’ would be used. It once happened that an assistant at the clinic in Vienna where I gave my University lectures asked me for permission to attend the course. He listened very attentively and said nothing; after the last lecture was over he offered to join me outside. As we walked away, he told me that with his chief’s knowledge he had written a book combating my views; he regretted very much, however, that he had not first learnt more about them from my lectures, for in that case he would have written much of it differently. He had indeed enquired at the clinic whether he had not better first read *The Interpretation of Dreams*, but had been advised against doing so—it was not worth the trouble. He then himself compared the structure of my theory, so far as he now understood it, with that of the Catholic Church as regards its internal solidity. In the interests of the salvation of his soul, I shall assume that this remark implied a certain amount of appreciation. But he concluded by saying that it was too late to alter anything in his book, since it was already in print. Nor did my colleague think it necessary later to make any public avowal of his change of views on the subject of psycho-analysis; but preferred, in his capacity as a regular reviewer for a medical journal, to follow its development with flippant comments.¹

Whatever personal sensitiveness I possessed became blunted during those years, to my advantage. I was saved from becoming embittered, however, by a circumstance which is not always present to help lonely discoverers. Such people are as a rule tormented by the need to account for the lack of sympathy or the aversion of their contemporaries, and feel this attitude as a distressing contradiction of the security of their own sense of conviction. There was no need for me to feel so; for psycho-analytic theory enabled me to understand this attitude in my contemporaries and to see it as a necessary consequence of fundamental analytic premisses. If it was true that the set of facts I had discovered were kept from the knowledge of patients themselves by internal resistances of an affective kind, then these resistances would be bound to appear in healthy people too, as

¹ [A sequel to this anecdote will be found at the beginning of Section V of Freud’s *Autobiographical Study* (1925d).]

soon as some external source confronted them with what was repressed. It was not surprising that they should be able to justify this rejection of my ideas on intellectual grounds though it was actually affective in origin. The same thing happened equally often with patients; the arguments they advanced were the same and were not precisely brilliant. In Falstaff's words, reasons are 'as plenty as blackberries'.¹ The only difference was that with patients one was in a position to bring pressure to bear on them so as to induce them to get insight into their resistances and overcome them, whereas one had to do without this advantage in dealing with people who were ostensibly healthy. How to compel these healthy people to examine the matter in a cool and scientifically objective spirit was an unsolved problem which was best left to time to clear up. In the history of science one can clearly see that often the very proposition which has at first called out nothing but contradiction has later come to be accepted, although no new proofs in support of it have been brought forward.

It was hardly to be expected, however, that during the years when I alone represented psycho-analysis I should develop any particular respect for the world's opinion or any bias towards intellectual appeasement.

¹ [*I Henry IV*, ii, 4.]

II

From the year 1902 onwards, a number of young doctors gathered round me with the express intention of learning, practising and spreading the knowledge of psycho-analysis. The stimulus came from a colleague who had himself experienced the beneficial effects of analytic therapy.¹ Regular meetings took place on certain evenings at my house, discussions were held according to certain rules and the participants endeavoured to find their bearings in this new and strange field of research and to interest others in it. One day a young man who had passed through a technical training college introduced himself with a manuscript which showed very unusual comprehension. We persuaded him to go through the *Gymnasium* [Secondary School] and the University and to devote himself to the non-medical side of psycho-analysis. The little society acquired in him a zealous and dependable secretary and I gained in Otto Rank a most loyal helper and co-worker.²

The small circle soon expanded, and in the course of the next few years often changed its composition. On the whole I could tell myself that it was hardly inferior, in wealth and variety of talent, to the staff of any clinical teacher one could think of. It included from the beginning the men who were later to play such a considerable, if not always a welcome, part in the history of the psycho-analytic movement. At that time, however, one could not yet guess at these developments. I had every reason to be satisfied, and I think I did everything possible to impart my own knowledge and experience to the others. There were only two inauspicious circumstances which at last estranged me inwardly from the group. I could not succeed in establishing among its members the friendly relations that ought to obtain between men who are all engaged upon the same difficult work; nor was I able to stifle the disputes about priority for which there were so many opportunities under these conditions of work in common. The difficulties in the way of giving

¹ [Wilhelm Stekel.]

² [Footnote added 1924:] Now director of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag [International Psycho-Analytical Publishing House, see *Standard Ed.*, 17, 267-8] and editor of the *Zeitschrift* and *Imago* from their inception [see below, p. 47].

instruction in the practice of psycho-analysis, which are quite particularly great and are responsible for much in the present dissensions, were evident already in this private Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society. I myself did not venture to put forward a still unfinished technique and a theory still in the making with an authority which would probably have enabled the others to avoid some wrong turnings and ultimate disasters. The self-reliance of intellectual workers, their early independence of their teacher, is always gratifying from a psychological point of view; but it is only of advantage to science if those workers fulfil certain personal conditions which are none too common. For psycho-analysis in particular a long and severe discipline and training in self-discipline would have been required. In view of the courage displayed by their devotion to a subject so much frowned upon and so poor in prospects, I was disposed to tolerate much among the members to which I should otherwise have made objection. Besides doctors, the circle included others—men of education who had recognized something important in psycho-analysis: writers, painters and so on. My *Interpretation of Dreams* and my book on jokes, among others, had shown from the beginning that the theories of psycho-analysis cannot be restricted to the medical field, but are capable of application to a variety of other mental sciences.

In 1907 the situation changed all at once and contrary to all expectations. It appeared that psycho-analysis had unobtrusively awakened interest and gained friends, and that there were even some scientific workers who were ready to acknowledge it. A communication from Bleuler¹ had informed me before this that my works had been studied and made use of in the Burghölzli. In January 1907, the first member of the Zurich clinic came to Vienna—Dr. Eitingon.² Other visits followed, which led to an animated exchange of ideas. Finally, on the invitation of C. G. Jung, at that time still assistant physician at the Burghölzli, a first meeting took place at Salzburg in the spring of 1908, which brought together friends of psycho-analysis from Vienna, Zurich and other places. One of the

¹ [Eugen Bleuler (1857–1939), the well-known psychiatrist, then head of the Burghölzli, the public mental hospital at Zurich.]

² [Footnote added 1924:] The subsequent founder of the 'Psycho-Analytic Policlinic' in Berlin. [See two short notes on this by Freud (1923g and 1930b).]

results of this first Psycho-Analytical Congress was the founding of a periodical called the *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen* [see below, p. 46], under the direction of Bleuler and Freud and edited by Jung, which first appeared in 1909. This publication gave expression to an intimate co-operation between Vienna and Zurich.

I have repeatedly acknowledged with gratitude the great services rendered by the Zurich School of Psychiatry in the spread of psycho-analysis, particularly by Bleuler and Jung, and I have no hesitation in doing so again, even in the greatly altered circumstances of the present. True, it was not the support of the Zurich School which first directed the attention of the scientific world to psycho-analysis at that time. What had happened was that the latency period had expired and everywhere psycho-analysis was becoming the object of ever-increasing interest. But in all other places this accession of interest at first produced nothing but a very emphatic repudiation, mostly a quite passionate one; whereas in Zurich, on the contrary, agreement on general lines was the dominant note. Moreover, nowhere else did such a compact little group of adherents exist, or could a public clinic be placed at the service of psycho-analytic researches, or was there a clinical teacher who included psycho-analytic theories as an integral part of his psychiatric course. The Zurich group thus became the nucleus of the small band who were fighting for the recognition of analysis. The only opportunity of learning the new art and working at it in practice lay there. Most of my followers and co-workers at the present time came to me by way of Zurich, even those who were geographically much nearer to Vienna than to Switzerland. In relation to Western Europe, which contains the great centres of our culture, the position of Vienna is an outlying one; and its prestige has for many years been affected by strong prejudices. Representatives of all the most important nations congregate in Switzerland, where intellectual activity is so lively; a focus of infection there was bound to be of great importance for the spread of the 'psychical epidemic', as Hoche of Freiburg has called it.¹

¹ [Alfred Hoche (b. 1865), Professor of Psychiatry at Freiburg, was particularly vehement and abusive in his attacks on psycho-analysis. He read a paper on it at a medical congress at Baden-Baden with the title 'A Psychical Epidemic among Doctors'. (Hoche, 1910.)]

According to the evidence of a colleague who witnessed developments at the Burghölzli, it appears that psycho-analysis awakened interest there very early. In Jung's work on occult phenomena, published in 1902, there was already an allusion to my book on dream-interpretation. From 1903 or 1904, says my informant, psycho-analysis was in the forefront of interest. After personal relations between Vienna and Zurich had been established, an informal society was also started, in the middle of 1907, in the Burghölzli, where the problems of psycho-analysis were discussed at regular meetings. In the alliance between the Vienna and Zurich schools the Swiss were by no means mere recipients. They had already produced very creditable scientific work, the results of which were of service to psycho-analysis. The association experiments started by the Wundt School had been interpreted by them in a psycho-analytic sense, and had proved applicable in unexpected ways. By this means it had become possible to arrive at rapid experimental confirmation of psycho-analytic observations and to demonstrate directly to students certain connections which an analyst would only have been able to tell them about. The first bridge linking up experimental psychology with psycho-analysis had been built.

In psycho-analytic treatment, association experiments enable a provisional, qualitative analysis of the case to be made, but they furnish no essential contribution to the technique and can be dispensed with in carrying out analyses. More important, however, was another achievement by the Zurich school, or its leaders, Bleuler and Jung. The former showed that light could be thrown on a large number of purely psychiatric cases by adducing the same processes as have been recognized through psycho-analysis to obtain in dreams and neuroses (Freudian mechanisms); and Jung [1907] successfully applied the analytic method of interpretation to the most alien and obscure phenomena of dementia praecox [schizophrenia], so that their sources in the life-history and interests of the patient came clearly to light. After this it was impossible for psychiatrists to ignore psycho-analysis any longer. Bleuler's great work on schizophrenia (1911), in which the psycho-analytic point of view was placed on an equal footing with the clinical systematic one, completed this success.

I will not omit to point out a divergence which was already

at that time noticeable in the direction taken by the work of the two schools. As early as in 1897 ¹ I had published the analysis of a case of schizophrenia, which however was of a paranoid character, so that the solution of it could not take away from the impression made by Jung's analyses. But to me the important point had been, not so much the possibility of interpreting the symptoms, as the psychical mechanism of the disease, and above all the agreement of this mechanism with that of hysteria, which had already been discovered. At that time no light had yet been thrown on the differences between the two mechanisms. For I was then already aiming at a libido theory of the neuroses, which was to explain all neurotic and psychotic phenomena as proceeding from abnormal vicissitudes of the libido, that is, as diversions from its normal employment. This point of view was missed by the Swiss investigators. As far as I know, even to-day Bleuler maintains the view that the various forms of dementia praecox have an organic causation; and at the Salzburg Congress in 1908 Jung, whose book on this disease had appeared in 1907, supported the toxic theory of its causation, which takes no account of the libido theory, although it is true that it does not rule it out. Later on (1912) he came to grief on this same point, by making too much of the material which he had previously refused to employ.

There is a third contribution made by the Swiss School, probably to be ascribed entirely to Jung, which I do not value so highly as others do whose concern with these matters is more remote. I refer to the theory of 'complexes' which grew out of the *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien* [*Studies in Word-Association*] (1906). It has neither itself produced a psychological theory, nor has it proved capable of easy incorporation into the context of psycho-analytic theory. The word 'complex', on the other hand, has become naturalized, so to speak, in psycho-analytic language; it is a convenient and often indispensable term for summing up a psychological state descriptively.² None of the other

¹ [This wrong date appears in all the German editions. The case was published in May, 1896. It occupies Section III of Freud's second paper on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1896b).]

² [Freud seems to have first borrowed the term from Jung in a paper on evidence in legal proceedings (1906c). He himself, however, had used the word in what seems a very similar sense long before, in a footnote to the case of Frau Emmy von N. in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 69 *Ed.*, 2, 69 n.]

terms coined by psycho-analysis for its own needs has achieved such widespread popularity or been so misapplied to the detriment of the construction of clearer concepts. Analysts began to speak among themselves of a 'return of a complex' where they meant a 'return of the repressed', or fell into the habit of saying 'I have a complex against him', where the only correct expression would have been 'a resistance against him'.

In the years following 1907, when the schools of Vienna and Zurich were united, psycho-analysis made the extraordinary surge forward of which the momentum is felt even to-day; this is shown both by the spread of psycho-analytic literature and by the constant increase in the number of doctors who are practising or studying it, as well as by the frequency of the attacks made on it at Congresses and in learned societies. It has penetrated into the most distant lands and has everywhere not merely startled psychiatrists but commanded the attention of the educated public and of scientific workers in other fields. Havelock Ellis, who has followed its development with sympathy though without ever calling himself an adherent, wrote in 1911 in a report for the Australasian Medical Congress: 'Freud's psycho-analysis is now championed and carried out not only in Austria and in Switzerland, but in the United States, in England, in India, in Canada, and, I doubt not, in Australasia.'¹ A physician from Chile (probably a German) spoke at the International Congress at Buenos Aires in 1910 in support of the existence of infantile sexuality and commended highly the effects of psycho-analytic therapy on obsessional symptoms.² An English neurologist in Central India (Berkeley-Hill³) informed me, through a distinguished colleague who was visiting Europe, that the analyses of Mohammedan Indians which he had carried out showed that the aetiology of their neuroses was no different from what we find in our European patients.

The introduction of psycho-analysis into North America was accompanied by very special marks of honour. In the autumn

¹ Havelock Ellis, 1911. [Freud himself contributed a paper to the same Congress in Sydney (1913*m* [1911]).]

² G. Greve, 1910. [Freud wrote an abstract of this (1911*g*).]

³ [The name was added in 1924.]

of 1909, Stanley Hall, the President of Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, invited Jung and myself to take part in the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the University by giving a number of lectures in German. To our great surprise, we found the members of that small but highly esteemed University for the study of education and philosophy so unprejudiced that they were acquainted with all the literature of psycho-analysis and had given it a place in their lectures to students. In prudish America it was possible, in academic circles at least, to discuss freely and scientifically everything that in ordinary life is regarded as objectionable. The five lectures which I improvised in Worcester appeared in an English translation in the *American Journal of Psychology* [1910a], and were shortly afterwards published in German under the title *Über Psychoanalyse*. Jung read a paper on diagnostic association experiments and another on conflicts in the mind of the child.¹ We were rewarded with the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. During that week of celebrations at Worcester, psycho-analysis was represented by five men: besides Jung and myself, there were Ferenczi, who had joined me for the journey, Ernest Jones, then at the University of Toronto (Canada) and now in London, and A. A. Brill, who was already practising psycho-analysis in New York.

The most important personal relationship which arose from the meeting at Worcester was that with James J. Putnam, Professor of Neuropathology at Harvard University. Some years before, he had expressed an unfavourable opinion of psycho-analysis, but now he rapidly became reconciled to it and recommended it to his countrymen and his colleagues in a series of lectures which were as rich in content as they were brilliant in form. The esteem he enjoyed throughout America on account of his high moral character and unflinching love of truth was of great service to psycho-analysis and protected it against the denunciations which in all probability would otherwise quickly have overwhelmed it. Later on, yielding too much to the strong ethical and philosophical bent of his nature, Putnam made what seems to me an impossible demand—he expected psycho-analysis to place itself at the service of a particular moral-philosophical conception of the Universe—but he remains the

¹ [Jung 1910a and 1910b.]

chief pillar of the psycho-analytic movement in his native land.¹

For the further spread of this movement Brill and Jones deserve the greatest credit: in their writings they drew their countrymen's attention with unremitting assiduity to the easily observable fundamental facts of everyday life, of dreams and neurosis. Brill has contributed still further to this effect by his medical practice and by his translations of my works, and Jones by his instructive lectures and by his skill in debate at congresses in America.² The absence of any deep-rooted scientific tradition in America and the much less stringent rule of official authority there have been of decided advantage to the impetus given by Stanley Hall. It was characteristic of that country that from the beginning professors and superintendents of mental hospitals showed as much interest in analysis as independent practitioners. But it is clear that precisely for this reason the ancient centres of culture, where the greatest resistance has been displayed, must be the scene of the decisive struggle over psycho-analysis.

Among European countries France has hitherto shown itself the least disposed to welcome psycho-analysis, although useful work in French by A. Maeder of Zurich has provided easy access to its theories. The first indications of sympathy came from the provinces: Morichau-Beauchant (Poitiers) was the first Frenchman to adhere publicly to psycho-analysis. Régis³ and Hesnard (Bordeaux) have recently [1914] attempted to disperse the prejudices of their countrymen against the new ideas by an exhaustive presentation, which, however, is not always understanding and takes special exception to symbolism.⁴ In Paris itself, a conviction still seems to reign (to which Janet himself gave eloquent expression at the Congress⁵ in London in 1913) that everything good in psycho-analysis is a repetition of Janet's views with insignificant modifications, and that every-

¹ [Footnote added 1924:] See Putnam's *Addresses on Psycho-Analysis*, 1921. [Freud contributed a preface to this (1921a).]—Putnam died in 1918. [See Freud's obituary of him (1919b).]

² The publications of both authors have appeared in collected volumes: Brill, 1912, and Ernest Jones, 1913.

³ [E. Régis (1855–1918) was Professor of Psychiatry at Bordeaux from 1905.]

⁴ [Before 1924 this read 'an exhaustive and understanding presentation which only took exception to symbolism'.]

⁵ [The International Medical Congress.]

thing else in it is bad. At this Congress itself, indeed, Janet had to submit to a number of corrections by Ernest Jones, who was able to point out to him his insufficient knowledge of the subject.¹ Even though we deny his claims, however, we cannot forget the value of his work on the psychology of the neuroses.

In Italy, after several promising starts, no real interest was forthcoming. To Holland analysis found early access through personal connections: Van Emden, Van Ophuijsen, Van Renterghem (*Freud en zijn School* [1913]) and the two Stärckes are actively occupied with it both in practice and theory.² In scientific circles in England interest in analysis has developed very slowly, but there is reason to expect that the sense for the practical and the passionate love of justice in the English will ensure it a brilliant future there.

In Sweden, P. Bjerre, who succeeded to Wetterstrand's practice, gave up hypnotic suggestion, at least for the time, in favour of analytic treatment. R. Vogt (Christiania) had already shown an appreciation of psycho-analysis in his *Psykiatriens grundtraek*, published in 1907; so that the first text-book of psychiatry to refer to psycho-analysis was written in Norwegian. In Russia, psycho-analysis has become generally known and has spread widely; almost all my writings, as well as those of other adherents of analysis, have been translated into Russian. But a really penetrating comprehension of analytic theories has not yet been evinced in Russia; so that the contributions of Russian physicians are at present not very notable. The only trained analyst there is M. Wulff who practises in Odessa. It is principally due to L. Jekels that psycho-analysis has been introduced to Polish scientific and literary circles. Hungary, so near geographically to Austria, and so far from it scientifically, has produced only one collaborator, S. Ferenczi, but one that indeed outweighs a whole society.³

¹ [Cf. Janet (1913) and Jones (1915), also Editor's footnote to *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer and Freud, 1895), *Standard Ed.*, 2, xii-xiii.]

² The first official recognition of dream-interpretation and psycho-analysis in Europe was extended to them by the psychiatrist Jelgersma, Rector of the University of Leyden, in his rectorial address on February 9, 1914.

³ (Footnote added 1923:) It is not my intention, of course, to bring this account, written in 1914, 'up to date' [in English in the original]. I will only add a few remarks to indicate how the picture has altered in the interval, which includes the World War. In Germany a gradual infiltration

As regards the position of psycho-analysis in Germany, it can only be said that it forms the centre-point of scientific discussions and provokes the most emphatic expressions of disagreement both among doctors and laymen; these are not yet at an end, but are constantly flaring up again, sometimes with greater intensity. No official educational bodies there have up to now recognized psycho-analysis. Successful practitioners who employ it are few; only a few institutions, such as Binswanger's in Kreuzlingen (on Swiss soil) and Marcinowski's in Holstein, have opened their doors to it. One of the most prominent representatives of analysis, Karl Abraham, at one time an assistant of Bleuler's, maintains himself in the critical atmosphere of Berlin. One might wonder that this state of things should have continued unaltered for several years if one did not know that the account I have given only represents external appearances. Too much significance should not be attributed to rejection by the official representatives of science and heads of institutions, and by the followers dependent on them. It is natural that its opponents should give loud expression to their views, while its intimidated adherents keep silence. Some of the latter, whose first contributions to analysis raised favourable expectations, have later withdrawn from the movement under the pressure of circumstances. The movement itself advances of analytic theories into clinical psychiatry is taking place, though this is not always admitted. The French translations of my works that have been appearing during the last few years have finally aroused a keen interest in psycho-analysis even in France, though for the moment this is more active in literary circles than in scientific ones. In Italy M. Levi Bianchini (of Nocera Superiore) and Edoardo Weiss (of Trieste) have come forward as translators and champions of psycho-analysis (cf. the *Biblioteca Psicoanalitica Italiana*). A collected edition of my works which is appearing in Madrid (translated by Lopez Ballesteros) is evidence of the lively interest taken in it in Spanish-speaking countries (Prof. H. Delgado in Lima). As regards England, the prophecy which I have made above seems to be in steady course of fulfilment; a special centre for the study of analysis has been formed at Calcutta in British India. In North America it is still true that the depth of understanding of analysis does not keep pace with its popularity. In Russia, since the Revolution, psycho-analytic work has begun afresh at several centres. In Poland the *Polska Biblioteka Psychoanalityczna* is now appearing. In Hungary a brilliant analytic school is flourishing under the leadership of Ferenczi. (Cf. the Festschrift issued in honour of his fiftieth birthday [which included an appreciation by Freud, 1923i].) At the present time the Scandinavian countries are still the least receptive.

surely though silently; it is constantly gaining new adherents among psychiatrists and laymen, it brings in a growing stream of new readers for psycho-analytic literature and for that very reason drives its opponents to ever more violent defensive efforts. At least a dozen times in recent years, in reports of the proceedings of certain congresses and scientific bodies or in reviews of certain publications, I have read that now psycho-analysis is dead, defeated and disposed of once and for all. The best answer to all this would be in the terms of Mark Twain's telegram to the newspaper which had falsely published news of his death: 'Report of my death greatly exaggerated.' After each of these obituaries psycho-analysis regularly gained new adherents and co-workers or acquired new channels of publicity. After all, being declared dead was an advance on being buried in silence.

Hand in hand with this expansion of psycho-analysis in space went an expansion in content; it extended from the field of the neuroses and psychiatry to other fields of knowledge. I shall not treat this aspect of the development of our discipline in much detail, since this has been done with great success by Rank and Sachs [1913] in a volume (one of Löwenfeld's *Grenzfragen*) which deals exhaustively with precisely this side of analytic research. Moreover, this development is still in its infancy; it has been little worked at, consists mostly of tentative beginnings and in part of no more than plans. No reasonable person will see any grounds for reproach in this. An enormous mass of work confronts a small number of workers, most of whom have their main occupation elsewhere and can bring only the qualifications of an amateur to bear on the technical problems of these unfamiliar fields of science. These workers, who derive from psycho-analysis, make no secret of their amateurishness. Their aim is merely to act as sign-posts and stop-gaps for the specialists, and to put the analytic technique and principles at their disposal against a time when they in turn shall take up the work. That the results achieved are nevertheless not inconsiderable is due partly to the fruitfulness of the analytic method, and partly to the circumstance that there are already a few investigators who are not doctors, and have taken up the application of psycho-analysis to the mental sciences as their profession in life.

Most of these applications of analysis naturally go back to a hint in my earliest analytic writings. The analytic examination

of neurotic people and the neurotic symptoms of normal people necessitated the assumption of psychological conditions which could not possibly be limited to the field in which they had been discovered. In this way analysis not only provided us with the explanation of pathological phenomena, but revealed their connection with normal mental life and disclosed unsuspected relationships between psychiatry and the most various other sciences dealing with activities of the mind. Certain typical dreams, for instance, yielded an explanation of some myths and fairy-tales. Riklin [1908] and Abraham [1909] followed this hint and initiated the researches into myths which have found their completion, in a manner complying with even expert standards, in Rank's works on mythology [e.g. 1909, 1911*b*]. Further investigation into dream-symbolism led to the heart of the problems of mythology, folklore (Jones [e.g. 1910 and 1912] and Storfer [1914]) and the abstractions of religion. A deep impression was made on all hearers at one of the psycho-analytical Congresses when a follower of Jung's demonstrated the correspondence between schizophrenic phantasies and the cosmogonies of primitive times and races.¹ Mythological material later received further elaboration (which, though open to criticism, was none the less very interesting) at the hands of Jung, in works attempting to correlate the neuroses with religious and mythological phantasies.

Another path led from the investigation of dreams to the analysis of works of imagination and ultimately to the analysis of their creators—writers and artists themselves. At an early stage it was discovered that dreams invented by writers will often yield to analysis in the same way as genuine ones. (Cf. 'Gradiva' [1907*a*].) The conception of unconscious mental activity made it possible to form a preliminary idea of the nature of imaginative creative writing; and the realization, gained in the study of neurotics, of the part played by the instinctual impulses enabled us to perceive the sources of artistic production and confronted us with two problems: how the artist reacts to this instigation and what means he employs to disguise his reactions.² Most analysts with general interests

¹ [Jan Nelken at the Weimar Congress in 1911. An expanded version of the paper will be found in Nelken, 1912.]

² Cf. Rank's *Der Künstler* [*The Artist*, 1907], analyses of imaginative writers by Sadger [1909], Reik [1912, etc.], and others, my own small

have contributed something to the solution of these problems, which are the most fascinating among the applications of psycho-analysis. Naturally, opposition was not lacking in this direction either on the part of people who knew nothing of analysis; it took the same form as it did in the original field of psycho-analytic research—the same misconceptions and vehement rejections. It was only to be expected from the beginning that, whatever the regions into which psycho-analysis might penetrate, it would inevitably experience the same struggles with those already in possession of the field. These attempted invasions, however, have not yet stirred up the attention in some quarters which awaits them in the future. Among the strictly scientific applications of analysis to literature, Rank's exhaustive work on the theme of incest [1912] easily takes the first place. Its subject is bound to arouse the greatest unpopularity. Up to the present, little work based on psycho-analysis has been done in the sciences of language and history. I myself ventured the first approach to the problems of the psychology of religion by drawing a parallel between religious ritual and the ceremonials of neurotics (1907*b*).¹ Dr. Pfister, a pastor in Zurich, has traced back the origin of religious fanaticism to perverse eroticism in his book on the piety of Count von Zinzendorf [1910], as well as in other contributions. In the latest works of the Zurich school, however, we find analysis permeated with religious ideas rather than the opposite outcome that had been in view.

In the four essays with the title *Totem and Taboo* [1912–13] I have made an attempt to deal with the problems of social anthropology in the light of analysis; this line of investigation leads direct to the origins of the most important institutions of our civilization, of the structure of the state, of morality and religion, and, moreover, of the prohibition against incest and of conscience. It is no doubt too early to decide how far the conclusions thus reached will be able to withstand criticism.

The first example of an application of the analytic mode of thought to the problems of aesthetics was contained in my book on jokes [1905*c*]. Everything beyond this is still awaiting workers, who may expect a particularly rich harvest in this work on a childhood memory of Leonardo da Vinci's [1910*c*], and Abraham's analysis of Segantini [1911].

¹ [All the German editions give this date wrongly as 1910.]

field. We are entirely without the co-operation of specialists in all these branches of knowledge, and in order to attract them Hanns Sachs, in 1912, founded the periodical *Imago* which is edited by him and Rank. A beginning has been made by Hitschmann and von Winterstein in throwing psycho-analytic light on philosophical systems and personalities, and here there is much need both of extended and of deeper investigation.

The revolutionary discoveries of psycho-analysis in regard to the mental life of children—the part played in it by sexual impulses (von Hug-Hellmuth [1913]), and the fate of those components of sexuality which become unserviceable in the function of reproduction—were bound early to direct attention to education and to stimulate an attempt to bring analytic points of view into the foreground in that field of work. Recognition is due to Dr. Pfister for having, with sincere enthusiasm, initiated the application of psycho-analysis in this direction and brought it to the notice of ministers of religion and those concerned with education. (Cf. *The Psycho-Analytic Method*, 1913.¹) He has succeeded in gaining the sympathy and participation of a number of Swiss teachers in this. Other members of his profession are said to share his views but to have preferred nevertheless to remain cautiously in the background. In their retreat from psycho-analysis, a section of Vienna analysts seem to have arrived at a kind of combination of medicine and education.²

With this incomplete outline I have attempted to give some idea of the still incalculable wealth of connections which have come to light between medical psycho-analysis and other fields of science. There is material here for a generation of investigators to work at, and I do not doubt that the work will be carried out as soon as the resistances against psycho-analysis are overcome on its original ground.³

To write the story of these resistances would, I think, be both fruitless and inopportune at the present time. The story is not very creditable to the scientific men of our day. But I must add at once that it has never occurred to me to pour contempt upon the opponents of psycho-analysis merely because they were

¹ [Freud wrote a preface to this (1913b).]

² Adler and Furtmüller, *Heilen und Bilden* [*Healing and Educating*], 1914.

³ See my two articles in *Scientia* (1913j).

opponents—apart from the few unworthy individuals, the adventurers and profiteers, who are always to be found on both sides in time of war. I knew very well how to account for the behaviour of these opponents and, moreover, I had learnt that psycho-analysis brings out the worst in everyone. But I made up my mind not to answer my opponents and, so far as my influence went, to restrain others from polemics. Under the peculiar conditions of the controversy over psycho-analysis it seemed to me very doubtful whether either public or written discussion would avail anything; it was certain which way the majority at congresses and meetings would go, and my faith in the reasonableness and good behaviour of the gentlemen who opposed me was not at any time great. Experience shows that only very few people are capable of remaining polite, to say nothing of objective, in a scientific dispute, and the impression made on me by scientific squabbles has always been odious. Perhaps this attitude on my part has been misunderstood; perhaps I have been thought so good-natured or so easily intimidated that no further notice need be taken of me. This was a mistake; I can be as abusive and enraged as anyone; but I have not the art of expressing the underlying emotions in a form suitable for publication and I therefore prefer to abstain completely.

Perhaps in some respects it would have been better if I had given free rein to my own passions and to those of others round me. We have all heard of the interesting attempt to explain psycho-analysis as a product of the Vienna milieu. As recently as in 1913 Janet was not ashamed to use this argument, although he himself is no doubt proud of being a Parisian, and Paris can scarcely claim to be a city of stricter morals than Vienna.¹ The suggestion is that psycho-analysis, and in particular its assertion that the neuroses are traceable to disturbances in sexual life, could only have originated in a town like Vienna—in an atmosphere of sensuality and immorality foreign to other cities—and that it is simply a reflection, a projection into theory, as it were, of these peculiar Viennese conditions. Now I am certainly no local patriot; but this theory about psycho-analysis always seems to me quite exceptionally senseless—so senseless, in fact, that I have sometimes been inclined to suppose that the reproach of being a citizen of Vienna is only

¹ [The last clause of this sentence was added in 1924.]

a euphemistic substitute for another reproach which no one would care to put forward openly.¹ If the premisses on which the argument rests were the opposite of what they are, then it might be worth giving it a hearing. If there were a town in which the inhabitants imposed exceptional restrictions on themselves as regards sexual satisfaction, and if at the same time they exhibited a marked tendency to severe neurotic disorders, that town might certainly give rise in an observer's mind to the idea that the two circumstances had some connection with each other, and might suggest that one was contingent on the other. But neither of these assumptions is true of Vienna. The Viennese are no more abstinent and no more neurotic than the inhabitants of any other capital city. There is rather less embarrassment—less prudery—in regard to sexual relationships than in the cities of the West and North which are so proud of their chastity. These peculiar characteristics of Vienna would be more likely to mislead the observer on the causation of neurosis than to enlighten him on it.

Vienna has done everything possible, however, to deny her share in the origin of psycho-analysis. In no other place is the hostile indifference of the learned and educated section of the population so evident to the analyst as in Vienna.

It may be that my policy of avoiding wide publicity is to some extent responsible for this. If I had encouraged or allowed the medical societies of Vienna to occupy themselves with psycho-analysis in stormy debates which would have discharged all the passions and brought into the open all the reproaches and invectives that were on its opponents' tongues or in their hearts—then, perhaps, the ban on psycho-analysis would have been overcome by now and it would no longer be a stranger in its native city. As it is, the poet may be right when he makes his Wallenstein say:

Doch das vergeben mir die Wiener nicht,
dass ich um ein Spektakel sie betrog.²

The task to which I was not equal—that of demonstrating to the opponents of psycho-analysis *suaviter in modo* their injustice and arbitrariness—was undertaken and carried out most credit-

¹ [Presumably Freud's Jewish origin.]

² [Literally: 'But what the Viennese will not forgive me is having cheated them out of a spectacle.' Schiller, *Die Piccolomini*, II, 7.]

ably by Bleuler in a paper written in 1910, 'Freud's Psycho-Analysis: A Defence and Some Critical Remarks'. It would seem so natural for me to praise this work (which offers criticisms in both directions) that I will hasten to say what I take exception to in it. It seems to me still to display partiality, to be too lenient to the faults of the opponents of psycho-analysis and too severe on the shortcomings of its adherents. This trait in it may possibly explain why the opinion of a psychiatrist of such high repute, such undoubted ability and independence, failed to carry more weight with his colleagues. The author of *Affectivity* (1906) ought not to be surprised if the influence of a work is determined not by the strength of its arguments but by its affective tone. Another part of its influence—its influence on the followers of psycho-analysis—was destroyed later by Bleuler himself, when in 1913 he showed the reverse side of his attitude to psycho-analysis in his 'Criticism of the Freudian Theory'. In that paper he subtracts so much from the structure of psycho-analytic theory that our opponents may well be glad of the help given them by this champion of psycho-analysis. These adverse judgements of Bleuler's, however, are not based on new arguments or better observations. They rely simply on the state of his own knowledge, the inadequacy of which he no longer himself admits, as he did in his earlier works. It seemed therefore that an almost irreparable loss threatened psycho-analysis here. But in his last publication, 'Criticisms of my *Schizophrenia*' (1914), Bleuler rallies his forces in the face of the attacks made on him for having introduced psycho-analysis into his book on schizophrenia, and makes what he himself calls a 'presumptuous claim'. 'But now I will make a presumptuous claim: I consider that up to the present the various schools of psychology have contributed extremely little towards explaining the nature of psychogenic symptoms and diseases, but that depth-psychology offers something towards a psychology which still awaits creation and which physicians are in need of in order to understand their patients and to cure them rationally; and I even believe that in my *Schizophrenia* I have taken a very short step towards that understanding. The first two assertions are certainly correct; the last may be an error.'

Since by 'depth-psychology' he means nothing else but psycho-analysis, we may for the present be content with this acknowledgement.

III

*Mach es kurz!
Am Jüngsten Tag ist's nur ein Furz!*¹
GOETHE

Two years after the first private Congress of psycho-analysts the second took place, this time at Nuremberg, in March, 1910. In the interval between them, influenced partly by the favourable reception in America, by the increasing hostility in German-speaking countries, and by the unforeseen acquisition of support from Zurich, I had conceived a project which with the help of my friend Ferenczi I carried out at this second Congress. What I had in mind was to organize the psycho-analytic movement, to transfer its centre to Zurich and to give it a chief who would look after its future career. As this scheme has met with much opposition among the adherents of psycho-analysis, I will set out my reasons for it in some detail. I hope that these will justify me, even though it turns out that what I did was in fact not very wise.

I judged that the new movement's association with Vienna was no recommendation but rather a handicap to it. A place in the heart of Europe like Zurich, where an academic teacher had opened the doors of his institution to psycho-analysis, seemed to me much more promising. I also took it that a second handicap lay in my own person, opinion about which was too much con-

¹ [Literally: 'Cut it short! On the Day of Judgement it is no more than a fart.' The lines occur in some ironic verses written late in Goethe's life (Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe, 15, 400-1). Satan is represented in them as bringing up a number of charges against Napoleon, and the words quoted by Freud are God the Fathers' reply. Freud had many years earlier (on December 4, 1896) quoted the same words in a letter to Fliess, as the suggested motto for a chapter on 'Resistance' (Freud, 1950a, Letter 51). Two possible explanations, not necessarily incompatible, may be offered for Freud's use of the quotation in the present connection. He may be applying the words to the criticisms put forward by the opponents of psycho-analysis, or he may be applying them ironically to himself for wasting his time on such trivialities.—It may also be remarked for the benefit of the non-German reader that '*Jüngsten Tag*' (literally, 'last day') would not normally be spelt with a capital 'J'.]

fused by the liking or hatred of the different sides: I was either compared to Columbus,¹ Darwin and Kepler, or abused as a general paralytic. I wished, therefore, to withdraw into the background both myself and the city where psycho-analysis first saw the light. Moreover, I was no longer young; I saw that there was a long road ahead, and I felt oppressed by the thought that the duty of being a leader should fall to me so late in life.² Yet I felt that there must be someone at the head. I knew only too well the pitfalls that lay in wait for anyone who became engaged in analysis, and hoped that many of them might be avoided if an authority could be set up who would be prepared to instruct and admonish. This position had at first been occupied by myself, owing to my fifteen years' start in experience which nothing could counterbalance. I felt the need of transferring this authority to a younger man, who would then as a matter of course take my place after my death. This man could only be C. G. Jung, since Bleuler was my contemporary in age; in favour of Jung were his exceptional talents, the contributions he had already made to psycho-analysis, his independent position and the impression of assured energy which his personality conveyed. In addition to this, he seemed ready to enter into a friendly relationship with me and for my sake to give up certain racial prejudices which he had previously permitted himself. I had no inkling at that time that in spite of all these advantages the choice was a most unfortunate one, that I had lighted upon a person who was incapable of tolerating the authority of another, but who was still less capable of wielding it himself, and whose energies were relentlessly devoted to the furtherance of his own interests.

I considered it necessary to form an official association because I feared the abuses to which psycho-analysis would be subjected as soon as it became popular. There should be some headquarters whose business it would be to declare: 'All this nonsense is nothing to do with analysis; this is not psycho-analysis.' At the sessions of the local groups (which together would constitute the international association) instruction should be given as to how psycho-analysis was to be conducted and doctors should be trained, whose activities would then receive a kind of guarantee. Moreover, it seemed to me desirable, since

¹ [This name was added in 1924.]

² [In 1910 Freud was 54.]

official science had pronounced its solemn ban upon psycho-analysis and had declared a boycott against doctors and institutions practising it, that the adherents of psycho-analysis should come together for friendly communication with one another and mutual support.

This and nothing else was what I hoped to achieve by founding the 'International Psycho-Analytical Association'. It was probably more than could be attained. Just as my opponents were to discover that it was not possible to stem the tide of the new movement, so I was to find that it would not proceed in the direction I wished to mark out for it. The proposals made by Ferenczi in Nuremburg were adopted, it is true; Jung was elected President and made Riklin his Secretary; the publication of a bulletin which should link the Central Executive with the local groups was resolved upon. The object of the Association was declared to be 'to foster and further the science of psycho-analysis founded by Freud, both as pure psychology and in its application to medicine and the mental sciences; and to promote mutual support among its members in all endeavours to acquire and to spread psycho-analytic knowledge'. The scheme was strongly opposed only by the Vienna group. Adler, in great excitement, expressed the fear that 'censorship and restrictions on scientific freedom' were intended. Finally the Viennese gave in, after having secured that the seat of the Association should be not Zurich, but the place of residence of the President for the time being, who was to be elected for two years.

At this Congress three local groups were constituted: one in Berlin, under the chairmanship of Abraham; one in Zurich, whose head had become the President of the whole Association; and one in Vienna, the direction of which I made over to Adler. A fourth group, in Budapest, could not be formed until later. Bleuler had not attended the Congress on account of illness, and later he evinced hesitation about joining the Association on general grounds; he let himself be persuaded to do so, it is true, after a personal conversation with me, but resigned again shortly afterwards as a result of disagreements in Zurich. This severed the connection between the Zurich local group and the Burghölzli institution.

One outcome of the Nuremberg Congress was the founding of the *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse* [*Central Journal for Psycho-Analysis*], for which purpose Adler and Stekel joined forces. It

was obviously intended originally to represent the Opposition: it was meant to win back for Vienna the hegemony threatened by the election of Jung. But when the two founders of the journal, labouring under the difficulties of finding a publisher, assured me of their peaceful intentions and as a guarantee of their sincerity gave me a right of veto, I accepted the direction of it and worked energetically for the new organ; its first number appeared in September, 1910.

I will now continue the story of the Psycho-Analytical Congresses. The third Congress took place in September, 1911, at Weimar, and was even more successful than the previous ones in its general atmosphere and scientific interest. J. J. Putnam, who was present on this occasion, declared afterwards in America how much pleasure it had given him and expressed his respect for 'the mental attitude' of those who attended it, quoting some words I was said to have used in reference to them: 'They have learnt to tolerate a bit of truth.' (Putnam 1912.) It is a fact that no one who had attended scientific congresses could have failed to carry away a favourable impression of the Psycho-Analytical Association. I myself had conducted the first two Congresses and I had allowed every speaker time for his paper, leaving discussions to take place in private afterwards among the members. Jung, as President, took over the direction at Weimar and re-introduced formal discussions after each paper, which, however, did not give rise to any difficulties as yet.

A very different picture was presented by the fourth Congress, held in Munich two years later, in September, 1913. It is still fresh in the memory of all who were present. It was conducted by Jung in a disagreeable and incorrect manner; the speakers were restricted in time and the discussions overwhelmed the papers. By a malicious stroke of chance it happened that that evil genius, Hoche,¹ had settled in the very building in which the meetings were held. Hoche would have had no difficulty in convincing himself of the nonsense which the analysts made of his description of them as a fanatical sect blindly submissive to their leader. The fatiguing and unedifying proceedings ended in the re-election of Jung to the Presidency of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, which he accepted, although two-fifths of those present refused him their support. We dispersed without any desire to meet again.

¹ [See footnote, p. 27.]

At about the time of this Congress the strength of the International Psycho-Analytical Association was as follows. The local groups in Vienna, Berlin and Zurich had been formed at the Congress in Nuremberg as early as 1910. In May, 1911, a group at Munich under the chairmanship of Dr. L. Seif was added. In the same year the first American local group was formed under the chairmanship of A. A. Brill, with the name 'The New York Psychoanalytic Society'. At the Weimar Congress the foundation of a second American group was authorized; it came into existence during the following year under the name of 'The American Psychoanalytic Association', and included members from Canada and the whole of America; Putnam was elected President and Ernest Jones Secretary. Shortly before the Congress in Munich in 1913, the Budapest local group was formed under the chairmanship of Ferenczi. Soon after this the first English group was formed by Ernest Jones, who had returned to London. The membership of these local groups, of which there were now eight, naturally affords no means of estimating the number of unorganized students and adherents of psycho-analysis.

The development of the periodicals devoted to psycho-analysis also deserves a brief mention. The first of these was a series of monographs entitled *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde* ['Papers on Applied Mental Science']¹ which have appeared irregularly since 1907 and now number fifteen issues. (The publisher was to begin with Heller in Vienna and later F. Deuticke.) They comprise works by Freud (Nos. 1 and 7), Riklin, Jung, Abraham (Nos. 4 and 11), Rank (Nos. 5 and 13), Sadger, Pfister, Max Graf, Jones (Nos. 10 and 14), Storfer and von Hug-Hellmuth.² When the journal *Imago* (which will be referred to shortly [p. 47]) was founded, this form of publication ceased to have quite the same value. After the meeting at Salzburg in 1908, the *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen* [*Yearbook for Psycho-Analytic and Psychopathological Researches*] was founded, which appeared for five years under Jung's editorship and has now re-emerged, under two new editors³ and with a slight change in its title, as the *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse* [*Yearbook of Psycho-Analysis*.] It is no

¹ [See Freud's prospectus for that series (1907e).]

² [Footnote added 1924:] Since then, further works have appeared, by Sadger (Nos. 16 and 18) and Kielholz (No. 17).

³ [See above p. 7 n.]

longer intended to be, as it has been in recent years, merely a repository for the publication of self-contained works. Instead, it will endeavour, through the activity of its editors, to fulfil the aim of recording all the work done and all the advances made in the sphere of psycho-analysis.¹ The *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, which, as I have already said, was started by Adler and Stekel after the foundation of the International Psycho-Analytical Association in Nuremberg in 1910, has, during its short existence, had a stormy career. As early as in the tenth number of the first volume [July, 1911] an announcement appeared on the front page that, on account of scientific differences of opinion with the director, Dr. Alfred Adler had decided to withdraw voluntarily from the editorship. After this Dr. Stekel remained the only editor (from the summer of 1911). At the Weimar Congress [September, 1911] the *Zentralblatt* was raised to the position of official organ of the International Association and made available to all members in return for an increase in the annual subscription. From the third number of the second volume² onwards (winter [December], 1912) Stekel became solely responsible for its contents. His behaviour, of which it is not easy to publish an account, had compelled me to resign the direction and hurriedly to establish a new organ for psycho-analysis—the *Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse* [*International Journal for Medical Psycho-Analysis*]. The combined efforts of almost all our workers and of Hugo Heller, the new publisher, resulted in the appearance of the first number in January, 1913, whereupon it took the place of the *Zentralblatt* as official organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association.

Meanwhile, early in 1912, a new periodical, *Imago* (published by Heller), designed exclusively for the application of psycho-analysis to the mental sciences, was founded by Dr. Hanns Sachs and Dr. Otto Rank. *Imago* is now in the middle of its third volume and is read with interest by a continually increasing number of subscribers, some of whom have little connection with medical analysis.³

¹ [Footnote added 1924:] It ceased publication at the beginning of the War [after only a single volume (1914) had been issued].

² ['Second volume' in all former editions. It should in fact be 'third volume'. The volumes ran from October to September.]

³ [Footnote added 1924:] The publication of these two periodicals was transferred in 1919 to the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag [the

Apart from these four periodical publications (*Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, *Jahrbuch*, *Zeitschrift* and *Imago*) other German and foreign journals publish works which may claim a place in the literature of psycho-analysis. *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, directed by Morton Prince, usually contains so many good analytic contributions that it must be regarded as the principal representative of analytic literature in America. In the winter of 1913, White and Jelliffe in New York started a new periodical (*The Psychoanalytic Review*) which is devoted exclusively to psycho-analysis, no doubt bearing in mind the fact that most medical men in America who are interested in analysis find the German language a difficulty.¹

I must now mention two secessions which have taken place among the adherents of psycho-analysis; the first occurred between the founding of the Association in 1910 and the Weimar Congress in 1911; the second took place after this and became manifest at Munich in 1913. The disappointment that they caused me might have been averted if I had paid more attention to the reactions of patients under analytic treatment. I knew very well of course that anyone may take to flight at his first approach to the unwelcome truths of analysis; I had always myself maintained that everyone's understanding of it is limited by his own repressions (or rather, by the resistances which sustain them) so that he cannot go beyond a particular point in his relation to analysis. But I had not expected that anyone who had reached a certain depth in his understanding of analysis could renounce that understanding and lose it. And yet daily experience with patients had shown that total rejection of analytic knowledge may result whenever a specially strong resistance arises at any depth in the mind; one may have

International Psycho-Analytical Publishing House]. At the present time (1923) they are both in their ninth volume. (Actually, the *Internationale Zeitschrift* is in the eleventh and *Imago* in the twelfth year of its existence, but, in consequence of events during the war, Volume IV of the *Zeitschrift* covered more than one year, i.e. the years 1916-18, and Volume V of *Imago* the years 1917-18.) With the beginning of Volume VI the word 'ärztliche' ['medical'] was dropped from the title of the *Internationale Zeitschrift*.

¹ [Footnote added 1924:] In 1920 Ernest Jones undertook the founding of *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, intended for readers in England and America.

succeeded in laboriously bringing a patient to grasp some parts of analytic knowledge and to handle them like possessions of his own, and yet one may see him, under the domination of the very next resistance, throw all he has learnt to the winds and stand on the defensive as he did in the days when he was a carefree beginner. I had to learn that the very same thing can happen with psycho-analysts as with patients in analysis.

It is no easy or enviable task to write the history of these two secessions, partly because I am without any strong personal motive for doing so—I had not expected gratitude nor am I revengeful to any effective degree—and partly because I know that by doing so I shall lay myself open to the invectives of my not too scrupulous opponents and offer the enemies of analysis the spectacle they so heartily desire—of ‘the psycho-analysts tearing one another limb from limb’. After exercising so much self-restraint in not coming to blows with opponents outside analysis, I now see myself compelled to take up arms against its former followers or people who still like to call themselves its followers. I have no choice in the matter, however; only indolence or cowardice could lead one to keep silence, and silence would cause more harm than a frank revelation of the harms that already exist. Anyone who has followed the growth of other scientific movements will know that the same upheavals and dissensions commonly occur in them as well. It may be that elsewhere they are more carefully concealed; but psycho-analysis, which repudiates so many conventional ideals, is more honest in these matters too.

Another very severe drawback is that I cannot entirely avoid throwing some analytic light on these two opposition movements. Analysis is not suited, however, for polemical use; it presupposes the consent of the person who is being analysed and a situation in which there is a superior and a subordinate. Anyone, therefore, who undertakes an analysis for polemical purposes must expect the person analysed to use analysis against him in turn, so that the discussion will reach a state which entirely excludes the possibility of convincing any impartial third person. I shall therefore restrict to a minimum my use of analytic knowledge, and, with it, of indiscretion and aggressiveness towards my opponents; and I may also point out that I am not basing any scientific criticism on these grounds. I am not concerned with the truth that may be contained in the

theories which I am rejecting, nor shall I attempt to refute them. I shall leave that task to other qualified workers in the field of psycho-analysis, and it has, indeed, already been partly accomplished. I wish merely to show that these theories controvert the fundamental principles of analysis (and on what points they controvert them) and that for this reason they should not be known by the name of analysis. So I shall avail myself of analysis only in order to explain how these divergences from it could arise among analysts. When I come to the points at which the divergences occurred, I shall have, it is true, to defend the just rights of psycho-analysis with some remarks of a purely critical nature.

The first task confronting psycho-analysis was to explain the neuroses; it used the two facts of resistance and transference as starting-points, and, taking into consideration the third fact of amnesia, accounted for them with its theories of repression, of the sexual motive forces in neurosis and of the unconscious. Psycho-analysis has never claimed to provide a complete theory of human mentality in general, but only expected that what it offered should be applied to supplement and correct the knowledge acquired by other means. Adler's theory, however, goes far beyond this point; it seeks at one stroke to explain the behaviour and character of human beings as well as their neurotic and psychotic illnesses. It is actually more suited to any other field than that of neurosis, although for reasons connected with the history of its development it still places this in the foreground. For many years I had opportunities of studying Dr. Adler and have never refused to recognize his unusual ability, combined with a particularly speculative disposition. As an instance of the 'persecution' to which he asserts he has been subjected by me, I can point to the fact that after the Association was founded I made over to him the leadership of the Vienna group. It was not until urgent demands were put forward by all the members of the society that I let myself be persuaded to take the chair again at its scientific meetings. When I perceived how little gift Adler had precisely for judging unconscious material, my view changed to an expectation that he would succeed in discovering the connections of psycho-analysis with psychology and with the biological foundations of instinctual processes—an expectation which was in some

sense justified by the valuable work he had done on 'organ-inferiority'.¹ And he did in fact effect something of the kind; but his work conveys an impression 'as if'—to speak in his own 'jargon'²—it was intended to prove that psycho-analysis was wrong in everything and that it had only attributed so much importance to sexual motive forces because of its credulity in accepting the assertions of neurotics. I may even speak publicly of the personal motive for his work, since he himself announced it in the presence of a small circle of members of the Vienna group:—'Do you think it gives me such great pleasure to stand in your shadow my whole life long?' To be sure, I see nothing reprehensible in a younger man freely admitting his ambition, which one would in any case guess was among the incentives for his work. But even though a man is dominated by a motive of this kind he should know how to avoid being what the English, with their fine social tact, call 'unfair'—which in German can only be expressed by a much cruder word. How little Adler has succeeded in this is shown by the profusion of petty outbursts of malice which disfigure his writings and by the indications they contain of an uncontrolled craving for priority. At the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society we once actually heard him claim priority for the conception of the 'unity of the neuroses' and for the 'dynamic view' of them. This came as a great surprise to me, for I had always believed that these two principles were stated by me before I ever made Adler's acquaintance.

This striving of Adler's for a place in the sun has, however, had one result which is bound to be beneficial to psycho-analysis. When, after irreconcilable scientific disagreements had come to light, I was obliged to bring about Adler's resignation from the editorship of the *Zentralblatt*, he left the Vienna society as well, and founded a new one, which at first adopted the tasteful name of 'The Society for Free Psycho-Analysis' [*Verein für freie Psychoanalyse*]. But outsiders who are unconnected with analysis are evidently as unskilful in appreciating the differences between the views of two psycho-analysts as we Europeans are in detecting the differences between two Chinese faces. 'Free' psycho-analysis remained in the shadow of 'official', 'orthodox' psycho-analysis and was treated merely as an appendage to the

¹ [Adler, 1907.]

² [The terms 'as if' and 'jargon' figure prominently in Adler's writings.]

latter. Then Adler took a step for which we are thankful; he severed all connection with psycho-analysis, and gave his theory the name of 'Individual Psychology'. There is room enough on God's earth, and anyone who can has a perfect right to potter about on it without being prevented; but it is not a desirable thing for people who have ceased to understand one another and have grown incompatible with one another to remain under the same roof. Adler's 'Individual Psychology' is now one of the many schools of psychology which are adverse to psycho-analysis and its further development is no concern of ours.

The Adlerian theory was from the very beginning a 'system'—which psycho-analysis was careful to avoid becoming. It is also a remarkably good example of 'secondary revision', such as occurs, for instance, in the process to which dream-material is submitted by the action of waking thought. In Adler's case the place of dream-material is taken by the new material obtained through psycho-analytic studies; this is then viewed purely from the standpoint of the ego, reduced to the categories with which the ego is familiar, translated, twisted and—exactly as happens in dream-formation—is misunderstood.¹ Moreover, the Adlerian theory is characterized less by what it asserts than by what it denies, so that it consists of three sorts of elements of quite dissimilar value: useful contributions to the psychology of the ego, superfluous but admissible translations of the analytic facts into the new 'jargon', and distortions and perversions of these facts when they do not comply with the requirements of the ego.

The elements of the first sort have never been ignored by psycho-analysis, although they did not deserve any special attention from it; it was more concerned to show that every ego-trend contains libidinal components. The Adlerian theory emphasizes the counterpart to this, the egoistic constituent in libidinal instinctual impulses. This would have been an appreciable gain if Adler had not on every occasion used this observation in order to deny the libidinal impulses in favour of their egoistic instinctual components. His theory does what every patient does and what our conscious thought in general does—namely, makes use of a *rationalization*, as Jones [1908] has called it, in order to conceal the unconscious motive. Adler is so

¹ [See Chapter VI (I) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Standard Ed., 5, 490).]

consistent in this that he positively considers that the strongest motive force in the sexual act is the man's intention of showing himself master of the woman—of being 'on top'. I do not know if he has expressed these monstrous notions in his writings.

Psycho-analysis recognized early that every neurotic symptom owes its possibility of existence to a compromise. Every symptom must therefore in some way comply with the demands of the ego which manipulates the repression; it must offer some advantage, it must admit of some useful application, or it would meet with the same fate as the original instinctual impulse itself which has been fended off. The term 'gain from illness' has taken this into account; one is even justified in differentiating the 'primary' gain to the ego, which must be operative at the time of the generation of the symptom, from a 'secondary' part, which supervenes in attachment to other purposes of the ego, if the symptom is to persist.¹ It has also long been known that the withdrawal of this gain from illness, or its disappearance in consequence of some change in real external circumstances, constitutes one of the mechanisms of a cure of the symptom. In the Adlerian doctrine the main emphasis falls on these easily verifiable and clearly intelligible connections, while the fact is altogether overlooked that on countless occasions the ego is merely making a virtue of necessity in submitting, because of its usefulness, to the very disagreeable symptom which is forced upon it—for instance, in accepting anxiety as a means to security. The ego is here playing the ludicrous part of the clown in a circus who by his gestures tries to convince the audience that every change in the circus ring is being carried out under his orders. But only the youngest of the spectators are deceived by him.

Psycho-analysis is obliged to give its backing to the second constituent of Adler's theory as it would to something of its own. And in fact it is nothing else than psycho-analytic knowledge, which that author extracted from sources open to everyone during ten years of work in common and which he has now labelled as his own by a change in nomenclature. I myself consider 'safeguarding [*Sicherung*]', for instance, a better term than 'protective measure [*Schutzmassregel*]' which is the one I employ; but I cannot discover any difference in their meaning. Again, a

¹ [A full discussion of the primary and secondary gain from illness will be found in Lecture XXIV of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17).]

host of familiar features come to light in Adler's propositions when one restores the earlier 'phantasied' and 'phantasy' in place of 'feigned [*fingiert*]', 'fictive' and 'fiction'. The identity of these terms would be insisted upon by psycho-analysis even if their author had not taken part in our common work over a period of many years.

The third part of the Adlerian theory, the twisted interpretations and distortions of the disagreeable facts of analysis, are what definitely separate 'Individual Psychology', as it is now to be called, from psycho-analysis. As we know, the principle of Adler's system is that the individual's aim of self-assertion, his 'will to power', is what, in the form of a 'masculine protest',¹ plays a dominating part in the conduct of life, in character-formation and in neurosis. This 'masculine protest', the Adlerian motive force, is nothing else, however, but repression detached from its psychological mechanism and, moreover, sexualized in addition—which ill accords with the vaunted ejection of sexuality from its place in mental life.² The 'masculine protest' undoubtedly exists, but if it is made into the [sole] motive force of mental life the observed facts are being treated like a spring-board that is left behind after it has been used to jump off from. Let us consider one of the fundamental situations in which desire is felt in infancy: that of a child observing the sexual act between adults. Analysis shows, in the case of people with whose life-story the physician will later be concerned, that at such moments two impulses take possession of the immature spectator. In boys, one is the impulse to put himself in the place of the active man, and the other, the opposing current, is the impulse to identify himself with the passive woman.³ Between them these two impulses exhaust the pleasurable possibilities of the situation. The first alone can come under

¹ [The term 'masculine protest' was introduced by Adler in a paper 'Der psychische Hermaphroditismus im Leben und in der Neurose [Psychical Hermaphroditism in Life and in Neurosis]' at the Nuremberg International Psycho-Analytical Congress in 1910. An abstract appeared in *Jb. psychoan. psychopath. Forsch.*, 2 (1910), 738, and the paper was published in full in *Fortschritte der Medizin*, 28 (1910), 486.]

² [Freud discussed Adler's explanation of repression at greater length at the end of his paper 'A Child is Being Beaten' (1919e), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 200.—Some discussion of the 'masculine protest' in relation to narcissism will be found below (p. 92).]

³ [Cf. Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).]

the head of the masculine protest, if that concept is to retain any meaning at all. The second, however, the further course of which Adler disregards or which he knows nothing about, is the one that will become the more important in the subsequent neurosis. Adler has so merged himself in the jealous narrowness of the ego that he takes account only of those instinctual impulses which are agreeable to the ego and are encouraged by it; the situation in neurosis, in which the impulses are *opposed* to the ego, is precisely the one that lies beyond his horizon.

In connection with the attempt, which psycho-analysis has made necessary, to correlate the fundamental principle of its theory with the mental life of children, Adler exhibits the most serious departures from actual observation and the most fundamental confusion in his concepts. The biological, social and psychological meanings of 'masculine' and 'feminine' are here hopelessly mixed.¹ It is impossible, and is disproved by observation, that a child, whether male or female, should found the plan of its life on an original depreciation of the female sex and take the wish to be a real man as its 'guiding line'.² Children have, to begin with, no idea of the significance of the distinction between the sexes; on the contrary, they start with the assumption that the same genital organ (the male one) is possessed by both sexes; they do not begin their sexual researches with the problem of the distinction between the sexes,³ while the *social* underestimation of women is completely foreign to them. There are women in whose neurosis the wish to be a man has played no part. Whatever in the nature of a masculine protest can be shown to exist is easily traceable to a disturbance in primary narcissism due to threats of castration or to the earliest interferences with sexual activities. All disputes about the psychogenesis of the neuroses must eventually be decided in the field of the neuroses of childhood. Careful dissection of a neurosis in early childhood puts an end to all misapprehensions about the

¹ [Cf. a footnote added in 1915 to Section 4 of the third of Freud's *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 219 f.]

² ['*Leitlinie*', a term constantly used by Adler.]

³ [This statement (which was repeated in a passage added in 1915 to Section 5 of the second of Freud's *Three Essays*, *Standard Ed.*, 7, 195) was corrected in his later paper on the distinction between the sexes (1925j).]

aetiology of the neuroses and to all doubts about the part played by the sexual instincts in them.¹ That is why, in his criticism of Jung's paper 'Conflicts in the Mind of the Child' [1910c], Adler [1911a] was obliged to resort to the imputation that the facts of the case had been one-sidedly arranged, 'no doubt by the [child's] father'.

I will not dwell any longer on the biological aspect of the Adlerian theory nor discuss whether either actual 'organ-inferiority' [p. 51 *n.* 1] or the subjective feeling of it—one does not know which—is really capable of serving as the foundation of Adler's system. I will merely remark in passing that if it were so neurosis would appear as a by-product of every kind of physical decrepitude, whereas observation shows that an impressive majority of ugly, misshapen, crippled and miserable people fail to react to their defects by neurosis. Nor will I deal with the interesting assertion according to which inferiority is to be traced back to the feeling of being a child. It shows the disguise under which the factor of infantilism, which is so strongly emphasized by psycho-analysis, re-appears in 'Individual Psychology'. On the other hand, I must point out how all the psychological acquisitions of psycho-analysis have been thrown to the winds by Adler. In his book *Über den nervösen Charakter* [1912] the unconscious is still mentioned as a psychological peculiarity, without, however, any relation to his system. Later, he has consistently declared that it is a matter of indifference to him whether an idea is conscious or unconscious. Adler has never from the first shown any understanding of repression. In an abstract of a paper read by him at the Vienna Society (February, 1911) he wrote that it must be pointed out that the evidence in a particular case showed that the patient had never repressed his libido, but had been continually 'safeguarding' himself against it.² Soon afterwards, in a discussion at the Vienna Society, he said: 'If you ask where repression comes from, you are told, "from civilization"; but if you go on to ask where civilization comes from, you are told "from repression"'. So you see it is all simply playing with words.' A tithe of the acuteness and ingenuity with which Adler has unmasked the

¹ [The illustration of this fact is the main thesis of Freud's 'Wolf Man' analysis (1918b), which was drafted a few months after the present paper.]

² [This abstract will be found in *Zbl. Psychoan.*, 1, 371.]

defensive devices of the 'nervous character' would have been enough to show him the way out of this pettifogging argument. What is meant is simply that civilization is based on the repressions effected by former generations, and that each fresh generation is required to maintain this civilization by effecting the same repressions. I once heard of a child who thought people were laughing at him, and began to cry, because when he asked where eggs come from he was told 'from hens', and when he went on to ask where hens come from he was told 'from eggs'. But they were not playing with words; on the contrary, they were telling him the truth.

Everything that Adler has to say about dreams, the shibboleth of psycho-analysis, is equally empty and unmeaning. At first he regarded dreams as a turning away from the feminine to the masculine line—which is simply a translation of the wish-fulfilment theory of dreams into the language of the 'masculine protest'. Later he found that the essence of dreams lies in enabling men to accomplish unconsciously what they are denied consciously. Adler [1911b, 215 n.] must also be credited with priority in confusing dreams with latent dream-thoughts—a confusion on which the discovery of his 'prospective tendency' rests. Maeder [1912] followed his lead in this later.¹ Here the fact is readily overlooked that every interpretation of a dream which is incomprehensible in its manifest form is based on the very method of dream-interpretation whose premisses and conclusions are being disputed. In regard to resistance Adler informs us that it serves the purpose of putting into effect the patient's opposition to the physician. This is certainly true; it is as much as to say that it serves the purpose of resistance. Where it comes from, however, or how it happens that its phenomena are at the disposal of the patient is not further enquired into, as being of no interest to the ego. The detailed mechanism of the symptoms and manifestations of diseases, the explanation of the manifold variety of those diseases and their forms of expression, are disregarded *in toto*; for everything alike is pressed into the service of the masculine protest, self-assertion and the aggrandizement of the personality. The system is complete; to produce it has cost an enormous amount of labour in the recasting of interpretations, while it has not furnished a single new

¹ [See a footnote added in 1914 to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 579–80.]

observation. I fancy I have made it clear that it has nothing to do with psycho-analysis.

The view of life which is reflected in the Adlerian system is founded exclusively on the aggressive instinct; there is no room in it for love. We might feel surprise that such a cheerless *Weltanschauung* should have met with any attention at all; but we must not forget that human beings, weighed down by the burden of their sexual needs, are ready to accept any thing if only the 'overcoming of sexuality' is offered them as a bait.

Adler's secession took place before the Weimar Congress in 1911; after that date the Swiss began theirs. The first signs of it, curiously enough, were a few remarks of Riklin's in some popular articles appearing in Swiss publications, so that the general public learned earlier than those most intimately concerned in the subject that psycho-analysis had got the better of some regrettable errors which had previously discredited it. In 1912 Jung boasted, in a letter from America, that his modifications of psycho-analysis had overcome the resistances of many people who had hitherto refused to have anything to do with it. I replied that that was nothing to boast of, and that the more he sacrificed of the hard-won truths of psycho-analysis the more would he see resistances vanishing. This modification which the Swiss were so proud of introducing was again nothing else but a pushing into the background of the sexual factor in psycho-analytic theory. I confess that from the beginning I regarded this 'advance' as too far-reaching an adjustment to the demands of actuality.

These two retrograde movements away from psycho-analysis, which I must now compare with each other, show another point in common: for they both court a favourable opinion by putting forward certain lofty ideas, which view things, as it were, *sub specie aeternitatis*. With Adler, this part is played by the relativity of all knowledge and the right of the personality to put an artificial construction on the data of knowledge according to individual taste; with Jung, the appeal is made to the historic right of youth to throw off the fetters in which tyrannical age with its hidebound views seeks to bind it. A few words must be devoted to exposing the fallacy of these ideas.

The relativity of our knowledge is a consideration which may

be advanced against every other science just as well as against psycho-analysis. It is derived from familiar reactionary currents of present-day feeling which are hostile to science, and it lays claim to an appearance of superiority to which no one is entitled. None of us can guess what the ultimate judgement of mankind about our theoretical efforts will be. There are instances in which rejection by the first three generations has been corrected by the succeeding one and changed into recognition. After a man has listened carefully to the voice of criticism in himself and has paid some attention to the criticisms of his opponents, there is nothing for him to do but with all his strength to maintain his own convictions which are based on experience. One should be content to conduct one's case honestly, and should not assume the office of judge, which is reserved for the remote future. The stress on arbitrary personal views in scientific matters is bad; it is clearly an attempt to dispute the right of psycho-analysis to be valued as a science—after that value, incidentally, has already been depreciated by what has been said before [on the relative nature of all knowledge]. Anyone who sets a high value on scientific thought will rather seek every possible means and method of circumscribing the factor of fanciful personal predilections as far as possible wherever it still plays too great a part. Moreover, it is opportune to recall that any zeal in defending ourselves is out of place. These arguments of Adler's are not intended seriously. They are only meant for use against his opponents; they do not touch his own theories. Nor have they prevented his followers from hailing him as the Messiah, for whose appearance expectant humanity has been prepared by a number of forerunners. The Messiah is certainly no relative phenomenon.

Jung's argument *ad captandam benevolentiam*¹ rests on the too optimistic assumption that the progress of the human race, of civilization and knowledge, has always pursued an unbroken line; as if there had been no periods of decadence, no reactions and restorations after every revolution, no generations who have taken a backward step and abandoned the gains of their predecessors. His approach to the standpoint of the masses, his abandonment of an innovation which proved unwelcome, make it *a priori* improbable that Jung's corrected version of psycho-analysis can justly claim to be a youthful act of liberation. After

¹ ['For the purpose of gaining good-will.']

all, it is not the age of the doer that decides this but the character of the deed.

Of the two movements under discussion Adler's is indubitably the more important; while radically false, it is marked by consistency and coherence. It is, moreover, in spite of everything, founded upon a theory of the instincts. Jung's modification, on the other hand, loosens the connection of the phenomena with instinctual life; and further, as its critics (e.g. Abraham, Ferenczi and Jones) have pointed out, it is so obscure, unintelligible and confused as to make it difficult to take up any position upon it. Wherever one lays hold of anything, one must be prepared to hear that one has misunderstood it, and one cannot see how to arrive at a correct understanding of it. It is put forward in a peculiarly vacillating manner, one moment as 'quite a mild deviation, which does not justify the outcry that has been raised about it' (Jung), and the next moment as a new message of salvation which is to begin a new epoch for psycho-analysis, and, indeed, a new *Weltanschauung* for everyone.

When one thinks of the inconsistencies displayed in the various public and private pronouncements made by the Jungian movement, one is bound to ask oneself how much of this is due to lack of clearness and how much to lack of sincerity. It must be admitted, however, that the exponents of the new theory find themselves in a difficult position. They are now disputing things which they themselves formerly upheld, and they are doing so, moreover, not on the ground of fresh observations which might have taught them something further, but in consequence of fresh interpretations which make the things they see look different to them now from what they did before. For this reason they are unwilling to give up their connection with psycho-analysis, as whose representatives they became known to the world, and prefer to give it out that psycho-analysis has changed. At the Munich Congress I found it necessary to clear up this confusion, and I did so by declaring that I did not recognize the innovations of the Swiss as legitimate continuations and further developments of the psycho-analysis that originated with me. Outside critics (like Furtmüller) had already seen how things were, and Abraham is right in saying that Jung is in full retreat from psycho-analysis. I am of course perfectly ready to allow that everyone has a right to think and

to write what he pleases; but he has no right to put it forward as something other than what it really is.

Just as Adler's investigation brought something new to psycho-analysis—a contribution to the psychology of the ego—and then expected us to pay too high a price for this gift by throwing over all the fundamental theories of analysis, so in the same way Jung and his followers paved the way for their fight against psycho-analysis by presenting it with a new acquisition. They traced in detail (as Pfister did before them) the way in which the material of sexual ideas belonging to the family-complex and incestuous object-choice is made use of in representing the highest ethical and religious interests of man—that is, they have illuminated an important instance of the sublimation of the erotic instinctual forces and of their transformation into trends which can no longer be called erotic. This was in complete harmony with all the expectations of psycho-analysis, and would have agreed very well with the view that in dreams and neurosis a regressive dissolution of this sublimation, as of all others, becomes visible. But the world would have risen in indignation and protested that ethics and religion were being sexualized. Now I cannot refrain from thinking teleologically for once and concluding that these discoverers were not equal to meeting such a storm of indignation. Perhaps it even began to rage in their own bosoms. The theological prehistory of so many of the Swiss throws no less light on their attitude to psycho-analysis than does Adler's socialist prehistory on the development of his psychology. One is reminded of Mark Twain's famous story of all the things that happened to his watch and of his concluding words: 'And he used to wonder what became of all the unsuccessful tinkers, and gunsmiths, and shoemakers, and blacksmiths; but nobody could ever tell him.'

Suppose—to make use of a simile—that in a particular social group there lives a *parvenu*, who boasts of being descended from a noble family living in another place. It is pointed out to him, however, that his parents live somewhere in the neighbourhood, and that they are quite humble people. There is only one way of escape from his difficulty and he seizes on it. He can no longer repudiate his parents, but he asserts that they themselves are of noble lineage and have merely come down in the world; and he procures a family-tree from some obliging official source. It seems to me that the Swiss have been obliged to behave in much

the same way. If ethics and religion were not allowed to be sexualized but had to be something 'higher' from the start, and if nevertheless the ideas contained in them seemed undeniably to be descended from the Oedipus and family-complex, there could be only one way out: it must be that from the very first these complexes themselves do not mean what they seem to be expressing, but bear the higher 'anagogic' meaning (as Silberer calls it) which made it possible for them to be employed in the abstract trains of thought of ethics and religious mysticism.

I am quite prepared to be told again that I have misunderstood the substance and purpose of the Neo-Zurich theory; but I must protest in advance against any contradictions to my view of it that may be found in the publications of that school being laid at my door instead of theirs. I can find no other way of making the whole range of Jung's innovations intelligible to myself and of grasping all their implications. All the changes that Jung has proposed to make in psycho-analysis flow from his intention to eliminate what is objectionable in the family-complexes, so as not to find it again in religion and ethics. For sexual libido an abstract concept has been substituted, of which one may safely say that it remains mystifying and incomprehensible to wise men and fools alike. The Oedipus complex has a merely 'symbolic' meaning: the mother in it means the unattainable, which must be renounced in the interests of civilization; the father who is killed in the Oedipus myth is the 'inner' father, from whom one must set oneself free in order to become independent. Other parts of the material of sexual ideas will no doubt be subjected to similar re-interpretations in the course of time. In the place of a conflict between ego-dystonic erotic trends and the self-preservative ones a conflict appears between the 'life-task' and 'psychical inertia' [p. 272]; the neurotic's sense of guilt corresponds to his self-reproach for not properly fulfilling his 'life-task'. In this way a new religio-ethical system has been created, which, just like the Adlerian system, was bound to re-interpret, distort or jettison the factual findings of analysis. The truth is that these people have picked out a few cultural overtones from the symphony of life and have once more failed to hear the mighty and primordial melody of the instincts.

In order to preserve this system intact it was necessary to turn entirely away from observation and from the technique of

psycho-analysis. Occasionally enthusiasm for the cause even permitted a disregard of scientific logic—as when Jung finds that the Oedipus complex is not ‘specific’ enough for the aetiology of the neuroses, and proceeds to attribute this specific quality to inertia, the most universal characteristic of all matter, animate and inanimate! It is to be noted, by the way, that the ‘Oedipus complex’ represents only a topic with which the individual’s mental forces have to deal, and is not itself a force, like ‘psychical inertia’. The study of individual people had shown (and always will show) that the sexual complexes in their original sense are alive in them. On that account the investigation of individuals was pushed into the background [in the new theories] and replaced by conclusions based on evidence derived from anthropological research. The greatest risk of coming up against the original, undisguised meaning of these re-interpreted complexes was to be met with in the early childhood of every individual; consequently in therapy the injunction was laid down that this past history should be dwelt on as little as possible and the main emphasis put on reverting to the current conflict, in which, moreover, the essential thing was on no account to be what was accidental and personal, but what was general—in fact, the non-fulfilment of the life-task. As we know, however, a neurotic’s current conflict becomes comprehensible and admits of solution only when it is traced back to his pre-history, when one goes back along the path that his libido took when he fell ill.

The form taken by the Neo-Zurich therapy under these influences can be conveyed in the words of a patient who experienced it himself: ‘This time not a trace of attention was given to the past or to the transference. Wherever I thought I recognized the latter it was pronounced to be a pure libidinal symbol. The moral instruction was very fine and I followed it faithfully, but I did not advance a step. It was even more annoying for me than for him, but how could I help it? . . . Instead of freeing me by analysis, every day brought fresh tremendous demands on me, which had to be fulfilled if the neurosis was to be conquered—for instance, inward concentration by means of introversion, religious meditation, resuming life with my wife in loving devotion, etc. It was almost beyond one’s strength; it was aiming at a radical transformation of one’s whole inner nature. I left the analysis as a poor sinner with

intense feelings of contrition and the best resolutions, but at the same time in utter discouragement. Any clergyman would have advised what he recommended, but where was I to find the strength?' The patient, it is true, reported that he had heard that analysis of the past and of the transference must be gone through first; but he had been told that he had already had enough of it. Since this first kind of analysis had not helped him more, the conclusion seems to me justified that the patient had *not* had enough of it. Certainly the subsequent treatment, which no longer had any claim to be called psycho-analysis, did not improve matters. It is remarkable that the members of the Zurich school should have made the long journey round by way of Vienna in order to wind up at the nearby city of Berne, where Dubois¹ cures neuroses by ethical encouragement in a more considerate manner.²

The total incompatibility of this new movement with psycho-analysis shows itself too, of course, in Jung's treatment of repression, which is hardly mentioned nowadays in his writings, in his misunderstanding of dreams, which, like Adler [cf. p. 57], in complete disregard of dream-psychology, he confuses with the latent dream-thoughts, and in his loss of all understanding of the unconscious—in short, in all the points which I should regard as the essence of psycho-analysis. When Jung tells us that the incest-complex is merely 'symbolic', that after all it has no 'real' existence, that after all a savage feels no desire towards an old hag but prefers a young and pretty woman, we are tempted to conclude that 'symbolic' and 'without real existence' simply mean something which, in virtue of its manifestations and pathogenic effects, is described by psycho-analysis as 'existing unconsciously'—a description that disposes of the apparent contradiction.

If one bears in mind that dreams are something different from the latent dream-thoughts which they work over, there is

¹ [Paul Dubois (1848–1918), Professor of Neuropathology at Berne, had some celebrity during the early part of the century for his method of treating neuroses by 'persuasion'.]

² I know the objections there are to making use of a patient's reports, and I will therefore expressly state that my informant is a trustworthy person, very well capable of forming a judgement. He gave me this information quite spontaneously and I make use of his communication without asking his consent, since I cannot allow that a psycho-analytic technique has any right to claim the protection of medical discretion.

nothing surprising in patients dreaming of things with which their minds have been filled during the treatment, whether it be the 'life-task', or 'being on top' or 'underneath'. The dreams of people being analysed can undoubtedly be directed, in the same way as they are by stimuli produced for experimental purposes. One can determine a part of the material which appears in a dream; nothing in the essence or mechanism of dreams is altered by this. Nor do I believe that 'biographical' dreams, as they are called, occur outside analysis.¹ If, on the other hand, one analyses dreams which occurred before treatment, or if one considers the dreamer's own additions to what has been suggested to him in the treatment, or if one avoids setting him any such tasks, then one may convince oneself how far removed it is from the purpose of a dream to produce attempted solutions of the life-task. Dreams are only a form of thinking; one can never reach an understanding of this form by reference to the content of the thoughts; only an appreciation of the dream-work will lead to that understanding.²

It is not difficult to find a factual refutation of Jung's misconceptions of psycho-analysis and deviations from it. Every analysis conducted in a proper manner, and in particular every analysis of a child, strengthens the convictions upon which the theory of psycho-analysis is founded, and rebuts the re-interpretations made by both Jung's and Adler's systems. In the days before his illumination, Jung himself [1910*b*, see above p. 31] carried out and published an analysis of this kind of a child; it remains to be seen whether he will undertake a new interpretation of its results with the help of a different 'one-sided arrangement of the facts', to use the expression employed by Adler in this connection [p. 56 above].

The view that the sexual representation of 'higher' thoughts in dreams and neurosis is nothing but an archaic mode of expression is of course irreconcilable with the fact that in neurosis these sexual complexes prove to be the bearers of the quantities of libido which have been withdrawn from utilization in real life. If it was merely a question of a sexual 'jargon', the

¹ [See *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 348.]

² [The topic of this paragraph was discussed by Freud at greater length in Section VII of 'Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation' (1923*c*). Cf. also a footnote added in 1925 to Chapter VI (I) of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 506-7.]

economy of the libido could not have been altered in any way by it. Jung admits this himself in his *Darstellung der psychoanalytischen Theorie* [1913] and formulates the task of therapy as the detaching of libidinal cathexes from these complexes. This can never be achieved, however, by directing the patient away from them and urging him to sublimate, but only by exhaustive examination of them and by making them fully and completely conscious. The first piece of reality which the patient must deal with is his illness. Efforts to spare him that task point to the physician's incapacity to help him to overcome his resistances, or else to the physician's dread of the results of the work.

It may be said lastly that by his 'modification' of psycho-analysis Jung has given us a counterpart to the famous Lichtenberg knife.¹ He has changed the hilt, and he has put a new blade into it; yet because the same name is engraved on it we are expected to regard the instrument as the original one.

I think I have made clear, on the contrary, that the new teaching which aims at replacing psycho-analysis signifies an abandonment of analysis and a secession from it. Some people may be inclined to fear that this secession is bound to have more momentous consequences for analysis than would another, owing to its having been started by men who have played so great a part in the movement and have done so much to advance it. I do not share this apprehension.

Men are strong so long as they represent a strong idea; they become powerless when they oppose it. Psycho-analysis will survive this loss and gain new adherents in place of these. In conclusion, I can only express a wish that fortune may grant an agreeable upward journey to all those who have found their stay in the underworld of psycho-analysis too uncomfortable for their taste. The rest of us, I hope, will be permitted without hindrance to carry through to their conclusion our labours in the depths.

February, 1914.

¹ [The *mot* is quoted in a footnote to Section 8 of Chapter II of Freud's book on jokes (1905c).]

ON NARCISSISM: AN INTRODUCTION
(1914)

EDITOR'S NOTE

ZUR EINFÜHRUNG DES NARZISSMUS

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1914 *Jb. Psychoan.*, 6, 1–24.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 78–112. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Pp. 35.
1925 *G.S.*, 6, 155–187.
1931 *Theoretische Schriften*, 25–57.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 138–170.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

‘On Narcissism: an Introduction’

- 1925 *C.P.*, 4, 30–59. (Tr. C. M. Baines.)

The present translation is based on the one published in 1925.

The title of this paper would have been more literally translated ‘On the Introduction of the Concept of Narcissism’. Freud had been using the term for many years previously. We learn from Ernest Jones (1955, 388) that at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on November 10, 1909, Freud had declared that narcissism was a necessary intermediate stage between auto-erotism and object-love. At about the same time he was preparing the second edition of the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905d) for the press (the preface is dated ‘December, 1909’), and it seems probable that the first public mention of the new term is to be found in a footnote added to that edition (*Standard Ed.*, 7, 145 n.)—assuming, that is to say, that the new edition appeared in the early part of 1910. For at the end of May in the same year Freud’s book on *Leonardo* (1910c) appeared, in which there is a considerably longer reference to narcissism (*Standard Ed.*, 11, 100). A paper on the subject by Rank, mentioned by Freud at the beginning of the present study, was published in 1911, and other references by Freud himself soon followed; e.g. in Section III of the Schreber

analysis (1911c) and in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13), *Standard Ed.*, 13, 88–90.

The idea of writing the present paper emerges in Freud's letters for the first time in June, 1913, and he finished a first draft of it during a holiday in Rome in the third week of September of the same year. It was not until the end of February, 1914, that he started on the final version and it was completed a month later.

The paper is among the most important of Freud's writings and may be regarded as one of the pivots in the evolution of his views. It sums up his earlier discussions on the subject of narcissism and considers the place taken by narcissism in sexual development; but it goes far beyond this. For it enters into the deeper problems of the relations between the ego and external objects, and it draws the new distinction between 'ego-libido' and 'object-libido'. Furthermore—most important of all, perhaps—it introduces the concepts of the 'ego ideal' and of the self-observing agency related to it, which were the basis of what was ultimately to be described as the 'super-ego' in *The Ego and the Id* (1923b). And in addition to all this, at two points in the paper—at the end of the first section and at the beginning of the third—it trenches upon the controversies with Adler and Jung which were the principal theme of the 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', written more or less simultaneously with the present work during the early months of 1914. Indeed, one of Freud's motives in writing this paper was, no doubt, to show that the concept of narcissism offers an alternative to Jung's non-sexual 'libido' and to Adler's 'masculine protest'.

These are far from being the only topics raised in the paper, and it is therefore scarcely surprising that it should have an unusual appearance of being over-compressed—of its framework bursting from the quantity of material it contains. Freud himself seems to have felt something of the kind. Ernest Jones tells us (1955, 340) that 'he was very dissatisfied with the result' and wrote to Abraham: 'The "Narcissism" had a difficult labour and bears all the marks of a corresponding deformation.'

However this may be, the paper is one which demands and repays prolonged study; and it was the starting-point of many later lines of thought. Some of these, for instance, were pursued further in 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917e [1915]), p. 237

below, and in Chapters VIII and XI of *Group Psychology* (1921c). The subject of narcissism, it may be added, occupies the greater part of Lecture XXVI of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17). The further development of the fresh views on the structure of the mind which are already beginning to become apparent in the present paper led Freud later to a re-assessment of some of the statements he makes here, especially as regards the functioning of the ego. In this connection it must be pointed out that the meaning which Freud attached to '*das Ich*' (almost invariably translated by 'the ego' in this edition) underwent a gradual modification. At first he used the term without any great precision, as we might speak of 'the self'; but in his latest writings he gave it a very much more definite and narrow meaning. The present paper occupies a transitional point in this development. The whole topic will be found discussed more fully in the Editor's Introduction to *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).

Extracts from the translation of this paper published in 1925 were included in Rickman's *A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud* (1937, 118-41).

ON NARCISSISM: AN INTRODUCTION

I

THE term narcissism is derived from clinical description and was chosen by Paul Näcke¹ in 1899 to denote the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated—who looks at it, that is to say, strokes it and fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction through these activities. Developed to this degree, narcissism has the significance of a perversion that has absorbed the whole of the subject's sexual life, and it will consequently exhibit the characteristics which we expect to meet with in the study of all perversions.

Psycho-analytic observers were subsequently struck by the fact that individual features of the narcissistic attitude are found in many people who suffer from other disorders—for instance, as Sadger has pointed out, in homosexuals—and finally it seemed probable that an allocation of the libido such as deserved to be described as narcissism might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a place in the regular course of human sexual development.² Difficulties in psycho-analytic work upon neurotics led to the same supposition, for it seemed as though this kind of narcissistic attitude in them constituted one of the limits to their susceptibility to influence. Narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal

¹ [In a footnote added by Freud in 1920 to his *Three Essays* (1905d, *Standard Ed.*, 7, 218 n.) he said that he was wrong in stating in the present paper that the term 'narcissism' was introduced by Näcke and that he should have attributed it to Havelock Ellis. Ellis himself, however, subsequently (1928) wrote a short paper in which he corrected Freud's correction and argued that the priority should in fact be divided between himself and Näcke, explaining that the term 'narcissus-like' had been used by him in 1898 as a description of a psychological attitude, and that Näcke in 1899 had introduced the term '*Narcissmus*' to describe a sexual perversion. The German word used by Freud is '*Narzissmus*'. In his paper on Schreber (1911c), near the beginning of Section III, he defends this form of the word on the ground of euphony against the possibly more correct '*Narzissismus*'.]

² Otto Rank (1911c).

complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature.

A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the conception of a primary and normal narcissism arose when the attempt was made to subsume what we know of dementia praecox (Kraepelin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler) under the hypothesis of the libido theory. Patients of this kind, whom I have proposed to term paraphrenics,¹ display two fundamental characteristics: megalomania and diversion of their interest from the external world—from people and things. In consequence of the latter change, they become inaccessible to the influence of psychoanalysis and cannot be cured by our efforts. But the paraphrenic's turning away from the external world needs to be more precisely characterized. A patient suffering from hysteria or obsessional neurosis has also, as far as his illness extends, given up his relation to reality. But analysis shows that he has by no means broken off his erotic relations to people and things. He still retains them in phantasy; i.e. he has, on the one hand, substituted for real objects imaginary ones from his memory, or has mixed the latter with the former; and on the other hand, he has renounced the initiation of motor activities for the attainment of his aims in connection with those objects. Only to this condition of the libido may we legitimately apply the term 'introversion' of the libido which is used by Jung indiscriminately.² It is otherwise with the paraphrenic. He seems really to have withdrawn his libido from people and things in the external world, without replacing them by others in phantasy. When he *does* so replace them, the process seems to be a secondary one and to be part of an attempt at recovery, designed to lead the libido back to objects.³

The question arises: What happens to the libido which has been withdrawn from external objects in schizophrenia? The megalomania characteristic of these states points the way. This megalomania has no doubt come into being at the expense of

¹ [For a discussion of Freud's use of this term, see a long Editor's footnote near the end of Section III of the Schreber analysis (1911c).]

² [Cf. a footnote in 'The Dynamics of Transference' (1912b).]

³ In connection with this see my discussion of the 'end of the world' in [Section III of] the analysis of Senatspräsident Schreber [1911c]; also Abraham, 1908. [See also below, p. 86.]

object-libido. The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism. But the megalomania itself is no new creation; on the contrary, it is, as we know, a magnification and plainer manifestation of a condition which had already existed previously. This leads us to look upon the narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured by a number of different influences.

Let me insist that I am not proposing here to explain or penetrate further into the problem of schizophrenia, but that I am merely putting together what has already been said elsewhere,¹ in order to justify the introduction of the concept of narcissism.

This extension of the libido theory—in my opinion, a legitimate one—receives reinforcement from a third quarter, namely, from our observations and views on the mental life of children and primitive peoples. In the latter we find characteristics which, if they occurred singly, might be put down to megalomania: an over-estimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts, the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’, a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing with the external world—‘magic’—which appears to be a logical application of these grandiose premisses.² In the children of to-day, whose development is much more obscure to us, we expect to find an exactly analogous attitude towards the external world.³ Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out.⁴ In our

¹ [See, in particular, the works referred to in the last footnote. On p. 86 below, Freud in fact penetrates further into the problem.]

² Cf. the passages in my *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13) which deal with this subject. [These are chiefly in the third essay, *Standard Ed.*, 13, 83 ff.]

³ Cf. Ferenczi (1913a).

⁴ [Freud used this and similar analogies more than once again, e.g. in Lecture XXVI of his *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17) and in his short paper on ‘A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis’ (1917a), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 139. He later revised some of the views expressed here. See the end of the Editor’s Note, p. 71 above.]

researches, taking, as they did, neurotic symptoms for their starting-point, this part of the allocation of libido necessarily remained hidden from us at the outset. All that we noticed were the emanations of this libido—the object-cathexes, which can be sent out and drawn back again. We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido.¹ The more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted. The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favour of an object-cathexis; while we have the opposite condition in the paranoic's phantasy (or self-perception) of the 'end of the world'.² Finally, as regards the differentiation of psychical energies, we are led to the conclusion that to begin with, during the state of narcissism, they exist together and that our analysis is too coarse to distinguish between them; not until there is object-cathexis is it possible to discriminate a sexual energy—the libido—from an energy of the ego-instincts.³

Before going any further I must touch on two questions which lead us to the heart of the difficulties of our subject. In the first place, what is the relation of the narcissism of which we are now speaking to auto-erotism, which we have described as an early state of the libido?⁴ Secondly, if we grant the ego a primary cathexis of libido, why is there any necessity for further distinguishing a sexual libido from a non-sexual energy of the ego-instincts? Would not the postulation of a single kind of psychical energy save us all the difficulties of differentiating an energy of the ego-instincts from ego-libido, and ego-libido from object-libido?⁵

As regards the first question, I may point out that we are

¹ [This distinction is drawn here by Freud for the first time.]

² [See footnote 3, p. 74 above.] There are two mechanisms of this 'end of the world' idea: in the one case, the whole libidinal cathexis flows off to the loved object; in the other, it all flows back into the ego.

³ [Some account of the development of Freud's views on the instincts will be found in the Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', below p. 113 ff.]

⁴ [See the second of Freud's *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 181–3.]

⁵ [Cf. a remark on this passage in the Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', p. 115 below.]

bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be something added to auto-erotism—a new psychical action—in order to bring about narcissism.

To be asked to give a definite answer to the second question must occasion perceptible uneasiness in every psycho-analyst. One dislikes the thought of abandoning observation for barren theoretical controversy, but nevertheless one must not shirk an attempt at clarification. It is true that notions such as that of an ego-libido, an energy of the ego-instincts, and so on, are neither particularly easy to grasp, nor sufficiently rich in content; a speculative theory of the relations in question would begin by seeking to obtain a sharply defined concept as its basis. But I am of opinion that that is just the difference between a speculative theory and a science erected on empirical interpretation. The latter will not envy speculation its privilege of having a smooth, logically unassailable foundation, but will gladly content itself with nebulous, scarcely imaginable basic concepts, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are not the foundation of science, upon which everything rests: that foundation is observation alone. They are not the bottom but the top of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damaging it. The same thing is happening in our day in the science of physics, the basic notions of which as regards matter, centres of force, attraction, etc., are scarcely less debatable than the corresponding notions in psycho-analysis.¹

The value of the concepts 'ego-libido' and 'object-libido' lies in the fact that they are derived from the study of the intimate characteristics of neurotic and psychotic processes. A differentiation of libido into a kind which is proper to the ego and one which is attached to objects is an unavoidable corollary to an original hypothesis which distinguished between sexual instincts and ego-instincts. At any rate, analysis of the pure transference neuroses (hysteria and obsessional neurosis) compelled me to make this distinction and I only know that all attempts to

¹ [This line of thought was expanded by Freud in the opening passage of his paper on 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), below, p. 117.]

account for these phenomena by other means have been completely unsuccessful.

In the total absence of any theory of the instincts which would help us to find our bearings, we may be permitted, or rather, it is incumbent upon us, to start off by working out some hypothesis to its logical conclusion, until it either breaks down or is confirmed. There are various points in favour of the hypothesis of there having been from the first a separation between sexual instincts and others, ego-instincts, besides the serviceability of such a hypothesis in the analysis of the transference neuroses. I admit that this latter consideration alone would not be unambiguous, for it might be a question of an indifferent psychical energy which only becomes libido through the act of cathecting an object. But, in the first place, the distinction made in this concept corresponds to the common, popular distinction between hunger and love. In the second place, there are biological considerations in its favour. The individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and the other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at least involuntarily. The individual himself regards sexuality as one of his own ends; whereas from another point of view he is an appendage to his germ-plasm, at whose disposal he puts his energies in return for a bonus of pleasure. He is the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) immortal substance—like the inheritor of an entailed property, who is only the temporary holder of an estate which survives him. The separation of the sexual instincts from the ego-instincts would simply reflect this twofold function of the individual.¹ Thirdly, we must recollect that all our provisional ideas in psychology will presumably some day be based on an organic substructure. This makes it probable that it is special substances and chemical processes which perform the operations of sexuality and provide for the extension of individual life into that of the species.² We are taking this probability into account in replacing the special chemical substances by special psychical forces.

I try in general to keep psychology clear from everything that

¹ [The psychological bearing of Weismann's germ-plasm theory was discussed by Freud at much greater length in Chapter VI of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 45 ff.]

² [See below, footnote 2, p. 125.]

is different in nature from it, even biological lines of thought. For that very reason I should like at this point expressly to admit that the hypothesis of separate ego-instincts and sexual instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological basis, but derives its principal support from biology. But I shall be consistent enough [with my general rule] to drop this hypothesis if psycho-analytic work should itself produce some other, more serviceable hypothesis about the instincts. So far, this has not happened. It may turn out that, most basically and on the longest view, sexual energy—libido—is only the product of a differentiation in the energy at work generally in the mind. But such an assertion has no relevance. It relates to matters which are so remote from the problems of our observation, and of which we have so little cognizance, that it is as idle to dispute it as to affirm it; this primal identity may well have as little to do with our analytic interests as the primal kinship of all the races of mankind has to do with the proof of kinship required in order to establish a legal right of inheritance. All these speculations take us nowhere. Since we cannot wait for another science to present us with the final conclusions on the theory of the instincts, it is far more to the purpose that we should try to see what light may be thrown upon this basic problem of biology by a synthesis of the *psychological* phenomena. Let us face the possibility of error; but do not let us be deterred from pursuing the logical implications of the hypothesis we first adopted¹ of an antithesis between ego-instincts and sexual instincts (a hypothesis to which we were forcibly led by analysis of the transference neuroses), and from seeing whether it turns out to be without contradictions and fruitful, and whether it can be applied to other disorders as well, such as schizophrenia.

It would, of course, be a different matter if it were proved that the libido theory has already come to grief in the attempt to explain the latter disease. This has been asserted by C. G. Jung (1912) and it is on that account that I have been obliged to enter upon this last discussion, which I would gladly have been spared. I should have preferred to follow to its end the course embarked upon in the analysis of the Schreber case without any discussion of its premisses. But Jung's assertion is,

¹ [*'Ersterwählte'* ('first selected') in the editions before 1924. The later editions read *'ersterwähnte'* ('first mentioned'), which seems to make less good sense and may be a misprint.]

to say the least of it, premature. The grounds he gives for it are scanty. In the first place, he appeals to an admission of my own that I myself have been obliged, owing to the difficulties of the Schreber analysis, to extend the concept of libido (that is, to give up its sexual content) and to identify libido with psychical interest in general. Ferenczi (1913*b*), in an exhaustive criticism of Jung's work, has already said all that is necessary in correction of this erroneous interpretation. I can only corroborate his criticism and repeat that I have never made any such retraction of the libido theory. Another argument of Jung's, namely, that we cannot suppose that the withdrawal of the libido is in itself enough to bring about the loss of the normal function of reality,¹ is no argument but a dictum. It 'begs the question',² and saves discussion; for whether and how this is possible was precisely the point that should have been under investigation. In his next major work, Jung (1913 [339-40]) just misses the solution I had long since indicated: 'At the same time', he writes, 'there is this to be further taken into consideration (a point to which, incidentally, Freud refers in his work on the Schreber case [1911*c*])—that the introversion of the *libido sexualis* leads to a cathexis of the "ego", and that it may possibly be this that produces the result of a loss of reality. It is indeed a tempting possibility to explain the psychology of the loss of reality in this fashion.' But Jung does not enter much further into a discussion of this possibility. A few lines³ later he dismisses it with the remark that this determinant 'would result in the psychology of an ascetic anchorite, not in a dementia praecox'. How little this inapt analogy can help us to decide the question may be learnt from the consideration that an anchorite of this kind, who 'tries to eradicate every trace of sexual interest' (but only in the popular sense of the word 'sexual'), does not even necessarily display any pathogenic allocation of the libido. He may have diverted his sexual interest from human beings entirely, and yet may have sublimated it into a heightened interest in the divine, in nature, or in the animal kingdom, without his libido having undergone an introversion on to his phantasies or a return to

¹ [The phrase is from Janet (1909): '*La fonction du réel*'. See the opening sentences of Freud, 1911*b*.]

² [In English in the original.]

³ [All the German editions read '*Seiten*' ('pages'), a misprint for '*Zeilen*'.]

his ego. This analogy would seem to rule out in advance the possibility of differentiating between interest emanating from erotic sources and from others. Let us remember, further, that the researches of the Swiss school, however valuable, have elucidated only two features in the picture of dementia praecox—the presence in it of complexes known to us both in healthy and neurotic subjects, and the similarity of the phantasies that occur in it to popular myths—but that they have not been able to throw any further light on the mechanism of the disease. We may repudiate Jung's assertion, then, that the libido theory has come to grief in the attempt to explain dementia praecox, and that it is therefore disposed of for the other neuroses as well.

II

Certain special difficulties seem to me to lie in the way of a direct study of narcissism. Our chief means of access to it will probably remain the analysis of the paraphrenias. Just as the transference neuroses have enabled us to trace the libidinal instinctual impulses, so dementia praecox and paranoia will give us an insight into the psychology of the ego. Once more, in order to arrive at an understanding of what seems so simple in normal phenomena, we shall have to turn to the field of pathology with its distortions and exaggerations. At the same time, other means of approach remain open to us, by which we may obtain a better knowledge of narcissism. These I shall now discuss in the following order: the study of organic disease, of hypochondria and of the erotic life of the sexes.

In estimating the influence of organic disease upon the distribution of libido, I follow a suggestion made to me orally by Sándor Ferenczi. It is universally known, and we take it as a matter of course, that a person who is tormented by organic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in the things of the external world, in so far as they do not concern his suffering. Closer observation teaches us that he also withdraws *libidinal* interest from his love-objects: so long as he suffers, he ceases to love. The commonplace nature of this fact is no reason why we should be deterred from translating it into terms of the libido theory. We should then say: the sick man withdraws his libidinal cathexes back upon his own ego, and sends them out again when he recovers. 'Concentrated is his soul', says Wilhelm Busch of the poet suffering from toothache, 'in his molar's narrow hole.'¹ Here libido and ego-interest share the same fate and are once more indistinguishable from each other. The familiar egoism of the sick person covers both. We find it so natural because we are certain that in the same situation we should behave in just the same way. The way in which a lover's feelings, however strong, are banished by bodily ailments, and

¹ [Einzig in der engen Höhle
Des Backenzahnes weilt die Seele.
Balduin Bählamm, Chapter VIII.]

suddenly replaced by complete indifference, is a theme which has been exploited by comic writers to an appropriate extent.

The condition of sleep, too, resembles illness in implying a narcissistic withdrawal of the positions of the libido on to the subject's own self, or, more precisely, on to the single wish to sleep. The egoism of dreams fits very well into this context. [Cf. below, p. 223.] In both states we have, if nothing else, examples of changes in the distribution of libido that are consequent upon a change in the ego.

Hypochondria, like organic disease, manifests itself in distressing and painful bodily sensations, and it has the same effect as organic disease on the distribution of libido. The hypochondriac withdraws both interest and libido—the latter specially markedly—from the objects of the external world and concentrates both of them upon the organ that is engaging his attention. A difference between hypochondria and organic disease now becomes evident: in the latter, the distressing sensations are based upon demonstrable [organic] changes; in the former, this is not so. But it would be entirely in keeping with our general conception of the processes of neurosis if we decided to say that hypochondria must be right: organic changes must be supposed to be present in it, too.

But what could these changes be? We will let ourselves be guided at this point by our experience, which shows that bodily sensations of an unpleasurable nature, comparable to those of hypochondria, occur in the other neuroses as well. I have said before that I am inclined to class hypochondria with neurasthenia and anxiety-neurosis as a third 'actual' neurosis.¹ It would probably not be going too far to suppose that in the case of the other neuroses a small amount of hypochondria was regularly formed at the same time as well. We have the best

¹ [This seems to have been first hinted at in a footnote near the end of Section II of the Schreber case (1911c). It was again briefly, though more explicitly, mentioned by Freud in his closing remarks on masturbation at a discussion in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society (1912f). He returned to the subject later towards the end of Lecture XXIV of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17). At a much earlier period, Freud had already approached the question of the relation between hypochondria and the other 'actual' neuroses. See Section I (2) of his first paper on anxiety neurosis (1895b).]

example of this, I think, in anxiety neurosis with its superstructure of hysteria. Now the familiar prototype of an organ that is painfully tender, that is in some way changed and that is yet not diseased in the ordinary sense, is the genital organ in its states of excitation. In that condition it becomes congested with blood, swollen and humected, and is the seat of a multiplicity of sensations. Let us now, taking any part of the body, describe its activity of sending sexually exciting stimuli to the mind as its 'erotogenicity', and let us further reflect that the considerations on which our theory of sexuality was based have long accustomed us to the notion that certain other parts of the body—the 'erotogenic' zones—may act as substitutes for the genitals and behave analogously to them.¹ We have then only one more step to take. We can decide to regard erotogenicity as a general characteristic of all organs and may then speak of an increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body. For every such change in the erotogenicity of the organs there might then be a parallel change of libidinal cathexis in the ego. Such factors would constitute what we believe to underlie hypochondria and what may have the same effect upon the distribution of libido as is produced by a material illness of the organs.

We see that, if we follow up this line of thought, we come up against the problem not only of hypochondria, but of the other 'actual' neuroses—neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. Let us therefore stop at this point. It is not within the scope of a purely psychological inquiry to penetrate so far behind the frontiers of physiological research. I will merely mention that from this point of view we may suspect that the relation of hypochondria to paraphrenia is similar to that of the other 'actual' neuroses to hysteria and obsessional neurosis: we may suspect, that is, that it is dependent on ego-libido just as the others are on object-libido, and that hypochondriacal anxiety is the counterpart, as coming from ego-libido, to neurotic anxiety. Further, since we are already familiar with the idea that the mechanism of falling ill and of the formation of symptoms in the transference neuroses—the path from introversion to regression—is to be linked to a damming-up of object-libido,² we may come to closer quarters with the idea of a damming-up

¹ [Cf. *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 183 f.]

² Cf. [the opening pages of] 'Types of Onset of Neurosis' (1912c).

of ego-libido as well and may bring this idea into relation with the phenomena of hypochondria and paraphrenia.

At this point, our curiosity will of course raise the question why this damming-up of libido in the ego should have to be experienced as unpleasurable. I shall content myself with the answer that unpleasure is always the expression of a higher degree of tension, and that therefore what is happening is that a quantity in the field of material events is being transformed here as elsewhere into the psychical quality of unpleasure. Nevertheless it may be that what is decisive for the generation of unpleasure is not the absolute magnitude of the material event, but rather some particular function of that absolute magnitude.¹ Here we may even venture to touch on the question of what makes it necessary at all for our mental life to pass beyond the limits of narcissism and to attach the libido to objects.² The answer which would follow from our line of thought would once more be that this necessity arises when the cathexis of the ego with libido exceeds a certain amount. A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love. This follows somewhat on the lines of Heine's picture of the psychogenesis of the Creation:

Krankheit ist wohl der letzte Grund
Des ganzen Schöpferdrangs gewesen;
Erschaffend konnte ich genesen,
Erschaffend wurde ich gesund.³

We have recognized our mental apparatus as being first and foremost a device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as distressing or would have pathogenic effects. Working them over in the mind helps remarkably towards an internal draining away of excitations which are incapable of direct discharge outwards, or for which such a

¹ [This whole question is discussed much more fully in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), below, p. 119 ff. For the use of the term 'quantity' in the last sentence, see Part I, Section 1, of Freud's 'Project' (1950a), written in 1895.]

² [A much more elaborate discussion of this problem too will be found in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), p. 134 ff. below.]

³ [God is imagined as saying: 'Illness was no doubt the final cause of the whole urge to create. By creating, I could recover; by creating, I became healthy.' *Neue Gedichte*, 'Schöpfungslieder VII'.]

discharge is for the moment undesirable. In the first instance, however, it is a matter of indifference whether this internal process of working-over is carried out upon real or imaginary objects. The difference does not appear till later—if the turning of the libido on to unreal objects (introversion) has led to its being dammed up. In paraphrenics, megalomania allows of a similar internal working-over of libido which has returned to the ego; perhaps it is only when the megalomania fails that the damming-up of libido in the ego becomes pathogenic and starts the process of recovery which gives us the impression of being a disease.

I shall try here to penetrate a little further into the mechanism of paraphrenia and shall bring together those views which already seem to me to deserve consideration. The difference between paraphrenic affections and the transference neuroses appears to me to lie in the circumstance that, in the former, the libido that is liberated by frustration does not remain attached to objects in phantasy, but withdraws on to the ego. Megalomania would accordingly correspond to the psychical mastering of this latter amount of libido, and would thus be the counterpart of the introversion on to phantasies that is found in the transference neuroses; a failure of this psychical function gives rise to the hypochondria of paraphrenia and this is homologous to the anxiety of the transference neuroses. We know that this anxiety can be resolved by further psychical working-over, i.e. by conversion, reaction-formation or the construction of protections (phobias). The corresponding process in paraphrenics is an attempt at restoration, to which the striking manifestations of the disease are due. Since paraphrenia frequently, if not usually, brings about only a *partial* detachment of the libido from objects, we can distinguish three groups of phenomena in the clinical picture: (1) those representing what remains of a normal state or of neurosis (residual phenomena); (2) those representing the morbid process (detachment of libido from its objects and, further, megalomania, hypochondria, affective disturbance and every kind of regression); (3) those representing restoration, in which the libido is once more attached to objects, after the manner of a hysteria (in dementia praecox or paraphrenia proper), or of an obsessional neurosis (in paranoia). This fresh libidinal cathexis differs from the primary one in that it starts from another level and under other

conditions.¹ The difference between the transference neuroses brought about in the case of this fresh kind of libidinal cathexis and the corresponding formations where the ego is normal should be able to afford us the deepest insight into the structure of our mental apparatus.

A third way in which we may approach the study of narcissism is by observing the erotic life of human beings, with its many kinds of differentiation in man and woman. Just as object-libido at first concealed ego-libido from our observation, so too in connection with the object-choice of infants (and of growing children) what we first noticed was that they derived their sexual objects from their experiences of satisfaction. The first auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with vital functions which serve the purpose of self-preservation. The sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts; only later do they become independent of these, and even then we have an indication of that original attachment in the fact that the persons who are concerned with a child's feeding, care, and protection become his earliest sexual objects: that is to say, in the first instance his mother or a substitute for her. Side by side, however, with this type and source of object-choice, which may be called the 'anaclitic' or 'attachment' type,² psycho-analytic research has revealed a second

¹ [See some further remarks on this at the end of the paper on 'The Unconscious' (pp. 203-4 below).]

² [*Anlehnungstypus*.] Literally, 'leaning-on type'. The term has been rendered in English as the 'anaclitic type' by analogy with the grammatical term 'enclitic', used of particles which cannot be the first word in a sentence, but must be appended to, or must lean up against, a more important one, e.g. the Latin '*enim*' or the Greek '*δέ*'. This seems to be the first published appearance of the actual term '*Anlehnungstypus*'. The idea that a child arrives at its first sexual object on the basis of its nutritional instinct is to be found in the first edition of the *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 222; but the two or three explicit mentions in that work of the 'anaclitic type' were not added to it until the 1915 edition. The concept was very clearly foreshadowed near the beginning of the second of Freud's papers on the psychology of love (1912d), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 180-1. The term '*angelehnte*' ('attached') is used in a similar sense near the beginning of Section III of the Schreber case history (1911c), but the underlying hypothesis is not stated there.—It should be noted that the 'attachment' (or '*Anlehnung*') indicated by the term is that of the sexual instincts to the ego-instincts, not of the child to its mother.]

type, which we were not prepared for finding. We have discovered, especially clearly in people whose libidinal development has suffered some disturbance, such as perverts and homosexuals, that in their later choice of love-objects they have taken as a model not their mother but their own selves. They are plainly seeking *themselves* as a love-object, and are exhibiting a type of object-choice which must be termed 'narcissistic'. In this observation we have the strongest of the reasons which have led us to adopt the hypothesis of narcissism.

We have, however, not concluded that human beings are divided into two sharply differentiated groups, according as their object-choice conforms to the anaclitic or to the narcissistic type; we assume rather that both kinds of object-choice are open to each individual, though he may show a preference for one or the other. We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects—himself and the woman who nurses him—and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone, which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object-choice.

A comparison of the male and female sexes then shows that there are fundamental differences between them in respect of their type of object-choice, although these differences are of course not universal. Complete object-love of the attachment type is, properly speaking, characteristic of the male. It displays the marked sexual overvaluation which is doubtless derived from the child's original narcissism and thus corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual object. This sexual overvaluation is the origin of the peculiar state of being in love, a state suggestive of a neurotic compulsion, which is thus traceable to an impoverishment of the ego as regards libido in favour of the love-object.¹ A different course is followed in the type of female most frequently met with, which is probably the purest and truest one. With the onset of puberty the maturing of the female sexual organs, which up till then have been in a condition of latency, seems to bring about an intensification of the original narcissism, and this is unfavourable to the development of a true object-choice with its accompanying sexual overvaluation. Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which

¹ [Freud returned to this in a discussion of being in love in Chapter VIII of his *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 112 f.]

compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their choice of object. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man's love for them. Nor does their need lie in the direction of loving, but of being loved; and the man who fulfils this condition is the one who finds favour with them. The importance of this type of woman for the erotic life of mankind is to be rated very high. Such women have the greatest fascination for men, not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule they are the most beautiful, but also because of a combination of interesting psychological factors. For it seems very evident that another person's narcissism has a great attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism and are in search of object-love. The charm of a child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his self-contentment and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as cats and the large beasts of prey. Indeed, even great criminals and humorists, as they are represented in literature, compel our interest by the narcissistic consistency with which they manage to keep away from their ego anything that would diminish it. It is as if we envied them for maintaining a blissful state of mind—an unassailable libidinal position which we ourselves have since abandoned. The great charm of narcissistic women has, however, its reverse side; a large part of the lover's dissatisfaction, of his doubts of the woman's love, of his complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its root in this incongruity between the types of object-choice.

Perhaps it is not out of place here to give an assurance that this description of the feminine form of erotic life is not due to any tendentious desire on my part to depreciate women. Apart from the fact that tendentiousness is quite alien to me, I know that these different lines of development correspond to the differentiation of functions in a highly complicated biological whole; further, I am ready to admit that there are quite a number of women who love according to the masculine type and who also develop the sexual overvaluation proper to that type.

Even for narcissistic women, whose attitude towards men remains cool, there is a road which leads to complete object-love. In the child which they bear, a part of their own body

confronts them like an extraneous object, to which, starting out from their narcissism, they can then give complete object-love. There are other women, again, who do not have to wait for a child in order to take the step in development from (secondary) narcissism to object-love. Before puberty they feel masculine and develop some way along masculine lines; after this trend has been cut short on their reaching female maturity, they still retain the capacity of longing for a masculine ideal—an ideal which is in fact a survival of the boyish nature that they themselves once possessed.¹

What I have so far said by way of indication may be concluded by a short summary of the paths leading to the choice of an object.

A person may love:—

(1) According to the narcissistic type:

- (a) what he himself is (i.e. himself),
- (b) what he himself was,
- (c) what he himself would like to be,
- (d) someone who was once part of himself.

(2) According to the anaclitic (attachment) type:

- (a) the woman who feeds him,
- (b) the man who protects him,

and the succession of substitutes who take their place. The inclusion of case (c) of the first type cannot be justified till a later stage of this discussion. [P. 101.]

The significance of narcissistic object-choice for homosexuality in men must be considered in another connection.²

The primary narcissism of children which we have assumed and which forms one of the postulates of our theories of the libido, is less easy to grasp by direct observation than to confirm by inference from elsewhere. If we look at the attitude of affectionate parents towards their children, we have to recog-

¹ [Freud developed his views on female sexuality in a number of later papers: on a case of female homosexuality (1920a), on the effects of the physiological distinctions between the sexes (1925j), on the sexuality of women (1931b) and in Lecture XXIII of his *New Introductory Lectures* (1933a).]

² [Freud had already raised this point in Section III of his study on Leonardo (1910c), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 98 ff.]

nize that it is a revival and reproduction of their own narcissism, which they have long since abandoned. The trustworthy pointer constituted by overvaluation, which we have already recognized as a narcissistic stigma in the case of object-choice, dominates, as we all know, their emotional attitude. Thus they are under a compulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child—which sober observation would find no occasion to do—and to conceal and forget all his shortcomings. (Incidentally, the denial of sexuality in children is connected with this.) Moreover, they are inclined to suspend in the child's favour the operation of all the cultural acquisitions which their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew on his behalf the claims to privileges which were long ago given up by themselves. The child shall have a better time than his parents; he shall not be subject to the necessities which they have recognized as paramount in life. Illness, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on his own will, shall not touch him; the laws of nature and of society shall be abrogated in his favour; he shall once more really be the centre and core of creation—'His Majesty the Baby',¹ as we once fancied ourselves. The child shall fulfil those wishful dreams of the parents which they never carried out—the boy shall become a great man and a hero in his father's place, and the girl shall marry a prince as a tardy compensation for her mother. At the most touchy point in the narcissistic system, the immortality of the ego, which is so hard pressed by reality, security is achieved by taking refuge in the child. Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents' narcissism born again, which, transformed into object-love, unmistakably reveals its former nature.

¹ [In English in the original. Perhaps a reference to a well-known Royal Academy picture of the Edwardian age, which bore that title and showed two London policemen holding up the crowded traffic to allow a nursery-maid to wheel a perambulator across the street.—'His Majesty the Ego' appears in Freud's earlier paper on 'Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming' (1908e).]

III

The disturbances to which a child's original narcissism is exposed, the reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the paths into which he is forced in doing so—these are themes which I propose to leave on one side, as an important field of work which still awaits exploration. The most significant portion of it, however, can be singled out in the shape of the 'castration complex' (in boys, anxiety about the penis—in girls, envy for the penis) and treated in connection with the effect of early deterrence from sexual activity. Psycho-analytic research ordinarily enables us to trace the vicissitudes undergone by the libidinal instincts when these, isolated from the ego-instincts, are placed in opposition to them; but in the particular field of the castration complex, it allows us to infer the existence of an epoch and a psychical situation in which the two groups of instincts, still operating in unison and inseparably mingled, make their appearance as narcissistic interests. It is from this context that Adler [1910] has derived his concept of the 'masculine protest', which he has elevated almost to the position of the sole motive force in the formation of character and neurosis alike and which he bases not on a narcissistic, and therefore still a libidinal, trend, but on a social valuation. Psycho-analytic research has from the very beginning recognized the existence and importance of the 'masculine protest', but it has regarded it, in opposition to Adler, as narcissistic in nature and derived from the castration complex. The 'masculine protest' is concerned in the formation of character, into the genesis of which it enters along with many other factors, but it is completely unsuited for explaining the problems of the neuroses, with regard to which Adler takes account of nothing but the manner in which they serve the ego-instincts. I find it quite impossible to place the genesis of neurosis upon the narrow basis of the castration complex, however powerfully it may come to the fore in men among their resistances to the cure of a neurosis. Incidentally, I know of cases of neurosis in which the 'masculine protest', or, as we regard it, the castration

complex, plays no pathogenic part, and even fails to appear at all.¹

Observation of normal adults shows that their former megalomania has been damped down and that the psychical characteristics from which we inferred their infantile narcissism have been effaced. What has become of their ego-libido? Are we to suppose that the whole amount of it has passed into object-cathexes? Such a possibility is plainly contrary to the whole trend of our argument; but we may find a hint at another answer to the question in the psychology of repression.

We have learnt that libidinal instinctual impulses undergo the vicissitude of pathogenic repression if they come into conflict with the subject's cultural and ethical ideas. By this we never mean that the individual in question has a merely intellectual knowledge of the existence of such ideas; we always mean that he recognizes them as a standard for himself and submits to the claims they make on him. Repression, we have said, proceeds from the ego; we might say with greater precision that it proceeds from the self-respect of the ego. The same impressions, experiences, impulses and desires that one man indulges or at least works over consciously will be rejected with the utmost indignation by another, or even stifled before they enter consciousness.² The difference between the two, which contains the conditioning factor of repression, can easily be expressed in terms which enable it to be explained by the libido theory. We can say that the one man has set up an *ideal* in himself by which he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no

¹ [In a letter dated September 30, 1926, replying to a question from Dr. Edoardo Weiss (who has kindly brought it to our attention), Freud wrote: 'Your question, in connection with my assertion in my paper on Narcissism, as to whether there are neuroses in which the castration complex plays no part, puts me in an embarrassing position. I no longer recollect what it was I had in mind at the time. To-day, it is true, I could not name any neurosis in which this complex is not to be met with, and in any case I should not have written the sentence to-day. But we know so little of the whole subject that I should prefer not to give a final decision either way.'—A further criticism of Adler's views on the 'masculine protest' will be found in the 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', p. 54 f. above.]

² [Cf. some remarks in the paper on repression (1915*d*), below, p. 150.]

such ideal. For the ego the formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression.¹

This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value. As always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed. He is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the awakening of his own critical judgement, so that he can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal.²

We are naturally led to examine the relation between this forming of an ideal and sublimation. Sublimation is a process that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct's directing itself towards an aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual satisfaction; in this process the accent falls upon deflection from sexuality. Idealization is a process that concerns the *object*; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido. For example, the sexual overvaluation of an object is an idealization of it. In so far as sublimation describes something that has to do with the instinct and idealization something to do with the object, the two concepts are to be distinguished from each other.³

The formation of an ego ideal is often confused with the sublimation of instinct, to the detriment of our understanding of the facts. A man who has exchanged his narcissism for homage to a high ego ideal has not necessarily on that account succeeded in sublimating his libidinal instincts. It is true that the ego

¹ [A comment on this sentence will be found in a footnote to Chapter XI of *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 131 n.]

² [In the editions previous to 1924 this read '... is only the substitute ...']

³ [Freud recurs to the topic of idealization in Chapter VIII of his *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 112 f.]

ideal demands such sublimation, but it cannot enforce it; sublimation remains a special process which may be prompted by the ideal but the execution of which is entirely independent of any such prompting. It is precisely in neurotics that we find the highest differences of potential between the development of their ego ideal and the amount of sublimation of their primitive libidinal instincts; and in general it is far harder to convince an idealist of the inexpedient location of his libido than a plain man whose pretensions have remained more moderate. Further, the formation of an ego ideal and sublimation are quite differently related to the causation of neurosis. As we have learnt, the formation of an ideal heightens the demands of the ego and is the most powerful factor favouring repression; sublimation is a way out, a way by which those demands can be met *without* involving repression.¹

It would not surprise us if we were to find a special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured and which, with this end in view, constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal.² If such an agency does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a *discovery*—we can only *recognize* it; for we may reflect that what we call our ‘conscience’ has the required characteristics. Recognition of this agency enables us to understand the so-called ‘delusions of being noticed’ or more correctly, of being *watched*, which are such striking symptoms in the paranoid diseases and which may also occur as an isolated form of illness, or intercalated in a transference neurosis. Patients of this sort complain that all their thoughts are known and their actions watched and supervised; they are informed of the functioning of this agency by voices which characteristically speak to them in the third person (‘Now she’s thinking of that again’, ‘now he’s going out’). This complaint is justified; it describes the truth. A power of this kind, watching, discovering and criticizing all our intentions, does really exist. Indeed, it exists in every one of us in normal life.

¹ [The possible connection between sublimation and the transformation of sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido is discussed by Freud towards the beginning of Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).]

² [It was from a combination of this agency and the ego ideal that Freud was later to evolve the super-ego. Cf. Chapter XI of *Group Psychology* (1921c) and Chapter II of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).]

Delusions of being watched present this power in a regressive form, thus revealing its genesis and the reason why the patient is in revolt against it. For what prompted the subject to form an ego ideal, on whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his environment—his fellow-men—and public opinion.

In this way large amounts of libido of an essentially homosexual kind are drawn into the formation of the narcissistic ego ideal and find outlet and satisfaction in maintaining it. The institution of conscience was at bottom an embodiment, first of parental criticism, and subsequently of that of society—a process which is repeated in what takes place when a tendency towards repression develops out of a prohibition or obstacle that came in the first instance from without. The voices, as well as the undefined multitude, are brought into the foreground again by the disease, and so the evolution of conscience is reproduced regressively. But the revolt against this 'censoring agency' arises out of the subject's desire (in accordance with the fundamental character of his illness) to liberate himself from all these influences, beginning with the parental one, and out of his withdrawal of homosexual libido from them. His conscience then confronts him in a regressive form as a hostile influence from without.

The complaints made by paranoics also show that at bottom the self-criticism of conscience coincides with the self-observation on which it is based. Thus the activity of the mind which has taken over the function of conscience has also placed itself at the service of internal research, which furnishes philosophy with the material for its intellectual operations. This may have some bearing on the characteristic tendency of paranoics to construct speculative systems.¹

It will certainly be of importance to us if evidence of the

¹ I should like to add to this, merely by way of suggestion, that the developing and strengthening of this observing agency might contain within it the subsequent genesis of (subjective) memory and the time-factor, the latter of which has no application to unconscious processes. [For some further light on these two points see 'The Unconscious', pp. 187 and 188-9 below.]

activity of this critically observing agency—which becomes heightened into conscience and philosophic introspection—can be found in other fields as well. I will mention here what Herbert Silberer has called the ‘functional phenomenon’, one of the few indisputably valuable additions to the theory of dreams. Silberer, as we know, has shown that in states between sleeping and waking we can directly observe the translation of thoughts into visual images, but that in these circumstances we frequently have a representation, not of a thought-content, but of the actual state (willingness, fatigue, etc.) of the person who is struggling against sleep. Similarly, he has shown that the conclusions of some dreams or some divisions in their content merely signify the dreamer’s own perception of his sleeping and waking. Silberer has thus demonstrated the part played by observation—in the sense of the paranoid’s delusions of being watched—in the formation of dreams. This part is not a constant one. Probably the reason why I overlooked it is because it does not play any great part in my own dreams; in persons who are gifted philosophically and accustomed to introspection it may become very evident.¹

We may here recall that we have found that the formation of dreams takes place under the dominance of a censorship which compels distortion of the dream-thoughts. We did not, however, picture this censorship as a special power, but chose the term to designate one side of the repressive trends that govern the ego, namely the side which is turned towards the dream-thoughts. If we enter further into the structure of the ego, we may recognize in the ego ideal and in the dynamic utterances of conscience the *dream-censor*² as well. If this censor is to some extent on the alert even during sleep, we can

¹ [See Silberer (1909 and 1911). In 1914—the year in which he wrote the present paper—Freud added a much longer discussion of this phenomenon to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Standard Ed., 5, 503–6).]

² [Here and at the beginning of the next sentence, as well as below on p. 100, Freud makes use of the personal form, ‘*Zensor*’, instead of his almost universal ‘*Zensur*’ (‘censorship’). Cf. a footnote to the passage in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, referred to in the last footnote (Standard Ed., 5, 505). The distinction between the two words is clearly brought out in a sentence near the end of Lecture XXVI of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17): ‘We know the self-observing agency as the ego-censor, the conscience; it is this that exercises the dream-censorship during the night.’]

understand how it is that its suggested activity of self-observation and self-criticism—with such thoughts as, ‘now he is too sleepy to think’, ‘now he is waking up’—makes a contribution to the content of the dream.¹

At this point we may attempt some discussion of the self-regarding attitude in normal people and in neurotics.

In the first place self-regard appears to us to be an expression of the size of the ego; what the various elements are which go to determine that size is irrelevant. Everything a person possesses or achieves, every remnant of the primitive feeling of omnipotence which his experience has confirmed, helps to increase his self-regard.

Applying our distinction between sexual and ego-instincts, we must recognize that self-regard has a specially intimate dependence on narcissistic libido. Here we are supported by two fundamental facts: that in paraphrenics self-regard is increased, while in the transference neuroses it is diminished; and that in love-relations not being loved lowers the self-regarding feelings, while being loved raises them. As we have indicated, the aim and the satisfaction in a narcissistic object-choice is to be loved.²

Further, it is easy to observe that libidinal object-cathexis does not raise self-regard. The effect of dependence upon the loved object is to lower that feeling: a person in love is humble. A person who loves has, so to speak, forfeited a part of his narcissism, and it can only be replaced by his being loved. In all these respects self-regard seems to remain related to the narcissistic element in love.

The realization of impotence, of one's own inability to love, in consequence of mental or physical disorder, has an exceedingly lowering effect upon self-regard. Here, in my judgement, we must look for one of the sources of the feelings of inferiority which are experienced by patients suffering from the transference neuroses and which they are so ready to report. The main source of these feelings is, however, the impoverishment of the ego, due to the extraordinarily large libidinal cathexes

¹ I cannot here determine whether the differentiation of the censoring agency from the rest of the ego is capable of forming the basis of the philosophic distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness.

² [This subject is enlarged on by Freud in Chapter VIII of his *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 113 f.]

which have been withdrawn from it—due, that is to say, to the injury sustained by the ego through sexual trends which are no longer subject to control.

Adler [1907] is right in maintaining that when a person with an active mental life recognizes an inferiority in one of his organs, it acts as a spur and calls out a higher level of performance in him through overcompensation. But it would be altogether an exaggeration if, following Adler's example, we sought to attribute every successful achievement to this factor of an original inferiority of an organ. Not all artists are handicapped with bad eyesight, nor were all orators originally stammerers. And there are plenty of instances of excellent achievements springing from *superior* organic endowment. In the aetiology of neuroses organic inferiority and imperfect development play an insignificant part—much the same as that played by currently active perceptual material in the formation of dreams. Neuroses make use of such inferiorities as a pretext, just as they do of every other suitable factor. We may be tempted to believe a neurotic woman patient when she tells us that it was inevitable she should fall ill, since she is ugly, deformed or lacking in charm, so that no one could love her; but the very next neurotic will teach us better—for she persists in her neurosis and in her aversion to sexuality, although she seems more desirable, and is more desired, than the average woman. The majority of hysterical women are among the attractive and even beautiful representatives of their sex, while, on the other hand, the frequency of ugliness, organic defects and infirmities in the lower classes of society does not increase the incidence of neurotic illness among them.

The relations of self-regard to erotism—that is, to libidinal object-cathexes—may be expressed concisely in the following way. Two cases must be distinguished, according to whether the erotic cathexes are ego-syntonic, or, on the contrary, have suffered repression. In the former case (where the use made of the libido is ego-syntonic), love is assessed like any other activity of the ego. Loving in itself, in so far as it involves longing and deprivation, lowers self-regard; whereas being loved, having one's love returned, and possessing the loved object, raises it once more. When libido is repressed, the erotic cathexis is felt as a severe depletion of the ego, the satisfaction of love is impossible, and the re-enrichment of the ego can be effected only by

a withdrawal of libido from its objects. The return of the object-libido to the ego and its transformation into narcissism represents,¹ as it were, a happy love once more; and, on the other hand, it is also true that a real happy love corresponds to the primal condition in which object-libido and ego-libido cannot be distinguished.

The importance and extensiveness of the topic must be my justification for adding a few more remarks which are somewhat loosely strung together.

The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido on to an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling this ideal.

At the same time the ego has sent out the libidinal object-cathexes. It becomes impoverished in favour of these cathexes, just as it does in favour of the ego ideal, and it enriches itself once more from its satisfactions in respect of the object, just as it does by fulfilling its ideal.

One part of self-regard is primary—the residue of infantile narcissism; another part arises out of the omnipotence which is corroborated by experience (the fulfilment of the ego ideal), whilst a third part proceeds from the satisfaction of object-libido.

The ego ideal has imposed severe conditions upon the satisfaction of libido through objects; for it causes some of them to be rejected by means of its censor,² as being incompatible. Where no such ideal has been formed, the sexual trend in question makes its appearance unchanged in the personality in the form of a perversion. To be their own ideal once more, in regard to sexual no less than other trends, as they were in childhood—this is what people strive to attain as their happiness.

Being in love consists in a flowing-over of ego-libido on to the object. It has the power to remove repressions and re-instate perversions. It exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal. Since, with the object type (or attachment type), being in love occurs

¹ [*Darstellt.* In the first edition only: *herstellt*, 'establishes'.]

² [See footnote, p. 97.]

in virtue of the fulfilment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say that whatever fulfils that condition is idealized.

The sexual ideal may enter into an interesting auxiliary relation to the ego ideal. It may be used for substitutive satisfaction where narcissistic satisfaction encounters real hindrances. In that case a person will love in conformity with the narcissistic type of object-choice, will love what he once was and no longer is, or else what possesses the excellences which he never had at all (cf. (c) [p. 90]). The formula parallel to the one there stated runs thus: what possesses the excellence which the ego lacks for making it an ideal, is loved. This expedient is of special importance for the neurotic, who, on account of his excessive object-cathexes, is impoverished in his ego and is incapable of fulfilling his ego ideal. He then seeks a way back to narcissism from his prodigal expenditure of libido upon objects, by choosing a sexual ideal after the narcissistic type which possesses the excellences to which he cannot attain. This is the cure by love, which he generally prefers to cure by analysis. Indeed, he cannot believe in any other mechanism of cure; he usually brings expectations of this sort with him to the treatment and directs them towards the person of the physician. The patient's incapacity for love, resulting from his extensive repressions, naturally stands in the way of a therapeutic plan of this kind. An unintended result is often met with when, by means of the treatment, he has been partially freed from his repressions: he withdraws from further treatment in order to choose a love-object, leaving his cure to be continued by a life with someone he loves. We might be satisfied with this result, if it did not bring with it all the dangers of a crippling dependence upon his helper in need.

The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation. It binds not only a person's narcissistic libido, but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido,¹ which is in this way turned back into the ego. The want of satisfaction which arises from the non-fulfilment of this ideal

¹ [The importance of homosexuality in the structure of groups had been hinted at in *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13), *Standard Ed.*, 13, 144, and was again referred to in *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 124 n. and 141.]

liberates homosexual libido, and this is transformed into a sense of guilt (social anxiety). Originally this sense of guilt was a fear of punishment by the parents, or, more correctly, the fear of losing their love; later the parents are replaced by an indefinite number of fellow-men. The frequent causation of paranoia by an injury to the ego, by a frustration of satisfaction within the sphere of the ego ideal, is thus made more intelligible, as is the convergence of ideal-formation and sublimation in the ego ideal, as well as the involution of sublimations and the possible transformation of ideals in paraphrenic disorders.

PAPERS ON METAPSYCHOLOGY
[1915]

PAPERS ON METAPSYCHOLOGY

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

FREUD published his first extended account of his views on psychological theory in the seventh chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), which incorporated, in a transmuted form, much of the substance of his earlier, unpublished 'Project' (1950*a* [1895]). Apart from occasional short discussions, such as the one in Chapter VI of his book on jokes (1905*c*), ten years passed before he again began to enter deeply into theoretical problems. An exploratory paper on 'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911*b*) was followed by other more or less tentative approaches—in Part III of his Schreber analysis (1911*c*), in his English paper on the unconscious (1912*g*), and in the long discussion of narcissism (1914*c*). Finally, in the spring and summer of 1915, he once more undertook a full-length and systematic exposition of his psychological theories.

The five papers which follow form an interconnected series. As we learn from a footnote to the fourth of them (p. 222), they are part of a collection which Freud had originally planned to publish in book form under the title *Zur Vorbereitung einer Metapsychologie* (*Preliminaries to a Metapsychology*).¹ He adds that the intention of the series was to provide a stable theoretical foundation for psycho-analysis.

Though the first three of these papers were published in 1915 and the last two in 1917, we learn from Dr. Ernest Jones (1955, 208) that they were in fact all written in a period of some seven weeks between March 15 and May 4, 1915. We also learn from Dr. Jones (*ibid.*, 209) that seven more papers were added to the series during the following three months, the whole collection of twelve being completed by August 9. These further seven papers, however, were never published by Freud and it seems probable that at some later date he destroyed them,

¹ In *G.S.*, 5 (1924), 432, the paper written by Freud for the Society for Psychical Research (1912*g*) is included under the rubric 'Papers on Metapsychology' along with the present five papers. It did not, however, form part of the original collection.

for no trace of them has been found and indeed their very existence was unknown or forgotten until Dr. Jones came to examine Freud's letters. At the time he was writing them in 1915 he kept his correspondents (Abraham, Ferenczi and Jones) informed of his progress; but there seems to be only a single reference to them afterwards, in a letter to Abraham in November, 1917. This must have been written at about the time of publication of the last two papers to appear, and it seems to imply that the seven others were still in existence then and that he still intended to publish them, though he felt that an opportune moment had not yet arrived.

We are told the subjects with which five of the last seven papers dealt: Consciousness, Anxiety, Conversion Hysteria, Obsessional Neurosis and the Transference Neuroses in General; and we can detect possible references to them in the surviving papers. We can even guess the subjects which the two unspecified papers may have discussed—namely, Sublimation and Projection¹ (or Paranoia)—for there are fairly plain allusions to these. The collection of twelve papers would thus have been a comprehensive one, dealing with the underlying processes in most of the principal neuroses and psychoses (conversion hysteria, anxiety hysteria, obsessional neurosis, manic-depressive insanity and paranoia) as well as in dreams, with the mental mechanisms of repression, sublimation, introjection and projection, and with the two mental systems of consciousness and the unconscious.

It is difficult to exaggerate our loss from the disappearance of these papers. There was a unique conjunction of favourable factors at the time at which Freud wrote them. His previous major theoretical work (the seventh chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams*) had been written fifteen years before, at a relatively early stage of his psychological studies. Now, however, he had some twenty-five years of psycho-analytic experience behind him on which to base his theoretical constructions, while he remained at the summit of his intellectual powers. And it was at this time that the accidental circumstance of the shrinking of his practice owing to the outbreak of the first World

¹ In Part III of the Schreber analysis (1911c), Freud discussed the mechanism of projection, but professed himself dissatisfied and promised to consider it more fully in a later work. This he seems never to have done, unless it was in one of these missing papers.

War gave him the necessary leisure for five months in which to carry through his attempt. We may try to console ourselves, no doubt, with the reflection that much of the contents of the lost papers must have found its way into Freud's later writings. But we would give a great deal to possess connected discussions on such questions as consciousness or sublimation in place of the scattered and relatively meagre allusions with which we have in fact to rest satisfied.

In view of the special importance of this series of papers, the closeness of their reasoning and the occasional abstruseness of the topics with which they deal, particular efforts have been made to render them with accuracy. The translation has throughout (and especially where there are doubtful passages) been kept as close as possible to the German, even at the risk of its reading stiffly. (Such un-English terms, for instance, as 'the repressed' and 'the mental' have been freely used.) Although the version published in 1925 has been taken as a basis, what follows is in effect an entirely new one. It has also seemed reasonable to include more than the usual quantity of introductory material, to annotate the text very freely, and in particular to give ample references to other parts of Freud's writings which may throw light on any obscurities. A list of the more important of his theoretical works will be found in an appendix at the end of the series (p. 259).

Extracts from the translations published in 1925 of 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', 'Repression', and 'Mourning and Melancholia' were included in Rickman's *A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud* (1937, 79-98, 99-110 and 142-161).

INSTINCTS AND THEIR VICISSITUDES
(1915)

EDITOR'S NOTE

TRIEBE UND TRIEBSCHICKSALE

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1915 *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 3 (2), 84-100.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 252-278. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 443-465.
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 165-187.
1931 *Theoretische Schriften*, 58-82.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 210-232.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'Instincts and their Vicissitudes'

- 1925 *C.P.*, 4, 69-83. (Tr. C. M. Baines.)

The present translation, though based on that of 1925, has been very largely rewritten.

Freud began writing this paper on March 15, 1915; it and the following one ('Repression') had been completed by April 4.

It should be remarked by way of preface that here (and throughout the *Standard Edition*) the English word 'instinct' stands for the German '*Trieb*'. The choice of this English equivalent rather than such possible alternatives as 'drive' or 'urge' is discussed in the General Introduction to the first volume of the edition. The word 'instinct' is in any case not used here in the sense which seems at the moment to be the most current among biologists. But Freud shows in the course of this paper the meaning which he attaches to the word so translated. Incidentally, on p. 195 below, in the paper on 'The Unconscious', he himself uses the German word '*Instinkt*', though possibly in a rather different sense.

There is, however, an ambiguity in Freud's use of the term '*Trieb*' ('instinct') and '*Triebrepräsentanz*' ('instinctual representative') to which, for the sake of clearer understanding,

attention must be drawn. On pp. 121–2 he describes an instinct as ‘a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, . . . the psychical representative¹ of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind’. He had twice before given descriptions in almost the same words. Some years earlier, towards the end of Section III of his discussion of the case of Schreber (1911c), he wrote of instinct as ‘the concept on the frontier between the somatic and the mental . . . , the psychical representative of organic forces’. And again, in a passage probably written a few months before the present paper and added to the third edition (published in 1915, but with a preface dated ‘October 1914’) of his *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 168, he wrote of instinct as ‘the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation . . . a concept lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical’. These three accounts seem to make it plain that Freud was drawing no distinction between an instinct and its ‘psychical representative’. He was apparently regarding the instinct itself as the psychical representative of somatic forces. If now, however, we turn to the later papers in this series, we seem to find him drawing a very sharp distinction between the instinct and its psychical representative. This is perhaps shown most clearly in a passage in ‘The Unconscious’ (p. 177): ‘An instinct can never become an object of consciousness—only the idea [*Vorstellung*] that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea. . . . When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual impulse . . . we can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational representative of which is unconscious.’ This same view appears in many other passages. For instance,

¹ The German word here and in the Schreber quotation is ‘*Repräsentant*’, a particularly formal word used mainly in legal or constitutional language. In all the other quotations which follow, as well as almost invariably later, Freud writes ‘*Repräsentanz*’, which is a more abstract form and would be better rendered by ‘representance’ if it existed, or by ‘representation’ if it were not so exceedingly ambiguous. (‘*Vertretung*’, the ordinary German word for ‘representation’, appears in a parallel passage in the original text of Freud’s *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article, 1926f.) In many places Freud uses the compound ‘*Triebrepräsentanz*’, which means ‘representative of an instinct’ but is usually abbreviated here into ‘instinctual representative’.

in 'Repression' (p. 148) Freud speaks of 'the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct' and goes on: '... the representative in question persists unaltered and the instinct remains attached to it'; and again, in the same paper (p. 152), he writes of an instinctual representative as 'an idea or group of ideas which is cathected with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido, interest) coming from an instinct', and proceeds to say that 'besides the idea, some other element representing the instinct has to be taken into account'. In this second group of quotations, therefore, the instinct is no longer regarded as being the psychical representative of somatic impulses but rather as itself being something non-psychical. Both of these apparently differing views of the nature of an instinct are to be found elsewhere in Freud's later writings, though the second predominates. It may be, however, that the contradiction is more apparent than real, and that its solution lies precisely in the ambiguity of the concept itself—a frontier-concept between the physical and the mental.

In a number of passages Freud expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of psychological knowledge about the instincts. Not long before, for instance, in his paper on narcissism (1914c, p. 78 above), he had complained of 'the total absence of any theory of the instincts which would help us to find our bearings'. Later, too, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 34, he wrote of the instincts as 'at once the most important and the most obscure element of psychological research', and in his *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article (1926f) he confessed that 'for psycho-analysis too the theory of the instincts is an obscure region'. The present paper is a relatively early attempt to deal with the subject comprehensively. Its many successors corrected and supplemented it at a number of points, but it nevertheless holds the field as the clearest account of what Freud understood by the instincts and of the way in which he thought they operated. Subsequent reflection, it is true, led him to alter his views on their classification as well as on their deeper determinants; but this paper is an indispensable basis for understanding the developments that were to follow.

The course of Freud's changing views on the classification of the instincts may perhaps be appropriately summarized here. It is a surprising fact that the instincts make their explicit

appearance at a comparatively late point in the sequence of his writings. The word 'instinct' is scarcely to be found in the works of the Breuer period or in the Fliess correspondence or even in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a). Not until the *Three Essays* (1905d) is the 'sexual instinct' freely mentioned as such; the 'instinctual impulses',¹ which were to become one of Freud's commonest terms, seem not to appear till the paper on 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' (1907b). But this is mainly no more than a *verbal* point: the instincts were of course there under other names. Their place was taken to a great extent by such things as 'excitations', 'affective ideas', 'wishful impulses', 'endogenous stimuli', and so on. For instance, a distinction is drawn below (p. 118) between a 'stimulus', which operates as a force giving a single impact, and an 'instinct', which always operates as a constant one. This precise distinction had been drawn by Freud twenty years earlier in almost identical words except that instead of 'stimulus' and 'instinct' he spoke of 'exogenous' and 'endogenous excitations'.² Similarly, Freud points out below (p. 119) that the primitive organism cannot take evasive action against instinctual needs as it can against external stimuli. In this case too he had anticipated the idea twenty years before, though once again the term used was 'endogenous stimuli'. This second passage, in Section 1 of Part I of the 'Project' (1950a [1895]), goes on to say that these endogenous stimuli 'have their origin in the cells of the body and give rise to the major needs: hunger, respiration and sexuality', but nowhere here is the actual word 'instinct' to be found.

The conflict which underlies the psychoneuroses was at this early period sometimes described as being between 'the ego' and 'sexuality'; and though the term 'libido' was often used, the concept was of a manifestation of 'somatic sexual tension', which in its turn was regarded as a chemical event. Only in the *Three Essays* was libido explicitly established as an expression of the sexual instinct. The other party to the conflict, 'the ego', remained undefined for much longer. It was chiefly discussed in connection with its functions—in particular 'repression', 'resistance' and 'reality-testing'—but (apart from a very early

¹ 'Triebregungen.'

² See the end of Section II of Freud's first paper on anxiety neurosis (1895b).

attempt in Section 14 of Part I of the 'Project') little was said either of its structure or dynamics.¹ The 'self-preservative' instincts had scarcely ever been referred to, except indirectly in connection with the theory that the libido had attached itself to them in the earlier phases of its development;² and there seemed no obvious reason for connecting them with the part played by the ego as the repressive agent in neurotic conflicts. Then, with apparent suddenness, in a short paper on psychogenic disturbance of vision (1910i), Freud introduced the term 'ego-instincts' and identified these on the one hand with the self-preservative instincts and on the other with the repressive function. From this time forward the conflict was regularly represented as being between two sets of instincts—the libido and the ego-instincts.

The introduction of the concept of 'narcissism', however, raised a complication. In his paper on that theory (1914c), Freud advanced the notion of 'ego-libido' (or 'narcissistic libido') which cathects the ego, as contrasted with 'object-libido' which cathects objects (p. 76 above). A passage in that paper (*loc. cit.*) as well as a remark in the present one (p. 124) show that he was already feeling uneasy as to whether his 'dualistic' classification of the instincts would hold. It is true that in the Schreber analysis (1911c) he insisted on the difference between 'ego-cathexes' and 'libido' and between 'interest emanating from erotic sources' and 'interest in general'—a distinction which re-appears in the rejoinder to Jung in the paper on narcissism (pp. 80–1 above). The term 'interest' is used again in the present paper (p. 135); and in Lecture XXVI of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17) 'ego-interest' or simply 'interest' is regularly contrasted with 'libido'. Nevertheless, the exact nature of these non-libidinal instincts was obscure. The turning-point in Freud's classification of the instincts was reached in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g). In Chapter VI of that work he frankly recognized the difficulty of the position that had been reached, and explicitly declared that 'narcissistic libido was of

¹ Cf. the end of the Editor's Note to the paper on Narcissism (p. 71 above), and a discussion of 'reality-testing' in the Editor's Note to 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams' (p. 220 below).

² See, for instance, a passage in the *Three Essays*, *Standard Ed.*, 7, 181–2, where, however, the explicit mention of self-preservation was added in 1915.

course a manifestation of the force of the sexual instinct' and that 'it had to be identified with the "self-preservative instincts".' (*Standard Ed.*, 18, 50 ff.) He still held, however, that there were ego-instincts and object-instincts other than libidinal ones; and it was here that, still adhering to a dualistic view, he introduced his hypothesis of the death-instinct. An account of the development of his views on the classification of the instincts up to that point was given in the long footnote at the end of Chapter VI of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, *Standard Ed.*, 18, 60-1, and a further discussion of the subject, in the light of his newly completed picture of the structure of the mind, occupied Chapter IV of *The Ego and the Id* (1923*b*). He traversed the whole ground once again in much detail in Chapter VI of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930*a*), and he there for the first time gave especial consideration to the aggressive and destructive instincts. He had earlier paid little attention to these except where (as in sadism and masochism) they were fused with libidinal elements; but he now discussed them in their pure form and explained them as derivatives of the death-instinct. A still later review of the subject will be found in the second half of Lecture XXXII of the *New Introductory Lectures* (1933*a*) and a final summary in Chapter II of the posthumous *Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1940*a* [1938]).¹

¹ Some remarks on the destructive instinct and the possibility of its sublimation are contained in two letters of Freud's to Princess Marie Bonaparte of May 27 and June 17, 1937. They are printed in Appendix I (Nos. 34 and 35) of the third volume of Ernest Jones's biography (1957).

INSTINCTS AND THEIR VICISSITUDES

WE have often heard it maintained that sciences should be built up on clear and sharply defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them. Even at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations alone. Such ideas—which will later become the basic concepts of the science—are still more indispensable as the material is further worked over. They must at first necessarily possess some degree of indefiniteness; there can be no question of any clear delimitation of their content. So long as they remain in this condition, we come to an understanding about their meaning by making repeated references to the material of observation from which they appear to have been derived, but upon which, in fact, they have been imposed. Thus, strictly speaking, they are in the nature of conventions—although everything depends on their not being arbitrarily chosen but determined by their having significant relations to the empirical material, relations that we seem to sense before we can clearly recognize and demonstrate them. It is only after more thorough investigation of the field of observation that we are able to formulate its basic scientific concepts with increased precision, and progressively so to modify them that they become serviceable and consistent over a wide area. Then, indeed, the time may have come to confine them in definitions. The advance of knowledge, however, does not tolerate any rigidity even in definitions. Physics furnishes an excellent illustration of the way in which even ‘basic concepts’ that have been established in the form of definitions are constantly being altered in their content.¹

A conventional basic concept of this kind, which at the

¹ [A similar line of thought had been developed in the paper on narcissism (1914c, p. 77 above).]

moment is still somewhat obscure but which is indispensable to us in psychology, is that of an 'instinct'.¹ Let us try to give a content to it by approaching it from different angles.

First, from the angle of *physiology*. This has given us the concept of a 'stimulus' and the pattern of the reflex arc, according to which a stimulus applied to living tissue (nervous substance) *from* the outside is discharged by action *to* the outside. This action is expedient in so far as it withdraws the stimulated substance from the influence of the stimulus, removes it out of its range of operation.

What is the relation of 'instinct' to 'stimulus'? There is nothing to prevent our subsuming the concept of 'instinct' under that of 'stimulus' and saying that an instinct is a stimulus applied to the mind. But we are immediately set on our guard against *equating* instinct and mental stimulus. There are obviously other stimuli to the mind besides those of an instinctual kind, stimuli which behave far more like physiological ones. For example, when a strong light falls on the eye, it is not an instinctual stimulus; it *is* one, however, when a dryness of the mucous membrane of the pharynx or an irritation of the mucous membrane of the stomach makes itself felt.²

We have now obtained the material necessary for distinguishing between instinctual stimuli and other (physiological) stimuli that operate on the mind. In the first place, an instinctual stimulus does not arise from the external world but from within the organism itself. For this reason it operates differently upon the mind and different actions are necessary in order to remove it. Further, all that is essential in a stimulus is covered if we assume that it operates with a single impact, so that it can be disposed of by a single expedient action. A typical instance of this is motor flight from the source of stimulation. These impacts may, of course, be repeated and summated, but that makes no difference to our notion of the process and to the conditions for the removal of the stimulus. An instinct, on the other hand, never operates as a force giving a *momentary* impact but always as a *constant* one. Moreover, since it impinges not from without but from within the organism, no flight can avail against it. A better term for an instinctual stimulus is a

¹ ['*Trieb*' in the original. See Editor's Note, p. 111.]

² Assuming, of course, that these internal processes are the organic basis of the respective needs of thirst and hunger.

'need'. What does away with a need is 'satisfaction'. This can be attained only by an appropriate ('adequate') alteration of the internal source of stimulation.

Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an almost entirely helpless living organism, as yet unorientated in the world, which is receiving stimuli in its nervous substance.¹ This organism will very soon be in a position to make a first distinction and a first orientation. On the one hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes to an external world. On the other hand, it will also be aware of stimuli against which such action is of no avail and whose character of constant pressure persists in spite of it; these stimuli are the signs of an internal world, the evidence of instinctual needs. The perceptual substance of the living organism will thus have found in the efficacy of its muscular activity a basis for distinguishing between an 'outside' and an 'inside'.²

We thus arrive at the essential nature of instincts in the first place by considering their main characteristics—their origin in sources of stimulation within the organism and their appearance as a constant force—and from this we deduce one of their further features, namely, that no actions of flight avail against them. In the course of this discussion, however, we cannot fail to be struck by something that obliges us to make a further admission. In order to guide us in dealing with the field of psychological phenomena, we do not merely apply certain conventions to our empirical material as basic *concepts*; we also

¹ [The hypothesis which follows concerning the behaviour of a primitive living organism, and the postulation of a fundamental 'principle of constancy', had been stated in similar terms in some of the very earliest of Freud's psychological works. See, for instance, Chapter VII, Sections C and E, of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 565 ff. and 598 ff. But it had been expressed still earlier in *neurological* terms in his posthumously published 'Project' of 1895 (1950a, Part I, Section 1), as well as, more briefly, in his lecture on the Breuer and Freud 'Preliminary Communication' (1893h) and in the penultimate paragraph of his French paper on hysterical paralyses (1893c). Freud returned to the hypothesis once more, in Chapters I and IV of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 1 ff. and 26 ff.; and reconsidered it in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c). Cf. footnote, p. 121 below.]

² [See further below, p. 134 ff. Freud dealt with the subject later in his paper on 'Negation' (1925h) and in Chapter I of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930a).]

make use of a number of complicated *postulates*. We have already alluded to the most important of these, and all we need now do is to state it expressly. This postulate is of a biological nature, and makes use of the concept of 'purpose' (or perhaps of expediency) and runs as follows: the nervous system is an apparatus which has the function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which, if it were feasible, would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition.¹ Let us for the present not take exception to the indefiniteness of this idea and let us assign to the nervous system the task—speaking in general terms—of *mastering stimuli*. We then see how greatly the simple pattern of the physiological reflex is complicated by the introduction of instincts. External stimuli impose only the single task of withdrawing from them; this is accomplished by muscular movements, one of which eventually achieves that aim and thereafter, being the expedient movement, becomes a hereditary disposition. Instinctual stimuli, which originate from within the organism, cannot be dealt with by this mechanism. Thus they make far higher demands on the nervous system and cause it to undertake involved and interconnected activities by which the external world is so changed as to afford satisfaction to the internal source of stimulation. Above all, they oblige the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli, for they maintain an incessant and unavoidable afflux of stimulation. We may therefore well conclude that instincts and not external stimuli are the true motive forces behind the advances that have led the nervous system, with its unlimited capacities, to its present high level of development. There is naturally nothing to prevent our supposing that the instincts themselves are, at least in part, precipitates of the effects of external stimulation, which in the course of phylogenesis have brought about modifications in the living substance.

When we further find that the activity of even the most highly developed mental apparatus is subject to the pleasure principle, i.e. is automatically regulated by feelings belonging to the pleasure-unpleasure series, we can hardly reject the further hypothesis that these feelings reflect the manner in which the process of mastering stimuli takes place—certainly in the sense that unpleasurable feelings are connected with an increase

¹ [This is the 'principle of constancy'. See footnote 1 above, p. 119].

and pleasurable feelings with a decrease of stimulus. We will, however, carefully preserve this assumption in its present highly indefinite form, until we succeed, if that is possible, in discovering what sort of relation exists between pleasure and unpleasure, on the one hand, and fluctuations in the amounts of stimulus affecting mental life, on the other. It is certain that many very various relations of this kind, and not very simple ones, are possible.¹

If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a *biological* point of view, an 'instinct' appears to us as a concept

¹ [It will be seen that two principles are here involved. One of these is the 'principle of constancy' (see above, p. 120, and footnote 1, p. 119). It is stated again in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 1920g, Chapter I (*Standard Ed.*, 18, 9), as follows: 'The mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant.' For this principle Freud, in the same work (*ibid.*, 56), adopted the term 'Nirvana principle'. The second principle involved is the 'pleasure principle', stated at the beginning of the paragraph to which this note is appended. It, too, is restated in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (*ibid.*, 7): 'The course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle. . . . [That course] takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with . . . an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure.' Freud seems to have assumed to begin with that these two principles were closely correlated and even identical. Thus, in his 'Project' of 1895 (Freud, 1950a, Part I, Section 8) he writes: 'Since we have certain knowledge of a trend in psychical life towards avoiding unpleasure, we are tempted to identify that trend with the primary trend towards inertia [i.e. towards avoiding excitation].' A similar view is taken in Chapter VII (E) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 598. In the passage in the text above, however, a doubt appears to be expressed as to the completeness of the correlation between the two principles. This doubt is carried farther in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (*Standard Ed.*, 18, 8 and 63) and is discussed at some length in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c). Freud there argues that the two principles cannot be identical, since there are unquestionably states of increasing tension which are pleasurable (e.g. sexual excitement), and he goes on to suggest (what had already been hinted at in the two passages in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* just referred to) that the pleasurable or unpleasurable quality of a state may be related to a *temporal* characteristic (or rhythm) of the changes in the quantity of excitation present. He concludes that in any case the two principles must not be regarded as identical: the pleasure principle is a *modification* of the Nirvana principle. The Nirvana principle, he maintains, is to be attributed to the 'death instinct', and its modification into the pleasure principle is due to the influence of the 'life instinct' or libido.]

on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body.¹

We are now in a position to discuss certain terms which are used in reference to the concept of an instinct—for example, its ‘pressure’, its ‘aim’, its ‘object’ and its ‘source’.

By the pressure [*Drang*] of an instinct we understand its motor factor, the amount of force or the measure of the demand for work which it represents. The characteristic of exercising pressure is common to all instincts; it is in fact their very essence. Every instinct is a piece of activity; if we speak loosely of passive instincts, we can only mean instincts whose *aim* is passive.²

The aim [*Ziel*] of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction, which can only be obtained by removing the state of stimulation at the source of the instinct. But although the ultimate aim of each instinct remains unchangeable, there may yet be different paths leading to the same ultimate aim; so that an instinct may be found to have various nearer or intermediate aims, which are combined or interchanged with one another. Experience permits us also to speak of instincts which are ‘inhibited in their aim’, in the case of processes which are allowed to make some advance towards instinctual satisfaction but are then inhibited or deflected. We may suppose that even processes of this kind involve a partial satisfaction.

The object [*Objekt*] of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim. It is what is most variable about an instinct and is not originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible. The object is not necessarily something extraneous: it may equally well be a part of the subject’s own body. It may be

¹ [See the discussion in the Editor’s Note, pp. 111–13.]

² [Some remarks on the active nature of instincts will be found in a footnote added in 1915 to Section 4 of the third of Freud’s *Three Essays* (1905*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 219.—A criticism of Adler for misunderstanding this ‘pressing’ characteristic of instincts appears at the end of the second Section of Part III of the ‘Little Hans’ analysis (1909*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 140–1.]

changed any number of times in the course of the vicissitudes which the instinct undergoes during its existence; and highly important parts are played by this displacement of instinct. It may happen that the same object serves for the satisfaction of several instincts simultaneously, a phenomenon which Adler [1908] has called a 'confluence' of instincts [*Triebverschränkung*].¹ A particularly close attachment of the instinct to its object is distinguished by the term 'fixation'. This frequently occurs at very early periods of the development of an instinct and puts an end to its mobility through its intense opposition to detachment.²

By the source [*Quelle*] of an instinct is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an instinct. We do not know whether this process is invariably of a chemical nature or whether it may also correspond to the release of other, e.g. mechanical, forces. The study of the sources of instincts lies outside the scope of psychology. Although instincts are wholly determined by their origin in a somatic source, in mental life we know them only by their aims. An exact knowledge of the sources of an instinct is not invariably necessary for purposes of psychological investigation; sometimes its source may be inferred from its aim.

Are we to suppose that the different instincts which originate in the body and operate on the mind are also distinguished by different *qualities*, and that that is why they behave in qualitatively different ways in mental life? This supposition does not seem to be justified; we are much more likely to find the simpler assumption sufficient—that the instincts are all qualitatively alike and owe the effect they make only to the amount of excitation they carry, or perhaps, in addition, to certain functions of that quantity. What distinguishes from one another the mental effects produced by the various instincts may be traced to the difference in their sources. In any event, it is only in a later connection that we shall be able to make plain what the problem of the quality of instincts signifies.³

What instincts should we suppose there are, and how many?

¹ [Two instances of this are given by Freud in the analysis of 'Little Hans' (1909b), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 106 and 127.]

² [Cf. below, p. 148.]

³ [It is not clear what 'later connection' Freud had in mind.]

There is obviously a wide opportunity here for arbitrary choice. No objection can be made to anyone's employing the concept of an instinct of play or of destruction or of gregariousness, when the subject-matter demands it and the limitations of psychological analysis allow of it. Nevertheless, we should not neglect to ask ourselves whether instinctual motives like these, which are so highly specialized on the one hand, do not admit of further dissection in accordance with the *sources* of the instinct, so that only primal instincts—those which cannot be further dissected—can lay claim to importance.

I have proposed that two groups of such primal instincts should be distinguished: the *ego*, or *self-preservative*, instincts and the *sexual* instincts. But this supposition has not the status of a necessary postulate, as has, for instance, our assumption about the biological purpose of the mental apparatus (p. 120); it is merely a working hypothesis, to be retained only so long as it proves useful, and it will make little difference to the results of our work of description and classification if it is replaced by another. The occasion for this hypothesis arose in the course of the evolution of psycho-analysis, which was first employed upon the psychoneuroses, or, more precisely, upon the group described as 'transference neuroses' (hysteria and obsessional neurosis); these showed that at the root of all such affections there is to be found a conflict between the claims of sexuality and those of the ego. It is always possible that an exhaustive study of the other neurotic affections (especially of the narcissistic psychoneuroses, the schizophrenias) may oblige us to alter this formula and to make a different classification of the primal instincts. But for the present we do not know of any such formula, nor have we met with any argument unfavourable to drawing this contrast between sexual and ego-instincts.¹

I am altogether doubtful whether any decisive pointers for the differentiation and classification of the instincts can be arrived at on the basis of working over the psychological material. This working-over seems rather itself to call for the application to the material of definite assumptions concerning instinctual life, and it would be a desirable thing if those assumptions could be taken from some other branch of knowledge and carried over to psychology. The contribution which biology has to

¹ [See the Editor's Note, p. 115.]

make here certainly does not run counter to the distinction between sexual and ego-instincts. Biology teaches that sexuality is not to be put on a par with other functions of the individual; for its purposes go beyond the individual and have as their content the production of new individuals—that is, the preservation of the species. It shows, further, that two views, seemingly equally well-founded, may be taken of the relation between the ego and sexuality. On the one view, the individual is the principal thing, sexuality is one of its activities and sexual satisfaction one of its needs; while on the other view the individual is a temporary and transient appendage to the quasi-immortal germ-plasm, which is entrusted to him by the process of generation.¹ The hypothesis that the sexual function differs from other bodily processes in virtue of a special chemistry is, I understand, also a postulate of the Ehrlich school of biological research.²

Since a study of instinctual life from the direction of consciousness presents almost insuperable difficulties, the principal source of our knowledge remains the psycho-analytic investigation of mental disturbances. Psycho-analysis, however, in consequence of the course taken by its development, has hitherto been able to give us information of a fairly satisfactory nature only about the *sexual* instincts; for it is precisely that group which alone can be observed in isolation, as it were, in the psychoneuroses. With the extension of psycho-analysis to the other neurotic affections, we shall no doubt find a basis for our knowledge of the ego-instincts as well, though it would be rash to expect equally favourable conditions for observation in this further field of research.

This much can be said by way of a general characterization of the sexual instincts. They are numerous, emanate from a great variety of organic sources, act in the first instance independently of one another and only achieve a more or less complete synthesis at a late stage. The aim which each of them

¹ [See footnote, p. 78 above. The same point is made near the beginning of Lecture XXVI of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17).]

² [This hypothesis had already been announced by Freud in the first edition of his *Three Essays* (1905*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 216 n. But he had held it for at least ten years previously. See, for instance, Draft I in the Fliess correspondence (1950*a*), probably written in 1895.]

strives for is the attainment of 'organ-pleasure';¹ only when synthesis is achieved do they enter the service of the reproductive function and thereupon become generally recognizable as sexual instincts. At their first appearance they are attached to the instincts of self-preservation, from which they only gradually become separated; in their choice of object, too, they follow the paths that are indicated to them by the ego-instincts.² A portion of them remains associated with the ego-instincts throughout life and furnishes them with libidinal components, which in normal functioning easily escape notice and are revealed clearly only by the onset of illness.³ They are distinguished by possessing the capacity to act vicariously for one another to a wide extent and by being able to change their objects readily. In consequence of the latter properties they are capable of functions which are far removed from their original purposive actions—capable, that is, of 'sublimation'.

Our inquiry into the various vicissitudes which instincts undergo in the process of development and in the course of life must be confined to the sexual instincts, which are the more familiar to us. Observation shows us that an instinct may undergo the following vicissitudes:—

Reversal into its opposite.

Turning round upon the subject's own self.

Repression.

Sublimation.

Since I do not intend to treat of sublimation here⁴ and since repression requires a special chapter to itself [cf. next paper, p. 146], it only remains for us to describe and discuss the two first points. Bearing in mind that there are motive forces which

¹ ['Organ-pleasure' (i.e. pleasure attached to one particular bodily organ) seems to be used here for the first time by Freud. The term is discussed at greater length in the early part of Lecture XXI of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17). The underlying idea, of course, goes back much earlier. See, for instance, the opening passage of the third of the *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 207.]

² [Cf. 'On Narcissism', p. 87 above.]

³ [Ibid., p. 82 f. above.]

⁴ [Sublimation had already been touched upon in the paper on narcissism (pp. 94–5); but it seems possible that it formed the subject of one of the lost metapsychological papers. (See Editor's Introduction, p. 106.)]

work against an instinct's being carried through in an unmodified form, we may also regard these vicissitudes as modes of *defence* against the instincts.

Reversal of an instinct into its opposite resolves on closer examination into two different processes: a change from activity to passivity, and a reversal of its content. The two processes, being different in their nature, must be treated separately.

Examples of the first process are met with in the two pairs of opposites: sadism—masochism and scopophilia—exhibitionism. The reversal affects only the *aims* of the instincts. The active aim (to torture, to look at) is replaced by the passive aim (to be tortured, to be looked at). Reversal of *content* is found in the single instance of the transformation of love into hate.

The turning round of an instinct upon the subject's own self is made plausible by the reflection that masochism is actually sadism turned round upon the subject's own ego, and that exhibitionism includes looking at his own body. Analytic observation, indeed, leaves us in no doubt that the masochist shares in the enjoyment of the assault upon himself, and that the exhibitionist shares in the enjoyment of [the sight of] his exposure. The essence of the process is thus the change of the *object*, while the aim remains unchanged. We cannot fail to notice, however, that in these examples the turning round upon the subject's self and the transformation from activity to passivity converge or coincide.

To elucidate the situation, a more thorough investigation is essential.

In the case of the pair of opposites sadism—masochism, the process may be represented as follows:

(a) Sadism consists in the exercise of violence or power upon some other person as object.

(b) This object is given up and replaced by the subject's self. With the turning round upon the self the change from an active to a passive instinctual aim is also effected.

(c) An extraneous person is once more sought as object; this person, in consequence of the alteration which has taken place in the instinctual aim, has to take over the role of the subject.¹

¹ [Though the general sense of these passages is clear, there may be some confusion in the use of the word 'subject'. As a rule 'subject' and 'object' are used respectively for the person in whom an instinct (or other

Case (c) is what is commonly termed masochism. Here, too, satisfaction follows along the path of the original sadism, the passive ego placing itself back in phantasy in its first role, which has now in fact been taken over by the extraneous subject.¹ Whether there is, besides this, a more direct masochistic satisfaction is highly doubtful. A primary masochism, not derived from sadism in the manner I have described, seems not to be met with.² That it is not superfluous to assume the existence of stage (b) is to be seen from the behaviour of the sadistic instinct in obsessional neurosis. There there is a turning round upon the subject's self *without* an attitude of passivity towards another person: the change has only got as far as stage (b). The desire to torture has turned into self-torture and self-punishment, not into masochism. The active voice is changed, not into the passive, but into the reflexive, middle voice.³

Our view of sadism is further prejudiced by the circumstance that this instinct, side by side with its general aim (or perhaps, rather, within it), seems to strive towards the accomplishment of a quite special aim—not only to humiliate and master, but, in addition, to inflict pains. Psycho-analysis would appear to show that the infliction of pain plays no part among the original purposive actions of the instinct. A sadistic child takes no account of whether or not he inflicts pains, nor does he intend to do so. But when once the transformation into masochism has taken place, the pains are very well fitted to provide a passive masochistic aim; for we have every reason to believe that sensations of pain, like other unpleasurable sensations, trench upon sexual excitation and produce a pleasurable condition, for the sake of which the subject will even willingly experience the unpleasure of pain.⁴ When once feeling pains has become a masochistic aim, the sadistic aim of *causing* pains can arise also,

state of mind) originates, and the person or thing to which it is directed. Here, however, 'subject' seems to be used for the person who plays the active part in the relationship—the agent. The word is more obviously used in this sense in the parallel passage on p. 129 and elsewhere below.]

¹ [See last footnote.]

² (*Footnote added 1924:*) In later works (cf. 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', 1924c) relating to problems of instinctual life I have expressed an opposite view.

³ [The allusion here is to the voices of the Greek verb.]

⁴ [See a passage near the end of the second of the *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 203–4.]

retrogressively; for while these pains are being inflicted on other people, they are enjoyed masochistically by the subject through his identification of himself with the suffering object. In both cases, of course, it is not the pain itself which is enjoyed, but the accompanying sexual excitation—so that this can be done especially conveniently from the sadistic position. The enjoyment of pain would thus be an aim which was originally masochistic, but which can only become an instinctual aim in someone who was originally sadistic.

For the sake of completeness I may add that feelings of pity cannot be described as a result of a transformation of instinct occurring in sadism, but necessitate the notion of a *reaction-formation* against that instinct. (For the difference, see later.)¹

Rather different and simpler findings are afforded by the investigation of another pair of opposites—the instincts whose respective aim is to look and to display oneself (scopophilia and exhibitionism, in the language of the perversions). Here again we may postulate the same stages as in the previous instance:—(a) Looking as an *activity* directed towards an extraneous object. (b) Giving up of the object and turning of the scopophilic instinct towards a part of the subject's own body; with this, transformation to passivity and setting up of a new aim—that of being looked at. (c) Introduction of a new subject² to whom one displays oneself in order to be looked at by him. Here, too, it can hardly be doubted that the active aim appears before the passive, that looking precedes being looked at. But there is an important divergence from what happens in the case of sadism, in that we can recognize in the case of the

¹ [It is not clear to what passage this is intended to refer, unless, again, it was included in a missing paper on sublimation. There is in fact some discussion of the subject in 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' (1915b), p. 281 below. But this cannot have been what Freud had in mind, for it was originally published in a different volume. In a footnote added in 1915 (the year in which the present paper was written) to the *Three Essays* (1905d), Freud insists that sublimation and reaction-formation are to be regarded as distinct processes (*Standard Ed.*, 7, 178 n.).—The German word for 'pity' is '*Mitleid*', literally 'suffering with', 'compassion'. Another view of the origin of the feeling is expressed in the 'Wolf Man' analysis (1918b), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 88, which was actually written, in all probability, at the end of 1914, a few months earlier than the present paper.]

² [I.e. agent; see footnote on pp. 127–8.]

scopophilic instinct a yet earlier stage than that described as (a). For the beginning of its activity the scopophilic instinct is auto-erotic: it has indeed an object, but that object is part of the subject's own body. It is only later that the instinct is led, by a process of comparison, to exchange this object for an analogous part of someone else's body—stage (a). This preliminary stage is interesting because it is the source of *both* the situations represented in the resulting pair of opposites, the one or the other according to which element in the original situation is changed. The following might serve as a diagrammatic picture of the scopophilic instinct:—

(a) Oneself looking at a sexual organ	=	A sexual organ being looked at by oneself
(β) Oneself looking at an extraneous object (active scopophilia)		(γ) An object which is oneself or part of oneself being looked at by an extraneous person (exhibitionism)

A preliminary stage of this kind is absent in sadism, which from the outset is directed upon an extraneous object, although it might not be altogether unreasonable to construct such a stage out of the child's efforts to gain control over his own limbs.¹

With regard to both the instincts which we have just taken as examples, it should be remarked that their transformation by a reversal from activity to passivity and by a turning round upon the subject never in fact involves the whole quota of the instinctual impulse. The earlier active direction of the instinct persists to some degree side by side with its later passive direction, even when the process of its transformation has been very extensive. The only correct statement to make about the scopophilic instinct would be that all the stages of its development, its auto-erotic, preliminary stage as well as its final active or passive form, co-exist alongside one another; and the truth of this becomes obvious if we base our opinion, not on the actions to which the instinct leads, but on the mechanism of its satisfaction. Perhaps, however, it is permissible to look at the matter

¹ (Footnote added 1924:) Cf. footnote 2, p. 128.

and represent it in yet another way. We can divide the life of each instinct into a series of separate successive waves, each of which is homogeneous during whatever period of time it may last, and whose relation to one another is comparable to that of successive eruptions of lava. We can then perhaps picture the first, original eruption of the instinct as proceeding in an unchanged form and undergoing no development at all. The next wave would be modified from the outset—being turned, for instance, from active to passive—and would then, with this new characteristic, be added to the earlier wave, and so on. If we were then to take a survey of the instinctual impulse from its beginning up to a given point, the succession of waves which we have described would inevitably present the picture of a definite development of the instinct.

The fact that, at this¹ later period of development of an instinctual impulse, its (passive) opposite may be observed alongside of it deserves to be marked by the very apt term introduced by Bleuler—‘ambivalence’.²

This reference to the developmental history of instincts and the permanence of their intermediate stages should make the development of instincts fairly intelligible to us. Experience shows that the amount of demonstrable ambivalence varies greatly between individuals, groups and races. Marked instinctual ambivalence in a human being living at the present day may be regarded as an archaic inheritance, for we have reason to suppose that the part played in instinctual life by the active impulses in their unmodified form was greater in *primaeval* times than it is on an average to-day.³

We have become accustomed to call the early phase of the

¹ [*Jener*’. In the first edition only, *jeder*’, ‘every’.]

² [The term ‘ambivalence’, coined by Bleuler (1910*b*, and 1911, 43 and 305), seems not to have been used by him in this sense. He distinguished three kinds of ambivalence: (1) emotional, i.e. oscillation between love and hate, (2) voluntary, i.e. inability to decide on an action, and (3) intellectual, i.e. belief in contradictory propositions. Freud generally uses the term in the first of these senses. See, for instance, the first occasion on which he seems to have adopted it, near the end of his paper on ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912*b*), and later in the present paper (pp. 133 and 139). The passage in the text is one of the few in which he has applied the term to activity and passivity. For another instance of this exceptional use see a passage in Section III of the ‘Wolf Man’ case history (1918*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 26.]

³ [See *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13), *Standard Ed.*, 13, 66.]

development of the ego, during which its sexual instincts find auto-erotic satisfaction, 'narcissism', without at once entering on any discussion of the relation between auto-erotism and narcissism. It follows that the preliminary stage of the scopophilic instinct, in which the subject's own body is the object of the scopophilia, must be classed under narcissism, and that we must describe it as a narcissistic formation. The active scopophilic instinct develops from this, by leaving narcissism behind. The passive scopophilic instinct, on the contrary, holds fast to the narcissistic object. Similarly, the transformation of sadism into masochism implies a return to the narcissistic object. And in both these cases [i.e. in passive scopophilia and masochism] the narcissistic *subject* is, through identification, replaced by another, extraneous ego. If we take into account our constructed preliminary narcissistic stage of sadism, we shall be approaching a more general realization—namely, that the instinctual vicissitudes which consist in the instinct's being turned round upon the subject's own ego and undergoing reversal from activity to passivity are dependent on the narcissistic organization of the ego and bear the stamp of that phase. They perhaps correspond to the attempts at defence which at higher stages of the development of the ego are effected by other means. [See above, pp. 126–7.]

At this point we may call to mind that so far we have considered only two pairs of opposite instincts: sadism—masochism and scopophilia—exhibitionism. These are the best-known sexual instincts that appear in an ambivalent manner. The other components of the later sexual function are not yet sufficiently accessible to analysis for us to be able to discuss them in a similar way. In general we can assert of them that their activities are *auto-erotic*; that is to say, their object is negligible in comparison with the organ which is their source, and as a rule coincides with that organ. The object of the scopophilic instinct, however, though it too is in the first instance a part of the subject's own body, is not the eye itself; and in sadism the organic source, which is probably the muscular apparatus with its capacity for action, points unequivocally at an object other than itself, even though that object is part of the subject's own body. In the auto-erotic instincts, the part played by the organic source is so decisive that, according to a plausible suggestion of Federn (1913) and Jekels (1913), the form and

function of the organ determine the activity or passivity of the instinctual aim.

The change of the *content* [cf. p. 127] of an instinct into its opposite is observed in a single instance only—the transformation of *love into hate*.¹ Since it is particularly common to find both these directed simultaneously towards the same object, their co-existence furnishes the most important example of ambivalence of feeling. [See p. 131 *n.* 2.]

The case of love and hate acquires a special interest from the circumstance that it refuses to be fitted into our scheme of the instincts. It is impossible to doubt that there is the most intimate relation between these two opposite feelings and sexual life, but we are naturally unwilling to think of love as being some kind of special component instinct of sexuality in the same way as the others we have been discussing. We should prefer to regard loving as the expression of the *whole* sexual current of feeling; but this idea does not clear up our difficulties, and we cannot see what meaning to attach to an opposite content of this current.

Loving admits not merely of one, but of three opposites. In addition to the antithesis 'loving—hating', there is the other one of 'loving—being loved'; and, in addition to these, loving and hating taken together are the opposite of the condition of unconcern or indifference. The second of these three antitheses, loving—being loved, corresponds exactly to the transformation from activity to passivity and may be traced to an underlying situation in the same way as in the case of the scopophilic instinct. This situation is that of *loving oneself*, which we regard as the characteristic feature of narcissism. Then, according as the object or the subject is replaced by an extraneous one, what results is the active aim of loving or the passive one of being loved—the latter remaining near to narcissism.

Perhaps we shall come to a better understanding of the several opposites of loving if we reflect that our mental life as a whole is governed by *three polarities*, the antitheses

Subject (ego)—Object (external world),
Pleasure—Unpleasure, and
Active—Passive.

¹ [In the German editions previous to 1924 this reads 'the transformation of *love and hate*'.]

The antithesis ego—non-ego (external), i.e. subject—object, is, as we have already said [p. 119], thrust upon the individual organism at an early stage, by the experience that it can silence *external* stimuli by means of muscular action but is defenceless against *instinctual* stimuli. This antithesis remains, above all, sovereign in our intellectual activity and creates for research the basic situation which no efforts can alter. The polarity of pleasure—unpleasure is attached to a scale of feelings, whose paramount importance in determining our actions (our will) has already been emphasized [pp. 120–1]. The antithesis active—passive must not be confused with the antithesis ego—subject—external world—object. The relation of the ego to the external world is passive in so far as it receives stimuli from it and active when it reacts to these. It is forced by its instincts into a quite special degree of activity towards the external world, so that we might bring out the essential point if we say that the ego—subject is passive in respect of external stimuli but active through its own instincts. The antithesis active—passive coalesces later with the antithesis masculine—feminine, which, until this has taken place, has no psychological meaning. The coupling of activity with masculinity and of passivity with femininity meets us, indeed, as a biological fact; but it is by no means so invariably complete and exclusive as we are inclined to assume.¹

The three polarities of the mind are connected with one another in various highly significant ways. There is a primal psychical situation in which two of them coincide. Originally, at the very beginning of mental life, the ego is cathected with instincts and is to some extent capable of satisfying them on itself. We call this condition 'narcissism' and this way of obtaining satisfaction 'auto-erotic'.² At this time the external world

¹ [This question is discussed at much greater length in a footnote added in 1915 (the year in which the present paper was written) to the third of Freud's *Three Essays* (1905*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 219 f.—See also p. 55 above.]

² Some of the sexual instincts are, as we know, capable of this auto-erotic satisfaction, and so are adapted to being the vehicle for the development under the dominance of the pleasure principle [from the original 'reality-ego' into the 'pleasure-ego'] which we are about to describe [in the next paragraphs of the text]. Those sexual instincts which from the outset require an object, and the needs of the ego—instincts, which are never capable of auto-erotic satisfaction, naturally

is not cathected with interest (in a general sense) and is indifferent for purposes of satisfaction. During this period, therefore, the ego-subject coincides with what is pleasurable and the external world with what is indifferent (or possibly unpleasurable, as being a source of stimulation). If for the moment we define loving as the relation of the ego to its sources of pleasure, the situation in which the ego loves itself only and is indifferent to the external world illustrates the first of the opposites which we found to 'loving'.¹

In so far as the ego is auto-erotic, it has no need of the external world, but, in consequence of experiences undergone by the instincts of self-preservation, it acquires objects from that world, and, in spite of everything, it cannot avoid feeling internal instinctual stimuli for a time as unpleasurable. Under the disturb this state [of primal narcissism] and so pave the way for an advance from it. Indeed, the primal narcissistic state would not be able to follow the development [that is to be described] if it were not for the fact that every individual passes through a period during which he is helpless and has to be looked after and during which his pressing needs are satisfied by an external agency and are thus prevented from becoming greater.—[This very condensed footnote might have been easier to understand if it had been placed two or three paragraphs further on. It may perhaps be expanded as follows. In his paper on the 'Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911*b*) Freud had introduced the idea of the transformation of an early 'pleasure-ego' into a 'reality-ego'. In the passage which follows in the text above, he argues that there is in fact a still earlier *original* 'reality-ego'. This original 'reality-ego', instead of proceeding directly into the *final* 'reality-ego', is replaced, under the dominating influence of the pleasure principle, by a 'pleasure-ego'. The footnote enumerates those factors, on the one hand, which would favour this latter turn of events, and those factors, on the other hand, which would work against it. The existence of auto-erotic libidinal instincts would encourage the diversion to a 'pleasure-ego', while the *non*-auto-erotic libidinal instincts and the self-preservative instincts would be likely instead to bring about a direct transition to the final adult 'reality-ego'. This latter result would, he remarks, in fact come about, if it were not that parental care of the helpless infant satisfies this second set of instincts, artificially prolongs the primary state of narcissism, and so helps to make the establishment of the 'pleasure-ego' possible.]

¹ [On p. 133 Freud enumerates the opposites of loving in the following order: (1) hating, (2) being loved and (3) indifference. In the present passage, and below on pp. 136 and 139, he adopts a different order: (1) indifference, (2) hating and (3) being loved. It seems probable that in this second arrangement he gives indifference the first place as being the first to appear in the course of development.]

dominance of the pleasure principle a further development now takes place in the ego. In so far as the objects which are presented to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, 'introjects' them (to use Ferenczi's [1909] term¹); and, on the other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure. (See below [pp. 184 and 224], the mechanism of projection.)

Thus the original 'reality-ego', which distinguished internal and external by means of a sound objective criterion,² changes into a purified 'pleasure-ego', which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others. For the pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile. After this new arrangement, the two polarities coincide once more: the ego-subject coincides with pleasure, and the external world with unpleasure (with what was earlier indifference).

When, during the stage of primary narcissism, the object makes its appearance, the second opposite to loving, namely hating, also attains its development.³

As we have seen, the object is brought to the ego from the external world in the first instance by the instincts of self-preservation; and it cannot be denied that hating, too, originally characterized the relation of the ego to the alien external world with the stimuli it introduces. Indifference falls into place as a special case of hate or dislike, after having first appeared as their forerunner. At the very beginning, it seems, the external world, objects, and what is hated are identical. If later on an object turns out to be a source of pleasure, it is loved, but it is also incorporated into the ego; so that for the purified pleasure-ego once again objects coincide with what is extraneous and hated.

Now, however, we may note that just as the pair of opposites love—indifference reflects the polarity ego—external world, so the second antithesis love—hate³ reproduces the polarity pleasure—unpleasure, which is linked to the first polarity. When

¹ [This seems to be the first occasion on which Freud himself used the term. Cf. the footnote on p. 241 below.]

² [See above p. 119 and footnote 2. The 'reality-ego' and the 'pleasure-ego' had already been introduced in the paper on the two principles of mental functioning (1911b).]

³ [See footnote 1, p. 135.]

the purely narcissistic stage has given place to the object-stage, pleasure and unpleasure signify relations of the ego to the object. If the object becomes a source of pleasurable feelings, a motor urge is set up which seeks to bring the object closer to the ego and to incorporate it into the ego. We then speak of the 'attraction' exercised by the pleasure-giving object, and say that we 'love' that object. Conversely, if the object is a source of unpleasurable feelings, there is an urge which endeavours to increase the distance between the object and the ego and to repeat in relation to the object the original attempt at flight from the external world with its emission of stimuli. We feel the 'repulsion' of the object, and hate it; this hate can afterwards be intensified to the point of an aggressive inclination against the object—an intention to destroy it.

We might at a pinch say of an instinct that it 'loves' the objects towards which it strives for purposes of satisfaction; but to say that an instinct 'hates' an object strikes us as odd. Thus we become aware that the attitudes¹ of love and hate cannot be made use of for the relations of *instincts* to their objects, but are reserved for the relations of the *total ego* to objects. But if we consider linguistic usage, which is certainly not without significance, we shall see that there is a further limitation to the meaning of love and hate. We do not say of objects which serve the interests of self-preservation that we *love* them; we emphasize the fact that we *need* them, and perhaps express an additional, different kind of relation to them by using words that denote a much reduced degree of love—such as, for example, 'being fond of', 'liking' or 'finding agreeable'.

Thus the word 'to love' moves further and further into the sphere of the pure pleasure-relation of the ego to the object and finally becomes fixed to sexual objects in the narrower sense and to those which satisfy the needs of sublimated sexual instincts. The distinction between the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts which we have imposed upon our psychology is thus seen to be in conformity with the spirit of our language. The fact that we are not in the habit of saying of a single sexual instinct that it loves its object, but regard the relation of the ego

¹ [German '*Beziehungen*', literally 'relations'. In the first edition this word is printed '*Bezeichnungen*', 'descriptions' or 'terms'—which seems to make better sense. The word 'relations' in the later part of the sentence stands for '*Relationen*' in the German text.]

to its sexual object as the most appropriate case in which to employ the word 'love'—this fact teaches us that the word can only begin to be applied in this relation after there has been a synthesis of all the component instincts of sexuality under the primacy of the genitals and in the service of the reproductive function.

It is noteworthy that in the use of the word 'hate' no such intimate connection with sexual pleasure and the sexual function appears. The relation of *unpleasure* seems to be the sole decisive one. The ego hates, abhors and pursues with intent to destroy all objects which are a source of unpleasurable feeling for it, without taking into account whether they mean a frustration of sexual satisfaction or of the satisfaction of self-preservative needs. Indeed, it may be asserted that the true prototypes of the relation of hate are derived not from sexual life, but from the ego's struggle to preserve and maintain itself.

So we see that love and hate, which present themselves to us as complete opposites in their content, do not after all stand in any simple relation to each other. They did not arise from the cleavage of any originally common entity, but sprang from different sources, and had each its own development before the influence of the pleasure—unpleasure relation made them into opposites.

It now remains for us to put together what we know of the genesis of love and hate. Love is derived from the capacity of the ego to satisfy some of its instinctual impulses auto-erotically by obtaining organ-pleasure. It is originally narcissistic, then passes over on to objects, which have been incorporated into the extended ego, and expresses the motor efforts of the ego towards these objects as sources of pleasure. It becomes intimately linked with the activity of the later sexual instincts and, when these have been completely synthesized, coincides with the sexual impulsion as a whole. Preliminary stages of love emerge as provisional sexual aims while the sexual instincts are passing through their complicated development. As the first of these aims we recognize the phase of incorporating or devouring—a type of love which is consistent with abolishing the object's separate existence and which may therefore be described as ambivalent.¹ At the higher stage of the pregenital sadistic-anal

¹ [Freud's first published account of the oral stage was given in a paragraph added to the third (1915) edition of his *Three Essays, Standard*

organization,¹ the striving for the object appears in the form of an urge for mastery, to which injury or annihilation of the object is a matter of indifference. Love in this form and at this preliminary stage is hardly to be distinguished from hate in its attitude towards the object. Not until the genital organization is established does love become the opposite of hate.

Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love. It derives from the narcissistic ego's primordial repudiation of the external world with its outpouring of stimuli. As an expression of the reaction of unpleasure evoked by objects, it always remains in an intimate relation with the self-preservative instincts; so that sexual and ego-instincts can readily develop an antithesis which repeats that of love and hate. When the ego-instincts dominate the sexual function, as is the case at the stage of the sadistic-anal organization, they impart the qualities of hate to the instinctual aim as well.

The history of the origins and relations of love makes us understand how it is that love so frequently manifests itself as 'ambivalent'—i.e. as accompanied by impulses of hate against the same object.² The hate which is admixed with the love is in part derived from the preliminary stages of loving which have not been wholly surmounted; it is also in part based on reactions of repudiation by the ego-instincts, which, in view of the frequent conflicts between the interests of the ego and those of love, can find grounds in real and contemporary motives. In both cases, therefore, the admixed hate has as its source the self-preservative instincts. If a love-relation with a given object is broken off, hate not infrequently emerges in its place, so that we get the impression of a transformation of love into hate. This account of what happens leads on to the view that the hate, which has its real motives, is here reinforced by a regression of the love to the sadistic preliminary stage; so that the hate acquires an erotic character and the continuity of a love-relation is ensured.

The third antithesis of loving, the transformation of loving into being loved,³ corresponds to the operation of the polarity

Ed., 7, 198. The preface to that edition is dated 'October 1914'—some months before the present paper was written. See also below, p. 249 ff.]

¹ [See 'The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis' (1913i).]

² [See footnote 2, p. 131.]

³ [See footnote 1, p. 135.]

of activity and passivity, and is to be judged in the same way as the cases of scopophilia and sadism.¹

We may sum up by saying that the essential feature in the vicissitudes undergone by instincts lies in *the subjection of the instinctual impulses to the influences of the three great polarities that dominate mental life*. Of these three polarities we might describe that of activity—passivity as the *biological*, that of ego—external world as the *real*, and finally that of pleasure—unpleasure as the *economic* polarity.

The instinctual vicissitude of *repression* will form the subject of an inquiry which follows [in the next paper].

¹ [The relation between love and hate was further discussed by Freud, in the light of his hypothesis of a death-instinct, in Chapter IV of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).]

REPRESSION
(1915)

EDITOR'S NOTE

DIE VERDRÄNGUNG

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1915 *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 3 (3), 129-38.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 279-93. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 466-79.
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 188-201.
1931 *Theoretische Schriften*, 83-97.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 248-61.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'Repression'

- 1925 *C.P.*, 4, 84-97. (Tr. C. M. Baines.)

The present translation, though based on that of 1925, has been very largely rewritten.

In his 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914*d*), Freud declared that 'the theory of repression is the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests' (p. 16 above); and in the present essay, together with Section IV of the paper on 'The Unconscious' which follows it (p. 180 ff.), he gave his most elaborate formulation of that theory.

The concept of repression goes back historically to the very beginnings of psycho-analysis. The first published reference to it was in the Breuer and Freud 'Preliminary Communication' of 1893 (*Standard Ed.*, 2, 10). The term '*Verdrängung*' had been used by the early nineteenth-century psychologist Herbart and may possibly have come to Freud's knowledge through his teacher Meynert, who had been an admirer of Herbart.¹ But, as Freud himself insisted in the passage of the 'History' already quoted (p. 15 above), 'the theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source'. 'It was a

¹ See below, p. 162. A full discussion of this will be found in the first volume of Ernest Jones's biography (1953, 407 ff.).

novelty', he wrote in his 'Autobiographical Study' (1925*d*), 'and nothing like it had ever before been recognized in mental life.' There are several accounts in Freud's writings of how the discovery came about: for instance, in the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 268-9, and again in the 'History', p. 16 above. All these accounts are alike in emphasizing the fact that the concept of repression was inevitably suggested by the clinical phenomenon of resistance, which in turn was brought to light by a technical innovation—namely, the abandonment of hypnosis in the cathartic treatment of hysteria.

It will be noticed that in the account given in the *Studies* the term actually used to describe the process is not 'repression' but 'defence'. At this early period the two terms were used by Freud indifferently, almost as equivalents, though 'defence' was perhaps the commoner. Soon, however, as he remarked in his paper on sexuality in the neuroses (1906*a*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 276, 'repression' began to be used quite generally in place of 'defence'. Thus, for instance, in the 'Rat Man' case history (1909*d*) Freud discussed the mechanism of 'repression' in obsessional neurosis—i.e. the displacement of the emotional cathexis from the objectionable idea, as contrasted with the complete expulsion of the idea from consciousness in hysteria—and spoke of 'two kinds of repression' (*Standard Ed.*, 10, 196). It is, indeed, in this wider sense that the term is used in the present paper, as is shown by the discussion towards the end of it on the different mechanisms of repression in the various forms of psychoneurosis. It seems pretty clear, however, that the form of repression which Freud had chiefly in mind here was that which occurs in hysteria; and much later on, in Chapter XI, Section A (c), of *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926*d*), he proposed to restrict the term 'repression' to this one particular mechanism and to revive 'defence' as 'a general designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis'. The importance of making this distinction was later illustrated by him in Section V of 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937*c*).

The special problem of the nature of the motive force which puts repression into operation was one which was a constant source of concern to Freud, though it is scarcely touched on in the present paper. In particular there was the question of the relation between repression and sex, and to this Freud in his

early days gave fluctuating replies, as may be seen at many points in the Fliess correspondence (1950a). Subsequently, however, he firmly rejected any attempt at 'sexualizing' repression. A full discussion of this question (with particular reference to the views of Adler) will be found in the last section of "A Child is Being Beaten" (1919e), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 200 ff. Later still, in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926d), especially in Chapter IV, and in the earlier part of Lecture XXXII of the *New Introductory Lectures* (1933a), he threw fresh light on the subject by arguing that anxiety, was not, as he had previously held and as he states below, for instance on pp. 153 and 155, a *consequence* of repression but was one of the chief motive forces leading to it.¹

¹ The distinction between repression and the 'disavowal' or 'denial' ('*Verleugnung*') by the ego of external reality or some part of it was first discussed by Freud at length in his paper on 'Fetishism' (1927e). See below, p. 221.

REPRESSION

ONE of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet with resistances which seek to make it inoperative. Under certain conditions, which we shall presently investigate more closely, the impulse then passes into the state of 'repression' [*Verdrängung*]. If what was in question was the operation of an external stimulus, the appropriate method to adopt would obviously be flight; with an instinct, flight is of no avail, for the ego cannot escape from itself. At some later period, rejection based on judgement (*condemnation*) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual impulse. Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation; it is a concept which could not have been formulated before the time of psycho-analytic studies.

It is not easy in theory to deduce the possibility of such a thing as repression. Why should an instinctual impulse undergo a vicissitude like this? A necessary condition of its happening must clearly be that the instinct's attainment of its aim should produce unpleasure instead of pleasure. But we cannot well imagine such a contingency. There are no such instincts: satisfaction of an instinct is always pleasurable. We should have to assume certain peculiar circumstances, some sort of process by which the pleasure of satisfaction is changed into unpleasure.

In order the better to delimit repression, let us discuss some other instinctual situations. It may happen that an external stimulus becomes internalized—for example, by eating into and destroying some bodily organ—so that a new source of constant excitation and increase of tension arises. The stimulus thereby acquires a far-reaching similarity to an instinct. We know that a case of this sort is experienced by us as *pain*. The aim of this pseudo-instinct, however, is simply the cessation of the change in the organ and of the unpleasure accompanying it. There is no other direct pleasure to be attained by cessation of pain. Further, pain is imperative; the only things to which it can yield are removal by some toxic agent or the influence of mental distraction.

The case of pain is too obscure to give us any help in our

purpose.¹ Let us take the case in which an instinctual stimulus such as hunger remains unsatisfied. It then becomes imperative and can be allayed by nothing but the action that satisfies it;² it keeps up a constant tension of need. Nothing in the nature of a repression seems in this case to come remotely into question.

Thus repression certainly does not arise in cases where the tension produced by lack of satisfaction of an instinctual impulse is raised to an unbearable degree. The methods of defence which are open to the organism against that situation must be discussed in another connection.³

Let us rather confine ourselves to clinical experience, as we meet with it in psycho-analytic practice. We then learn that the satisfaction of an instinct which is under repression would be quite possible, and further, that in every instance such a satisfaction would be pleasurable in itself; but it would be irreconcilable with other claims and intentions. It would, therefore, cause pleasure in one place and unpleasure in another. It has consequently become a condition for repression that the motive force of unpleasure shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure obtained from satisfaction. Psycho-analytic observation of the transference neuroses, moreover, leads us to conclude that repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from the very beginning, and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity—that *the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious*.⁴ This view of repression would be made more complete by assuming that, before the mental organization reaches this stage, the task of fending off instinctual impulses is dealt with by the other vicissitudes which instincts may undergo—e.g. reversal into the opposite or turning round upon the subject's own self [cf. pp. 126–7].

It seems to us now that, in view of the very great extent to

¹ [Pain and the organism's method of dealing with it are discussed in Chapter IV of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 30. The subject is already raised in Part I, Section 6, of the 'Project' (1950a [1895]).]

² [In the 'Project' (1950a [1895]), Part I, Section 1, this is termed the 'specific action'.]

³ [It is not clear what 'other connection' Freud had in mind.]

⁴ [A modification of this formula will be found below on p. 203.]

which repression and what is unconscious are correlated, we must defer probing more deeply into the nature of repression until we have learnt more about the structure of the succession of psychical agencies and about the differentiation between what is unconscious and conscious. [See the following paper, p. 180 ff.] Till then, all we can do is to put together in a purely descriptive fashion a few characteristics of repression that have been observed clinically, even though we run the risk of having to repeat unchanged much that has been said elsewhere.

We have reason to assume that there is a *primal repression*, a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct¹ being denied entrance into the conscious. With this a *fixation* is established; the representative in question persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains attached to it. This is due to the properties of unconscious processes of which we shall speak later [p. 187].

The second stage of repression, *repression proper*, affects mental derivatives of the repressed representative, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. On account of this association, these ideas experience the same fate as what was primally repressed. Repression proper, therefore, is actually an after-pressure.² Moreover, it is a mistake to emphasize only the repulsion which operates from the direction of the conscious upon what is to be repressed; quite as important is the attraction exercised by what was primally repressed upon everything with which it can establish a connection. Probably the trend towards repression would fail in its purpose if these two forces did not co-operate, if there were not something previously repressed ready to receive what is repelled by the conscious.³

Under the influence of the study of the psychoneuroses, which

¹ [See the Editor's Note to the previous paper, p. 111 ff.]

² [*Nachdrängen*.] Freud uses the same term in his account of the process in the Schreber analysis (see next footnote), and also in his paper on 'The Unconscious' (see below, pp. 180 and 181). But, on alluding to the point more than twenty years later in the third section of 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937c), he uses the word '*Nachverdrängung*' ('after-repression').]

³ [The account of the two stages of repression given in the last two paragraphs had been anticipated by Freud four years earlier (though in

brings before us the important effects of repression, we are inclined to overvalue their psychological bearing and to forget too readily that repression does not hinder the instinctual representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious, from organizing itself further, putting out derivatives and establishing connections. Repression in fact interferes only with the relation of the instinctual representative to *one* psychical system, namely, to that of the conscious.

Psycho-analysis is able to show us other things as well which are important for understanding the effects of repression in the psychoneuroses. It shows us, for instance, that the instinctual representative develops with less interference and more profusely if it is withdrawn by repression from conscious influence. It proliferates in the dark, as it were, and takes on extreme forms of expression, which when they are translated and presented to the neurotic are not only bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by giving him the picture of an extraordinary and dangerous strength of instinct. This deceptive strength of instinct is the result of an uninhibited development in phantasy and of the damming-up consequent on frustrated satisfaction. The fact that this last result is bound up with repression points the direction in which the true significance of repression has to be looked for.

Reverting once more, however, to the opposite aspect of repression, let us make it clear that it is not even correct to suppose that repression withholds from the conscious *all* the derivatives of what was primally repressed.¹ If these derivatives have become sufficiently far removed from the repressed representative, whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by reason of the number of intermediate links inserted, they have free access to the conscious. It is as though the resistance of the conscious against them was a function of their distance from what was originally repressed. In carrying out the technique of psycho-analysis, we continually require the patient to produce such derivatives of the repressed as, in consequence either of their remoteness or of their distortion, can pass the censorship

a somewhat different form) in the third section of the Schreber analysis (1911c), and in a letter to Ferenczi of December 6, 1910 (Jones, 1955 499). See also *Standard Ed.*, 5, 547 n., and *ibid.* 7, 175-6 n.]

¹ [What follows in this paragraph is discussed at greater length in Section VI of 'The Unconscious' (below, p. 190 ff.).]

of the conscious. Indeed, the associations which we require him to give without being influenced by any conscious purposive idea and without any criticism, and from which we reconstitute a conscious translation of the repressed representative—these associations are nothing else than remote and distorted derivatives of this kind. During this process we observe that the patient can go on spinning a thread of such associations, till he is brought up against some thought, the relation of which to what is repressed becomes so obvious that he is compelled to repeat his attempt at repression. Neurotic symptoms, too, must have fulfilled this same condition, for they are derivatives of the repressed, which has, by their means, finally won the access to consciousness which was previously denied to it.¹

We can lay down no general rule as to what degree of distortion and remoteness is necessary before the resistance on the part of the conscious is removed. A delicate balancing is here taking place, the play of which is hidden from us; its mode of operation, however, enables us to infer that it is a question of calling a halt when the cathexis of the unconscious reaches a certain intensity—an intensity beyond which the unconscious would break through to satisfaction. Repression acts, therefore, in a *highly individual* manner. Each single derivative of the repressed may have its own special vicissitude; a little more or a little less distortion alters the whole outcome. In this connection we can understand how it is that the objects to which men give most preference, their ideals, proceed from the same perceptions and experiences as the objects which they most abhor, and that they were originally only distinguished from one another through slight modifications. [Cf. p. 93.] Indeed, as we found in tracing the origin of the fetish,² it is possible for the original instinctual representative to be split in two, one part undergoing repression, while the remainder, precisely on account of this intimate connection, undergoes idealization.

The same result as follows from an increase or a decrease in

¹ [In the German editions before 1924 the latter part of this sentence read: 'Welches sich . . . den ihm versagten Zugang vom Bewusstsein endlich erkämpft hat'. This was translated formerly 'which has finally . . . wrested from consciousness the right of way previously denied it'. In the German editions from 1924 onwards the word '*vom*' was corrected to '*zum*', thus altering the sense to that given in the text above.]

² [Cf. Section 2 (A) of the first of Freud's *Three Essays* (1905*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 153-4.]

the degree of distortion may also be achieved at the other end of the apparatus, so to speak, by a modification in the condition for the production of pleasure and unpleasure. Special techniques have been evolved, with the purpose of bringing about such changes in the play of mental forces that what would otherwise give rise to unpleasure may on this occasion result in pleasure; and, whenever a technical device of this sort comes into operation, the repression of an instinctual representative which would otherwise be repudiated is removed. These techniques have till now only been studied in any detail in jokes.¹ As a rule the repression is only temporarily removed and is promptly re-instated.

Observations like this, however, enable us to note some further characteristics of repression. Not only is it, as we have just shown, *individual* in its operation, but it is also exceedingly *mobile*. The process of repression is not to be regarded as an event which takes place *once*, the results of which are permanent, as when some living thing has been killed and from that time onward is dead; repression demands a persistent expenditure of force, and if this were to cease the success of the repression would be jeopardized, so that a fresh act of repression would be necessary. We may suppose that the repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure.² Thus the maintenance of a repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure of force, while its removal results in a saving from an economic point of view. The mobility of repression, incidentally, also finds expression in the psychical characteristics of the state of sleep, which alone renders possible the formation of dreams.³ With a return to waking life the repressive cathexes which have been drawn in are once more sent out.

Finally, we must not forget that after all we have said very little about an instinctual impulse when we have established that it is repressed. Without prejudice to its repression, such an impulse may be in widely different states. It may be inactive, i.e. only very slightly cathected with mental energy; or it may be cathected in varying degrees, and so enabled to be active. True,

¹ [See the second chapter of Freud's book on jokes (1905c).]

² [This is discussed further on p. 180 f. below.]

³ [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), Chap. VII (C), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 567-8. See also below, p. 225.]

its activation will not result in a direct removal of the repression, but it will set in motion all the processes which end in a penetration by the impulse into consciousness along circuitous paths. With unrepressed derivatives of the unconscious the fate of a particular idea is often decided by the degree of its activity or cathexis. It is an everyday occurrence that such a derivative remains unrepressed so long as it represents only a small amount of energy, although its content would be calculated to give rise to a conflict with what is dominant in consciousness. The quantitative factor proves decisive for this conflict: as soon as the basically obnoxious idea exceeds a certain degree of strength, the conflict becomes a real one, and it is precisely this activation that leads to repression. So that, where repression is concerned, an increase of energetic cathexis operates in the same sense as an approach to the unconscious, while a decrease of that cathexis operates in the same sense as remoteness from the unconscious or distortion. We see that the repressive trends may find a substitute for repression in a weakening of what is distasteful.

In our discussion so far we have dealt with the repression of an instinctual representative, and by the latter we have understood an idea¹ or group of ideas which is cathected with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido or interest) coming from an instinct. Clinical observation now obliges us to divide up what we have hitherto regarded as a single entity; for it shows us that besides the idea, some other element representing the instinct has to be taken into account, and that this other element undergoes vicissitudes of repression which may be quite different from those undergone by the idea. For this other element of the psychical representative the term *quota of affect* has been generally adopted.² It corresponds to the instinct in so far as the latter has become detached from the idea and finds expression, proportionate to its quantity, in processes which are sensed as affects. From this point on, in describing a case of repression, we shall have to follow up separately what, as the result of repression, becomes of the *idea*, and what becomes of the instinctual energy linked to it.

We should be glad to be able to say something general about

¹ [*Vorstellung*.] See footnote 1, p. 174.]

² [*Affektbetrag*.] This term dates back to the Breuer period. Cf., for instance, the last paragraphs of Freud's paper, 1894a.]

the vicissitudes of both; and having taken our bearings a little we shall in fact be able to do so. The general vicissitude which overtakes the *idea* that represents the instinct can hardly be anything else than that it should vanish from the conscious if it was previously conscious, or that it should be held back from consciousness if it was about to become conscious. The difference is not important; it amounts to much the same thing as the difference between my ordering an undesirable guest out of my drawing-room (or out of my front hall), and my refusing, after recognizing him, to let him cross my threshold at all.¹ The *quantitative* factor of the instinctual representative has three possible vicissitudes, as we can see from a cursory survey of the observations made by psycho-analysis: either the instinct is altogether suppressed, so that no trace of it is found, or it appears as an affect which is in some way or other qualitatively coloured, or it is changed into anxiety.² The two latter possibilities set us the task of taking into account, as a further instinctual vicissitude, the *transformation* into *affects*, and especially into *anxiety*, of the psychical energies of *instincts*.

We recall the fact that the motive and purpose of repression was nothing else than the avoidance of unpleasure. It follows that the vicissitude of the quota of affect belonging to the representative is far more important than the vicissitude of the idea, and this fact is decisive for our assessment of the process of repression. If a repression does not succeed in preventing feelings of unpleasure or anxiety from arising, we may say that it has failed, even though it may have achieved its purpose as far as the ideational portion is concerned. Repressions that have failed will of course have more claim on our interest than any that may have been successful; for the latter will for the most part escape our examination.

We must now try to obtain some insight into the *mechanism*

¹ This simile, which is thus applicable to the process of repression, may also be extended to a characteristic of it which has been mentioned earlier: I have merely to add that I must set a permanent guard over the door which I have forbidden this guest to enter, since he would otherwise burst it open. (See above [p. 151].) [The simile had been elaborated by Freud in the second of his *Five Lectures* (1910a), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 25-7.]

² [Freud's altered views on this last point were stated by him in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926d), especially at the end of Chapter IV and in Chapter XI, Section A (b).]

of the process of repression. In particular we want to know whether there is a single mechanism only, or more than one, and whether perhaps each of the psychoneuroses is distinguished by a mechanism of repression peculiar to it. At the outset of this enquiry, however, we are met by complications. The mechanism of a repression becomes accessible to us only by our deducing that mechanism from the *outcome* of the repression. Confining our observations to the effect of repression on the ideational portion of the representative, we discover that as a rule it creates a *substitutive formation*. What is the mechanism by which such a substitute is formed? Or should we distinguish several mechanisms here as well? Further, we know that repression leaves *symptoms* behind it. May we then suppose that the forming of substitutes and the forming of symptoms coincide, and, if this is so on the whole, is the mechanism of forming symptoms the same as that of repression? The general probability would seem to be that the two are widely different, and that it is not the repression itself which produces substitutive formations and symptoms, but that these latter are indications of a *return of the repressed*¹ and owe their existence to quite other processes. It would also seem advisable to examine the mechanisms by which substitutes and symptoms are formed before considering the mechanisms of repression.

Obviously this is no subject for further speculation. The place of speculation must be taken by a careful analysis of the results of repression observable in the different neuroses. I must, however, suggest that we should postpone this task, too, until we have formed reliable conceptions of the relation of the conscious to the unconscious.² But, in order that the present discussion may not be entirely unfruitful, I will say in advance that (1) the mechanism of repression does not in fact coincide with the mechanism or mechanisms of forming substitutes, (2) there are a great many different mechanisms of forming substitutes and (3) the mechanisms of repression have at least this one thing in

¹ [The concept of a 'return of the repressed' is a very early one in Freud's writings. It appears already in Section II of his second paper on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1896*b*), as well as in the still earlier draft of that paper sent to Fliess on January 1, 1896 (1950*a*, Draft K).]

² [Freud takes up the task in Section IV of his paper on 'The Unconscious', below, p. 181 ff.]

common: a *withdrawal of the cathexis of energy* (or of *libido*, where we are dealing with sexual instincts).

Further, restricting myself to the three best-known forms of psychoneurosis, I will show by means of some examples how the concepts here introduced find application to the study of repression.

From the field of *anxiety hysteria* I will choose a well-analysed example of an animal phobia.¹ The instinctual impulse subjected to repression here is a libidinal attitude towards the father, coupled with fear of him. After repression, this impulse vanishes out of consciousness: the father does not appear in it as an object of libido. As a substitute for him we find in a corresponding place some animal which is more or less fitted to be an object of anxiety. The formation of the substitute for the ideational portion [of the instinctual representative] has come about by *displacement* along a chain of connections which is determined in a particular way. The quantitative portion has not vanished, but has been transformed into anxiety. The result is fear of a wolf, instead of a demand for love from the father. The categories here employed are of course not enough to supply an adequate explanation of even the simplest case of psychoneurosis: there are always other considerations to be taken into account. A repression such as occurs in an animal phobia must be described as radically unsuccessful. All that it has done is to remove and replace the idea; it has failed altogether in sparing unpleasure. And for this reason, too, the work of the neurosis does not cease. It proceeds to a second phase, in order to attain its immediate and more important purpose. What follows is an attempt at flight—the formation of the *phobia proper*, of a number of avoidances which are intended to prevent a release of the anxiety. More specialized investigation enables us to understand the mechanism by which the phobia achieves its aim. [See p. 182 ff. below.]

We are obliged to take quite another view of the process of repression when we consider the picture of a true *conversion hysteria*. Here the salient point is that it is possible to bring about a total disappearance of the quota of affect. When this is so, the patient displays towards his symptoms what Charcot called

¹ [This is, of course, a reference to the case history of the 'Wolf Man' (1918b), which, though it was not published till three years after the present paper, had already been completed in essentials.]

'*la belle indifférence des hystériques*'.¹ In other cases this suppression is not so completely successful: some distressing sensations may attach to the symptoms themselves, or it may prove impossible to prevent some release of anxiety, which in turn sets to work the mechanism of forming a phobia. The ideational content of the instinctual representative is completely withdrawn from consciousness; as a substitute—and at the same time as a symptom—we have an over-strong innervation (in typical cases, a somatic one), sometimes of a sensory, sometimes of a motor character, either as an excitation or an inhibition. The over-innervated area proves on a closer view to be a part of the repressed instinctual representative itself—a part which, as though by a process of *condensation*, has drawn the whole cathexis on to itself. These remarks do not of course bring to light the whole mechanism of a conversion hysteria; in especial the factor of *regression*, which will be considered in another connection, has also to be taken into account.² In so far as repression in [conversion] hysteria is made possible only by the extensive formation of substitutes, it may be judged to be entirely unsuccessful; as regards dealing with the quota of affect, however, which is the true task of repression, it generally signifies a total success. In conversion hysteria the process of repression is completed with the formation of the symptom and does not, as in anxiety hysteria, need to continue to a second phase—or rather, strictly speaking, to continue endlessly.

A totally different picture of repression is shown, once more, in the third disorder which we shall consider for the purposes of our illustration—in *obsessional neurosis*. Here we are at first in doubt what it is that we have to regard as the instinctual representative that is subjected to repression—whether it is a libidinal or a hostile trend. This uncertainty arises because obsessional neurosis has as its basis a regression owing to which a sadistic trend has been substituted for an affectionate one. It is this hostile impulsion against someone who is loved which is subjected to repression. The effect at an early stage of the work of repression is quite different from what it is at a later one. At first the repression is completely successful; the ideational con-

¹ [Freud has already quoted this in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 135.]

² [This is perhaps a reference to the missing metapsychological paper on conversion hysteria. See Editor's Introduction, p. 106.]

tent is rejected and the affect made to disappear. As a substitutive formation there arises an alteration in the ego in the shape of an increased conscientiousness, and this can hardly be called a symptom. Here, substitute and symptom do not coincide. From this we learn something, too, about the mechanism of repression. In this instance, as in all others, repression has brought about a withdrawal of libido; but here it has made use of *reaction-formation* for this purpose, by intensifying an opposite. Thus in this case the formation of a substitute has the same mechanism as repression and at bottom coincides with it, while chronologically, as well as conceptually, it is distinct from the formation of a symptom. It is very probable that the whole process is made possible by the ambivalent relationship into which the sadistic impulsion that has to be repressed has been introduced. But the repression, which was at first successful, does not hold firm; in the further course of things its failure becomes increasingly marked. The ambivalence which has enabled repression through reaction-formation to take place is also the point at which the repressed succeeds in returning. The vanished affect comes back in its transformed shape as social anxiety, moral anxiety and unlimited self-reproaches; the rejected idea is replaced by a *substitute by displacement*, often a displacement on to something very small or indifferent.¹ A tendency to a complete re-establishment of the repressed idea is as a rule unmistakably present. The failure in the repression of the quantitative, affective factor brings into play the same mechanism of flight, by means of avoidance and prohibitions, as we have seen at work in the formation of hysterical phobias. The rejection of the *idea* from the conscious is, however, obstinately maintained, because it entails abstention from action, a motor fettering of the impulse. Thus in obsessional neurosis the work of repression is prolonged in a sterile and interminable struggle.

The short series of comparisons presented here may easily convince us that more comprehensive investigations are necessary before we can hope thoroughly to understand the processes connected with repression and the formation of neurotic symptoms. The extraordinary intricacy of all the factors to be taken into consideration leaves only one way of presenting them open to us. We must select first one and then another point of view,

¹ [Cf. Section II (c) of the 'Rat Man' analysis, *Standard Ed.*, 10, 241.]

and follow it up through the material as long as the application of it seems to yield results. Each separate treatment of the subject will be incomplete in itself, and there cannot fail to be obscurities where it touches upon material that has not yet been treated; but we may hope that a final synthesis will lead to a proper understanding.

THE UNCONSCIOUS
(1915)

EDITOR'S NOTE

DAS UNBEWUSSTE

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1915 *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 3 (4), 189-203 and (5), 257-69.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 294-338. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 480-519.
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 202-41.
1931 *Theoretische Schriften*, 98-140.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 264-303.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'The Unconscious'

- 1925 *C.P.*, 4, 98-136. (Tr. C. M. Baines.)

The present translation, though based on that of 1925, has been very largely rewritten.

This paper seems to have taken less than three weeks to write—from April 4 to April 23, 1915. It was published in the *Internationale Zeitschrift* later in the same year in two instalments, the first containing Sections I-IV, and the second Sections V-VII. In the editions before 1924 the paper was not divided into sections, but what are now the section-headings were printed as side-headings in the margin. The only exception to this is that the words 'The Topographical Point of View', which are now part of the heading to Section II, were originally in the margin at the beginning of the second paragraph of the section at the words 'Proceeding now . . .' (p. 172). A few minor changes were also made in the text in the 1924 edition.

If the series of 'Papers on Metapsychology' may perhaps be regarded as the most important of all Freud's theoretical writings, there can be no doubt that the present essay on 'The Unconscious' is the culmination of that series.

The concept of there being unconscious mental processes is of

course one that is fundamental to psycho-analytic theory. Freud was never tired of insisting upon the arguments in support of it and combating the objections to it. Indeed, the very last unfinished scrap of his theoretical writing, the fragment written by him in 1938 to which he gave the English title 'Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-Analysis' (1940*b*), is a fresh vindication of that concept.

It should be made clear at once, however, that Freud's interest in the assumption was never a philosophical one—though, no doubt, philosophical problems inevitably lay just round the corner. His interest was a *practical* one. He found that without making that assumption he was unable to explain or even to describe a large variety of phenomena which he came across. By making it, on the other hand, he found the way open to an immensely fertile region of fresh knowledge.

In his early days and in his nearest environment there can have been no great resistance to the idea. His immediate teachers—Meynert, for instance¹—in so far as they were interested in psychology, were governed chiefly by the views of J. F. Herbart (1776–1841), and it seems that a text-book embodying the Herbartian principles was in use at Freud's secondary school (Jones, 1953, 409 f.). A recognition of the existence of unconscious mental processes played an essential part in Herbart's system. In spite of this, however, Freud did not immediately adopt the hypothesis in the earliest stages of his psychopathological researches. He seems from the first, it is true, to have felt the force of the argument on which stress is laid in the opening pages of the present paper—the argument, that is, that to restrict mental events to those that are conscious and to intersperse them with purely physical, neural events 'disrupts psychical continuities' and introduces unintelligible gaps into the chain of observed phenomena. But there were two ways in which this difficulty could be met. We might disregard the physical events and adopt the hypothesis that the gaps are filled with unconscious mental ones; but, on the other hand, we might disregard the conscious mental events and construct a purely physical chain, without any breaks in it, which would cover all the facts of observation. To Freud, whose early scientific career had been entirely concerned with physiology,

¹ The possible influence on Freud in this respect of the physiologist Hering is discussed below in Appendix A (p. 205).

this second possibility was at first irresistibly attractive. The attraction was no doubt strengthened by the views of Hughlings-Jackson, of whose work he showed his admiration in his monograph on aphasia (1891*b*), a relevant passage from which will be found below in Appendix B (p. 206). The neurological method of describing psychopathological phenomena was accordingly the one which Freud began by adopting, and all his writings of the Breuer period are professedly based on that method. He became intellectually fascinated by the possibility of constructing a 'psychology' out of purely neurological ingredients, and devoted many months in the year 1895 to accomplishing the feat. Thus on April 27 of that year (Freud, 1950*a*, Letter 23) he wrote to Fliess: 'I am so deep in the "Psychology for Neurologists" that it quite consumes me, till I have to break off really overworked. I have never been so intensely preoccupied by anything. And will anything come of it? I hope so, but the going is hard and slow.' Something *did* come of it many months later—the torso which we know as the 'Project for a Scientific Psychology', despatched to Fliess in September and October, 1895. This astonishing production purports to describe and explain the whole range of human behaviour, normal and pathological, by means of a complicated manipulation of two material entities—the neurone and 'quantity in a condition of flow', an unspecified physical or chemical energy. The need for postulating any unconscious mental processes was in this way entirely avoided: the chain of physical events was unbroken and complete.

There were no doubt many reasons why the 'Project' was never finished and why the whole line of thought behind it was before long abandoned. But the principal reason was that Freud the neurologist was being overtaken and displaced by Freud the psychologist: it became more and more obvious that even the elaborate machinery of the neuron systems was far too cumbersome and coarse to deal with the subtleties which were being brought to light by 'psychological analysis' and which could only be accounted for in the language of mental processes. A displacement of Freud's interest had in fact been very gradually taking place. Already at the time of the publication of the *Aphasia* his treatment of the case of Frau Emmy von N. lay two or three years behind him, and her case history was written more than a year before the 'Project'. It is in a footnote

to that case history (*Standard Ed.*, 2, 76) that his first published use of the term 'the unconscious' is to be found; and though the *ostensible* theory underlying his share in the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895*d*) might be a neurological one, psychology, and with it the necessity for unconscious mental processes, was steadily creeping in. Indeed, the whole basis of the repression theory of hysteria, and of the cathartic method of treatment, cried out for a psychological explanation, and it was only by the most contorted efforts that they had been accounted for neurologically in Part II of the 'Project'.¹ A few years later, in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), a strange transformation had occurred: not only had the neurological account of psychology completely disappeared, but much of what Freud had written in the 'Project' in terms of the nervous system now turned out to be valid and far more intelligible when translated into mental terms. The unconscious was established once and for all.

But, it must be repeated, what Freud established was no mere metaphysical entity. What he did in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams* was, as it were, to clothe the metaphysical entity in flesh and blood. He showed for the first time what the unconscious was like, how it worked, how it differed from other parts of the mind, and what were its reciprocal relations with them. It was to these discoveries that he returned, amplifying and deepening them, in the paper which follows.

At an earlier stage, however, it had become evident that the term 'unconscious' was an ambiguous one. Three years previously, in the paper which he wrote in English for the Society for Psychical Research (1912*g*), and which is in many ways a preliminary to the present paper, he had carefully investigated these ambiguities, and had differentiated between the 'descriptive', 'dynamic' and 'systematic' uses of the word. He repeats the distinctions in Section II of this paper (p. 172 ff.), though in a slightly different form; and he came back to them again in Chapter I of *The Ego and the Id* (1923*b*) and, at even greater length, in Lecture XXXI of the *New Introductory Lectures* (1933*a*). The untidy way in which the contrast between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' fits the differences between the various systems of the mind is already stated clearly below (p. 192); but the whole

¹ Oddly enough it was Breuer, in his theoretical contribution to the *Studies*, who was the first to make a reasoned defence of unconscious ideas (*Standard Ed.*, 2, 222 f.).

position was only brought into perspective when in *The Ego and the Id* Freud introduced a new structural picture of the mind. In spite, however, of the unsatisfactory operation of the criterion 'conscious or unconscious?', Freud always insisted (as he does in two places here, pp. 172 and 192, and again both in *The Ego and the Id* and in the *New Introductory Lectures*) that that criterion 'is in the last resort our one beacon-light in the darkness of depth psychology'.¹

¹ The closing words of Chapter I of *The Ego and the Id*.—For English readers, it must be observed, there is a further ambiguity in the word 'unconscious' which is scarcely present in the German. The German words '*bewusst*' and '*unbewusst*' have the grammatical form of passive participles, and their usual sense is something like 'consciously known' and 'not consciously known'. The English 'conscious', though it *can* be used in the same way, is also used, and perhaps more commonly, in an *active* sense: 'he was conscious of the sound' and 'he lay there unconscious'. The German terms do not often have this active meaning, and it is important to bear in mind that 'conscious' is in general to be understood in a passive sense in what follows. The German word '*Bewusstsein*', on the other hand (which is here translated 'consciousness'), *does* have an active sense. Thus, for instance, on page 173 Freud speaks of a psychical act becoming 'an object of consciousness'; again, in the last paragraph of the first section of the paper (page 171) he speaks of 'the perception [of mental processes] by means of consciousness'; and in general, when he uses such phrases as 'our consciousness' he is referring to our consciousness *of* something. When he wishes to speak of a mental state's consciousness in the *passive* sense, he uses the word '*Bewusstheit*', which is translated here 'the attribute of being conscious', 'the fact of being conscious' or simply 'being conscious'—where the English 'conscious' is, as almost always in these papers, to be taken in the passive sense.

THE UNCONSCIOUS

WE have learnt from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious. When this happens we say of the idea that it is in a state of being 'unconscious',¹ and we can produce good evidence to show that even when it is unconscious it can produce effects, even including some which finally reach consciousness. Everything that is repressed must remain unconscious; but let us state at the very outset that the repressed does not cover everything that is unconscious. The unconscious has the wider compass: the repressed is a part of the unconscious.

How are we to arrive at a knowledge of the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious. Psycho-analytic work shows us every day that translation of this kind is possible. In order that this should come about, the person under analysis must overcome certain resistances—the same resistances as those which, earlier, made the material concerned into something repressed by rejecting it from the conscious.

I. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONCEPT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

Our right to assume the existence of something mental that is unconscious and to employ that assumption for the purposes of scientific work is disputed in many quarters. To this we can reply that our assumption of the unconscious is *necessary* and *legitimate*, and that we possess numerous proofs of its existence.

It is *necessary* because the data of consciousness have a very large number of gaps in them; both in healthy and in sick people psychical acts often occur which can be explained only by presupposing other acts, of which, nevertheless, consciousness affords no evidence. These not only include parapraxes and dreams in healthy people, and everything described as a psychical symptom or an obsession in the sick; our most personal daily experience acquaints us with ideas that come into our head

¹ [See Editor's Note, p. 165 footnote.]

we do not know from where, and with intellectual conclusions arrived at we do not know how. All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we insist upon claiming that every mental act that occurs in us must also necessarily be experienced by us through consciousness; on the other hand, they fall into a demonstrable connection if we interpolate between them the unconscious acts which we have inferred. A gain in meaning is a perfectly justifiable ground for going beyond the limits of direct experience. When, in addition, it turns out that the assumption of there being an unconscious enables us to construct a successful procedure by which we can exert an effective influence upon the course of conscious processes, this success will have given us an incontrovertible proof of the existence of what we have assumed. This being so, we must adopt the position that to require that whatever goes on in the mind must also be known to consciousness is to make an untenable claim.

We can go further and argue, in support of there being an unconscious psychical state, that at any given moment consciousness includes only a small content, so that the greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be for very considerable periods of time in a state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically unconscious. When all our latent memories are taken into consideration it becomes totally incomprehensible how the existence of the unconscious can be denied. But here we encounter the objection that these latent recollections can no longer be described as psychical, but that they correspond to residues of somatic processes from which what is psychical can once more arise. The obvious answer to this is that a latent memory is, on the contrary, an unquestionable residuum of a *psychical* process. But it is more important to realize clearly that this objection is based on the equation—not, it is true, explicitly stated but taken as axiomatic—of what is conscious with what is mental. This equation is either a *petitio principii* which begs the question whether everything that is psychical is also necessarily conscious; or else it is a matter of convention, of nomenclature. In this latter case it is, of course, like any other convention, not open to refutation. The question remains, however, whether the convention is so expedient that we are bound to adopt it. To this we may reply that the conventional equation of the psychical with the conscious is totally

inexpedient. It disrupts psychical continuities, plunges us into the insoluble difficulties of psycho-physical parallelism,¹ is open to the reproach that for no obvious reason it over-estimates the part played by consciousness, and that it forces us prematurely to abandon the field of psychological research without being able to offer us any compensation from other fields.

It is clear in any case that this question—whether the latent states of mental life, whose existence is undeniable, are to be conceived of as conscious mental states or as physical ones—threatens to resolve itself into a verbal dispute. We shall therefore be better advised to focus our attention on what we know with certainty of the nature of these debatable states. As far as their physical characteristics are concerned, they are totally inaccessible to us: no physiological concept or chemical process can give us any notion of their nature. On the other hand, we know for certain that they have abundant points of contact with conscious mental processes; with the help of a certain amount of work they can be transformed into, or replaced by, conscious mental processes, and all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions and so on, can be applied to them. Indeed, we are obliged to say of some of these latent states that the only respect in which they differ from conscious ones is precisely in the absence of consciousness. Thus we shall not hesitate to treat them as objects of psychological research, and to deal with them in the most intimate connection with conscious mental acts.

The stubborn denial of a psychical character to latent mental acts is accounted for by the circumstance that most of the phenomena concerned have not been the subject of study outside psycho-analysis. Anyone who is ignorant of pathological facts, who regards the parapraxes of normal people as accidental, and who is content with the old saw that dreams are froth [*‘Träume sind Schäume’*]² has only to ignore a few more problems of the psychology of consciousness in order to spare himself any need to assume an unconscious mental activity. Incidentally, even before the time of psycho-analysis, hypnotic experiments, and especially post-hypnotic suggestion, had tangibly demon-

¹ [Freud seems himself at one time to have been inclined to accept this theory, as is suggested by a passage in his book on aphasia (1891*b*, 56 ff.). This will be found translated below in Appendix B (p. 206).]

² [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 133.]

strated the existence and mode of operation of the mental unconscious.¹

The assumption of an unconscious is, moreover, a perfectly *legitimate* one, inasmuch as in postulating it we are not departing a single step from our customary and generally accepted mode of thinking. Consciousness makes each of us aware only of his own states of mind; that other people, too, possess a consciousness is an inference which we draw by analogy from their observable utterances and actions, in order to make this behaviour of theirs intelligible to us. (It would no doubt be psychologically more correct to put it in this way: that without any special reflection we attribute to everyone else our own constitution and therefore our consciousness as well, and that this identification is a *sine qua non* of our understanding.) This inference (or this identification) was formerly extended by the ego to other human beings, to animals, plants, inanimate objects and to the world at large, and proved serviceable so long as their similarity to the individual ego was overwhelmingly great; but it became more untrustworthy in proportion as the difference between the ego and these 'others' widened. To-day, our critical judgement is already in doubt on the question of consciousness in animals; we refuse to admit it in plants and we regard the assumption of its existence in inanimate matter as mysticism. But even where the original inclination to identification has withstood criticism—that is, when the 'others' are our fellow-men—the assumption of a consciousness in them rests upon an inference and cannot share the immediate certainty which we have of our own consciousness.

Psycho-analysis demands nothing more than that we should apply this process of inference to ourselves also—a proceeding to which, it is true, we are not constitutionally inclined. If we do this, we must say: all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person. Furthermore, experience shows that we understand very well how to interpret in other people (that is, how to fit into their chain of mental events) the same acts which we

¹ [In his very last discussion of the subject, in the unfinished fragment 'Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-Analysis' (1940b), Freud entered at some length into the evidence afforded by post-hypnotic suggestion.]

refuse to acknowledge as being mental in ourselves. Here some special hindrance evidently deflects our investigations from our own self and prevents our obtaining a true knowledge of it.

This process of inference, when applied to oneself in spite of internal opposition, does not, however, lead to the disclosure of an unconscious; it leads logically to the assumption of another, second consciousness which is united in one's self with the consciousness one knows. But at this point, certain criticisms may fairly be made. In the first place, a consciousness of which its own possessor knows nothing is something very different from a consciousness belonging to another person, and it is questionable whether such a consciousness, lacking, as it does, its most important characteristic, deserves any discussion at all. Those who have resisted the assumption of an unconscious *psychical* are not likely to be ready to exchange it for an unconscious *consciousness*. In the second place, analysis shows that the different latent mental processes inferred by us enjoy a high degree of mutual independence, as though they had no connection with one another, and knew nothing of one another. We must be prepared, if so, to assume the existence in us not only of a second consciousness, but of a third, fourth, perhaps of an unlimited number of states of consciousness, all unknown to us and to one another. In the third place—and this is the most weighty argument of all—we have to take into account the fact that analytic investigation reveals some of these latent processes as having characteristics and peculiarities which seem alien to us, or even incredible, and which run directly counter to the attributes of consciousness with which we are familiar. Thus we have grounds for modifying our inference about ourselves and saying that what is proved is not the existence of a second consciousness in us, but the existence of psychical acts which lack consciousness. We shall also be right in rejecting the term 'sub-consciousness' as incorrect and misleading.¹ The well-known cases of 'double conscience'² (splitting of consciousness) prove

¹ [In some of his very early writings, Freud himself used the term 'subconscious', e.g. in his French paper on hysterical paralyses (1893c) and in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 69 n. But he disrecommends the term as early as in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 615. He alludes to the point again in Lecture XIX of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17), and argues it a little more fully near the end of Chapter II of *The Question of Lay Analysis* (1926e).]

² [The French term for 'dual consciousness'.]

nothing against our view. We may most aptly describe them as cases of a splitting of the mental activities into two groups, and say that the same consciousness turns to one or the other of these groups alternately.

In psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs.¹ We can even hope to gain fresh knowledge from the comparison. The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the one hand, as a further expansion of the primitive animism which caused us to see copies of our own consciousness all around us, and, on the other hand, as an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of external perception—that internal objects are less unknowable than the external world.

¹ [This idea had already been dealt with at some length in Chapter VII (F) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 615–17.]

II. VARIOUS MEANINGS OF 'THE UNCONSCIOUS'— THE TOPOGRAPHICAL POINT OF VIEW

Before going any further, let us state the important, though inconvenient, fact that the attribute of being unconscious is only one feature that is found in the psychical and is by no means sufficient fully to characterize it. There are psychical acts of very varying value which yet agree in possessing the characteristic of being unconscious. The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent, temporarily unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the other hand, processes such as repressed ones, which if they were to become conscious would be bound to stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious processes. It would put an end to all misunderstandings if, from now on, in describing the various kinds of psychical acts we were to disregard the question of whether they were conscious or unconscious, and were to classify and correlate them only according to their relation to instincts and aims, according to their composition and according to which of the hierarchy of psychical systems they belong to. This, however, is for various reasons impracticable, so that we cannot escape the ambiguity of using the words 'conscious' and 'unconscious' sometimes in a descriptive and sometimes in a systematic sense, in which latter they signify inclusion in particular systems and possession of certain characteristics. We might attempt to avoid confusion by giving the psychical systems which we have distinguished certain arbitrarily chosen names which have no reference to the attribute of being conscious. Only we should first have to specify what the grounds are on which we distinguish the systems, and in doing this we should not be able to evade the attribute of being conscious, seeing that it forms the point of departure for all our investigations.¹ Perhaps we may look for some assistance from the proposal to employ, at any rate in writing, the abbreviation *Cs.* for consciousness and *Ucs.* for what is unconscious, when we are using the two words in the systematic sense.²

Proceeding now to an account of the positive findings of

¹ [Freud recurs to this below on p. 192.]

² [Freud had already introduced these abbreviations in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 540 ff.]

psycho-analysis, we may say that in general a psychical act goes through two phases as regards its state, between which is interposed a kind of testing (censorship). In the first phase the psychical act is unconscious and belongs to the system *Ucs.*; if, on testing, it is rejected by the censorship, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be 'repressed' and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this testing, it enters the second phase and thenceforth belongs to the second system, which we will call the system *Cs.* But the fact that it belongs to that system does not yet unequivocally determine its relation to consciousness. It is not yet conscious, but it is certainly *capable of becoming conscious* (to use Breuer's expression)¹—that is, it can now, given certain conditions, become an object of consciousness without any special resistance. In consideration of this capacity for becoming conscious we also call the system *Cs.* the 'preconscious'. If it should turn out that a certain censorship also plays a part in determining whether the preconscious becomes conscious, we shall discriminate more sharply between the systems *Pcs.* and *Cs.* [Cf. p. 191 f.]. For the present let it suffice us to bear in mind that the system *Pcs.* shares the characteristics of the system *Cs.* and that the rigorous censorship exercises its office at the point of transition from the *Ucs.* to the *Pcs.* (or *Cs.*).

By accepting the existence of these two (or three) psychical systems, psycho-analysis has departed a step further from the descriptive 'psychology of consciousness' and has raised new problems and acquired a new content. Up till now, it has differed from that psychology mainly by reason of its *dynamic* view of mental processes; now in addition it seems to take account of psychical *topography* as well, and to indicate in respect of any given mental act within what system or between what systems it takes place. On account of this attempt, too, it has been given the name of 'depth-psychology'.² We shall hear that it can be further enriched by taking yet another point of view into account. [Cf. p. 181.]

If we are to take the topography of mental acts seriously we must direct our interest to a doubt which arises at this point.

¹ [See *Studies on Hysteria*, Breuer and Freud (1895), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 225.]

² [By Bleuler (1914). See the 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914*d*), above, p. 41.]

When a psychical act (let us confine ourselves here to one which is in the nature of an idea¹) is transposed from the system *Ucs.* into the system *Cs.* (or *Pcs.*), are we to suppose that this transposition involves a fresh record—as it were, a second registration—of the idea in question, which may thus be situated as well in a fresh psychical locality, and alongside of which the original unconscious registration continues to exist?² Or are we rather to believe that the transposition consists in a change in the state of the idea, a change involving the same material and occurring in the same locality? This question may appear abstruse, but it must be raised if we wish to form a more definite conception of psychical topography, of the dimension of depth in the mind. It is a difficult one because it goes beyond pure psychology and touches on the relations of the mental apparatus to anatomy. We know that in the very roughest sense such relations exist. Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the brain as it is with no other organ. We are taken a step further—we do not know how much—by the discovery of the unequal importance of the different parts of the brain and their special relations to particular parts of the body and to particular mental activities. But every attempt to go on from there to discover a localization of mental processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as travelling along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely.³ The same fate would await any theory which attempted to recognize, let us say, the anatomical position of the system *Cs.*—conscious mental activity—as being in the cortex, and to localize the unconscious processes in the sub-cortical parts of the brain.⁴ There is a hiatus here which at present cannot be filled, nor is it one of the tasks of psychology

¹ [The German word here is '*Vorstellung*', which covers the English terms 'idea', 'image' and 'presentation'.]

² [The conception of an idea being present in the mind in more than one 'registration' was first put forward by Freud in a letter to Fliess of December 6, 1896 (Freud, 1950*a*, Letter 52). It is used in connection with the theory of memory in Chapter VII (Section B) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 539; and it is alluded to again in Section F of the same chapter (*ibid.*, 610) in an argument which foreshadows the present one.]

³ [Freud had himself been much concerned with the question of the localization of cerebral functions in his work on aphasia (1891*b*).]

⁴ [Freud had insisted on this as early as in his preface to his translation of Bernheim's *De la suggestion* (Freud, 1888–9).]

to fill it. Our psychical topography has *for the present* nothing to do with anatomy; it has reference not to anatomical localities, but to regions in the mental apparatus, wherever they may be situated in the body.

In this respect, then, our work is untrammelled and may proceed according to its own requirements. It will, however, be useful to remind ourselves that as things stand our hypotheses set out to be no more than graphic illustrations. The first of the two possibilities which we considered—namely, that the *Cs.* phase of an idea implies a fresh registration of it, which is situated in another place—is doubtless the cruder but also the more convenient. The second hypothesis—that of a merely *functional* change of state—is *a priori* more probable, but it is less plastic, less easy to manipulate. With the first, or topographical, hypothesis is bound up that of a topographical separation of the systems *Ucs.* and *Cs.* and also the possibility that an idea may exist simultaneously in two places in the mental apparatus—indeed, that if it is not inhibited by the censorship, it regularly advances from the one position to the other, possibly without losing its first location or registration.

This view may seem odd, but it can be supported by observations from psycho-analytic practice. If we communicate to a patient some idea which he has at one time repressed but which we have discovered in him, our telling him makes at first no change in his mental condition. Above all, it does not remove the repression nor undo its effects, as might perhaps be expected from the fact that the previously unconscious idea has now become conscious. On the contrary, all that we shall achieve at first will be a fresh rejection of the repressed idea. But now the patient has in actual fact the same idea in two forms in different places in his mental apparatus: first, he has the conscious memory of the auditory trace of the idea, conveyed in what we told him; and secondly, he also has—as we know for certain—the unconscious memory of his experience as it was in its earlier form.¹ Actually there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after the resistances have been overcome, has

¹ [The topographical picture of the distinction between conscious and unconscious ideas is presented in Freud's discussion of the case of 'Little Hans' (1909*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 120 f., and at greater length in the closing paragraphs of his technical paper 'On Beginning the Treatment' (1913*c*).]

entered into connection with the unconscious memory-trace. It is only through the making conscious of the latter itself that success is achieved. On superficial consideration this would seem to show that conscious and unconscious ideas are distinct registrations, topographically separated, of the same content. But a moment's reflection shows that the identity of the information given to the patient with his repressed memory is only apparent. To have heard something and to have experienced something are in their psychological nature two quite different things, even though the content of both is the same.

So for the moment we are not in a position to decide between the two possibilities that we have discussed. Perhaps later on we shall come upon factors which may turn the balance in favour of one or the other. Perhaps we shall make the discovery that our question was inadequately framed and that the difference between an unconscious and a conscious idea has to be defined in quite another way.¹

¹ [This argument is taken up again on p. 201.]

III. UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS

We have limited the foregoing discussion to ideas; we may now raise a new question, the answer to which is bound to contribute to the elucidation of our theoretical views. We have said that there are conscious and unconscious ideas; but are there also unconscious instinctual impulses, emotions and feelings, or is it in this instance meaningless to form combinations of the kind?

I am in fact of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can never become an object of consciousness—only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea. If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it. When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual impulse, the looseness of phraseology is a harmless one. We can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational representative of which is unconscious, for nothing else comes into consideration.¹

We should expect the answer to the question about unconscious feelings, emotions and affects to be just as easily given. It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e. that it should become known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned. But in psycho-analytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction, 'unconscious consciousness of guilt',² or a paradoxical 'unconscious anxiety'. Is there more meaning in the use of these terms than there is in speaking of 'unconscious instincts'?

The two cases are in fact not on all fours. In the first place, it may happen that an affective or emotional impulse is perceived but misconstrued. Owing to the repression of its proper representative it has been forced to become connected with another

¹ [Cf. the Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', p. 111 ff. above.]

² [German '*Schuldbewusstsein*', a common equivalent for '*Schuldgefühl*', 'sense of guilt'.]

idea, and is now regarded by consciousness as the manifestation of that idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affective impulse an 'unconscious' one. Yet its affect was never unconscious; all that had happened was that its *idea* had undergone repression. In general, the use of the terms 'unconscious affect' and 'unconscious emotion' has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse. We know that three such vicissitudes are possible:¹ either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed, i.e. it is prevented from developing at all. (These possibilities may perhaps be studied even more easily in the dream-work than in neuroses.²) We know, too, that to suppress the development of affect is the true aim of repression and that its work is incomplete if this aim is not achieved. In every instance where repression has succeeded in inhibiting the development of affects, we term those affects (which we restore when we undo the work of repression) 'unconscious'. Thus it cannot be denied that the use of the terms in question is consistent; but in comparison with unconscious ideas there is the important difference that unconscious ideas continue to exist after repression as actual structures in the system *Ucs.*, whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing. Strictly speaking, then, and although no fault can be found with the linguistic usage, there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas. But there may very well be in the system *Ucs.* affective structures which, like others, become conscious. The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes—basically of memory-traces—whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings. In the present state of our knowledge of affects and emotions we cannot express this difference more clearly.³

It is of especial interest to us to have established the fact that repression can succeed in inhibiting an instinctual impulse from

¹ Cf. the preceding paper on 'Repression' [p. 153].

² [The main discussion of affects in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a) will be found in Section H of Chapter VI, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 460–87.]

³ [This question is discussed again in Chapter II of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).]

being turned into a manifestation of affect. This shows us that the system *Cs.* normally controls affectivity as well as access to motility; and it enhances the importance of repression, since it shows that repression results not only in withholding things from consciousness, but also in preventing the development of affect and the setting-off of muscular activity. Conversely, too, we may say that as long as the system *Cs.* controls affectivity and motility, the mental condition of the person in question is spoken of as normal. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable difference in the relation of the controlling system to the two contiguous processes of discharge.¹ Whereas the control by the *Cs.* over voluntary motility is firmly rooted, regularly withstands the onslaught of neurosis and only breaks down in psychosis, control by the *Cs.* over the development of affects is less secure. Even within the limits of normal life we can recognize that a constant struggle for primacy over affectivity goes on between the two systems *Cs.* and *Ucs.*, that certain spheres of influence are marked off from one another and that intermixtures between the operative forces occur.

The importance of the system *Cs.* (*Pcs.*)² as regards access to the release of affect and to action enables us also to understand the part played by substitutive ideas in determining the form taken by illness. It is possible for the development of affect to proceed directly from the system *Ucs.*; in that case the affect always has the character of anxiety, for which all 'repressed' affects are exchanged. Often, however, the instinctual impulse has to wait until it has found a substitutive idea in the system *Cs.* The development of affect can then proceed from this conscious substitute, and the nature of that substitute determines the qualitative character of the affect. We have asserted [p. 152] that in repression a severance takes place between the affect and the idea to which it belongs, and that each then undergoes its separate vicissitudes. Descriptively, this is incontrovertible; in actuality, however, the affect does not as a rule arise till the break-through to a new representation in the system *Cs.* has been successfully achieved.

¹ Affectivity manifests itself essentially in motor (secretory and vaso-motor) discharge resulting in an (internal) alteration of the subject's own body without reference to the external world; motility, in actions designed to effect changes in the external world.

² [In the 1915 edition only, '*Pcs.*' does not occur.]

IV. TOPOGRAPHY AND DYNAMICS OF REPRESSION

We have arrived at the conclusion that repression is essentially a process affecting ideas on the border between the systems *Ucs.* and *Pcs.* (*Cs.*), and we can now make a fresh attempt to describe the process in greater detail.

It must be a matter of a *withdrawal* of cathexis; but the question is, in which system does the withdrawal take place and to which system does the cathexis that is withdrawn belong? The repressed idea remains capable of action in the *Ucs.*, and it must therefore have retained its cathexis. What has been withdrawn must be something else. [Cf. p. 202, below.] Let us take the case of repression proper ('after-pressure') [p. 148], as it affects an idea which is preconscious or even actually conscious. Here repression can only consist in withdrawing from the idea the (pre)conscious cathexis which belongs to the system *Pcs.* The idea then either remains uncathexed, or receives cathexis from the *Ucs.*, or retains the *Ucs.* cathexis which it already had. Thus there is a withdrawal of the preconscious cathexis, retention of the unconscious cathexis, or replacement of the preconscious cathexis by an unconscious one. We notice, moreover, that we have based these reflections (as it were, without meaning to) on the assumption that the transition from the system *Ucs.* to the system next to it is not effected through the making of a new registration but through a change in its state, an alteration in its cathexis. The functional hypothesis has here easily defeated the topographical one. [See above, pp. 174-5.]

But this process of withdrawal of libido¹ is not adequate to make another characteristic of repression comprehensible to us. It is not clear why the idea which has remained cathexed or has received cathexis from the *Ucs.* should not, in virtue of its cathexis, renew the attempt to penetrate into the system *Pcs.* If it could do so, the withdrawal of libido from it would have to be repeated, and the same performance would go on endlessly; but the outcome would not be repression. So, too, when it comes to describing *primal* repression, the mechanism just discussed of withdrawal of preconscious cathexis would fail to meet the case;

¹ [For the use of 'libido' here see four paragraphs lower down.]

for here we are dealing with an unconscious idea which has as yet received *no* cathexis from the *Pcs.* and therefore cannot have that cathexis withdrawn from it.

What we require, therefore, is another process which maintains the repression in the first case [i.e. the case of after-pressure] and, in the second [i.e. that of primal repression], ensures its being established as well as continued. This other process can only be found in the assumption of an *anticathexis*, by means of which the system *Pcs.* protects itself from the pressure upon it of the unconscious idea. We shall see from clinical examples how such an anticathexis, operating in the system *Pcs.*, manifests itself. It is this which represents the permanent expenditure [of energy] of a primal repression, and which also guarantees the permanence of that repression. Anticathexis is the sole mechanism of primal repression; in the case of repression proper ('after-pressure') there is in addition withdrawal of the *Pcs.* cathexis. It is very possible that it is precisely the cathexis which is withdrawn from the idea that is used for anticathexis.

We see how we have gradually been led into adopting a third point of view in our account of psychical phenomena. Besides the dynamic and the topographical points of view [p. 173], we have adopted the *economic* one. This endeavours to follow out the vicissitudes of amounts of excitation and to arrive at least at some *relative* estimate of their magnitude.

It will not be unreasonable to give a special name to this whole way of regarding our subject-matter, for it is the consummation of psycho-analytic research. I propose that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a *metapsychological*¹ presentation. We must say at once that in the present state of our knowledge there are only a few points at which we shall succeed in this.

Let us make a tentative effort to give a metapsychological description of the process of repression in the three transference neuroses which are familiar to us. Here we may replace

¹ [Freud had first used this term some twenty years earlier in a letter to Fliess of February 13, 1896. (Freud, 1950a, Letter 41.) He had only used it once before in his *published* works: in the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901b), Chapter XII (C).]

'cathexis' by 'libido',¹ because, as we know, it is the vicissitudes of *sexual* impulses with which we shall be dealing.

In anxiety hysteria a first phase of the process is frequently overlooked, and may perhaps be in fact missed out; on careful observation, however, it can be clearly discerned. It consists in anxiety appearing without the subject knowing what he is afraid of. We must suppose that there was present in the *Ucs.* some love-impulse demanding to be transposed into the system *Pcs.*; but the cathexis directed to it from the latter system has drawn back from the impulse (as though in an attempt at flight) and the unconscious libidinal cathexis of the rejected idea has been discharged in the form of anxiety.

On the occasion of a repetition (if there should be one) of this process, a first step is taken in the direction of mastering the unwelcome development of anxiety.² The [*Pcs.*] cathexis that has taken flight attaches itself to a substitutive idea which, on the one hand, is connected by association with the rejected idea, and, on the other, has escaped repression by reason of its remoteness from that idea. This substitutive idea—a 'substitute by displacement' [p. 155]—permits the still uninhabitable development of anxiety to be rationalized. It now plays the part of an anticathexis for the system *Cs.* (*Pcs.*),³ by securing it against an emergence in the *Cs.* of the repressed idea. On the other hand it is, or acts as if it were, the point of departure for the release of the anxiety-affect, which has now really become quite uninhabitable. Clinical observation shows, for instance, that a child suffering from an animal phobia experiences anxiety under two kinds of conditions: in the first place, when his repressed love-impulse becomes intensified, and, in the second, when he perceives the animal he is afraid of. The substitutive idea acts in the one instance as a point at which there is a passage across from the system *Ucs.* to the system *Cs.*, and, in the other instance, as a self-sufficing source for the release of anxiety. The extending dominance of the system *Cs.* usually manifests itself in the fact that the first of these two modes of excitation of the substitutive idea gives place more and more to the second. The child may perhaps end by behaving as though he had no predilection whatever towards his father but had

¹ [Freud had already done this four paragraphs earlier.]

² [This is the 'second phase' of the process.]

³ [In the 1915 edition only '*Pcs.*' does not occur.]

become quite free from him, and as though his fear of the animal was a real fear—except that this fear of the animal, fed as such a fear is from an unconscious instinctual source, proves obdurate and exaggerated in the face of all influences brought to bear from the system *Cs.*, and thereby betrays its derivation from the system *Ucs.*—In the second phase of anxiety hysteria, therefore, the anticathexis from the system *Cs.* has led to substitute-formation.

Soon the same mechanism finds a fresh application. The process of repression, as we know, is not yet completed, and it finds a further aim in the task of inhibiting the development of the anxiety which arises from the substitute.¹ This is achieved by the whole of the associated environment of the substitutive idea being cathected with special intensity, so that it can display a high degree of sensibility to excitation. Excitation of any point in this outer structure must inevitably, on account of its connection with the substitutive idea, give rise to a slight development of anxiety; and this is now used as a signal to inhibit, by means of a fresh flight on the part of the [*Pcs.*] cathexis, the further progress of the development of anxiety.² The further away the sensitive and vigilant anticathexes are situated from the feared substitute, the more precisely can the mechanism function which is designed to isolate the substitutive idea and to protect it from fresh excitations. These precautions naturally only guard against excitations which approach the substitutive idea from outside, through perception; they never guard against instinctual excitation, which reaches the substitutive idea from the direction of its link with the repressed idea. Thus the precautions do not begin to operate till the substitute has satisfactorily taken over representation of the repressed, and they can never operate with complete reliability. With each increase of instinctual excitation the protecting rampart round the substitutive idea must be shifted a little further outwards. The whole construction, which is set up in an analogous way in the other neuroses, is termed a *phobia*. The flight from a conscious

¹ [The 'third phase'.]

² [The notion of a small release of unpleasure acting as a 'signal' to prevent a much larger release is already to be found in Freud's 1895 'Project' (1950a, Part II, Section 6) and in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 602. The idea is, of course, developed much further in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926d), e.g. in Chapter XI, Section A (b).]

cathexis of the substitutive idea is manifested in the avoidances, renunciations and prohibitions by which we recognize anxiety hysteria.

Surveying the whole process, we may say that the third phase repeats the work of the second on an ampler scale. The system Cs. now protects itself against the activation of the substitutive idea by an anticathexis of its environment, just as previously it had secured itself against the emergence of the repressed idea by a cathexis of the substitutive idea. In this way the formation of substitutes by displacement has been further continued. We must also add that the system Cs. had earlier only one small area at which the repressed instinctual impulse could break through, namely, the substitutive idea; but that ultimately this *enclave* of unconscious influence extends to the whole phobic outer structure. Further, we may lay stress on the interesting consideration that by means of the whole defensive mechanism thus set in action a projection outward of the instinctual danger has been achieved. The ego behaves as if the danger of a development of anxiety threatened it not from the direction of an instinctual impulse but from the direction of a perception, and it is thus enabled to react against this external danger with the attempts at flight represented by phobic avoidances. In this process repression is successful in one particular: the release of anxiety can to some extent be dammed up, but only at a heavy sacrifice of personal freedom. Attempts at flight from the demands of instinct are, however, in general useless, and, in spite of everything, the result of phobic flight remains unsatisfactory.

A great deal of what we have found in anxiety hysteria also holds good for the other two neuroses, so that we can confine our discussion to their points of difference and to the part played by anticathexis. In conversion hysteria the instinctual cathexis of the repressed idea is changed into the innervation of the symptom. How far and in what circumstances the unconscious idea is drained empty by this discharge into innervation, so that it can relinquish its pressure upon the system Cs.—these and similar questions had better be reserved for a special investigation of hysteria.¹ In conversion hysteria the part played by the

¹ [Probably a reference to the missing metapsychological paper on conversion hysteria. (See Editor's Introduction, p. 106.)—Freud had already touched on the question in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 166–7.]

anticathexis proceeding from the system *Cs.* (*Pcs.*)¹ is clear and becomes manifest in the formation of the symptom. It is the anticathexis that decides upon what portion of the instinctual representative the whole cathexis of the latter is able to be concentrated. The portion thus selected to be a symptom fulfils the condition of expressing the wishful aim of the instinctual impulse no less than the defensive or punitive efforts of the system *Cs.*; thus it becomes hypercathected, and it is maintained from both directions like the substitutive idea in anxiety hysteria. From this circumstance we may conclude without hesitation that the amount of energy expended by the system *Cs.* on repression need not be so great as the cathectic energy of the symptom; for the strength of the repression is measured by the amount of anticathexis expended, whereas the symptom is supported not only by this anticathexis but also by the instinctual cathexis from the system *Ucs.* which is condensed in the symptom.

As regards obsessional neurosis, we need only add to the observations brought forward in the preceding paper [p. 156 f.] that it is here that the anticathexis from the system *Cs.* comes most noticeably into the foreground. It is this which, organized as a reaction-formation, brings about the first repression, and which is later the point at which the repressed idea breaks through. We may venture the supposition that it is because of the predominance of the anticathexis and the absence of discharge that the work of repression seems far less successful in anxiety hysteria and in obsessional neurosis than in conversion hysteria.

¹ [In the 1915 edition only, '(*Pcs.*)' does not occur.]

V. THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYSTEM *Ucs.*

The distinction we have made between the two psychical systems receives fresh significance when we observe that processes in the one system, the *Ucs.*, show characteristics which are not met with again in the system immediately above it.

The nucleus of the *Ucs.* consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses. These instinctual impulses are co-ordinate with one another, exist side by side without being influenced by one another, and are exempt from mutual contradiction. When two wishful impulses whose aims must appear to us incompatible become simultaneously active, the two impulses do not diminish each other or cancel each other out, but combine to form an intermediate aim, a compromise.

There are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degrees of certainty: all this is only introduced by the work of the censorship between the *Ucs.* and the *Pcs.* Negation is a substitute, at a higher level, for repression.¹ In the *Ucs.* there are only contents, cathected with greater or lesser strength.

The cathectic intensities [in the *Ucs.*] are much more mobile. By the process of *displacement* one idea may surrender to another its whole quota of cathexis; by the process of *condensation* it may appropriate the whole cathexis of several other ideas. I have proposed to regard these two processes as distinguishing marks of the so-called *primary psychical process*. In the system *Pcs.* the *secondary process*² is dominant. When a primary process is allowed to take its course in connection with elements belonging to the system *Pcs.*, it appears 'comic' and excites laughter.³

¹ [This had already been asserted by Freud in Chapter VI of his book on jokes (1905c). Cf., however, Freud's later discussion of negation (1925h).]

² Cf. the discussion in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a) [Section E, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 588 ff.], based on ideas developed by Breuer in *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer and Freud, 1895). [A comment on Freud's attribution of these hypotheses to Breuer will be found in the Editor's Introduction to the latter work (*Standard Ed.*, 2, xxvii) and in a footnote to the same volume (*ibid.*, 194).]

³ [Freud had expressed this idea in very similar words in Chapter VII (E) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 605. The point is dealt with more fully in his book on jokes (1905c), especially in the second and third Sections of Chapter VII.]

The processes of the system *Ucs.* are *timeless*; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system *Cs.*¹

The *Ucs.* processes pay just as little regard to *reality*. They are subject to the pleasure principle; their fate depends only on how strong they are and on whether they fulfil the demands of the pleasure-unpleasure regulation.²

To sum up: *exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process* (mobility of cathexes), *timelessness*, and *replacement of external by psychical reality*—these are the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the system *Ucs.*³

Unconscious processes only become cognizable by us under the conditions of dreaming and of neurosis—that is to say, when processes of the higher, *Pcs.*, system are set back to an earlier stage by being lowered (by regression). In themselves they cannot be cognized, indeed are even incapable of carrying on their existence; for the system *Ucs.* is at a very early moment overlaid by the *Pcs.* which has taken over access to consciousness and to motility. Discharge from the system *Ucs.* passes into somatic

¹ [In the 1915 edition only, this read '*Pcs.*'.—Mentions of the 'timelessness' of the unconscious will be found scattered throughout 'Freud', writings. The earliest is perhaps a sentence dating from 1897 (Freud, 1950a, Draft M) in which he declares that 'disregard of the characteristic of time is no doubt an essential distinction between activity in the pre-conscious and unconscious'. The point is indirectly alluded to in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 577-8, but the first explicit published mention of it seems to have been in a footnote added in 1907 to *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901b), near the end of the last chapter. Another passing allusion occurs in a footnote to the paper on narcissism (above, p. 96). Freud returned to the question more than once in his later writings: particularly in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 28, and in Lecture XXXI of the *New Introductory Lectures* (1933a). A discussion on the subject took place at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on November 8, 1911, and the published minutes (*Zbl. psychoan.*, 2, 476-7) give a very short summary of some remarks made by Freud on the occasion.]

² [Cf. Section 8 of 'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning, (1911b). 'Reality-testing' is dealt with at some length in the next paper (p. 231 ff., below).]

³ We are reserving for a different context the mention of another notable privilege of the *Ucs.* [This may refer to the relation of the *Ucs.* to words (p. 201 ff.); or possibly to one of the unpublished papers in the series.]

innervation that leads to development of affect; but even this path of discharge is, as we have seen [p. 178 f.], contested by the *Pcs.* By itself, the system *Ucs.* would not in normal conditions be able to bring about any expedient muscular acts, with the exception of those already organized as reflexes.

The full significance of the characteristics of the system *Ucs.* described above could only be appreciated by us if we were to contrast and compare them with those of the system *Pcs.* But this would take us so far afield that I propose that we should once more call a halt and not undertake the comparison of the two till we can do so in connection with our discussion of the higher system.¹ Only the most pressing points of all will be mentioned at this stage.

The processes of the system *Pcs.* display—no matter whether they are already conscious or only capable of becoming conscious—an inhibition of the tendency of cathected ideas towards discharge. When a process passes from one idea to another, the first idea retains a part of its cathexis and only a small portion undergoes displacement. Displacements and condensations such as happen in the primary process are excluded or very much restricted. This circumstance caused Breuer to assume the existence of two different states of cathectic energy in mental life: one in which the energy is tonically 'bound' and the other in which it is freely mobile and presses towards discharge.² In my opinion this distinction represents the deepest insight we have gained up to the present into the nature of nervous energy, and I do not see how we can avoid making it. A metapsychological presentation would most urgently call for further discussion at this point, though perhaps that would be too daring an undertaking as yet.

Further, it devolves upon the system *Pcs.* to make communication possible between the different ideational contents so that they can influence one another, to give them an order in time,³ and to set up a censorship or several censorships; 'reality-testing' too, and the reality-principle, are in its province. Conscious memory, moreover, seems to depend wholly on the *Pcs.*⁴

¹ [A probable reference to the lost paper on consciousness.]

² [Cf. footnote 2, on p. 186.]

³ [There is a hint at the mechanism by which the *Pcs.* effects this in the penultimate paragraph of Freud's paper on the 'Mystic Writing-Pad' (1925a).]

⁴ [Cf. above, p. 96 n.—In the 1915 edition only, this read 'Cs.'.]

This should be clearly distinguished from the memory-traces in which the experiences of the *Ucs.* are fixed, and probably corresponds to a special registration such as we proposed (but later rejected) to account for the relation of conscious to unconscious ideas [p. 174 ff.]. In this connection, also, we shall find means for putting an end to our oscillations in regard to the naming of the higher system—which we have hitherto spoken of indifferently, sometimes as the *Pcs.* and sometimes as the *Cs.*

Nor will it be out of place here to utter a warning against any over-hasty generalization of what we have brought to light concerning the distribution of the various mental functions between the two systems. We are describing the state of affairs as it appears in the adult human being, in whom the system *Ucs.* operates, strictly speaking, only as a preliminary stage of the higher organization. The question of what the content and connections of that system are during the development of the individual, and of what significance it possesses in animals—these are points on which no conclusion can be deduced from our description: they must be investigated independently.¹ Moreover, in human beings we must be prepared to find possible pathological conditions under which the two systems alter, or even exchange, both their content and their characteristics.

¹ [One of the very few remarks made by Freud on the metapsychology of animals will be found at the end of Chapter I of his *Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1940a).]

VI. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS

It would nevertheless be wrong to imagine that the *Ucs.* remains at rest while the whole work of the mind is performed by the *Pcs.*—that the *Ucs.* is something finished with, a vestigial organ, a residuum from the process of development. It is wrong also to suppose that communication between the two systems is confined to the act of repression, with the *Pcs.* casting everything that seems disturbing to it into the abyss of the *Ucs.* On the contrary, the *Ucs.* is alive and capable of development and maintains a number of other relations with the *Pcs.*, amongst them that of co-operation. In brief, it must be said that the *Ucs.* is continued into what are known as derivatives,¹ that it is accessible to the impressions of life, that it constantly influences the *Pcs.*, and is even, for its part, subjected to influences from the *Pcs.*

Study of the derivatives of the *Ucs.* will completely disappoint our expectations of a schematically clear-cut distinction between the two psychical systems. This will no doubt give rise to dissatisfaction with our results and will probably be used to cast doubts on the value of the way in which we have divided up the psychical processes. Our answer is, however, that we have no other aim but that of translating into theory the results of observation, and we deny that there is any obligation on us to achieve at our first attempt a well-rounded theory which will commend itself by its simplicity. We shall defend the complications of our theory so long as we find that they meet the results of observation, and we shall not abandon our expectations of being led in the end by those very complications to the discovery of a state of affairs which, while simple in itself, can account for all the complications of reality.

Among the derivatives of the *Ucs.* instinctual impulses, of the sort we have described, there are some which unite in themselves characters of an opposite kind. On the one hand, they are highly organized, free from self-contradiction, have made use of every acquisition of the system *Cs.* and would hardly be distinguished in our judgement from the formations of that system. On the other hand they are unconscious and are incapable of

¹ [See 'Repression', p. 149.]

becoming conscious. Thus *qualitatively* they belong to the system *Pcs.*, but *factually* to the *Ucs.* Their origin is what decides their fate. We may compare them with individuals of mixed race who, taken all round, resemble white men, but who betray their coloured descent by some striking feature or other, and on that account are excluded from society and enjoy none of the privileges of white people. Of such a nature are those phantasies of normal people as well as of neurotics which we have recognized as preliminary stages in the formation both of dreams and of symptoms and which, in spite of their high degree of organization, remain repressed and therefore cannot become conscious.¹ They draw near to consciousness and remain undisturbed so long as they do not have an intense cathexis, but as soon as they exceed a certain height of cathexis they are thrust back. Substitutive formations, too, are highly organized derivatives of the *Ucs.* of this kind; but these succeed in breaking through into consciousness, when circumstances are favourable—for example, if they happen to join forces with an anticathexis from the *Pcs.*

When, elsewhere,² we come to examine more closely the preconditions for becoming conscious, we shall be able to find a solution of some of the difficulties that arise at this juncture. Here it seems a good plan to look at things from the angle of consciousness, in contrast to our previous approach, which was upwards from the *Ucs.* To consciousness the whole sum of psychical processes presents itself as the realm of the preconscious. A very great part of this preconscious originates in the unconscious, has the character of its derivatives and is subjected to a censorship before it can become conscious. Another part of the *Pcs.* is capable of becoming conscious without any censorship. Here we come upon a contradiction of an earlier assumption. In discussing the subject of repression we were obliged to place the censorship which is decisive for becoming conscious between the systems *Ucs.* and *Pcs.* [p. 173]. Now it becomes probable that there is a censorship between the *Pcs.* and the *Cs.*³ Nevertheless

¹ [This question is elaborated in a footnote added in 1920 to Section 5 of the third of Freud's *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 226 n.]

² [Another probable reference to the lost paper on consciousness.]

³ [See p. 173. The point had already been raised by Freud in Chapter VII (F) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 615, and 617–18. It is discussed at greater length below, p. 193 f.]

we shall do well not to regard this complication as a difficulty, but to assume that to every transition from one system to that immediately above it (that is, every advance to a higher stage of psychical organization) there corresponds a new censorship. This, it may be remarked, does away with the assumption of a continuous laying down of new registrations [p. 174].

The reason for all these difficulties is to be found in the circumstance that the attribute of being conscious, which is the only characteristic of psychical processes that is directly presented to us, is in no way suited to serve as a criterion for the differentiation of systems. [Cf. p. 172 above.] Apart from the fact that the conscious is not always conscious but also at times latent, observation has shown that much that shares the characteristics of the system *Pcs.* does not become conscious; and we learn in addition that the act of becoming conscious is dependent on the attention of the *Pcs.* being turned in certain directions.¹ Hence consciousness stands in no simple relation either to the different systems or to repression. The truth is that it is not only the psychically repressed that remains alien to consciousness, but also some of the impulses which dominate our

¹ [Literally: 'we learn in addition that becoming conscious is restricted by certain directions of its attention.' The 'its' almost certainly refers to the *Pcs.* This rather obscure sentence would probably be clearer if we possessed the lost paper on consciousness. The gap here is particularly tantalizing, as it seems likely that the reference is to a discussion of the function of 'attention'—a subject on which Freud's later writings throw very little light. There are two or three passages in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a) which seem relevant in this connection: 'The excitatory processes occurring in [the preconscious] can enter consciousness without further impediment provided that certain other conditions are fulfilled: for instance . . . that the function which can only be described as "attention" is distributed in a particular way' (*Standard Ed.*, 5, 541). 'Becoming conscious is connected with the application of a particular psychical function, that of attention' (*ibid.*, 593). 'The system *Pcs.* not merely bars access to consciousness, it also . . . has at its disposal for distribution a mobile cathectic energy, a part of which is familiar to us in the form of attention' (*ibid.*, 615). In contrast to the paucity of allusions to the subject in Freud's later writings, the 'Project' of 1895 treats of attention at great length and regards it as one of the principal forces at work in the mental apparatus (Freud, 1950a, especially Section 1 of Part III). He there (as well as in his paper on 'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning', 1911b) relates it in particular to the function of 'reality-testing'. See the Editor's Note to 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams' (below, p. 220), where the relation of attention to the system *Pcpt.* is considered.]

ego—something, therefore, that forms the strongest functional antithesis to the repressed. The more we seek to win our way to a metapsychological view of mental life, the more we must learn to emancipate ourselves from the importance of the symptom of 'being conscious'.¹

So long as we still cling to this belief we see our generalizations regularly broken through by exceptions. On the one hand we find that derivatives of the *Ucs.*² become conscious as substitutive formations and symptoms—generally, it is true, after having undergone great distortion as compared with the unconscious, though often retaining many characteristics which call for repression. On the other hand, we find that many preconscious formations remain unconscious, though we should have expected that, from their nature, they might very well have become conscious. Probably in the latter case the stronger attraction of the *Ucs.* is asserting itself. We are led to look for the more important distinction as lying, not between the conscious and the preconscious, but between the preconscious and the unconscious. The *Ucs.* is turned back on the frontier of the *Pcs.* by the censorship, but derivatives of the *Ucs.* can circumvent this censorship, achieve a high degree of organization and reach a certain intensity of cathexis in the *Pcs.* When, however, this intensity is exceeded and they try to force themselves into consciousness, they are recognized as derivatives of the *Ucs.* and are repressed afresh at the new frontier of censorship, between the *Pcs.* and the *Cs.* Thus the first of these censorships is exercised against the *Ucs.* itself, and the second against its *Pcs.* derivatives. One might suppose that in the course of individual development the censorship had taken a step forward.

In psycho-analytic treatment the existence of the second censorship, located between the systems *Pcs.* and *Cs.*, is proved beyond question. We require the patient to form numerous derivatives of the *Ucs.*, we make him pledge himself to overcome the objections of the censorship to these preconscious formations becoming conscious, and by overthrowing *this* censorship, we

¹ [The complication discussed in this paragraph was reinforced by Freud at the end of Chapter I of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b), and in the following chapter he propounded his new structural picture of the mind, which so greatly simplified his whole description of its workings.]

² [All the German editions read '*Vbw*' (*Pcs.*). It seems probable that this is a misprint for '*Ubw*' (*Ucs.*).]

open up the way to abrogating the repression accomplished by the *earlier* one. To this let us add that the existence of the censorship between the *Pcs.* and the *Cs.* teaches us that becoming conscious is no mere act of perception, but is probably also a *hypercathexis*,¹ a further advance in the psychical organization.

Let us turn to the communications between the *Ucs.* and the other systems, less in order to establish anything new than in order to avoid omitting what is most prominent. At the roots of instinctual activity the systems communicate with one another most extensively. One portion of the processes which are there excited passes through the *Ucs.*, as through a preparatory stage, and reaches the highest psychical development in the *Cs.*; another portion is retained as *Ucs.* But the *Ucs.* is also affected by experiences originating from external perception. Normally all the paths from perception to the *Ucs.* remain open, and only those leading on from the *Ucs.* are subject to blocking by repression.

It is a very remarkable thing that the *Ucs.* of one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the *Cs.* This deserves closer investigation, especially with a view to finding out whether preconscious activity can be excluded as playing a part in it; but, descriptively speaking, the fact is incontestable. [Cf. an example of this in Freud, 1913i.]

The content of the system *Pcs.* (or *Cs.*) is derived partly from instinctual life (through the medium of the *Ucs.*), and partly from perception. It is doubtful how far the processes of this system can exert a direct influence on the *Ucs.*; examination of pathological cases often reveals an almost incredible independence and lack of susceptibility to influence on the part of the *Ucs.* A complete divergence of their trends, a total severance of the two systems, is what above all characterizes a condition of illness. Nevertheless, psycho-analytic treatment is based upon an influencing of the *Ucs.* from the direction of the *Cs.*, and at any rate shows that this, though a laborious task, is not impossible. The derivatives of the *Ucs.* which act as intermediaries between the two systems open the way, as we have already said [pp. 193-4], towards accomplishing this. But we may safely assume that a spontaneously effected alteration in the *Ucs.* from the direction of the *Cs.* is a difficult and slow process.

Co-operation between a preconscious and an unconscious

¹ [Cf. below, p. 202.]

impulse, even when the latter is intensely repressed, may come about if there is a situation in which the unconscious impulse can act in the same sense as one of the dominant trends. The repression is removed in this instance, and the repressed activity is admitted as a reinforcement of the one intended by the ego. The unconscious becomes ego-syntonic in respect of this single conjunction without any change taking place in its repression apart from this. In this co-operation the influence of the *Ucs.* is unmistakable: the reinforced tendencies reveal themselves as being nevertheless different from the normal; they make specially perfect functioning possible, and they manifest a resistance in the face of opposition which is similar to that offered, for instance, by obsessional symptoms.

The content of the *Ucs.* may be compared with an aboriginal population in the mind. If inherited mental formations exist in the human being—something analogous to instinct¹ in animals—these constitute the nucleus of the *Ucs.* Later there is added to them what is discarded during childhood development as unserviceable; and this need not differ in its nature from what is inherited. A sharp and final division between the content of the two systems does not, as a rule, take place till puberty.

¹ [The German word here is '*Instinkt*', not the usual '*Trieb*'. (See Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', p. 111 above.)—The question of the inheritance of mental formations was to be discussed by Freud soon afterwards in Lecture XXIII of his *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17) and in his 'Wolf Man' case history (1918*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 97.]

VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

What we have put together in the preceding discussions is probably as much as we can say about the *Ucs.* so long as we only draw upon our knowledge of dream-life and the transference neuroses. It is certainly not much, and at some points it gives an impression of obscurity and confusion; and above all it offers us no possibility of co-ordinating or subsuming the *Ucs.* into any context with which we are already familiar. It is only the analysis of one of the affections which we call narcissistic psychoneuroses that promises to furnish us with conceptions through which the enigmatic *Ucs.* will be brought more within our reach and, as it were, made tangible.

Since the publication of a work by Abraham (1908)—which that conscientious author has attributed to my instigation—we have tried to base our characterization of Kraepelin's 'dementia praecox' (Bleuler's 'schizophrenia') on its position with reference to the antithesis between ego and object. In the transference neuroses (anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria and obsessional neurosis) there was nothing to give special prominence to this antithesis. We knew, indeed, that frustration in regard to the object brings on the outbreak of the neurosis and that the neurosis involves a renunciation of the real object; we knew too that the libido that is withdrawn from the real object reverts first to a phantasied object and then to one that had been repressed (introversion).¹ But in these disorders object-cathexis in general is retained with great energy, and more detailed examination of the process of repression has obliged us to assume that object-cathexis persists in the system *Ucs.* in spite of—or rather in consequence of—repression. [Cf. p. 149.] Indeed, the capacity for transference, of which we make use for therapeutic purposes in these affections, presupposes an unimpaired object-cathexis.

In the case of schizophrenia, on the other hand, we have been driven to the assumption that after the process of repression the libido that has been withdrawn does not seek a new object, but retreats into the ego; that is to say, that here the object-cathexes

¹ [The process is described in detail in Section (a) of Freud's paper on 'Types of Onset of Neurosis' (1912c).]

are given up and a primitive objectless condition of narcissism is re-established. The incapacity of these patients for transference (so far as the pathological process extends), their consequent inaccessibility to therapeutic efforts, their characteristic repudiation of the external world, the appearance of signs of a hypercathexis of their own ego, the final outcome in complete apathy—all these clinical features seem to agree excellently with the assumption that their object-cathexes have been given up. As regards the relation of the two psychical systems to each other, all observers have been struck by the fact that in schizophrenia a great deal is expressed as being conscious which in the transference neuroses can only be shown to be present in the *Ucs.* by psycho-analysis. But to begin with we were not able to establish any intelligible connection between the ego-object relation and the relationships of consciousness.

What we are seeking seems to present itself in the following unexpected way. In schizophrenics we observe—especially in the initial stages, which are so instructive—a number of changes in *speech*, some of which deserve to be regarded from a particular point of view. The patient often devotes peculiar care to his way of expressing himself, which becomes ‘stilted’ and ‘precious’. The construction of his sentences undergoes a peculiar disorganization, making them so incomprehensible to us that his remarks seem nonsensical. Some reference to bodily organs or innervations is often given prominence in the content of these remarks. To this may be added the fact that in such symptoms of schizophrenia as are comparable with the substitutive formations of hysteria or obsessional neurosis, the relation between the substitute and the repressed material nevertheless displays peculiarities which would surprise us in these two forms of neurosis.

Dr. Victor Tausk of Vienna has placed at my disposal some observations that he has made in the initial stages of schizophrenia in a female patient, which are particularly valuable in that the patient was ready to explain her utterances herself.¹ I will take two of his examples to illustrate the view I wish to put forward, and I have no doubt that every observer could easily produce plenty of such material.

A patient of Tausk's, a girl who was brought to the clinic

¹ [A paper referring to the same patient was later published by Tausk (1919).]

after a quarrel with her lover, complained that *her eyes were not right, they were twisted*. This she herself explained by bringing forward a series of reproaches against her lover in coherent language. 'She could not understand him at all, he looked different every time; he was a hypocrite, an eye-twister,¹ he had twisted her eyes; now she had twisted eyes; they were not her eyes any more; now she saw the world with different eyes.'

The patient's comments on her unintelligible remark have the value of an analysis, for they contain the equivalent of the remark expressed in a generally comprehensible form. They throw light at the same time on the meaning and the genesis of schizophrenic word-formation. I agree with Tausk in stressing in this example the point that the patient's relation to a bodily organ (the eye) has arrogated to itself the representation of the whole content [of her thoughts]. Here the schizophrenic utterance exhibits a hypochondriac trait: it has become '*organ-speech*'.²

A second communication by the same patient was as follows: 'She was standing in church. Suddenly she felt a jerk; she had to *change her position, as though somebody was putting her into a position, as though she was being put in a certain position.*'

Now came the analysis of this through a fresh series of reproaches against her lover. 'He was common, he had made her common, too, though she was naturally refined. He had made her like himself by making her think that he was superior to her; now she had become like him, because she thought she would be better if she were like him. He had *given a false impression of his position*; now she was just like him' (by identification), 'he had *put her in a false position*'.

The physical movement of 'changing her position', Tausk remarks, depicted the words 'putting her in a false position' and her identification with her lover. I would call attention once more to the fact that the whole train of thought is dominated by the element which has for its content a bodily innervation (or, rather, the sensation of it). Furthermore, a hysterical woman would, in the first example, have *in fact* convulsively twisted her eyes, and, in the second, have given actual

¹ [The German '*Augenverdreher*' has the figurative meaning of 'deceiver'.]

² [Cf. Freud's discussion of hypochondria in his paper on narcissism (1914c), above, p. 83 ff.]

jerks, instead of having the *impulse* to do so or the *sensation* of doing so: and in neither example would she have any accompanying conscious thoughts, nor would she have been able to express any such thoughts afterwards.

These two observations, then, argue in favour of what we have called hypochondriacal speech or 'organ-speech'. But, what seems to us more important, they also point to something else, of which we have innumerable instances (for example, in the cases collected in Bleuler's monograph [1911]) and which may be reduced to a definite formula. In schizophrenia *words* are subjected to the same process as that which makes the dream-images out of latent dream-thoughts—to what we have called the primary psychical process. They undergo condensation, and by means of displacement transfer their catexes to one another in their entirety. The process may go so far that a single word, if it is specially suitable on account of its numerous connections, takes over the representation of a whole train of thought.¹ The works of Bleuler, Jung and their pupils offer a quantity of material which particularly supports this assertion.²

Before we draw any conclusion from impressions such as these, let us consider further the distinctions between the formation of substitutes in schizophrenia on the one hand, and in hysteria and obsessional neurosis on the other—subtle distinctions which nevertheless make a strange impression. A patient whom I have at present under observation has allowed himself to be withdrawn from all the interests of life on account of a bad condition of the skin of his face. He declares that he has blackheads and deep holes in his face which everyone notices. Analysis shows that he is playing out his castration complex upon his skin. At first he worked at these blackheads remorselessly; and it gave him great satisfaction to squeeze them out, because, as he said, something spurted out when he did so. Then he began to think that a deep cavity appeared wherever he had got rid of a blackhead, and he reproached himself most vehemently with having ruined his skin for ever by 'constantly

¹ [*The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 595.]

² The dream-work, too, occasionally treats words like things, and so creates very similar 'schizophrenic' utterances or neologisms. [See *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 295 ff. A distinction between what happens in dreams and in schizophrenia is drawn, however, in 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams', p. 229 below.]

fiddling about with his hand'. Pressing out the content of the blackheads is clearly to him a substitute for masturbation. The cavity which then appears owing to his fault is the female genital, i.e. the fulfilment of the threat of castration (or the phantasy representing that threat) provoked by his masturbating. This substitutive formation has, in spite of its hypochondriacal character, considerable resemblance to a hysterical conversion; and yet we have a feeling that something different must be going on here, that a substitutive formation such as this cannot be attributed to hysteria, even before we can say in what the difference consists. A tiny little cavity such as a pore of the skin would hardly be used by a hysteric as a symbol for the vagina, which he is otherwise ready to compare with every imaginable object that encloses a hollow space. Besides, we should expect the multiplicity of these little cavities to prevent him from using them as a substitute for the female genital. The same applies to the case of a young patient reported by Tausk some years ago to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society. This patient behaved in other respects exactly as though he were suffering from an obsessional neurosis; he took hours to wash and dress, and so on. It was noticeable, however, that he was able to give the meaning of his inhibitions without any resistance. In putting on his stockings, for instance, he was disturbed by the idea that he must pull apart the stitches in the knitting, i.e. the holes, and to him every hole was a symbol of the female genital aperture. This again is a thing which we cannot attribute to an obsessional neurotic. Reitler observed a patient of the latter sort, who also suffered from having to take a long time over putting on his stockings; this man, after overcoming his resistances, found as the explanation that his foot symbolized a penis, that putting on the stocking stood for a masturbatory act, and that he had to keep on pulling the stocking on and off, partly in order to complete the picture of masturbation, and partly in order to undo that act.

If we ask ourselves what it is that gives the character of strangeness to the substitutive formation and the symptom in schizophrenia, we eventually come to realize that it is the predominance of what has to do with words over what has to do with things. As far as the thing goes, there is only a very slight similarity between squeezing out a blackhead and an emission from the penis, and still less similarity between the innumerable

shallow pores of the skin and the vagina; but in the former case there is, in both instances, a 'spurting out', while in the latter the cynical saying, 'a hole is a hole', is true verbally. What has dictated the substitution is not the resemblance between the things denoted but the sameness of the words used to express them. Where the two—word and thing—do not coincide, the formation of substitutes in schizophrenia deviates from that in the transference neuroses.

If now we put this finding alongside the hypothesis that in schizophrenia object-cathexes are given up, we shall be obliged to modify the hypothesis by adding that the cathexis of the *word*-presentations of objects is retained. What we have permissibly called the conscious presentation¹ of the object can now be split up into the presentation of the *word* and the presentation of the *thing*; the latter consists in the cathexis, if not of the direct memory-images of the thing, at least of remoter memory-traces derived from these. We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a conscious and an unconscious presentation [see p. 176]. The two are not, as we supposed, different registrations of the same content in different psychical localities, nor yet different functional states of cathexis in the same locality; but the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone. The system *Ucs.* contains the thing-cathexes of the objects, the first and true object-cathexes; the system *Pcs.* comes

¹ [*'Vorstellung.'* This word has as a rule been translated above by 'idea'. (See footnote 1, p. 174.) From this point till the end of the paper, '*Vorstellung*' is uniformly translated by 'presentation'—'*Wortvorstellung*' 'presentation of the word' or 'word-presentation'; '*Sachvorstellung*' 'presentation of the thing' or 'thing-presentation'. These words were formerly translated by the somewhat misleading 'verbal idea' and 'concrete idea'. In 'Mourning and Melancholia' (below, p. 256) Freud replaced '*Sachvorstellung*' by the synonymous '*Dingvorstellung*'; and he had used this second version earlier, in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 295–6, and near the beginning of Chapter IV of his book on jokes (1905c).—The distinction between 'word-presentations' and 'thing-presentations' was already in his mind when he wrote these earlier works, and it no doubt derives from his studies on the aphasias. The matter was discussed at some length in his monograph on the subject (1891b), though in somewhat different terminology. The relevant passage in that work has been translated below in Appendix C (p. 209).]

about by this thing-presentation being hypercathected through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it. It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychical organization and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the *Pcs.* Now, too, we are in a position to state precisely what it is that repression denies to the rejected presentation in the transference neuroses [p. 180]: what it denies to the presentation is translation into words which shall remain attached to the object. A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not hypercathected, remains thereafter in the *Ucs.* in a state of repression.

I should like to point out at what an early date we already possessed the insight which to-day enables us to understand one of the most striking characteristics of schizophrenia. In the last few pages of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which was published in 1900, the view was developed that thought-processes, i.e. those acts of cathexis which are comparatively remote from perception, are in themselves without quality and unconscious, and that they attain their capacity to become conscious only through being linked with the residues of perceptions of *words*.¹ But word-presentations, for their part too, are derived from sense-perceptions, in the same way as thing-presentations are; the question might therefore be raised why presentations of objects cannot become conscious through the medium of their *own* perceptual residues. Probably, however, thought proceeds in systems so far remote from the original perceptual residues that they have no longer retained anything of the qualities of those residues, and, in order to become conscious, need to be reinforced by new qualities. Moreover, by being linked with words, cathexes can be provided with quality even when they represent only *relations* between presentations of objects and are thus unable to derive any quality from perceptions. Such relations, which become comprehensible only through words, form a major part of our thought-processes. As we can see, being linked with word-

¹ [*The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 617. See also *ibid.*, 574. This hypothesis had in fact been put forward (though not published) by Freud even earlier, in his 'Project' of 1895 (1950a, towards the beginning of Section 1 of Part III). It had also been mentioned by him more recently, in his paper on 'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911b).]

presentations is not yet the same thing as becoming conscious, but only makes it possible to become so; it is therefore characteristic of the system *Pcs.* and of that system alone.¹ With these discussions, however, we have evidently departed from our subject proper and find ourselves plunged into problems concerning the preconscious and the conscious, which for good reasons we are reserving for separate treatment.²

As regards schizophrenia, which we only touch on here so far as seems indispensable for a general understanding of the *Ucs.*, a doubt must occur to us whether the process here termed repression has anything at all in common with the repression which takes place in the transference neuroses. The formula that repression is a process which occurs between the systems *Ucs.* and *Pcs.* (or *Cs.*), and results in keeping something at a distance from consciousness [p. 147], must in any event be modified, in order that it may also be able to include the case of dementia praecox and other narcissistic affections. But the ego's attempt at flight, which expresses itself in the withdrawal of the conscious cathexis, nevertheless remains a factor common [to the two classes of neurosis]. The most superficial reflection shows us how much more radically and profoundly this attempt at flight, this flight of the ego, is put into operation in the narcissistic neuroses.

If, in schizophrenia, this flight consists in withdrawal of instinctual cathexis from the points which represent the *unconscious* presentation of the object, it may seem strange that the part of the presentation of this object which belongs to the system *Pcs.*—namely, the word-presentations corresponding to it—should, on the contrary, receive a more intense cathexis. We might rather expect that the word-presentation, being the preconscious part, would have to sustain the first impact of repression and that it would be totally uncathectable after repression had proceeded as far as the unconscious thing-presentations. This, it is true, is difficult to understand. It turns out that the cathexis of the word-presentation is not part of the act of repression, but represents the first of the attempts at recovery or cure which so conspicuously dominate the clinical picture of

¹ [Freud took up this subject again at the beginning of Chapter II of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).]

² [This seems likely to be another reference to the unpublished paper on consciousness. See, however, below, p. 232.]

schizophrenia.¹ These endeavours are directed towards regaining the lost object, and it may well be that to achieve this purpose they set off on a path that leads to the object *via* the verbal part of it, but then find themselves obliged to be content with words instead of things. It is a general truth that our mental activity moves in two opposite directions: either it starts from the instincts and passes through the system *Ucs.* to conscious thought-activity; or, beginning with an instigation from outside, it passes through the system *Cs.* and *Pcs.* till it reaches the *Ucs.* cathexes of the ego and objects. This second path must, in spite of the repression which has taken place, remain traversable, and it lies open to some extent to the endeavours made by the neurosis to regain its objects. When we think in abstractions there is a danger that we may neglect the relations of words to unconscious thing-presentations, and it must be confessed that the expression and content of our philosophizing then begins to acquire an unwelcome resemblance to the mode of operation of schizophrenics.² We may, on the other hand, attempt a characterization of the schizophrenic's mode of thought by saying that he treats concrete things as though they were abstract.

If we have made a true assessment of the nature of the *Ucs.* and have correctly defined the difference between an unconscious and a preconscious presentation, then our researches will inevitably bring us back from many other points to this same piece of insight.

¹ [See Part III of Freud's Schreber analysis (1911c).—A further schizophrenic attempt at recovery is mentioned below, p. 230.]

² [Freud had already made this point at the end of the second essay in *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13), *Standard Ed.*, 13, 73.]

APPENDIX A

FREUD AND EWALD HERING

AMONG Freud's seniors in Vienna was the physiologist Ewald Hering (1834–1918), who, as we learn from Dr. Jones (1953, 244), offered the young man a post as his assistant at Prague in 1884. An episode some forty years later seems to suggest, as Ernst Kris (1956) pointed out, that Hering's influence may have contributed to Freud's views on the unconscious. (Cf. above p. 162.) In 1880 Samuel Butler published his *Unconscious Memory*. This included a translation of a lecture delivered by Hering in 1870, 'Über das Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Funktion der organisierten Materie' ('On Memory as a Universal Function of Organized Matter'), with which Butler found himself in general agreement. A book with the title *The Unconscious*, by Israel Levine, was published in England in 1923; and a German translation of it by Anna Freud appeared in 1926. One section of it, however (Part I, Section 13), which deals with Samuel Butler, was translated by Freud himself. The author, Levine, though he mentioned Hering's lecture, was more concerned with Butler than with Hering, and in that connection (on page 34 of the German translation) Freud added a footnote as follows:—

'German readers, familiar with this lecture of Hering's and regarding it as a masterpiece, would not, of course, be inclined to bring into the foreground the considerations based on it by Butler. Moreover, some pertinent remarks are to be found in Hering which allow psychology the right to assume the existence of unconscious mental activity: "Who could hope to disentangle the fabric of our inner life with its thousandfold complexities, if we were willing to pursue its threads only so far as they traverse consciousness? . . . Chains such as these of unconscious material nerve-processes, which end in a link accompanied by a conscious perception, have been described as 'unconscious trains of ideas' and 'unconscious inferences'; and from the standpoint of psychology this can be justified. For the mind would often slip through the fingers of psychology, if psychology refused to keep a hold on the mind's unconscious states." [Hering, 1870, 11 and 13.]'

APPENDIX B

PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM

[It has been pointed out above (p. 163) that Freud's earlier views on the relation between the mind and the nervous system were greatly influenced by Hughlings-Jackson. This is particularly shown by the following passage extracted from his monograph on aphasia (1891*b*, 56-8). It is especially instructive to compare the last sentences on the subject of latent memories with Freud's later position. In order to preserve a uniform terminology, a new translation has been made.]

After this digression we return to the consideration of aphasia. We may recall that on the basis of Meynert's teachings the theory has grown up that the speech apparatus consists of distinct cortical centres in whose cells the word-presentations are contained, these centres being separated by a functionless cortical region, and linked together by white fibres (associative fasciculi). The question may at once be raised whether a hypothesis of this kind, which encloses presentations in nerve cells, can possibly be correct and permissible. I think not.

The tendency of earlier periods in medicine was to localize whole mental faculties, as they are defined by psychological nomenclature, in certain regions of the brain. By contrast, therefore, it was bound to seem a great advance when Wernicke declared that only the simplest psychical elements, the different sensory presentations, could legitimately be localized—localized at the central termination of the peripheral nerve which has received the impression. But shall we not be making the same mistake in principle, whether what we are trying to localize is a complicated concept, a whole mental activity, or a psychical element? Is it justifiable to take a nerve fibre, which for the whole length of its course has been a purely physiological structure and has been subject to purely physiological modifications, and to plunge its end into the sphere of the mind and to fit this end out with a presentation or a mnemonic image? If 'will', 'intelligence', and so on, are recognized as being psychological

technical terms to which very complicated states of affairs correspond in the physiological world, can we feel any more sure that a 'simple sensory presentation' is anything other than a technical term of the same kind?

It is probable that the chain of physiological events in the nervous system does not stand in a causal connection with the psychical events. The physiological events do not cease as soon as the psychical ones begin; on the contrary, the physiological chain continues. What happens is simply that, after a certain point of time, each (or some) of its links has a psychical phenomenon corresponding to it. Accordingly, the psychical is a process parallel to the physiological—'a dependent concomitant'.¹

I know quite well that I cannot accuse the people whose views I am here disputing of having executed this jump and change in their scientific angle of approach [i.e. from the physiological to the psychological] without consideration. They obviously mean nothing else than that the physiological modification of the nerve fibres which accompanies sensory excitation produces another modification in the central nerve cell, and that this latter modification becomes the physiological correlate of the 'presentation'. Since they can say a great deal more about presentations than about the modifications, of which no physiological characterization whatever has yet been reached and which are unknown, they make use of the elliptical statement that the presentation is localized in the nerve cell. This way of putting matters, however, at once leads to a confusion between the two things, which need have no resemblance to each other. In psychology a simple presentation is something elementary for us, which we can sharply distinguish from its connections with other presentations. This leads us to suppose that the physiological correlate of the presentation—i.e. the modification that originates from the excited nerve fibre with its termination at the centre—is something simple too, which can be localized at a particular point. To draw a parallel of this kind is of course entirely unjustifiable; the characteristics of the modification must be established on their own account and independently of their psychological counterpart.²

¹ [In English in the original. The phrase is from Hughlings-Jackson.]

² Hughlings-Jackson has given the most emphatic warning against confusions of this kind between the physical and the psychical in the process of speech: 'In all our studies of diseases of the nervous system

What, then, is the physiological correlate of a simple presentation or of the same presentation when it recurs? Clearly nothing static, but something in the nature of a process. This process admits of localization. It starts from a particular point in the cortex and spreads from there over the whole cortex or along certain tracts. When this process is completed, it leaves a modification behind in the cortex that has been affected by it—the possibility of remembering. It is highly doubtful whether there is anything psychical that corresponds to this modification either. Our consciousness shows nothing of a sort to justify, from the psychical point of view, the name of a ‘latent mnemic image’. But whenever the same state of the cortex is provoked again, the psychical aspect comes into being once more as a mnemic image . . .

we must be on our guard against the fallacy that what are physical states in lower centres fine away into psychical states in higher centres; that, for example, vibrations of sensory nerves become sensations, or that somehow or another an idea produces a movement.’ (1878, 306.)

APPENDIX C

WORDS AND THINGS

[The final section of Freud's paper on 'The Unconscious' seems to have roots in his early monograph on aphasia (1891*b*). It may be of interest, therefore, to reproduce here a passage from that work which, though not particularly easy to follow in itself, nevertheless throws light on the assumptions that underlay some of Freud's later views. The passage has the further incidental interest of presenting Freud in the very unusual position of talking in the technical language of the 'academic' psychology of the later nineteenth century. The passage here quoted follows after a train of destructive and constructive anatomical and physiological argument which has led Freud to a hypothetical scheme of neurological functioning which he describes as the 'speech apparatus'. It must be noted, however, that there is an important and perhaps confusing difference between the terminology Freud uses here and in 'The Unconscious'. What he here calls the 'object-presentation' is what in 'The Unconscious' he calls the 'thing-presentation'; while what in 'The Unconscious' he calls the 'object-presentation' denotes a complex made up of the combined 'thing-presentation' and 'word-presentation'—a complex which has no name given to it in the *Aphasia* passage. The translation has been made specially for this occasion, since, for terminological reasons, the published one was not entirely adapted to the present purpose. As in the last section of 'The Unconscious', we have here always used the word 'presentation' to render the German '*Vorstellung*', while 'image' stands for the German '*Bild*'. The passage runs from p. 74 to p. 81 of the original German edition.]

I now propose to consider what hypotheses are required to explain disturbances of speech on the basis of a speech apparatus constructed in this manner—in other words, what the study of disturbance of speech teaches us about the function of this apparatus. In doing so I shall keep the psychological and anatomical sides of the question as separate as possible.

From the point of view of psychology the unit of the function of speech is the 'word', a complex presentation, which proves to be a combination put together from auditory, visual and kinaesthetic elements. We owe our knowledge of this combination to pathology, which shows us that in organic lesions of the apparatus of speech a disintegration of speech takes place along the lines on which the combination is put together. We shall thus expect to find that the absence of one of these elements of the word-presentation will prove to be the most important indication for enabling us to arrive at a localization of the disease. Four components of the word-presentation are usually distinguished: the 'sound-image', the 'visual letter-image', the 'motor speech-image' and the 'motor writing-image'. This combination, however, turns out to be more complicated when one enters into the probable process of association that takes place in each of the various activities of speech:—

(1) We learn to *speak* by associating a 'sound-image of a word' with a 'sense of the innervation of a word'.¹ After we have spoken, we are also in possession of a 'motor speech-presentation' (centripetal sensations from the organs of speech); so that, in a motor respect, the 'word' is doubly determined for us. Of the two determining elements, the first—the innervatory word-presentation—seems to have the least value from a psychological point of view; indeed its appearance at all as a psychical factor may be disputed. In addition to this, after speaking, we receive a 'sound-image' of the spoken word. So long as we have not developed our power of speech very far, this second sound-image need not be the same as the first one, but only associated with it.² At this stage of speech-development—that of early childhood—we make use of a language constructed by ourselves. We behave in this like motor aphasics, for we associate a variety of extraneous verbal sounds with a single one produced by ourselves.

¹ ['It was once supposed that actively initiated movements involved a peculiar sort of sensation connected directly with the discharge of nervous impulses from the motor areas of the brain to the muscles. . . . The existence of this "innervation-sense", or sense of energy put forth, is now generally denied.' Stout (1938, 258). This last remark is confirmed by Freud a few lines lower down.]

² [The second sound-image is the sound-image of the word spoken by ourselves, and the first one is that of the word we are imitating (the sound-image mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph).]

(2) We learn to speak the language of other people by endeavouring to make the sound-image produced by ourselves as like as possible to the one which gave rise to our speech-innervation. We learn in this way to 'repeat'—to 'say after' another person. When we juxtapose words in connected speech, we hold back the innervation of the next word till the sound-image or the motor speech-presentation (or both) of the preceding word has reached us. The security of our speech is thus overdetermined,¹ and can easily stand the loss of one or other of the determining factors. On the other hand, a loss of the correction exercised by the second sound-image and by the motor speech-image explains some of the peculiarities of paraphasia, both physiological and pathological.

(3) We learn to *spell* by linking the visual images of the letters with new sound-images, which, for their part, must remind us of verbal sounds which we already know. We at once 'repeat' the sound-image that denotes the letter; so that letters, too, are seen to be determined by two sound-images which coincide, and two motor presentations which correspond to each other.

(4) We learn to *read* by linking up in accordance with certain rules the succession of innervatory and motor word-presentations which we receive when we speak separate letters, so that new motor word-presentations arise. As soon as we have spoken these new word-presentations aloud, we discover from their sound-images that the two motor images and sound-images which we have received in this way have long been familiar to us and are identical with the images used in speaking. We then associate the meaning which was attached to the primary verbal sounds with the speech-images which have been acquired by spelling. We now read with understanding. If what was spoken primarily was a dialect and not a literary language, the motor and sound-images of the words acquired through spelling have to be super-associated with the old images; thus we have to learn a new language—a task which is facilitated by the similarity between the dialect and the literary language.

It will be seen from this description of learning to read that it is a very complicated process, in which the course of the

¹ [In German '*überbestimmt*'. The synonymous term '*überdeterminiert*' is the one used so frequently in Freud's later writings to express the notion of multiple causation. Cf. *Standard Ed.*, 2, 212 n.]

associations must repeatedly move backwards and forwards. We shall also be prepared to find that disturbances of reading in aphasia are bound to occur in a great variety of ways. The only thing that decisively indicates a lesion in the *visual* element of reading is a disturbance in the reading of *separate letters*. The *combination* of letters into a word takes place during transmission to the speech-tract and will thus be abolished in *motor* aphasia. An *understanding* of what is read is arrived at only through the medium of the sound-images produced by the words that have been spoken, or through the medium of the motor word-images that arose in speaking. It is therefore seen to be a function that is extinguished not only where there are motor lesions, but also where there are *acoustic* ones. Understanding what is read is further seen to be a function independent of the actual performance of reading. Anyone can discover from self-observation that there are several kinds of reading, in some of which we do without an understanding of what is read. When I am reading proofs with a view to paying special attention to the visual images of the letters and other typographical signs, the sense of what I read escapes me so completely that I have to read the proofs through again specially, if I want to correct the style. When, on the other hand, I am reading a book that interests me, a novel, for instance, I overlook all the misprints; and it may happen that the names of the characters in it leave only a confused impression on my mind—a recollection, perhaps, that they are long or short, or contain some unusual letter, such as an 'x' or a 'z'. When I have to read aloud, and have to pay particular attention to the sound-images of my words and the intervals between them, I am once more in danger of concerning myself too little with the meaning of the words; and as soon as I get tired I read in such a way that, though other people can still understand what I am reading, I myself no longer know what I have read. These are phenomena of divided attention, which arise precisely here because an understanding of what is read only comes about in such a very circuitous way. If the process of reading itself offers difficulties, there is no longer any question of understanding. This is made clear by analogy with our behaviour when we are learning to read; and we must be careful not to regard the absence of understanding as evidence of the interruption of a tract. Reading aloud is not to be regarded as a process in any way different from reading to oneself, apart

from the fact that it helps to divert attention from the sensory part of the process of reading.

(5) We learn to *write* by reproducing the visual images of the letters by means of innervatory images of the hand, till the same or similar visual images appear. As a rule, the writing images are only similar to, and super-associated with, the reading images, since what we learn to read is *print* and what we learn to write is *hand-writing*. Writing proves to be a comparatively simple process and one that is not so easily disturbed as reading.


(6) It is to be assumed that later on, too, we carry out these different functions of speech along the same associative paths as those along which we learnt them. At this later stage, abbreviations and substitutions may occur, but it is not always easy to say what their nature is. Their importance is diminished by the consideration that in cases of organic lesion the apparatus of speech will probably be damaged to some extent as a whole and be compelled to return to the modes of association which are primary, well-established and lengthier. As regards reading, the 'visual word-image' undoubtedly makes its influence felt with practised readers, so that individual words (particularly proper names) can be read even without spelling them.

A word is thus a complex presentation consisting of the images enumerated above; or, to put it in another way, there corresponds to the word a complicated associative process into which the elements of visual, acoustic and kinaesthetic origin enumerated above enter together.

A word, however, acquires its *meaning* by being linked to an 'object-presentation',¹ at all events if we restrict ourselves to a consideration of substantives. The object-presentation itself is once again a complex of associations made up of the greatest variety of visual, acoustic, tactile, kinaesthetic and other presentations. Philosophy tells us that an object-presentation consists in nothing more than this—that the appearance of there being a 'thing' to whose various 'attributes' these sense-impressions bear witness is merely due to the fact that, in enumerating the sense-impressions which we have received from an object, we also assume the possibility of there being a large number of further impressions in the same chain of associations (J. S.

¹ [The 'thing-presentation' of the paper on 'The Unconscious' (p. 201 ff.).]

Mill).¹ The object-presentation is thus seen to be one which is not closed and almost one which cannot be closed, while the word-presentation is seen to be something closed, even though capable of extension.



PSYCHOLOGICAL DIAGRAM OF A WORD-PRESENTATION

The word-presentation is shown as a closed complex of presentations, whereas the object-presentation is shown as an open one. The word-presentation is not linked to the object-presentation by *all* its constituent elements, but only by its sound-image. Among the object-associations, it is the visual ones which stand for the object, in the same kind of way as the sound-image stands for the word. The connections linking the sound-image of the word with object-associations other than the visual ones are not indicated.

The pathology of disorders of speech leads us to assert that *the word-presentation is linked at its sensory end (by its sound-images) with the object-presentation*. We thus arrive at the existence of two classes of disturbance of speech: (1) A first-order aphasia, *verbal aphasia*, in which only the associations between the separate elements of the word-presentation are disturbed; and (2) a second-order aphasia, *asymbolic aphasia*, in which the association between the word-presentation and the object-presentation is disturbed.

I use the term 'asymbolia' in a sense other than that in which it has been ordinarily used since Finkelburg,² because the relation between word [-presentation] and object-presentation rather than that between object and object-presentation seems to me to deserve to be described as a 'symbolic' one. For dis-

¹ Cf. J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic* (1843), 1, Book I, Chapter III, also *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (1865).

² Quoted by Spamer (1876).

turbances in the recognition of objects, which Finkelnburg classes as asymbolia, I should like to propose the term 'agnosia'. It is possible that 'agnostic' disturbances (which can only occur in cases of bilateral and extensive cortical lesions) may also entail a disturbance of speech, since all incitements to spontaneous speaking arise from the field of object-associations. I should call such disturbances of speech third-order aphasias or *agnostic aphasias*. Clinical observation has in fact brought to our knowledge a few cases which require to be viewed in this way. . . .

A METAPSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPLEMENT
TO THE THEORY OF DREAMS
(1917 [1915])

EDITOR'S NOTE

METAPSYCHOLOGISCHE ERGÄNZUNG ZUR TRAUMLEHRE

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1917 *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 4 (6), 277-87.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 339-55. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 520-34.
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 242-56.
1931 *Theoretische Schriften*, 141-56.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 412-26.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

- 'Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams'
1925 *C.P.*, 4, 137-151. (Tr. C. M. Baines.)

The present translation, though based on that of 1925, has been very largely rewritten.

This paper, together with the next one ('Mourning and Melancholia'), seems to have been written over a period of eleven days between April 23 and May 4, 1915. It was not published until two years later. As its title implies, it is essentially an application of Freud's newly-stated theoretical scheme to the hypotheses put forward in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. But it resolves itself largely into a discussion of the effects produced by the state of sleep on the different 'systems' of the mind. And this discussion in turn is mainly concentrated on the problem of hallucination and on an investigation of how it is that in our normal state we are able to distinguish between phantasy and reality.

Freud had been occupied by this problem from early times. Much space was devoted to it in his 'Project' of 1895 (Freud, 1950a, especially in Part I, Sections 15 and 16, and in Part III, Section 1). And the solution he proposed for it there, though stated in a different terminology, visibly resembles the one put

forward in the present paper. It included two main lines of thought. Freud argued that the 'primary psychical processes' do not by themselves make any distinction between an idea and a perception; they require, in the first place, to be inhibited by the 'secondary psychical processes', and these can only come into operation where there is an 'ego' with a large enough store of cathexis to provide the energy necessary to put the inhibition into effect. The aim of the inhibition is to give time for 'indications of reality' to arrive from the perceptual apparatus. But, in the second place, besides this inhibiting and delaying function, the ego is also responsible for directing cathexes of 'attention' (see above, p. 192 and footnote) on to the external world, without which the indications of reality could not be observed.

In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 566 ff. and 598 ff., the function of inhibition and delay was again insisted upon as an essential factor in the process of judging whether things are real or not and was once more attributed to the 'secondary process', though the ego was no longer mentioned as such. Freud's next serious discussion of the subject was in his paper on 'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911b), where for the first time he used the actual term 'reality-testing'. Here again the delaying feature of the process was emphasized, but the function of attention now came in for further notice. It was described as a periodic examination of the external world and was related particularly to the sense organs and to consciousness. This last side of the problem, the part played by the systems *Pcpt.* and *Cs.*, is the one which is chiefly discussed in the paper which follows.

But Freud's interest in the subject was by no means exhausted by the present discussion. In *Group Psychology* (1921c), for instance, he attributed the work of reality-testing to the ego ideal (*Standard Ed.*, 18, 114)—an attribution which, however, he withdrew very soon afterwards, in a footnote at the beginning of Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b). And now for the first time since the early days of the 'Project' reality-testing was definitely ascribed to the ego. In a still later and particularly interesting discussion of the subject in the paper on 'Negation' (1925h), reality-testing was shown to depend on the ego's close genetic relation with the instruments of sense perception. In that paper, too (as well as at the end of the almost contemporary paper on the 'Mystic Writing-Pad', 1925a), there were

further references to the ego's habit of sending out periodic exploratory cathexes into the external world—evidently an allusion in different terms to what had originally been described as 'attention'. But in 'Negation' Freud carried his analysis of reality-testing further, and traced the whole course of its development back to the individual's earliest object-relations.

Freud's increasing interest in ego-psychology in his later years led him to a closer examination of the relations of the ego to the external world. In two short papers (1924*b* and 1924*e*) published soon after *The Ego and the Id* he discussed the distinction between the ego's relation to reality in neuroses and psychoses. And in a paper on 'Fetishism' (1927*e*) he gave his first detailed account of a method of defence by the ego—'*Verleugnung*' ('disavowal' or 'denial')—which had not previously been clearly differentiated from repression and which described the ego's reaction to an intolerable external reality. This theme was developed still further in some of Freud's very latest writings, particularly in Chapter VIII of the posthumous *Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1940*a* (1938)).

A METAPSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE THEORY OF DREAMS

WE SHALL discover in various connections how much our enquiries benefit if certain states and phenomena which may be regarded as *normal prototypes* of pathological affections are brought up for purposes of comparison. Among these we may include such affective states as grief and being in love, as well as the state of sleep and the phenomenon of dreaming.

We are not in the habit of devoting much thought to the fact that every night human beings lay aside the wrappings in which they have enveloped their skin, as well as anything which they may use as a supplement to their bodily organs (so far as they have succeeded in making good those organs' deficiencies by substitutes), for instance, their spectacles, their false hair and teeth, and so on. We may add that when they go to sleep they carry out an entirely analogous undressing of their minds and lay aside most of their psychical acquisitions. Thus on both counts they approach remarkably close to the situation in which they began life. Somatically, sleep is a reactivation of intra-uterine existence, fulfilling as it does the conditions of repose, warmth and exclusion of stimulus; indeed, in sleep many people resume the foetal posture. The psychical state of a sleeping person is characterized by an almost complete withdrawal from the surrounding world and a cessation of all interest in it.

In investigating psychoneurotic states, we find ourselves led to emphasize in each of them what are known as *temporal regressions*, i.e. the amount of developmental recession peculiar to it. We distinguish two such regressions—one affecting the development of the ego and the other that of the libido. In the state of sleep, the latter is carried to the point of restoring primitive

¹ This paper and the following one are derived from a collection which I originally intended to publish in book form under the title 'Zur Vorbereitung einer Metapsychologie' ['Preliminaries to a Metapsychology']. They follow on some papers which were printed in Volume III of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse* ('Instincts and their Vicissitudes', 'Repression' and 'The Unconscious'). The intention of the series is to clarify and carry deeper the theoretical assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could be founded. [See p. 105.]

narcissism, while the former goes back to the stage of hallucinatory satisfaction of wishes. [Cf. below, p. 227.]

It is, of course, the study of dreams which has taught us what we know of the psychical characteristics of the state of sleep. It is true that dreams only show us the dreamer in so far as he is *not* sleeping; nevertheless they are bound to reveal at the same time characteristics of sleep itself. We have come to know from observation some peculiarities of dreams which we could not at first understand, but which we can now fit into the picture without difficulty. Thus, we know that dreams are completely egoistic¹ and that the person who plays the chief part in their scenes is always to be recognized as the dreamer. This is now easily to be accounted for by the narcissism of the state of sleep. Narcissism and egoism, indeed, coincide; the word 'narcissism' is only intended to emphasize the fact that egoism is a libidinal phenomenon as well; or, to put it in another way, narcissism may be described as the libidinal complement of egoism.² The 'diagnostic' capacity of dreams—a phenomenon which is generally acknowledged, but regarded as puzzling—becomes equally comprehensible, too. In dreams, incipient physical disease is often detected earlier and more clearly than in waking life, and all the current bodily sensations assume gigantic proportions.³ This magnification is hypochondriacal in character; it is conditional upon the withdrawal of all psychical cathexes from the external world back on to the ego, and it makes possible early recognition of bodily changes which in waking life would still for a time have remained unobserved.

A dream tells us that something was going on which tended to interrupt sleep, and it enables us to understand in what way it has been possible to fend off this interruption. The final outcome is that the sleeper has dreamt and is able to go on sleeping; the internal demand which was striving to occupy him has been replaced by an external experience, whose demand has been disposed of. A dream is, therefore, among other things, a *projection*: an externalization of an internal process. We may

¹ [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Chapter V (D), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 267 ff. See, however, the addition made in 1925 to a footnote, *ibid.*, 270.]

² [A longer discussion of the relation between narcissism and egoism will be found in Lecture XXVI of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17).]

³ [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 4, 3 and 33–4.]

recall that we have already met with projection elsewhere among the means adopted for defence. The mechanism of a hysterical phobia, too, culminates in the fact that the subject is able to protect himself by attempts at flight against an external danger which has taken the place of an internal instinctual claim.¹ We will, however, defer the full treatment of projection till we come to analyse the narcissistic disorder in which this mechanism plays the most striking part.²

In what way, however, can a case arise in which the intention to sleep meets with an interruption? The interruption may proceed from an internal excitation or from an external stimulus. Let us first consider the more obscure and more interesting case of interruption from within. Observation shows that dreams are instigated by residues from the previous day—thought-cathexes which have not submitted to the general withdrawal of cathexes, but have retained in spite of it a certain amount of libidinal or other interest.³ Thus the narcissism of sleep has from the outset had to admit an exception at this point, and it is here that the formation of dreams takes its start. In analysis we make the acquaintance of these ‘day’s residues’ in the shape of latent dream-thoughts; and, both by reason of their nature and of the whole situation, we must regard them as preconscious ideas, as belonging to the system *Pcs*.

We cannot proceed any further in explaining the formation of dreams till we have overcome certain difficulties. The narcissism of the state of sleep implies a withdrawal of cathexis from all ideas of objects, from both the unconscious and the preconscious portions of those ideas. If, then, certain day’s residues have retained their cathexis, we hesitate to suppose that they have acquired at night so much energy as to compel notice on the part of consciousness; we should be more inclined to suppose that the cathexis they have retained is far weaker than that which they possessed during the day. Here analysis saves us further speculation, for it shows that these day’s residues must receive a reinforcement which has its source in unconscious instinctual impulses if they are to figure as constructors of dreams. This hypothesis presents no immediate difficulties, for

¹ [See the paper on ‘The Unconscious’, above, p. 182 ff.]

² [A possible reference to a missing paper on paranoia (p. 106).]

³ [For this and the following paragraph see *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 554 f.]

we have every reason to suppose that in sleep the censorship between the *Pcs.* and the *Ucs.* is greatly reduced, so that communication between the two systems is made easier.¹

But there is another doubt, which we must not pass over in silence. If the narcissistic state of sleep has resulted in a drawing-in of all the cathexes of the systems *Ucs.* and *Pcs.*, then there can no longer be any possibility of the preconscious day's residues being reinforced by unconscious instinctual impulses, seeing that these themselves have surrendered their cathexes to the ego. Here the theory of dream-formation ends up in a contradiction, unless we can rescue it by introducing a modification into our assumption about the narcissism of sleep.

A restrictive modification of this kind is, as we shall discover later,² necessary in the theory of dementia praecox as well. This must be to the effect that the repressed portion of the system *Ucs.* does not comply with the wish to sleep that comes from the ego, that it retains its cathexis in whole or in part, and that in general, in consequence of repression, it has acquired a certain measure of independence of the ego. Accordingly, too, some amount of the expenditure on repression (anticathexis) would have to be maintained throughout the night, in order to meet the instinctual danger—though the inaccessibility of all paths leading to a release of affect and to motility may considerably diminish the height of the anticathexis that is necessary.³ Thus we should picture the situation which leads to the formation of dreams as follows. The wish to sleep endeavours to draw in all the cathexes sent out by the ego and to establish an absolute narcissism. This can only partly succeed, for what is repressed in the system *Ucs.* does not obey the wish to sleep. A part of the anticathexes has therefore to be maintained, and the censorship between the *Ucs.* and the *Pcs.* must remain, even if not at its full strength. So far as the dominance of the ego extends, all the systems are emptied of cathexes. The stronger the *Ucs.* instinctual cathexes are, the more unstable is sleep. We are acquainted, too, with the extreme case where the ego gives up the wish to sleep, because it feels unable to inhibit the repressed impulses set free during sleep—in other words, where it renounces sleep because of its fear of its dreams.⁴

¹ [Ibid., 5, 526.]

² [It is not clear what this refers to.]

³ [Ibid., 5, 567–8. See also above, p. 151.]

⁴ [Ibid., 5, 579–80.]

Later on we shall learn¹ to recognize the momentous nature of this hypothesis regarding the unruliness of repressed impulses. For the present let us follow out the situation which occurs in dream-formation.

The possibility mentioned above [p. 224]—that some of the preconscious thoughts of the day may also prove resistant and retain a part of their cathexis—must be recognized as a second breach in narcissism.² At bottom, the two cases may be identical. The resistance of the day's residues may originate in a link with unconscious impulses which is already in existence during waking life; or the process may be somewhat less simple, and the day's residues which have not been wholly emptied of cathexis may establish a connection with the repressed material only after the state of sleep has set in, thanks to the easing of communication between the *Pcs.* and the *Ucs.* In both cases there follows the same decisive step in dream-formation: the preconscious dream-wish is formed, which *gives expression to the unconscious impulse in the material of the preconscious day's residues.* This dream-wish must be sharply distinguished from the day's residues; it need not have existed in waking life and it may already display the irrational character possessed by everything that is unconscious when we translate it into the conscious. Again, the dream-wish must not be confused with the wishful impulses which may have been present, though they certainly need not necessarily be present, amongst the preconscious (latent) dream-thoughts. If, however, there *were* any such preconscious wishes, the dream-wish associates itself with them, as a most effective reinforcement of them.

We have now to consider the further vicissitudes undergone by this wishful impulse, which in its essence represents an unconscious instinctual demand and which has been formed in the *Pcs.* as a dream-wish (a wish-fulfilling phantasy). Reflection tells us that this wishful impulse may be dealt with along three different paths. It may follow the path that would be normal in waking life, by pressing from the *Pcs.* to consciousness; or it may by-pass the *Cs.* and find direct motor discharge; or it may take the unexpected path which observation enables us in fact to trace. In the first case, it would become a *delusion* having as content the fulfilment of the wish; but in the state of sleep

¹ [The reference is again not clear.]

² [The first being the 'unruliness of repressed impulses'.]

this never happens. With our scanty knowledge of the metapsychological conditions of mental processes, we may perhaps take this fact as a hint that a complete emptying of a system renders it little susceptible to instigation. The second case, that of direct motor discharge, should be excluded by the same principle;¹ for access to motility normally lies yet another step beyond the censorship of consciousness. But we do meet with exceptional instances in which this happens, in the form of somnambulism. We do not know what conditions make this possible, or why it does not happen more often. What actually happens in dream-formation is a very remarkable and quite unforeseen turn of events. The process, begun in the *Pcs.* and reinforced by the *Ucs.*, pursues a backward course, through the *Ucs.* to perception, which is pressing upon consciousness. This *regression* is the third phase of dream-formation. For the sake of clarity, we will repeat the two earlier ones: the reinforcement of the *Pcs.* day's residues by the *Ucs.*, and the setting up of the dream-wish.

We call this kind of regression a *topographical* one, to distinguish it from the previously mentioned [p. 223] *temporal* or developmental regression.² The two do not necessarily always coincide, but they do so in the particular example before us. The reversal of the course of the excitation from the *Pcs.* through

¹ [The 'principle of the insusceptibility to excitation of uncathexed systems' (below, p. 234 *n.*) seems to be alluded to in one or two passages in Freud's later writings, e.g. in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 30, and near the end of the paper on the 'Mystic Writing-Pad' (1925a). But the principle is already foreshadowed in neurological terms in Freud's 1895 'Project' (1950a). In Part I, Section 11, of that work he lays it down that 'a quantity passes more easily from a neurone to a cathexed neurone than to an uncathexed one'. And in Section 20 he actually applies this hypothesis to the very problem of motor discharge in dreams which is the subject of the present passage. He writes: 'Dreams are devoid of motor discharge and, for the most part, of motor elements. We are paralysed in dreams. The easiest explanation of this characteristic is the absence of spinal pre-cathexis . . . Since the neurones are uncathexed, the motor excitation cannot pass over the barriers. . . .' A few paragraphs later on he discusses the 'retrogressive' nature of the hallucinatory characteristic of dreams, as he does in the later part of the present passage.]

² [Cf. a paragraph added in 1914 to Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 548 (in which three kinds of regression are distinguished), and another discussion of regression near the beginning of Lecture XXII of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17).]

the *Ucs.* to perception is at the same time a return to the early stage of hallucinatory wish-fulfilment.

We have already in *The Interpretation of Dreams* [Standard Ed., 5, 542 ff.] described the way in which the regression of the pre-conscious day's residues takes place in dream-formation. In this process thoughts are transformed into images, mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word-presentations are taken back to the thing-presentations which correspond to them, as if, in general, the process were dominated by considerations of *representability* [ibid., 5, 548]. When regression has been completed, a number of cathexes are left over in the system *Ucs.*—cathexes of memories of *things*. The primary psychical process is brought to bear on these memories, till, by condensation of them and displacement between their respective cathexes, it has shaped the manifest dream-content. Only where the word-presentations occurring in the day's residues are recent and current residues of *perceptions*, and not the expression of *thoughts*, are they themselves treated like thing-presentations, and subjected to the influence of condensation and displacement. Hence the rule laid down in *The Interpretation of Dreams* [ibid., 5, 418 ff.], and since confirmed beyond all doubt, that words and speeches in the dream-content are not freshly formed, but are modelled on speeches from the day preceding the dream (or on some other recent impressions, such as something that has been read). It is very noteworthy how little the dream-work keeps to the word-presentations; it is always ready to exchange one word for another till it finds the expression which is most handy for plastic representation.¹

¹ I also ascribe to considerations of representability the fact which is insisted on and perhaps over-estimated by Silberer [1914] that some dreams admit of two simultaneous, and yet essentially different interpretations, one of which he calls the 'analytic' and the other the 'anagogic'. When this happens, we are invariably concerned with thoughts of a very abstract nature, which must have made their representation in the dream very difficult. We might compare it with the problem of representing in pictures a leading article from a political newspaper. In such cases, the dream-work must first replace the text that consists of abstract thoughts by one more concrete, connected with the former in some way—by comparison, symbolism, allegorical allusion, or best of all, genetically—so that the more concrete text then takes the place of the abstract one as material for the dream-work. The abstract thoughts yield the so-called anagogic interpretation, which, in our interpretative work, we discover more easily than the true analytic one. Otto Rank has

Now it is in this respect that the essential difference between the dream-work and schizophrenia becomes clear. In the latter, what becomes the subject of modification by the primary process are the words themselves in which the preconscious thought was expressed; in dreams, what are subject to this modification are not the words, but the thing-presentations to which the words have been taken back.¹ In dreams there is a topographical regression; in schizophrenia there is not. In dreams there is free communication between (*Pcs.*) word-cathexes and (*Ucs.*) thing-cathexes, while it is characteristic of schizophrenia that this communication is cut off. The impression this difference makes on one is lessened precisely by the dream-interpretations we carry out in psycho-analytic practice. For, owing to the fact that dream-interpretation traces the course taken by the dream-work, follows the paths which lead from the latent thoughts to the dream-elements, reveals the way in which verbal ambiguities have been exploited, and points out the verbal bridges between different groups of material—owing to all this, we get an impression now of a joke, now of schizophrenia, and are apt to forget that for a dream all operations with words are no more than a preparation for a regression to things.

The completion of the dream-process consists in the thought-content—regressively transformed and worked over into a wishful phantasy—becoming conscious as a sense-perception; while this is happening it undergoes secondary revision, to which every perceptual concept is subject. The dream-wish, as we say, is *hallucinated*, and, as a hallucination, meets with belief in the reality of its fulfilment. It is precisely round this concluding piece in the formation of dreams that the gravest uncertainties centre, and it is in order to clear them up that we are proposing to compare dreams with pathological states akin to them.

The formation of the wishful phantasy and its regression to hallucination are the most essential parts of the dream-work, but they do not belong exclusively to dreams. They are also found in two morbid states: in acute hallucinatory confusion justly remarked that certain dreams about their treatment, dreamt by patients in analysis, are the best models on which to form a view of these dreams which admit of more than one interpretation. [Freud added a paragraph on anagogic interpretations in 1919 to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 523–4. See also ‘Dreams and Telepathy’ (1922a), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 216.]

¹ [Cf. ‘The Unconscious’ (p. 199 above).]

(Meynert's 'amentia'),¹ and in the hallucinatory phase of schizophrenia. The hallucinatory delirium of amentia is a clearly recognizable wishful phantasy, often completely well-ordered like a perfect day-dream. One might speak quite generally of a 'hallucinatory wishful psychosis', and attribute it equally to dreams and amentia. There are even dreams which consist of nothing but undistorted wishful phantasies with a very rich content.² The hallucinatory phase of schizophrenia has been less thoroughly studied; it seems as a rule to be of a composite nature, but in its essence it might well correspond to a fresh attempt at restitution, designed to restore a libidinal cathexis to the ideas of objects.³ I cannot extend the comparison to the other hallucinatory states in various pathological disorders, because in their case I have no experience of my own upon which to draw, and cannot utilize that of other observers.

Let us be clear that the hallucinatory wishful psychosis—in dreams or elsewhere—achieves two by no means identical results. It not only brings hidden or repressed wishes into consciousness; it also represents them, with the subject's entire belief, as fulfilled. The concurrence of these two results calls for explanation. It is quite impossible to maintain that unconscious wishes must necessarily be taken for realities when once they have become conscious; for, as we know, our judgement is very well able to distinguish realities from ideas and wishes, however intense they may be. On the other hand, it seems justifiable to assume that belief in reality is bound up with perception through the senses. When once a thought has followed the path to regression as far back as to the unconscious memory-traces of objects and thence to perception, we accept the perception of it as real.⁴ So hallucination brings belief in reality with it. We now have to ask ourselves what determines the coming into being of a hallucination. The first answer would be regression, and this would replace the problem of the origin of hallucina-

¹ [In the rest of this paper the term 'amentia' should be understood as referring to this condition.]

² [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 4, 131 n.]

³ In the paper on 'The Unconscious' [see pp. 203-4] we recognized the hypercathexis of word-presentations as a first attempt of this kind.

⁴ [This point was made by Breuer in his theoretical contribution to *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 188 and 189 n. He seems to attribute the idea to Meynert.]

tion by that of the mechanism of regression. As regards dreams, this latter problem need not remain long unanswered. Regression of *Pcs.* dream-thoughts to mnemonic images of things is clearly the result of the attraction which the *Ucs.* instinctual representatives—e.g. repressed memories of experiences—exercise upon the thoughts which have been put into words.¹ But we soon perceive that we are on a false scent. If the secret of hallucination is nothing else than that of regression, every regression of sufficient intensity would produce hallucination with belief in its reality. But we are quite familiar with situations in which a process of regressive reflection brings to consciousness very clear visual mnemonic images, though we do not on that account for a single moment take them for real perceptions. Again, we could very well imagine the dream-work penetrating to mnemonic images of this kind, making conscious to us what was previously unconscious, and holding up to us a wishful phantasy which rouses our longing, but which we should not regard as a real fulfilment of the wish. Hallucination must therefore be something more than the regressive revival of mnemonic images that are in themselves *Ucs.*

Let us, furthermore, bear in mind the great practical importance of distinguishing perceptions from ideas, however intensely recalled. Our whole relation to the external world, to reality, depends on our ability to do so. We have put forward the fiction² that we did not always possess this ability and that at the beginning of our mental life we did in fact hallucinate the satisfying object when we felt the need for it. But in such a situation satisfaction did not occur, and this failure must very soon have moved us to create some contrivance with the help of which it was possible to distinguish such wishful perceptions from a real fulfilment and to avoid them for the future. In other words, we gave up hallucinatory satisfaction of our wishes at a very early period and set up a kind of 'reality-testing.'³ The question now arises in what this reality-testing consisted, and how the hallucinatory wishful psychosis of dreams and amentia and similar conditions succeeds in abolishing it and in re-establishing the old mode of satisfaction.

¹ [*The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed.*, 5, 544 f.]

² [See Chapter VII (C) of *The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed.*, 5, 565 ff.]

³ [See Editor's Note, p. 220.]

The answer can be given if we now proceed to define more precisely the third of our psychical systems, the system *Cs.*, which hitherto we have not sharply distinguished from the *Pcs.* In *The Interpretation of Dreams*¹ we were already led to a decision to regard conscious perception as the function of a special system, to which we ascribed certain curious properties, and to which we shall now have good grounds for attributing other characteristics as well. We may regard this system, which is there called the *Pcpt.*, as coinciding with the system *Cs.*, on whose activity becoming conscious usually depends. Nevertheless, even so, the fact of a thing's becoming conscious still does not wholly coincide with its belonging to a system, for we have learnt that it is possible to be aware of sensory mnemonic images to which we cannot possibly allow a psychical location in the systems *Cs.* or *Pcpt.*

We must, however, put off discussing this difficulty till we can focus our interest upon the system *Cs.* itself.² In the present connection we may be allowed to assume that hallucination consists in a cathexis of the system *Cs.* (*Pcpt.*), which, however, is not effected—as normally—from without, but from within, and that a necessary condition for the occurrence of hallucination is that regression shall be carried far enough to reach this system itself and in so doing be able to pass over reality-testing.³

In an earlier passage⁴ we ascribed to the still helpless organism a capacity for making a first orientation in the world by means of its perceptions, distinguishing 'external' and 'internal' according to their relation to its muscular action. A perception which is made to disappear by an action is recognized as external, as reality; where such an action makes no difference, the perception originates within the subject's own body—it is not real. It is of value to the individual to possess a means such as this of recognizing reality,⁵ which at the same time helps him to deal with it, and he would be glad to be equipped with a similar power against the often merciless claims of his instincts. That is

¹ [Chapter VII (B), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 533 ff.]

² [Another probable reference to the missing paper on consciousness.]

³ I may add by way of supplement that any attempt to explain hallucination would have to start out from *negative* rather than positive hallucination.

⁴ 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' [p. 119].

⁵ [In German: '*Kennzeichen der Realität*'. Cf. '*Realitätszeichen*' ('indications of reality') in the 'Project' (1950a), Part I, Section 15, etc.]

why he takes such pains to transpose outwards what becomes troublesome to him from within—that is, to *project* it.¹

This function of orientating the individual in the world by discrimination between what is internal and what is external must now, after detailed dissection of the mental apparatus, be ascribed to the system *Cs.* (*Pcpt.*) alone. The *Cs.* must have at its disposal a motor innervation which determines whether the perception can be made to disappear or whether it proves resistant. Reality-testing need be nothing more than this contrivance.² We can say nothing more precise on this point, for we know too little as yet of the nature and mode of operation of the system *Cs.* We shall place reality-testing among the major *institutions of the ego*, alongside the *ensorships* which we have come to recognize between the psychical systems, and we shall expect that the analysis of the narcissistic disorders will help to bring other similar institutions to light. [Cf. p. 247.]

On the other hand, we can already learn from pathology the way in which reality-testing may be done away with or put out of action. We shall see this more clearly in the wishful psychosis of amentia than in that of dreams. Amentia is the reaction to a loss which reality affirms, but which the ego has to deny, since it finds it insupportable. Thereupon the ego breaks off its relation to reality; it withdraws the cathexis from the system of perceptions, *Cs.*—or rather, perhaps, it withdraws *a* cathexis, the special nature of which may be the subject of further enquiry. With this turning away from reality, reality-testing is got rid of, the (unrepressed, completely conscious) wishful phantasies are able to press forward into the system, and they are there regarded as a better reality. Such a withdrawal may be put on a par with the processes of repression. Amentia presents the interesting spectacle of a breach between the ego and one of its organs—one which had perhaps been its most faithful servant and had been bound up with it the most intimately.³

¹ [Cf. the further discussion of 'external' and 'internal' in the much later paper on 'Negation' (1925*h*) and in Chapter I of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930*a*).]

² Cf. a later passage on the distinction between testing with regard to reality and testing with regard to immediacy. [*Realitätsprüfung* and *Aktualitätsprüfung*]. No reference to the latter seems to occur anywhere else; and this may be one more reference to a missing paper.]

³ I may venture to suggest in this connection that the toxic hallucinoses, too, e.g. alcoholic delirium, are to be understood in an

What is performed in amentia by this 'repression' is performed in dreams by voluntary renunciation. The state of sleep does not wish to know anything of the external world; it takes no interest in reality, or only so far as abandoning the state of sleep—waking up—is concerned. Hence it withdraws cathexis from the system *Cs.* as well as from the other systems, the *Pcs.* and the *Ucs.*, in so far as the cathexes¹ in them obey the wish to sleep. With the system *Cs.* thus uncathected, the possibility of reality-testing is abandoned; and the excitations which, independently of the state of sleep, have entered on the path of regression will find that path clear as far as the system *Cs.* where they will count as undisputed reality.²

As regards the hallucinatory psychosis of dementia praecox, we shall infer from our discussion that that psychosis cannot be among the initial symptoms of the affection. It becomes possible only when the patient's ego is so far disintegrated that reality-testing no longer stands in the way of hallucination.

In what concerns the psychology of dream-processes we arrive at the result that all the essential characteristics of dreams are determined by the conditioning factor of sleep. Aristotle was entirely right, long ago, in his modest pronouncement that dreams are the mental activity of the sleeper.³ We might expand this and say: they are a residue of mental activity, made possible by the fact that the narcissistic state of sleep has not been able to be completely established. This does not sound very different from what psychologists and philosophers have said all along,

analogous fashion. Here the unbearable loss imposed by reality would be precisely the loss of alcohol. When the latter is supplied, the hallucinations cease.

¹ [The German word here is '*Positionen*', 'military posts'. The use of the metaphor was no doubt suggested by the fact that '*Besetzung*' ('cathexis') can itself be used in the sense of 'military occupation'.]

² Here the principle of the insusceptibility to excitation of uncathected systems [cf. p. 227] appears to be invalidated in the case of the system *Cs.* (*Pcpt.*). But it may be a question of only the *partial* removal of cathexis; and for the perceptual system in especial we must assume many conditions for excitation which are widely divergent from those of other systems.—We are not, of course, intending to disguise or gloss over the uncertain and tentative character of these metapsychological discussions. Only deeper investigation can lead to the achievement of a certain degree of probability.

³ [Quoted near the beginning of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 2.]

but it is based on quite different views about the structure and function of the mental apparatus. These views have this advantage over the earlier ones, that they have given us an understanding, too, of all the detailed characteristics of dreams.

Finally, let us once more glance at the significant light which the *topography* of the process of repression throws for us on the mechanism of mental disturbances. In dreams the withdrawal of cathexis (libido or interest) affects all systems equally; in the transference neuroses, the *Pcs.* cathexis is withdrawn; in schizophrenia, the cathexis of the *Ucs.*; in amentia, that of the *Cs.*

MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA
(1917 [1915])

EDITOR'S NOTE

TRAUER UND MELANCHOLIE

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1917 *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 4 (6), 288-301.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 356-77. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 535-53.
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 257-75.
1931 *Theoretische Schriften*, 157-77.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 428-46.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

‘Mourning and Melancholia’

- 1925 *C.P.*, 4, 152-70. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)

The present translation, though based on that of 1925, has been very largely rewritten.

As we learn from Dr. Ernest Jones (1955, 367-8), Freud had expounded the theme of the present paper to him in January, 1914; and he spoke of it to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on December 30 of that year. He wrote a first draft of the paper in February, 1915. He submitted this to Abraham, who sent him some lengthy comments, which included the important suggestion that there was a connection between melancholia and the oral stage of libidinal development (pp. 249-50). The final draft of the paper was finished on May 4, 1915, but, like its predecessor, it was not published till two years later.

In very early days (probably in January, 1895) Freud had sent Fliess an elaborate attempt at explaining melancholia (under which term he regularly included what are now usually described as states of depression) in purely neurological terms (Freud, 1950a, Draft G).

This attempt was not particularly fruitful, but it was soon replaced by a psychological approach to the subject. Only two

years later we find one of the most remarkable instances of Freud's pre-vision. It occurs in a manuscript, also addressed to Fliess, and bearing the title 'Notes (III)'. This manuscript, dated May 31, 1897, is incidentally the one in which Freud first foreshadowed the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1950*a*, Draft N). The passage in question, whose meaning is so condensed as to be in places obscure, deserves to be quoted in full:

'Hostile impulses against parents (a wish that they should die) are also an integral constituent of neuroses. They come to light consciously as obsessional ideas. In paranoia what is worst in delusions of persecution (pathological distrust of rulers and monarchs) corresponds to these impulses. They are repressed at times when compassion for the parents is active—at times of their illness or death. On such occasions it is a manifestation of mourning to reproach oneself for their death (what is known as melancholia) or to punish oneself in a hysterical fashion (through the medium of the idea of retribution) with the same states [of illness] that they have had. The identification which occurs here is, as we can see, nothing other than a mode of thinking and does not relieve us of the necessity for looking for the motive.'

The further application to melancholia of the line of thought outlined in this passage seems to have been left completely on one side by Freud. Indeed he scarcely mentioned the condition again before the present paper, except for some remarks in a discussion on suicide at the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society in 1910 (*Standard Ed.*, 11, 232), when he stressed the importance of drawing a comparison between melancholia and normal states of mourning, but declared that the psychological problem involved was still insoluble.

What enabled Freud to reopen the subject was, of course, the introduction of the concepts of narcissism and of an ego ideal. The present paper may, indeed, be regarded as an extension of the one on narcissism which Freud had written a year earlier (1914*c*). Just as that paper had described the workings of the 'critical agency' in cases of paranoia (see above p. 95 f.), so this one sees the same agency in operation in melancholia.

But the implications of this paper were destined to be more important than the explanation of the mechanism of one particular pathological state, though those implications did not become immediately obvious. The material contained here led

on to the further consideration of the 'critical agency' which is to be found in Chapter XI of *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 129 ff.; and this in turn led on to the hypothesis of the super-ego in *The Ego and the Id* (1923b) and to a fresh assessment of the sense of guilt.

Along another line, this paper called for an examination of the whole question of the nature of identification. Freud seems to have been inclined at first to regard it as closely associated with, and perhaps dependent on, the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development. Thus in *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13), *Standard Ed.*, 13, 142, he had written of the relation between the sons and the father of the primal horde that 'in the act of devouring him they accomplished their identification with him'. And again, in a passage added to the third edition of the *Three Essays*, published in 1915 but written some months before the present paper, he described the cannibalistic oral phase as 'the prototype of a process which, in the form of identification, is later to play such an important psychological part'. In the present paper (pp. 249-50) he speaks of identification as 'a preliminary stage of object-choice . . . the first way in which the ego picks out an object' and adds that 'the ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development at which it is, it wants to do so by devouring it'.¹ And indeed, though Abraham may have suggested the relevance of the oral phase to melancholia, Freud's own interest had already begun to turn to it, as is shown by the discussion of it in the 'Wolf Man' case history (1918b) which was written during the autumn of 1914 and in which a prominent part was played by that phase. (See *Standard Ed.*, 17, 106.) A few years later, in *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 105 ff., where the subject of identification is taken up again, explicitly in continuation of the present discussion, a change in the earlier view—or perhaps only a clarification of it—seems to emerge. Identification, we there learn, is something that *precedes* object-cathexis and is distinct from it,

¹ The term 'introjection' does not occur in this paper, though Freud had already used it, in a different connection, in the first of these metapsychological papers (p. 136) above. When he returned to the topic of identification, in the chapter of his *Group Psychology* referred to in the text, he used the word 'introjection' at several points, and it reappears, though not very frequently, in his subsequent writings.

though we are still told that 'it behaves like a derivative of the first, oral phase'. This view of identification is consistently emphasized in many of Freud's later writings, as, for instance, in Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id* (1923*b*), where he writes that identification with the parents 'is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis.'

What Freud seems later to have regarded as the most significant feature of this paper was, however, its account of the process by which in melancholia an object-cathexis is replaced by an identification. In Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id*, he argued that this process is not restricted to melancholia but is of quite general occurrence. These regressive identifications, he pointed out, were to a large extent the basis of what we describe as a person's 'character'. But, what was far more important, he suggested that the very earliest of these regressive identifications—those derived from the dissolution of the Oedipus complex—come to occupy a quite special position, and form, in fact, the nucleus of the super-ego.

MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA

DREAMS having served us as the prototype in normal life of narcissistic mental disorders, we will now try to throw some light on the nature of melancholia by comparing it with the normal affect of mourning.¹ This time, however, we must begin by making an admission, as a warning against any over-estimation of the value of our conclusions. Melancholia, whose definition fluctuates even in descriptive psychiatry, takes on various clinical forms the grouping together of which into a single unity does not seem to be established with certainty; and some of these forms suggest somatic rather than psychogenic affections. Our material, apart from such impressions as are open to every observer, is limited to a small number of cases whose psychogenic nature was indisputable. We shall, therefore, from the outset drop all claim to general validity for our conclusions, and we shall console ourselves by reflecting that, with the means of investigation at our disposal to-day, we could hardly discover anything that was not typical, if not of a whole class of disorders, at least of a small group of them.

The correlation of melancholia and mourning seems justified by the general picture of the two conditions.² Moreover, the exciting causes due to environmental influences are, so far as we can discern them at all, the same for both conditions. Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on. In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition. It is also well worth notice that, although mourning involves grave departures from the normal attitude to life, it never occurs to us to regard it as a pathological condition and to

¹ [The German '*Trauer*', like the English 'mourning', can mean both the affect of grief and its outward manifestation. Throughout the present paper, the word has been rendered 'mourning'.]

² Abraham (1912), to whom we owe the most important of the few analytic studies on this subject, also took this comparison as his starting point. [Freud himself had already made the comparison in 1910 and even earlier. (See Editor's Note, p. 240 above.)]

refer it to medical treatment. We rely on its being overcome after a certain lapse of time, and we look upon any interference with it as useless or even harmful.

The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment. This picture becomes a little more intelligible when we consider that, with one exception, the same traits are met with in mourning. The disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; but otherwise the features are the same. Profound mourning, the reaction to the loss of someone who is loved, contains the same painful frame of mind, the same loss of interest in the outside world—in so far as it does not recall him—the same loss of capacity to adopt any new object of love (which would mean replacing him) and the same turning away from any activity that is not connected with thoughts of him. It is easy to see that this inhibition and circumscription of the ego is the expression of an exclusive devotion to mourning which leaves nothing over for other purposes or other interests. It is really only because we know so well how to explain it that this attitude does not seem to us pathological.

We should regard it as an appropriate comparison, too, to call the mood of mourning a 'painful' one. We shall probably see the justification for this when we are in a position to give a characterization of the economics of pain.¹

In what, now, does the work which mourning performs consist? I do not think there is anything far-fetched in presenting it in the following way. Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object. This demand arouses understandable opposition—it is a matter of general observation that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them. This opposition can be so intense that a turning away from reality takes place and a clinging to the object through the medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis.² Normally, respect for reality gains the day. Nevertheless its

¹ [See footnote 1, p. 147 above.]

² Cf. the preceding paper [p. 230].

orders cannot be obeyed at once. They are carried out bit by bit, at great expense of time and cathectic energy, and in the meantime the existence of the lost object is psychically prolonged. Each single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up and hypercathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of it.¹ Why this compromise by which the command of reality is carried out piecemeal should be so extraordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain in terms of economics. It is remarkable that this painful unpleasure is taken as a matter of course by us. The fact is, however, that when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again.²

Let us now apply to melancholia what we have learnt about mourning. In one set of cases it is evident that melancholia too may be the reaction to the loss of a loved object. Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that there is a loss of a more ideal kind. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love (e.g. in the case of a betrothed girl who has been jilted). In yet other cases one feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss of this kind has occurred, but one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either. This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows *whom* he has lost but not *what* he has lost in him. This would suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious.

In mourning we found that the inhibition and loss of interest are fully accounted for by the work of mourning in which the ego is absorbed. In melancholia, the unknown loss will result in a similar internal work and will therefore be responsible for the melancholic inhibition. The difference is that the inhibition

¹ [This idea seems to be expressed already in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d): a process similar to this one will be found described near the beginning of Freud's 'Discussion' of the case history of Fräulein Elisabeth von R. (*Standard Ed.*, 2, 162).]

² [A discussion of the economics of this process will be found below on p. 255.]

of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we cannot see what it is that is absorbing him so entirely. The melancholic displays something else besides which is lacking in mourning—an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself. The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished. He abases himself before everyone and commiserates with his own relatives for being connected with anyone so unworthy. He is not of the opinion that a change has taken place in him, but extends his self-criticism back over the past; he declares that he was never any better. This picture of a delusion of (mainly moral) inferiority is completed by sleeplessness and refusal to take nourishment, and—what is psychologically very remarkable—by an overcoming of the instinct which compels every living thing to cling to life.

It would be equally fruitless from a scientific and a therapeutic point of view to contradict a patient who brings these accusations against his ego. He must surely be right in some way and be describing something that is as it seems to him to be. Indeed, we must at once confirm some of his statements without reservation. He really is as lacking in interest and as incapable of love and achievement as he says. But that, as we know, is secondary; it is the effect of the internal work which is consuming his ego—work which is unknown to us but which is comparable to the work of mourning. He also seems to us justified in certain other self-accusations; it is merely that he has a keener eye for the truth than other people who are not melancholic. When in his heightened self-criticism he describes himself as petty, egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been to hide the weaknesses of his own nature, it may be, so far as we know, that he has come pretty near to understanding himself; we only wonder why a man has to be ill before he can be accessible to a truth of this kind. For there can be no doubt that if anyone holds and expresses to others an opinion of himself such as this (an opinion which Hamlet held both of himself and of everyone else¹), he is ill, whether he is speaking the

¹ 'Use every man after his desert, and who shall scape whipping?' (Act II, Scene 2).

truth or whether he is being more or less unfair to himself. Nor is it difficult to see that there is no correspondence, so far as we can judge, between the degree of self-abasement and its real justification. A good, capable, conscientious woman will speak no better of herself after she develops melancholia than one who is in fact worthless; indeed, the former is perhaps more likely to fall ill of the disease than the latter, of whom we too should have nothing good to say. Finally, it must strike us that after all the melancholic does not behave in quite the same way as a person who is crushed by remorse and self-reproach in a normal fashion. Feelings of shame in front of other people, which would more than anything characterize this latter condition, are lacking in the melancholic, or at least they are not prominent in him. One might emphasize the presence in him of an almost opposite trait of insistent communicativeness which finds satisfaction in self-exposure.

The essential thing, therefore, is not whether the melancholic's distressing self-denigration is correct, in the sense that his self-criticism agrees with the opinion of other people. The point must rather be that he is giving a correct description of his psychological situation. He has lost his self-respect and he must have good reason for this. It is true that we are then faced with a contradiction that presents a problem which is hard to solve. The analogy with mourning led us to conclude that he had suffered a loss in regard to an object; what he tells us points to a loss in regard to his ego.

Before going into this contradiction, let us dwell for a moment on the view which the melancholic's disorder affords of the constitution of the human ego. We see how in him one part of the ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object. Our suspicion that the critical agency which is here split off from the ego might also show its independence in other circumstances will be confirmed by every further observation. We shall really find grounds for distinguishing this agency from the rest of the ego. What we are here becoming acquainted with is the agency commonly called 'conscience'; we shall count it, along with the censorship of consciousness and reality-testing, among the major institutions of the ego,¹ and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can become diseased on its own account. In the clinical picture of

¹ [See above, p. 233.]

melancholia, dissatisfaction with the ego on moral grounds is the most outstanding feature. The patient's self-evaluation concerns itself much less frequently with bodily infirmity, ugliness or weakness, or with social inferiority; of this category, it is only his fears and asseverations of becoming poor that occupy a prominent position.

There is one observation, not at all difficult to make, which leads to the explanation of the contradiction mentioned above [at the end of the last paragraph but one]. If one listens patiently to a melancholic's many and various self-accusations, one cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself, but that with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves or has loved or should love. Every time one examines the facts this conjecture is confirmed. So we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's own ego.

The woman who loudly pities her husband for being tied to such an incapable wife as herself is really accusing her *husband* of being incapable, in whatever sense she may mean this. There is no need to be greatly surprised that a few genuine self-reproaches are scattered among those that have been transposed back. These are allowed to obtrude themselves, since they help to mask the others and make recognition of the true state of affairs impossible. Moreover, they derive from the *pros* and *cons* of the conflict of love that has led to the loss of love. The behaviour of the patients, too, now becomes much more intelligible. Their complaints are really 'plaints' in the old sense of the word. They are not ashamed and do not hide themselves, since everything derogatory that they say about themselves is at bottom said about someone else. Moreover, they are far from evincing towards those around them the attitude of humility and submissiveness that would alone befit such worthless people. On the contrary, they make the greatest nuisance of themselves, and always seem as though they felt slighted and had been treated with great injustice. All this is possible only because the reactions expressed in their behaviour still proceed from a mental constellation of revolt, which has then, by a certain process, passed over into the crushed state of melancholia.

There is no difficulty in reconstructing this process. An object-

choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the object-relationship was shattered. The result was not the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something different, for whose coming-about various conditions seem to be necessary. The object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end. But the free libido was not displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an *identification* of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special¹ agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification.

One or two things may be directly inferred with regard to the preconditions and effects of a process such as this. On the one hand, a strong fixation to the loved object must have been present; on the other hand, in contradiction to this, the object-cathexis must have had little power of resistance. As Otto Rank has aptly remarked, this contradiction seems to imply that the object-choice has been effected on a narcissistic basis, so that the object-cathexis, when obstacles come in its way, can regress to narcissism. The narcissistic identification with the object then becomes a substitute for the erotic cathexis, the result of which is that in spite of the conflict with the loved person the love-relation need not be given up. This substitution of identification for object-love is an important mechanism in the narcissistic affections; Karl Landauer (1914) has lately been able to point to it in the process of recovery in a case of schizophrenia. It represents, of course, a *regression* from one type of object-choice to original narcissism. We have elsewhere shown that identification is a preliminary stage of object-choice, that it is the first way—and one that is expressed in an ambivalent fashion—in which the ego picks out an object. The ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development in which it is,

¹ [In the first (1917) edition only, this word does not occur.]

it wants to do so by devouring it.¹ Abraham is undoubtedly right in attributing to this connection the refusal of nourishment met with in severe forms of melancholia.²

The conclusion which our theory would require—namely, that the disposition to fall ill of melancholia (or some part of that disposition) lies in the predominance of the narcissistic type of object-choice—has unfortunately not yet been confirmed by observation. In the opening remarks of this paper, I admitted that the empirical material upon which this study is founded is insufficient for our needs. If we could assume an agreement between the results of observation and what we have inferred, we should not hesitate to include this regression from object-cathexis to the still narcissistic oral phase of the libido in our characterization of melancholia. Identifications with the object are by no means rare in the transference neuroses either; indeed, they are a well-known mechanism of symptom-formation, especially in hysteria. The difference, however, between narcissistic and hysterical identification may be seen in this: that, whereas in the former the object-cathexis is abandoned, in the latter it persists and manifests its influence, though this is usually confined to certain isolated actions and innervations. In any case, in the transference neuroses, too, identification is the expression of there being something in common, which may signify love. Narcissistic identification is the older of the two and it paves the way to an understanding of hysterical identification, which has been less thoroughly studied.³

Melancholia, therefore, borrows some of its features from mourning, and the others from the process of regression from narcissistic object-choice to narcissism. It is on the one hand, like mourning, a reaction to the real loss of a loved object; but over and above this, it is marked by a determinant which is absent in normal mourning or which, if it is present, transforms the latter into pathological mourning. The loss of a love-object is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in love-rela-

¹ [See above, p. 138. Cf. also Editor's Note, pp. 241–2.]

² [Abraham apparently first drew Freud's attention to this in a private letter written between February and April, 1915. See Jones's biography (1955, 368).]

³ [The whole subject of identification was discussed later by Freud in Chapter VII of his *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 105 ff. There is an early account of hysterical identification in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 149–51.]

tionships to make itself effective and come into the open.¹ Where there is a disposition to obsessional neurosis the conflict due to ambivalence gives a pathological cast to mourning and forces it to express itself in the form of self-reproaches to the effect that the mourner himself is to blame for the loss of the loved object, i.e. that he has willed it. These obsessional states of depression following upon the death of a loved person show us what the conflict due to ambivalence can achieve by itself when there is no regressive drawing-in of libido as well. In melancholia, the occasions which give rise to the illness extend for the most part beyond the clear case of a loss by death, and include all those situations of being slighted, neglected or disappointed, which can import opposed feelings of love and hate into the relationship or reinforce an already existing ambivalence. This conflict due to ambivalence, which sometimes arises more from real experiences, sometimes more from constitutional factors, must not be overlooked among the preconditions of melancholia. If the love for the object—a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up—takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies, just like the corresponding phenomenon in obsessional neurosis, a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate² which relate to an object, and which have been turned round upon the subject's own self in the ways we have been discussing. In both disorders the patients usually still succeed, by the circuitous path of self-punishment, in taking revenge on the original object and in tormenting their loved one through their illness, having resorted to it in order to avoid the need to express their hostility to him openly. After all, the person who has occasioned the patient's emotional disorder, and on whom his illness is centred, is usually to be found in his immediate environment. The melancholic's erotic cathexis in regard to his object has thus undergone a double vicissitude: part of it has regressed to identification, but the other part, under the influence of the conflict due to

¹ [Much of what follows is elaborated in Chapter V of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).]

² For the distinction between the two, see my paper on 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' [pp. 138-9 above].

'ambivalence, has been carried back to the stage of sadism which is nearer to that conflict.

It is this sadism alone that solves the riddle of the tendency to suicide which makes melancholia so interesting—and so dangerous. So immense is the ego's self-love, which we have come to recognize as the primal state from which instinctual life proceeds, and so vast is the amount of narcissistic libido which we see liberated in the fear that emerges at a threat to life, that we cannot conceive how that ego can consent to its own destruction. We have long known, it is true, that no neurotic harbours thoughts of suicide which he has not turned back upon himself from murderous impulses against others, but we have never been able to explain what interplay of forces can carry such a purpose through to execution. The analysis of melancholia now shows that the ego can kill itself only if, owing to the return of the object-cathexis, it can treat itself as an object—if it is able to direct against itself the hostility which relates to an object and which represents the ego's original reaction to objects in the external world.¹ Thus in regression from narcissistic object-choice the object has, it is true, been got rid of, but it has nevertheless proved more powerful than the ego itself. In the two opposed situations of being most intensely in love and of suicide the ego is overwhelmed by the object, though in totally different ways.²

As regards one particular striking feature of melancholia that we have mentioned [p. 248], the prominence of the fear of becoming poor, it seems plausible to suppose that it is derived from anal erotism which has been torn out of its context and altered in a regressive sense.

Melancholia confronts us with yet other problems, the answer to which in part eludes us. The fact that it passes off after a certain time has elapsed without leaving traces of any gross changes is a feature it shares with mourning. We found by way of explanation [pp. 244–5] that in mourning time is needed for the command of reality-testing to be carried out in detail, and that when this work has been accomplished the ego will have succeeded in freeing its libido from the lost object. We may imagine

¹ Cf. 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' [p. 136 above].

² [Later discussions of suicide will be found in Chapter V of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b) and in the last pages of 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c).]

that the ego is occupied with analogous work during the course of a melancholia; in neither case have we any insight into the economics of the course of events. The sleeplessness in melancholia testifies to the rigidity of the condition, the impossibility of effecting the general drawing-in of cathexes necessary for sleep. The complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies—which in the transference neuroses we have called ‘anticathexes’—from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished.¹ It can easily prove resistant to the ego’s wish to sleep.

What is probably a somatic factor, and one which cannot be explained psychogenically, makes itself visible in the regular amelioration in the condition that takes place towards evening. These considerations bring up the question whether a loss in the ego irrespectively of the object—a purely narcissistic blow to the ego—may not suffice to produce the picture of melancholia and whether an impoverishment of ego-libido directly due to toxins may not be able to produce certain forms of the disease.

The most remarkable characteristic of melancholia, and the one in most need of explanation, is its tendency to change round into mania—a state which is the opposite of it in its symptoms. As we know, this does not happen to every melancholia. Some cases run their course in periodic relapses, during the intervals between which signs of mania may be entirely absent or only very slight. Others show the regular alternation of melancholic and manic phases which has led to the hypothesis of a circular insanity. One would be tempted to regard these cases as non-psychogenic, if it were not for the fact that the psycho-analytic method has succeeded in arriving at a solution and effecting a therapeutic improvement in several cases precisely of this kind. It is not merely permissible, therefore, but incumbent upon us to extend an analytic explanation of melancholia to mania as well.

I cannot promise that this attempt will prove entirely satisfactory. It hardly carries us much beyond the possibility of taking one’s initial bearings. We have two things to go upon:

¹ [This analogy of the open wound appears already (illustrated by two diagrams) in the rather abstruse Section VI of Freud’s early note on melancholia (Freud, 1950a, Draft G, probably written in January, 1895). See Editor’s Note, p. 229.]

the first is a psycho-analytic impression, and the second what we may perhaps call a matter of general economic experience. The impression which several psycho-analytic investigators have already put into words is that the content of mania is no different from that of melancholia, that both disorders are wrestling with the same 'complex', but that probably in melancholia the ego has succumbed to the complex whereas in mania it has mastered it or pushed it aside. Our second pointer is afforded by the observation that all states such as joy, exultation or triumph, which give us the normal model for mania, depend on the same economic conditions. What has happened here is that, as a result of some influence, a large expenditure of psychical energy, long maintained or habitually occurring, has at last become unnecessary, so that it is available for numerous applications and possibilities of discharge—when, for instance, some poor wretch, by winning a large sum of money, is suddenly relieved from chronic worry about his daily bread, or when a long and arduous struggle is finally crowned with success, or when a man finds himself in a position to throw off at a single blow some oppressive compulsion, some false position which he has long had to keep up, and so on. All such situations are characterized by high spirits, by the signs of discharge of joyful emotion and by increased readiness for all kinds of action—in just the same way as in mania, and in complete contrast to the depression and inhibition of melancholia. We may venture to assert that mania is nothing other than a triumph of this sort, only that here again what the ego has surmounted and what it is triumphing over remain hidden from it. Alcoholic intoxication, which belongs to the same class of states, may (in so far as it is an elated one) be explained in the same way; here there is probably a suspension, produced by toxins, of expenditures of energy in repression. The popular view likes to assume that a person in a manic state of this kind finds such delight in movement and action because he is so 'cheerful'. This false connection must of course be put right. The fact is that the economic condition in the subject's mind referred to above has been fulfilled, and this is the reason why he is in such high spirits on the one hand and so uninhibited in action on the other.

If we put these two indications together,¹ what we find is this.

¹ [The 'psycho-analytic impression' and the 'general economic experience'.]

In mania, the ego must have got over the loss of the object (or its mourning over the loss, or perhaps the object itself), and thereupon the whole quota of anticathexis which the painful suffering of melancholia had drawn to itself from the ego and 'bound' will have become available [p. 253]. Moreover, the manic subject plainly demonstrates his liberation from the object which was the cause of his suffering, by seeking like a ravenously hungry man for new object-cathexes.

This explanation certainly sounds plausible, but in the first place it is too indefinite, and, secondly, it gives rise to more new problems and doubts than we can answer. We will not evade a discussion of them, even though we cannot expect it to lead us to a clear understanding.

In the first place, normal mourning, too, overcomes the loss of the object, and it, too, while it lasts, absorbs all the energies of the ego. Why, then, after it has run its course, is there no hint in its case of the economic condition for a phase of triumph? I find it impossible to answer this objection straight away. It also draws our attention to the fact that we do not even know the economic means by which mourning carries out its task [p. 245]. Possibly, however, a conjecture will help us here. Each single one of the memories and situations of expectancy which demonstrate the libido's attachment to the lost object is met by the verdict of reality that the object no longer exists; and the ego, confronted as it were with the question whether it shall share this fate, is persuaded by the sum of the narcissistic satisfactions it derives from being alive to sever its attachment to the object that has been abolished. We may perhaps suppose that this work of severance is so slow and gradual that by the time it has been finished the expenditure of energy necessary for it is also dissipated.¹

It is tempting to go on from this conjecture about the work of mourning and try to give an account of the work of melancholia. Here we are met at the outset by an uncertainty. So far we have hardly considered melancholia from the topographical point of view, nor asked ourselves in and between what psychical systems the work of melancholia goes on. What

¹ The economic standpoint has hitherto received little attention in psycho-analytic writings. I would mention as an exception a paper by Victor Tausk (1913) on motives for repression devalued by recompenses.

part of the mental processes of the disease still takes place in connection with the unconscious object-cathexes that have been given up, and what part in connection with their substitute, by identification, in the ego?

The quick and easy answer is that 'the unconscious (thing-) presentation¹ of the object has been abandoned by the libido'. In reality, however, this presentation is made up of innumerable single impressions (or unconscious traces of them), and this withdrawal of libido is not a process that can be accomplished in a moment, but must certainly, as in mourning, be one in which progress is long-drawn-out and gradual. Whether it begins simultaneously at several points or follows some sort of fixed sequence is not easy to decide; in analyses it often becomes evident that first one and then another memory is activated, and that the laments which always sound the same and are wearisome in their monotony nevertheless take their rise each time in some different unconscious source. If the object does not possess this great significance for the ego—a significance reinforced by a thousand links—then, too, its loss will not be of a kind to cause either mourning or melancholia. This characteristic of detaching the libido bit by bit is therefore to be ascribed alike to mourning and to melancholia; it is probably supported by the same economic situation and serves the same purposes in both.

As we have seen, however [p. 250 f.], melancholia contains something more than normal mourning. In melancholia the relation to the object is no simple one; it is complicated by the conflict due to ambivalence. The ambivalence is either constitutional, i.e. is an element of every love-relation formed by this particular ego, or else it proceeds precisely from those experiences that involved the threat of losing the object. For this reason the exciting causes of melancholia have a much wider range than those of mourning, which is for the most part occasioned only by a real loss of the object, by its death. In melancholia, accordingly, countless separate struggles are carried on over the object, in which hate and love contend with each other; the one seeks to detach the libido from the object, the other to maintain this position of the libido against the assault. The location of these separate struggles cannot be assigned to any system but the *Ucs.*, the region of the memory-traces of *things*

¹ [*Dingvorstellung*. See above p. 201n.]

(as contrasted with *word-cathexes*). In mourning, too, the efforts to detach the libido are made in this same system; but in it nothing hinders these processes from proceeding along the normal path through the *Pcs.* to consciousness. This path is blocked for the work of melancholia, owing perhaps to a number of causes or a combination of them. Constitutional ambivalence belongs by its nature to the repressed; traumatic experiences in connection with the object may have activated other repressed material. Thus everything to do with these struggles due to ambivalence remains withdrawn from consciousness, until the outcome characteristic of melancholia has set in. This, as we know, consists in the threatened libidinal cathexis at length abandoning the object, only, however, to draw back to the place in the ego from which it had proceeded. So by taking flight into the ego love escapes extinction. After this regression of the libido the process can become conscious, and it is represented to consciousness as a conflict between one part of the ego and the critical agency.

What consciousness is aware of in the work of melancholia is thus not the essential part of it, nor is it even the part which we may credit with an influence in bringing the ailment to an end. We see that the ego debases itself and rages against itself, and we understand as little as the patient what this can lead to and how it can change. We can more readily attribute such a function to the *unconscious* part of the work, because it is not difficult to perceive an essential analogy between the work of melancholia and of mourning. Just as mourning impels the ego to give up the object by declaring the object to be dead and offering the ego the inducement of continuing to live [p.255], so does each single struggle of ambivalence loosen the fixation of the libido to the object by disparaging it, denigrating it and even as it were killing it. It is possible for the process in the *Ucs.* to come to an end, either after the fury has spent itself or after the object has been abandoned as valueless. We cannot tell which of these two possibilities is the regular or more usual one in bringing melancholia to an end, nor what influence this termination has on the future course of the case. The ego may enjoy in this the satisfaction of knowing itself as the better of the two, as superior to the object.

Even if we accept this view of the work of melancholia, it still does not supply an explanation of the one point on which

we were seeking light. It was our expectation that the economic condition for the emergence of mania after the melancholia has run its course is to be found in the ambivalence which dominates the latter affection; and in this we found support from analogies in various other fields. But there is one fact before which that expectation must bow. Of the three preconditions of melancholia—loss of the object, ambivalence, and regression of libido into the ego—the first two are also found in the obsessional self-reproaches arising after a death has occurred. In those cases it is unquestionably the ambivalence which is the motive force of the conflict, and observation shows that after the conflict has come to an end there is nothing left over in the nature of the triumph of a manic state of mind. We are thus led to the third factor as the only one responsible for the result. The accumulation of cathexis which is at first bound and then, after the work of melancholia is finished, becomes free and makes mania possible must be linked with regression of the libido to narcissism. The conflict within the ego, which melancholia substitutes for the struggle over the object, must act like a painful wound which calls for an extraordinarily high anti-cathexis.—But here once again, it will be well to call a halt and to postpone any further explanation of mania until we have gained some insight into the economic nature, first, of physical pain, and then of the mental pain which is analogous to it.¹ As we already know, the interdependence of the complicated problems of the mind forces us to break off every enquiry before it is completed—till the outcome of some other enquiry can come to its assistance.²

¹ [See footnote 1, p. 147 above.]

² [Footnote added 1925:] Cf. a continuation of this discussion of mania in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921c) [Standard Ed., 18, 130–3].

APPENDIX

LIST OF WRITINGS BY FREUD DEALING MAINLY WITH GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

[*The date at the beginning of each entry is that of the year during which the work in question was probably written. The date at the end is that of publication; and under that date fuller particulars of the work will be found in the Bibliography and Author Index. The items in square brackets were published posthumously.*]

- [1895 'A Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1950a).]
- [1896 Letters to Fliess of January 1 and December 6 (1950a).]
- 1899 *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Chapter VII (1900a).
- 1910-11 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911b).
- 1911 'Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)', Section III (1911c).
- 1912 'A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis' (1912g).
- 1914 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' (1914c).
- 1915 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c).
- 1915 'Repression' (1915d).
- 1915 'The Unconscious' (1915e).
- 1915 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams' (1917d).
- 1915 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917e).
- 1916-17 *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, Lectures XXII and XXVI (1916-17).
- 1920 *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g).
- 1921 *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Chapters VII and XI (1921c).
- 1922 'Two Encyclopaedia Articles: (B) The Libido Theory' (1923a).
- 1923 *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).
- 1924 'Neurosis and Psychosis' (1924b).
- 1924 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c).

- 1924 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis' (1924*e*).
1925 'A Note upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad" ' (1925*a*).
1925 'Negation' (1925*h*).
1929 *Civilization and its Discontents*, Chapters VI, VII and VIII (1930*a*).
1932 *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, Lectures XXXI and XXXII (1933*a*).
[1938 *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, Chapters I, II, IV, VIII and IX (1940*a*).]
[1938 'Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-Analysis' (1940*b*).]

A CASE OF PARANOIA RUNNING
COUNTER TO THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC
THEORY OF THE DISEASE
(1915)

MITTEILUNG EINES DER PSYCHOANALYTISCHEN
THEORIE WIDERSPRECHENDEN
FALLES VON PARANOIA

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1915 *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 3 (6), 321-9.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 125-138. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 288-300.
1926 *Psychoanalyse der Neurosen*, 23-37.
1931 *Neurosenlehre und Technik*, 23-36.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 234-246.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-
Analytical Theory of the Disease'

- 1924 *C.P.*, 2, 150-161. (Tr. E. Glover.)

The present translation is based on the one published in 1924.

The case history presented in this paper serves as a confirmation of the view put forward by Freud in his Schreber analysis (1911c) that there is a close connection between paranoia and homosexuality. It is incidentally an object-lesson to practitioners on the danger of basing a hasty opinion of a case on a superficial knowledge of the facts. The last few pages contain some interesting remarks of a more general kind on the processes at work during a neurotic conflict.

A CASE OF PARANOIA RUNNING COUNTER TO THE PSYCHO- ANALYTIC THEORY OF THE DISEASE

SOME years ago a well-known lawyer consulted me about a case which had raised some doubts in his mind. A young woman had asked him to protect her from the molestations of a man who had drawn her into a love-affair. She declared that this man had abused her confidence by getting unseen witnesses to photograph them while they were making love, and that by exhibiting these pictures it was now in his power to bring disgrace on her and force her to resign the post she occupied. Her legal adviser was experienced enough to recognize the pathological stamp of this accusation; he remarked, however, that, as what appears to be incredible often actually happens, he would appreciate the opinion of a psychiatrist in the matter. He promised to call on me again, accompanied by the plaintiff.

(Before I continue the account, I must confess that I have altered the *milieu* of the case in order to preserve the incognito of the people concerned, but that I have altered nothing else. I consider it a wrong practice, however excellent the motive may be, to alter any detail in the presentation of a case. One can never tell what aspect of a case may be picked out by a reader of independent judgement, and one runs the risk of leading him astray.)¹

Shortly afterwards I met the patient in person. She was thirty years old, a most attractive and handsome girl, who looked much younger than her age and was of a distinctly feminine type. She obviously resented the interference of a doctor and took no trouble to hide her distrust. It was clear that only the influence of her legal adviser, who was present, induced her to tell me the story which follows and which set me a problem that

¹ [Cf. a footnote to the same effect added in 1924 at the end of Freud's case history of 'Katharina' in Breuer and Freud, *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 134, and some remarks in the Introduction to the 'Rat Man' case history (1909d), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 155-6.]

will be mentioned later. Neither in her manner nor by any kind of expression of emotion did she betray the slightest shame or shyness, such as one would have expected her to feel in the presence of a stranger. She was completely under the spell of the apprehension brought on by her experience.

For many years she had been on the staff of a big business concern, in which she held a responsible post. Her work had given her satisfaction and had been appreciated by her superiors. She had never sought any love-affairs with men, but had lived quietly with her old mother, of whom she was the sole support. She had no brothers or sisters; her father had died many years before. Recently an employee in her office, a highly cultivated and attractive man, had paid her attentions and she in turn had been drawn towards him. For external reasons, marriage was out of the question, but the man would not hear of giving up their relationship on that account. He had pleaded that it was senseless to sacrifice to social convention all that they both longed for and had an indisputable right to enjoy, something that could enrich their life as nothing else could. As he had promised not to expose her to any risk, she had at last consented to visit him in his bachelor rooms in the daytime. There they kissed and embraced as they lay side by side, and he began to admire the charms which were now partly revealed. In the midst of this idyllic scene she was suddenly frightened by a noise, a kind of knock or click. It came from the direction of the writing-desk, which was standing across the window; the space between desk and window was partly taken up by a heavy curtain. She had at once asked her friend what this noise meant, and was told, so she said, that it probably came from the small clock on the writing-desk. I shall venture, however, to make a comment presently on this part of her narrative.

As she was leaving the house she had met two men on the staircase, who whispered something to each other when they saw her. One of the strangers was carrying something which was wrapped up and looked like a small box. She was much exercised over this meeting, and on her way home she had already put together the following notions: the box might easily have been a camera, and the man a photographer who had been hidden behind the curtain while she was in the room; the click had been the noise of the shutter; the photograph had been taken as soon as he saw her in a particularly compromising

position which he wished to record. From that moment nothing could abate her suspicion of her lover. She pursued him with reproaches and pestered him for explanations and reassurances, not only when they met but also by letter. But it was in vain that he tried to convince her that his feelings were sincere and that her suspicions were entirely without foundation. At last she called on the lawyer, told him of her experience and handed over the letters which the suspect had written to her about the incident. Later I had an opportunity of seeing some of these letters. They made a very favourable impression on me, and consisted mainly in expressions of regret that such a beautiful and tender relationship should have been destroyed by this 'unfortunate morbid idea'.

I need hardly justify my agreement with this judgement. But the case had a special interest for me other than a merely diagnostic one. The view had already been put forward in psycho-analytic literature that patients suffering from paranoia are struggling against an intensification of their homosexual trends—a fact pointing back to a narcissistic object-choice. And a further interpretation had been made: that the persecutor is at bottom someone whom the patient loves or has loved in the past.¹ A synthesis of the two propositions would lead us to the necessary conclusion that the persecutor must be of the same sex as the person persecuted. We did not maintain, it is true, as universally and without exception valid the thesis that paranoia is determined by homosexuality; but this was only because our observations were not sufficiently numerous; the thesis was one of those which in view of certain considerations become important only when universal application can be claimed for them. In psychiatric literature there is certainly no lack of cases in which the patient imagines himself persecuted by a person of the opposite sex. It is one thing, however, to read of such cases, and quite a different thing to come into personal contact with one of them. My own observations and analyses and those of my friends had so far confirmed the relation between paranoia and homosexuality without any difficulty. But the present case emphatically contradicted it. The girl seemed to be defending herself against love for a man by directly transforming the lover into a persecutor: there was no sign of the influence of a woman, no trace of a struggle against a homosexual attachment.

¹ [See Part III of Freud's Schreber analysis (1911c).]

In these circumstances the simplest thing would have been to abandon the theory that the delusion of persecution invariably depends on homosexuality, and at the same time to abandon everything that followed from that theory. Either the theory must be given up or else, in view of this departure from our expectations, we must side with the lawyer and assume that this was no paranoic combination but an actual experience which had been correctly interpreted. But I saw another way out, by which a final verdict could for the moment be postponed. I recollected how often wrong views have been taken about people who are ill psychically, simply because the physician has not studied them thoroughly enough and has thus not learnt enough about them. I therefore said that I could not form an immediate opinion, and asked the patient to call on me a second time, when she could relate her story again at greater length and add any subsidiary details that might have been omitted. Thanks to the lawyer's influence I secured this promise from the reluctant patient; and he helped me in another way by saying that at our second meeting his presence would be unnecessary.

The story told me by the patient on this second occasion did not conflict with the previous one, but the additional details she supplied resolved all doubts and difficulties. To begin with, she had visited the young man in his rooms not once but twice. It was on the second occasion that she had been disturbed by the suspicious noise: in her original story she had suppressed, or omitted to mention, the first visit because it had no longer seemed of importance to her. Nothing noteworthy had happened during this first visit, but something did happen on the day after it. Her department in the business was under the direction of an elderly lady whom she described as follows: 'She has white hair like my mother.' This elderly superior had a great liking for her and treated her with affection, though sometimes she teased her; the girl regarded herself as her particular favourite. On the day after her first visit to the young man's rooms he appeared in the office to discuss some business matter with this elderly lady. While they were talking in low voices the patient suddenly felt convinced that he was telling her about their adventure of the previous day—indeed, that the two of them had for some time been having a love-affair, which she had hitherto overlooked. The white-haired motherly old lady now knew everything, and her speech and conduct in the course

of the day confirmed the patient's suspicion. At the first opportunity she took her lover to task about his betrayal. He naturally protested vigorously against what he called a senseless accusation. For the time being, in fact, he succeeded in freeing her from her delusion, and she regained enough confidence to repeat her visit to his rooms a short time—I believe it was a few weeks—afterwards. The rest we know already from her first narrative.

In the first place, this new information removes any doubts as to the pathological nature of her suspicion. It is easy to see that the white-haired elderly superior was a substitute for her mother, that in spite of his youth her lover had been put in the place of her father, and that it was the strength of her mother-complex which had driven the patient to suspect a love-relationship between these ill-matched partners, however unlikely such a relation might be. Moreover, this disposes of the apparent contradiction to the expectation, based on psycho-analytic theory, that the development of a delusion of persecution will turn out to be determined by an over-powerful homosexual attachment. The *original* persecutor—the agency whose influence the patient wishes to escape—is here again not a man but a woman. The superior knew about the girl's love affairs, disapproved of them, and showed her disapproval by mysterious hints. The patient's attachment to her own sex opposed her attempts to adopt a person of the other sex as a love-object. Her love for her mother had become the spokesman of all those tendencies which, playing the part of a 'conscience', seek to arrest a girl's first step along the new road to normal sexual satisfaction—in many respects a dangerous one; and indeed it succeeded in disturbing her relation with men.

When a mother hinders or arrests a daughter's sexual activity, she is fulfilling a normal function whose lines are laid down by events in childhood, which has powerful, unconscious motives, and has received the sanction of society. It is the daughter's business to emancipate herself from this influence and to decide for herself on broad and rational grounds what her share of enjoyment or denial of sexual pleasure shall be. If in the attempt to emancipate herself she falls a victim to a neurosis it implies the presence of a mother-complex which is as a rule over-powerful, and is certainly unmastered. The conflict between this complex and the new direction taken by the libido

is dealt with in the form of one neurosis or another, according to the subject's disposition. The manifestation of the neurotic reaction will always be determined, however, not by her present-day relation to her actual mother but by her infantile relations to her earliest image of her mother.

We know that our patient had been fatherless for many years: we may also assume that she would not have kept away from men up to the age of thirty if she had not been supported by a powerful emotional attachment to her mother. This support became a heavy yoke when her libido began to turn to a man in response to his insistent wooing. She tried to free herself, to throw off her homosexual attachment; and her disposition, which need not be discussed here, enabled this to occur in the form of a paranoid delusion. The mother thus became the hostile and malevolent watcher and persecutor. As such she could have been overcome, had it not been that the mother-complex retained power enough to carry out its purpose of keeping the patient at a distance from men. Thus, at the end of the first phase of the conflict the patient had become estranged from her mother without having definitely gone over to the man. Indeed, both of them were plotting against her. Then the man's vigorous efforts succeeded in drawing her decisively to him. She conquered her mother's opposition in her mind and was willing to grant her lover a second meeting. In the later developments the mother did not reappear, but we may safely insist that in this [first] phase the lover had not become the persecutor directly but *via* the mother and in virtue of his relationship to the mother, who had played the leading part in the first delusion.

One would think that the resistance was now definitely overcome, that the girl who until now had been bound to her mother had succeeded in coming to love a man. But after the second visit a new delusion appeared, which, by making ingenious use of some accidental circumstances, destroyed this love and thus successfully carried through the purpose of the mother-complex. It still seems strange that a woman should protect herself against loving a man by means of a paranoid delusion; but before examining this state of things more closely, let us glance at the accidental circumstances that formed the basis of this second delusion, the one aimed exclusively against the man.

Lying partly undressed on the sofa beside her lover, she heard a noise like a click or beat. She did not know its cause, but she

arrived at an interpretation of it after meeting two men on the staircase, one of whom was carrying something that looked like a covered box. She became convinced that someone acting on instructions from her lover had watched and photographed her during their intimate *tête-à-tête*. I do not for a moment imagine, of course, that if the unlucky noise had not occurred the delusion would not have been formed; on the contrary, something inevitable is to be seen behind this accidental circumstance, something which was bound to assert itself compulsively in the patient, just as when she supposed that there was a *liaison* between her lover and the elderly superior, her mother-substitute. Among the store of unconscious phantasies of all neurotics, and probably of all human beings, there is one which is seldom absent and which can be disclosed by analysis: this is the phantasy of watching sexual intercourse between the parents. I call such phantasies—of the observation of sexual intercourse between the parents, of seduction, of castration, and others—‘primal phantasies’; and I shall discuss in detail elsewhere their origin and their relation to individual experience.¹ The accidental noise was thus merely playing the part of a provoking factor which activated the typical phantasy of overhearing which is a component of the parental complex. Indeed, it is doubtful whether we can rightly call the noise ‘accidental’. As Otto Rank has remarked to me, such noises are on the contrary an indispensable part of the phantasy of listening, and they reproduce either the sounds which betray parental intercourse or those by which the listening child fears to betray itself. But now we know at once where we stand. The patient’s lover was still her father, but she herself had taken her mother’s place. The part of the listener had then to be allotted to a third person. We can see by what means the girl had freed herself from her homosexual dependence on her mother. It was by means of a small piece of regression: instead of choosing her mother as a love-object, she identified herself with her—she herself *became* her mother. The possibility of this regression points to the narcissistic origin of her homosexual object-choice and thus to the paranoic disposition in her.² One

¹ [The subject of ‘primal phantasies’ is discussed at length in Lecture XXIII of Freud’s *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17) and in his case history of the ‘Wolf Man’ (1918b), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 59–60 and 97.]

² [Cf. the similar regression from object-love to identification described in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917e), p. 250 above.]

might sketch a train of thought which would bring about the same result as this identification: 'If my mother does it, I may do it too; I've just as good a right as she has.'

One can go a step further in disproving the accidental nature of the noise. We do not, however, ask our readers to follow us, since the absence of any deeper analytic investigation makes it impossible in this case to go beyond a certain degree of probability. The patient mentioned in her first interview with me that she had immediately demanded an explanation of the noise, and had been told that it was probably the ticking of the small clock on the writing-desk. I venture, however, to explain what she told me as a mistaken memory. It seems to me much more likely that at first she did not react to the noise at all, and that it became significant only after she met the two men on the staircase. Her lover, who had probably not even heard the noise, may have tried, perhaps on some later occasion when she assailed him with her suspicions, to account for it in this way: 'I don't know what noise you can have heard. Perhaps it was the small clock; it sometimes ticks like that.' This deferred use of impressions and this displacement of recollections often occur precisely in paranoia and are characteristic of it. But as I never met the man and could not continue the analysis of the woman, my hypothesis cannot be proved.

I might go still further in the analysis of this ostensibly real 'accident'. I do not believe that the clock ever ticked or that there was any noise to be heard at all. The woman's situation justified a sensation of a knock or beat in her clitoris. And it was this that she subsequently projected as a perception of an external object. Just the same sort of thing can occur in dreams. A hysterical woman patient of mine once related to me a short arousal dream to which she could bring no spontaneous associations. She dreamt simply that someone knocked and then she awoke. Nobody had knocked at the door, but during the previous nights she had been awakened by distressing sensations of pollutions: she thus had a motive for awakening as soon as she felt the first sign of genital excitation. There had been a 'knock' in her clitoris.¹ In the case of our paranoic patient, I should substitute for the accidental noise a similar process of projection. I certainly cannot guarantee that in the course of our short

¹ [Cf. a similar instance in Lecture XVII of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17).]

acquaintance the patient, who was reluctantly yielding to compulsion, gave me a truthful account of all that had taken place during the two meetings of the lovers. But an isolated contraction of the clitoris would be in keeping with her statement that no contact of the genitals had taken place. In her subsequent rejection of the man, lack of satisfaction undoubtedly played a part as well as 'conscience'.

Let us consider again the outstanding fact that the patient protected herself against her love for a man by means of a paranoic delusion. The key to the understanding of this is to be found in the history of the development of the delusion. As we might have expected, the latter was at first aimed against the woman. But now, *on this paranoic basis, the advance from a female to a male object was accomplished*. Such an advance is unusual in paranoia; as a rule we find that the victim of persecution remains fixated to the same persons, and therefore to the same sex to which his love-objects belonged before the paranoic transformation took place. But neurotic disorder does not preclude an advance of this kind, and our observation may be typical of many others. There are many similar processes occurring outside paranoia which have not yet been looked at from this point of view, amongst them some which are very familiar. For instance, the so-called neurasthenic's unconscious attachment to incestuous love-objects prevents him from choosing a strange woman as his object and restricts his sexual activity to phantasy. But within the limits of phantasy he achieves the progress which is denied him, and he succeeds in replacing mother and sister by extraneous objects. Since the veto of the censorship does not come into action with these objects, he can become conscious in his phantasies of his choice of these substitute-figures.

These then are phenomena of an attempted advance from the new ground which has as a rule been regressively acquired; and we may set alongside them the efforts made in some neuroses to regain a position of the libido which was once held and subsequently lost. Indeed we can hardly draw any conceptual distinction between these two classes of phenomena. We are too apt to think that the conflict underlying a neurosis is brought to an end when the symptom has been formed. In reality the struggle can go on in many ways after this. Fresh instinctual components arise on both sides, and these prolong it. The

symptom itself becomes an object of this struggle; certain trends anxious to preserve it conflict with others which strive to remove it and to re-establish the *status quo ante*. Methods are often sought of rendering the symptom nugatory by trying to regain along other lines of approach what has been lost and is now withheld by the symptom. These facts throw much light on a statement made by C. G. Jung to the effect that a peculiar 'psychical inertia', which opposes change and progress, is the fundamental precondition of neurosis. This inertia is indeed most peculiar; it is not a general one, but is highly specialized; it is not even all-powerful within its own field, but fights against tendencies towards progress and recovery which remain active even after the formation of neurotic symptoms. If we search for the starting-point of this special inertia, we discover that it is the manifestation of very early linkages—linkages which it is hard to resolve—between instincts and impressions and the objects involved in those impressions. These linkages have the effect of bringing the development of the instincts concerned to a standstill. Or in other words, this specialized 'psychical inertia' is only a different term, though hardly a better one, for what in psycho-analysis we are accustomed to call a 'fixation'.¹

¹ [This tendency to fixation, or, as he called it elsewhere, 'adhesiveness of the libido', had been alluded to by Freud in the first edition of his *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 242–3. It was further discussed by him towards the end of his case history of the 'Wolf Man' (1918b), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 115–16, and in Lecture XXII of his *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17), both of which works were more or less contemporary with the present paper. He returned to it much later, in Section VI of his 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937c), where he himself made use of the term 'psychical inertia', and where he related the phenomenon to the 'resistance of the id' which is met with in psycho-analytic treatment, and which, in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926d), Chapter XI, Section A(a), he had attributed to the power of the compulsion to repeat. A last allusion to 'psychical inertia' occurs near the end of Chapter VI of his posthumously published *Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1940a [1938]).]

THOUGHTS FOR THE TIMES ON
WAR AND DEATH
(1915)

ZEITGEMÄSSES ÜBER KRIEG UND TOD

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1915 *Imago*, 4 (1), 1-21.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 486-520. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 10, 315-346.
1924 Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Pp. 35.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 324-355.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

Reflections on War and Death

- 1918 New York: Moffat, Yard. Pp. iii + 72. (Tr. A. A. Brill and A. B. Kuttner.)
"Thoughts for the Times on War and Death"
1925 *C.P.*, 4, 288-317. (Tr. E. C. Mayne.)

The present translation is based on the one published in 1925.

These two essays were written round about March and April, 1915, some six months after the outbreak of the first World War, and express some of Freud's considered views on it. His more personal reactions will be found described in Chapter VII of Ernest Jones's second volume (1955). A letter written by him to a Dutch acquaintance, Dr. Frederik van Eeden, was published a short time before the present work: it appears as an appendix below, p. 301. Towards the end of the same year, 1915, Freud wrote another essay on an analogous theme, 'On Transience', which will also be found below (p. 305). Many years later he returned to the subject once more in his open letter to Einstein, *Why War?* (1935b). The second of the present two essays—on death—seems to have been first read by Freud at a meeting, early in April, 1915, of the B'nai B'rith, the Jewish club in Vienna to which he belonged for a large part of his life. (Cf. 1941e.) This essay is, of course, to a great extent based on the same material as Section II of *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13).

Extracts from the translation of this work published in 1925 were included in Rickman's *Civilization, War and Death, Selections from Three Works by Sigmund Freud* (1939, 1-25).

THOUGHTS FOR THE TIMES ON WAR AND DEATH

I

THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE WAR

IN the confusion of wartime in which we are caught up, relying as we must on one-sided information, standing too close to the great changes that have already taken place or are beginning to, and without a glimmering of the future that is being shaped, we ourselves are at a loss as to the significance of the impressions which press in upon us and as to the value of the judgements which we form. We cannot but feel that no event has ever destroyed so much that is precious in the common possessions of humanity, confused so many of the clearest intelligences, or so thoroughly debased what is highest. Science herself has lost her passionless impartiality; her deeply embittered servants seek for weapons from her with which to contribute towards the struggle with the enemy. Anthropologists feel driven to declare him inferior and degenerate, psychiatrists issue a diagnosis of his disease of mind or spirit. Probably, however, our sense of these immediate evils is disproportionately strong, and we are not entitled to compare them with the evils of other times which we have not experienced.

The individual who is not himself a combatant—and so a cog in the gigantic machine of war—feels bewildered in his orientation, and inhibited in his powers and activities. I believe that he will welcome any indication, however slight, which will make it easier for him to find his bearings within himself at least. I propose to pick out two among the factors which are responsible for the mental distress felt by non-combatants, against which it is such a heavy task to struggle, and to treat of them here: the disillusionment which this war has evoked, and the altered attitude towards death which this—like every other war—forces upon us.

When I speak of disillusionment, everyone will know at once what I mean. One need not be a sentimentalist; one may

perceive the biological and psychological necessity for suffering in the economy of human life, and yet condemn war both in its means and ends and long for the cessation of all wars. We have told ourselves, no doubt, that wars can never cease so long as nations live under such widely differing conditions, so long as the value of individual life is so variously assessed among them, and so long as the animosities which divide them represent such powerful motive forces in the mind. We were prepared to find that wars between the primitive and the civilized peoples, between the races who are divided by the colour of their skin—wars, even, against and among the nationalities of Europe whose civilization is little developed or has been lost—would occupy mankind for some time to come. But we permitted ourselves to have other hopes. We had expected the great world-dominating nations of white race upon whom the leadership of the human species has fallen, who were known to have world-wide interests as their concern, to whose creative powers were due not only our technical advances towards the control of nature but the artistic and scientific standards of civilization—we had expected these peoples to succeed in discovering another way of settling misunderstandings and conflicts of interest. Within each of these nations high norms of moral conduct were laid down for the individual, to which his manner of life was bound to conform if he desired to take part in a civilized community. These ordinances, often too stringent, demanded a great deal of him—much self-restraint, much renunciation of instinctual satisfaction. He was above all forbidden to make use of the immense advantages to be gained by the practice of lying and deception in the competition with his fellow-men. The civilized states regarded these moral standards as the basis of their existence. They took serious steps if anyone ventured to tamper with them, and often declared it improper even to subject them to examination by a critical intelligence. It was to be assumed, therefore, that the state itself would respect them, and would not think of undertaking anything against them which would contradict the basis of its own existence. Observation showed, to be sure, that embedded in these civilized states there were remnants of certain other peoples, which were universally unpopular and had therefore been only reluctantly, and even so not fully, admitted to participation in the common work of civilization, for which they had shown themselves suitable enough. But the great nations

themselves, it might have been supposed, would have acquired so much comprehension of what they had in common, and so much tolerance for their differences, that 'foreigner' and 'enemy' could no longer be merged, as they still were in classical antiquity, into a single concept.

Relying on this unity among the civilized peoples, countless men and women have exchanged their native home for a foreign one, and made their existence dependent on the intercommunications between friendly nations. Moreover anyone who was not by stress of circumstance confined to one spot could create for himself out of all the advantages and attractions of these civilized countries a new and wider fatherland, in which he could move about without hindrance or suspicion. In this way he enjoyed the blue sea and the grey; the beauty of snow-covered mountains and of green meadow lands; the magic of northern forests and the splendour of southern vegetation; the mood evoked by landscapes that recall great historical events, and the silence of untouched nature. This new fatherland was a museum for him, too, filled with all the treasures which the artists of civilized humanity had in the successive centuries created and left behind. As he wandered from one gallery to another in this museum, he could recognize with impartial appreciation what varied types of perfection a mixture of blood, the course of history, and the special quality of their mother-earth had produced among his compatriots in this wider sense. Here he would find cool, inflexible energy developed to the highest point; there, the graceful art of beautifying existence; elsewhere, the feeling for orderliness and law, or others among the qualities which have made mankind the lords of the earth.

Nor must we forget that each of these citizens of the civilized world had created for himself a 'Parnassus' and a 'School of Athens' of his own.¹ From among the great thinkers, writers and artists of all nations he had chosen those to whom he considered he owed the best of what he had been able to achieve in enjoyment and understanding of life, and he had venerated them along with the immortal ancients as well as with the familiar

¹ [Two of the famous frescoes by Raphael in the Papal Apartments of the Vatican. One of them represents a group of the world's great poets and the other a similar group of scholars. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 314, Freud uses the same two paintings as a parallel to one of the techniques employed by the dream-work.]

masters of his own tongue. None of these great men had seemed to him foreign because they spoke another language—neither the incomparable explorer of human passions, nor the intoxicated worshipper of beauty, nor the powerful and menacing prophet, nor the subtle satirist; and he never reproached himself on that account for being a renegade towards his own nation and his beloved mother-tongue.

The enjoyment of this common civilization was disturbed from time to time by warning voices, which declared that old traditional differences made wars inevitable, even among the members of a community such as this. We refused to believe it; but if such a war were to happen, how did we picture it? We saw it as an opportunity for demonstrating the progress of comity among men since the era when the Greek Amphictyonic Council proclaimed that no city of the league might be destroyed, nor its olive-groves cut down, nor its water-supply stopped; we pictured it as a chivalrous passage of arms, which would limit itself to establishing the superiority of one side in the struggle, while as far as possible avoiding acute suffering that could contribute nothing to the decision, and granting complete immunity for the wounded who had to withdraw from the contest, as well as for the doctors and nurses who devoted themselves to their recovery. There would, of course, be the utmost consideration for the non-combatant classes of the population—for women who take no part in war-work, and for the children who, when they are grown up, should become on both sides one another's friends and helpers. And again, all the international undertakings and institutions in which the common civilization of peace-time had been embodied would be maintained.

Even a war like this would have produced enough horror and suffering; but it would not have interrupted the development of ethical relations between the collective individuals of mankind—the peoples and states.

Then the war in which we had refused to believe broke out, and it brought—disillusionment. Not only is it more bloody and more destructive than any war of other days, because of the enormously increased perfection of weapons of attack and defence; it is at least as cruel, as embittered, as implacable as any that has preceded it. It disregards all the restrictions known as International Law, which in peace-time the states had

bound themselves to observe; it ignores the prerogatives of the wounded and the medical service, the distinction between civil and military sections of the population, the claims of private property. It tramples in blind fury on all that comes in its way, as though there were to be no future and no peace among men after it is over. It cuts all the common bonds between the contending peoples, and threatens to leave a legacy of embitterment that will make any renewal of those bonds impossible for a long time to come.

Moreover, it has brought to light an almost incredible phenomenon: the civilized nations know and understand one another so little that one can turn against the other with hate and loathing. Indeed, one of the great civilized nations is so universally unpopular that the attempt can actually be made to exclude it from the civilized community as 'barbaric', although it has long proved its fitness by the magnificent contributions to that community which it has made.¹ We live in hopes that the pages of an impartial history will prove that that nation, in whose language we write and for whose victory our dear ones are fighting, has been precisely the one which has least transgressed the laws of civilization. But at such a time who dares to set himself up as judge in his own cause?

Peoples are more or less represented by the states which they form, and these states by the governments which rule them. The individual citizen can with horror convince himself in this war of what would occasionally cross his mind in peace-time—that the state has forbidden to the individual the practice of wrongdoing, not because it desires to abolish it, but because it desires to monopolize it, like salt and tobacco. A belligerent state permits itself every such misdeed, every such act of violence, as would disgrace the individual. It makes use against the enemy not only of the accepted *ruses de guerre*, but of deliberate lying and deception as well—and to a degree which seems to exceed the usage of former wars. The state exacts the utmost degree of obedience and sacrifice from its citizens, but at the same time it treats them like children by an excess of secrecy and a censorship upon news and expressions of opinion which leaves the spirits of those whose intellects it thus suppresses defenceless against every unfavourable turn of events and every sinister rumour. It

¹ [Cf. a reference back to this at the end of the fourth paragraph of Chapter V of Freud's *Autobiographical Study* (1925d).]

absolves itself from the guarantees and treaties by which it was bound to other states, and confesses shamelessly to its own rapacity and lust for power, which the private individual has then to sanction in the name of patriotism.

It should not be objected that the state cannot refrain from wrong-doing, since that would place it at a disadvantage. It is no less disadvantageous, as a general rule, for the individual man to conform to the standards of morality and refrain from brutal and arbitrary conduct; and the state seldom proves able to indemnify him for the sacrifices it exacts. Nor should it be a matter for surprise that this relaxation of all the moral ties between the collective individuals of mankind should have had repercussions on the morality of individuals; for our conscience is not the inflexible judge that ethical teachers declare it, but in its origin is 'social anxiety' and nothing else.¹ When the community no longer raises objections, there is an end, too, to the suppression of evil passions, and men perpetrate deeds of cruelty, fraud, treachery and barbarity so incompatible with their level of civilization that one would have thought them impossible.

Well may the citizen of the civilized world of whom I have spoken stand helpless in a world that has grown strange to him—his great fatherland disintegrated, its common estates laid waste, his fellow-citizens divided and debased!

There is something to be said, however, in criticism of his disappointment. Strictly speaking it is not justified, for it consists in the destruction of an illusion. We welcome illusions because they spare us unpleasurable feelings, and enable us to enjoy satisfactions instead. We must not complain, then, if now and again they come into collision with some portion of reality, and are shattered against it.

Two things in this war have aroused our sense of disillusionment: the low morality shown externally by states which in their internal relations pose as the guardians of moral standards, and the brutality shown by individuals whom, as participants in the highest human civilization, one would not have thought capable of such behaviour.

Let us begin with the second point and try to formulate, in a few brief words, the point of view that we wish to criticize. How,

¹ [Freud had already given a less simplified view of the nature of conscience in his paper on narcissism (1914*c*). See above, p. 95.]

in point of fact, do we imagine the process by which an individual rises to a comparatively high plane of morality? The first answer will no doubt simply be that he is virtuous and noble from birth—from the very start. We shall not consider this view any further here. A second answer will suggest that we are concerned with a developmental process, and will probably assume that the development consists in eradicating his evil human tendencies and, under the influence of education and a civilized environment, replacing them by good ones. If so, it is nevertheless surprising that evil should re-emerge with such force in anyone who has been brought up in this way.

But this answer also contains the thesis which we propose to contradict. In reality, there is no such thing as 'eradicating' evil. Psychological—or, more strictly speaking, psycho-analytic—investigation shows instead that the deepest essence of human nature consists of instinctual impulses which are of an elementary nature, which are similar in all men and which aim at the satisfaction of certain primal needs. These impulses in themselves are neither good nor bad. We classify them and their expressions in that way, according to their relation to the needs and demands of the human community. It must be granted that all the impulses which society condemns as evil—let us take as representative the selfish and the cruel ones—are of this primitive kind.

These primitive impulses undergo a lengthy process of development before they are allowed to become active in the adult. They are inhibited, directed towards other aims and fields, become commingled, alter their objects, and are to some extent turned back upon their possessor. Reaction-formations against certain instincts take the deceptive form of a change in their content, as though egoism had changed into altruism, or cruelty into pity.¹ These reaction-formations are facilitated by the circumstance that some instinctual impulses make their appearance almost from the first in pairs of opposites—a very remarkable phenomenon, and one strange to the lay public, which is termed 'ambivalence of feeling'. The most easily observed and comprehensible instance of this is the fact that intense love and intense hatred are so often to be found together in the same person. Psycho-analysis adds that the two opposed feelings not infrequently have the same person for their object.

¹ [Cf. 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), p. 129 above.]

It is not until all these 'instinctual vicissitudes' have been surmounted that what we call a person's character is formed, and this, as we know, can only very inadequately be classified as 'good' or 'bad'. A human being is seldom altogether good or bad; he is usually 'good' in one relation and 'bad' in another, or 'good' in certain external circumstances and in others decidedly 'bad'. It is interesting to find that the pre-existence of strong 'bad' impulses in infancy is often the actual condition for an unmistakable inclination towards 'good' in the adult. Those who as children have been the most pronounced egoists may well become the most helpful and self-sacrificing members of the community; most of our sentimentalists, friends of humanity and protectors of animals have been evolved from little sadists and animal-tormentors.

The transformation of 'bad' instincts is brought about by two factors working in the same direction, an internal and an external one. The internal factor consists in the influence exercised on the bad (let us say, the egoistic) instincts by eroticism—that is, by the human need for love, taken in its widest sense. By the admixture of *erotic* components the egoistic instincts are transformed into *social* ones. We learn to value being loved as an advantage for which we are willing to sacrifice other advantages. The external factor is the force exercised by upbringing, which represents the claims of our cultural environment, and this is continued later by the direct pressure of that environment. Civilization has been attained through the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction, and it demands the same renunciation from each newcomer in turn. Throughout an individual's life there is a constant replacement of external by internal compulsion. The influences of civilization cause an ever-increasing transformation of egoistic trends into altruistic and social ones by an admixture of erotic elements. In the last resort it may be assumed that every internal compulsion which makes itself felt in the development of human beings was originally—that is, in the *history of mankind*—only an external one. Those who are born to-day bring with them as an inherited organization some degree of tendency (disposition) towards the transformation of egoistic into social instincts, and this disposition is easily stimulated into bringing about that result. A further portion of this instinctual transformation has to be accomplished during the life of the individual himself. So the

human being is subject not only to the pressure of his immediate cultural environment, but also to the influence of the cultural history of his ancestors.

If we give the name of 'susceptibility to culture' to a man's personal capacity for the transformation of the egoistic impulses under the influence of erotism, we may further affirm that this susceptibility is made up of two parts, one innate and the other acquired in the course of life, and that the relation of the two to each other and to that portion of the instinctual life which remains untransformed is a very variable one.

Generally speaking, we are apt to attach too much importance to the innate part, and in addition to this we run the risk of over-estimating the total susceptibility to culture in comparison with the portion of instinctual life which has remained primitive—that is, we are misled into regarding men as 'better' than they actually are. For there is yet another element which obscures our judgement and falsifies the issue in a favourable sense.

The instinctual impulses of other people are of course hidden from our observation. We infer them from their actions and behaviour, which we trace back to *motives* arising from their instinctual life. Such an inference is bound to be erroneous in many cases. This or that action which is 'good' from the cultural point of view may in one instance originate from a 'noble' motive, in another not. Ethical theorists class as 'good' actions only those which are the outcome of good impulses; to the others they refuse recognition. But society, which is practical in its aims, is not on the whole troubled by this distinction; it is content if a man regulates his behaviour and actions by the precepts of civilization, and is little concerned with his motives.

We have learned that the *external compulsion* exercised on a human being by his upbringing and environment produces a further transformation towards good in his instinctual life—a further turning from egoism towards altruism. But this is not the regular or necessary effect of the external compulsion. Upbringing and environment not only offer benefits in the way of love, but also employ other kinds of incentive, namely, rewards and punishments. In this way their effect may turn out to be that a person who is subjected to their influence will choose to behave well in the cultural sense of the phrase, although no ennoblement of instinct, no transformation of egoistic into

altruistic inclinations, has taken place in him. The result will, roughly speaking, be the same; only a particular concatenation of circumstances will reveal that one man always acts in a good way because his instinctual inclinations compel him to, and the other is good only in so far and for so long as such cultural behaviour is advantageous for his own selfish purposes. But superficial acquaintance with an individual will not enable us to distinguish between the two cases, and we are certainly misled by our optimism into grossly exaggerating the number of human beings who have been transformed in a cultural sense.

Civilized society, which demands good conduct and does not trouble itself about the instinctual basis of this conduct, has thus won over to obedience a great many people who are not in this following their own natures. Encouraged by this success, society has allowed itself to be misled into tightening the moral standard to the greatest possible degree, and it has thus forced its members into a yet greater estrangement from their instinctual disposition. They are consequently subject to an unceasing suppression of instinct, and the resulting tension betrays itself in the most remarkable phenomena of reaction and compensation. In the domain of sexuality, where such suppression is most difficult to carry out, the result is seen in the reactive phenomena of neurotic disorders. Elsewhere the pressure of civilization brings in its train no pathological results, it is true, but is shown in malformations of character, and in the perpetual readiness of the inhibited instincts to break through to satisfaction at any suitable opportunity. Anyone thus compelled to act continually in accordance with precepts which are not the expression of his instinctual inclinations, is living, psychologically speaking, beyond his means, and may objectively be described as a hypocrite, whether he is clearly aware of the incongruity or not. It is undeniable that our contemporary civilization favours the production of this form of hypocrisy to an extraordinary extent. One might venture to say that it is built up on such hypocrisy, and that it would have to submit to far-reaching modifications if people were to undertake to live in accordance with psychological truth. Thus there are very many more cultural hypocrites than truly civilized men—indeed, it is a debatable point whether a certain degree of cultural hypocrisy is not indispensable for the maintenance of civilization, because the susceptibility to culture which has hitherto been organized

in the minds of present-day men would perhaps not prove sufficient for the task. On the other hand, the maintenance of civilization even on so dubious a basis offers the prospect of paving the way in each new generation for a more far-reaching transformation of instinct which shall be the vehicle of a better civilization.

We may already derive one consolation from this discussion: our mortification and our painful disillusionment on account of the uncivilized behaviour of our fellow-citizens of the world during this war were unjustified. They were based on an illusion to which we had given way. In reality our fellow-citizens have not sunk so low as we feared, because they had never risen so high as we believed. The fact that the collective individuals of mankind, the peoples and states, mutually abrogated their moral restraints naturally prompted these individual citizens to withdraw for a while from the constant pressure of civilization and to grant a temporary satisfaction to the instincts which they had been holding in check. This probably involved no breach in their relative morality within their own nations.

We may, however, obtain a deeper insight than this into the change brought about by the war in our former compatriots, and at the same time receive a warning against doing them an injustice. For the development of the mind shows a peculiarity which is present in no other developmental process. When a village grows into a town or a child into a man, the village and the child become lost in the town and the man. Memory alone can trace the old features in the new picture; and in fact the old materials or forms have been got rid of and replaced by new ones. It is otherwise with the development of the mind. Here one can describe the state of affairs, which has nothing to compare with it, only by saying that in this case every earlier stage of development persists alongside the later stage which has arisen from it; here succession also involves co-existence, although it is to the same materials that the whole series of transformations has applied. The earlier mental state may not have manifested itself for years, but none the less it is so far present that it may at any time again become the mode of expression of the forces in the mind, and indeed the only one, as though all later developments had been annulled or undone. This extraordinary plasticity of mental developments is not unrestricted as regards direction; it may be described as a

special capacity for involution—for regression—since it may well happen that a later and higher stage of development, once abandoned, cannot be reached again. But the primitive stages can always be re-established; the primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable.

What are called mental diseases inevitably produce an impression in the layman that intellectual and mental life have been destroyed. In reality, the destruction only applies to later acquisitions and developments. The essence of mental disease lies in a return to earlier states of affective life and of functioning. An excellent example of the plasticity of mental life is afforded by the state of sleep, which is our goal every night. Since we have learnt to interpret even absurd and confused dreams, we know that whenever we go to sleep we throw off our hard-won morality like a garment, and put it on again next morning. This stripping of ourselves is not, of course, dangerous, because we are paralysed, condemned to inactivity, by the state of sleep. It is only dreams that can tell us about the regression of our emotional life to one of the earliest stages of development. For instance, it is noteworthy that all our dreams are governed by purely egoistic motives.¹ One of my English friends put forward this thesis at a scientific meeting in America, whereupon a lady who was present remarked that that might be the case in Austria, but she could assert as regards herself and her friends that *they* were altruistic even in their dreams. My friend, although himself of English race, was obliged to contradict the lady emphatically on the ground of his personal experience in dream-analysis, and to declare that in their dreams high-minded American ladies were quite as egoistic as the Austrians.

Thus the transformation of instinct, on which our susceptibility to culture is based, may also be permanently or temporarily undone by the impacts of life. The influences of war are undoubtedly among the forces that can bring about such involution; so we need not deny susceptibility to culture to all who are at the present time behaving in an uncivilized way, and we may anticipate that the ennoblement of their instincts will be restored in more peaceful times.

¹ [Freud later qualified this view in an addition made in 1925 to a footnote to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Standard Ed., 4, 270-1) where he also tells the anecdote which follows. The 'English friend', as is there made plain, was Dr. Ernest Jones.]

There is, however, another symptom in our fellow-citizens of the world which has perhaps astonished and shocked us no less than the descent from their ethical heights which has given us so much pain. What I have in mind is the want of insight shown by the best intellects, their obduracy, their inaccessibility to the most forcible arguments and their uncritical credulity towards the most disputable assertions. This indeed presents a lamentable picture, and I wish to say emphatically that in this I am by no means a blind partisan who finds all the intellectual shortcomings on one side. But this phenomenon is much easier to account for and much less disquieting than the one we have just considered. Students of human nature and philosophers have long taught us that we are mistaken in regarding our intelligence as an independent force and in overlooking its dependence on emotional life. Our intellect, they teach us, can function reliably only when it is removed from the influences of strong emotional impulses; otherwise it behaves merely as an instrument of the will and delivers the inference which the will requires. Thus, in their view, logical arguments are impotent against affective interests, and that is why disputes backed by reasons, which in Falstaff's phrase are 'as plenty as blackberries',¹ are so unfruitful in the world of interests. Psycho-analytic experience has, if possible, further confirmed this statement. It can show every day that the shrewdest people will all of a sudden behave without insight, like imbeciles, as soon as the necessary insight is confronted by an emotional resistance, but that they will completely regain their understanding once that resistance has been overcome. The logical bedazzlement which this war has conjured up in our fellow-citizens, many of them the best of their kind, is therefore a secondary phenomenon, a consequence of emotional excitement, and is bound, we may hope, to disappear with it.

Having in this way once more come to understand our fellow-citizens who are now alienated from us, we shall much more easily endure the disappointment which the nations, the collective individuals of mankind, have caused us, for the demands we make upon these should be far more modest. Perhaps they are recapitulating the course of individual development, and to-day still represent very primitive phases in organization and in the formation of higher unities. It is in agreement with this

¹ [See p. 24 n.]

that the educative factor of an external compulsion towards morality, which we found was so effective in individuals, is as yet barely discernible in them. We had hoped, certainly, that the extensive community of interests established by commerce and production would constitute the germ of such a compulsion, but it would seem that nations still obey their passions far more readily than their interests. Their interests serve them, at most, as *rationalizations* for their passions; they put forward their interests in order to be able to give reasons for satisfying their passions. It is, to be sure, a mystery why the collective individuals should in fact despise, hate and detest one another—every nation against every other—and even in times of peace. I cannot tell why that is so. It is just as though when it becomes a question of a number of people, not to say millions, all individual moral acquisitions are obliterated, and only the most primitive, the oldest, the crudest mental attitudes are left. It may be that only later stages in development will be able to make some change in this regrettable state of affairs. But a little more truthfulness and honesty on all sides—in the relations of men to one another and between them and their rulers—should also smooth the way for this transformation.¹

¹ [The effects of the conflict between civilization and instinctual life (pp. 282–6 above) is a question which Freud discussed many times—from his early ‘“Civilized” Sexual Ethics and Modern Nervous Illness’ (1908d) to his late *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930a).]

II

OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEATH

THE second factor to which I attribute our present sense of estrangement in this once lovely and congenial world is the disturbance that has taken place in the attitude which we have hitherto adopted towards death.

That attitude was far from straightforward. To anyone who listened to us we were of course prepared to maintain that death was the necessary outcome of life, that everyone owes nature a death¹ and must expect to pay the debt—in short, that death was natural, undeniable and unavoidable. In reality, however, we were accustomed to behave as if it were otherwise. We showed an unmistakable tendency to put death on one side, to eliminate it from life. We tried to hush it up; indeed we even have a saying [in German]: ‘to think of something as though it were death’.² That is, as though it were our own death, of course. It is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators. Hence the psycho-analytic school could venture on the assertion that at bottom no one believes in his own death, or, to put the same thing in another way, that in the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortality.

When it comes to someone else’s death, the civilized man will carefully avoid speaking of such a possibility in the hearing of the person under sentence. Children alone disregard this restriction; they unashamedly threaten one another with the possibility of dying, and even go so far as to do the same thing to someone whom they love, as, for instance: ‘Dear Mummy, when you’re dead I’ll do this or that.’ The civilized adult can hardly even entertain the thought of another person’s death

¹ [A reminiscence of Prince Hal’s remark to Falstaff in *I Henry IV*, v, 1: ‘Thou owest God a death.’ This was a favourite misquotation of Freud’s. See, for instance, *The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed.*, 4, 205, and a letter to Fliess of February 6, 1899 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 104), in which he explicitly attributes it to Shakespeare.]

² [I.e. to think something unlikely or incredible.]

without seeming to himself hard-hearted or wicked; unless, of course, as a doctor or lawyer or something of the kind, he has to deal with death professionally. Least of all will he allow himself to think of the other person's death if some gain to himself in freedom, property or position is bound up with it. This sensitiveness of ours does not, of course, prevent the occurrence of deaths; when one does happen, we are always deeply affected, and it is as though we were badly shaken in our expectations. Our habit is to lay stress on the fortuitous causation of the death—accident, disease, infection, advanced age; in this way we betray an effort to reduce death from a necessity to a chance event. A number of simultaneous deaths strikes us as something extremely terrible. Towards the actual person who has died we adopt a special attitude—something almost like admiration for someone who has accomplished a very difficult task. We suspend criticism of him, overlook his possible misdeeds, declare that '*de mortuis nil nisi bonum*', and think it justifiable to set out all that is most favourable to his memory in the funeral oration and upon the tombstone. Consideration for the dead, who, after all, no longer need it, is more important to us than the truth, and certainly, for most of us, than consideration for the living.

The complement to this cultural and conventional attitude towards death is provided by our complete collapse when death has struck down someone whom we love—a parent or a partner in marriage, a brother or sister, a child or a close friend. Our hopes, our desires and our pleasures lie in the grave with him, we will not be consoled, we will not fill the lost one's place. We behave as if we were a kind of Asra, who die when those they love die.¹

But this attitude of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity

¹ [The Asra in Heine's poem ('Der Asra', in *Romanzero*, based on a passage in Stendhal's *De l'amour*) were a tribe of Arabs who 'die when they love'.]

of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralysed by the thought of who is to take the son's place with his mother, the husband's with his wife, the father's with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: '*Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.*' ('It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.')

It is an inevitable result of all this that we should seek in the world of fiction, in literature and in the theatre compensation for what has been lost in life. There we still find people who know how to die—who, indeed, even manage to kill someone else. There alone too the condition can be fulfilled which makes it possible for us to reconcile ourselves with death: namely, that behind all the vicissitudes of life we should still be able to preserve a life intact. For it is really too sad that in life it should be as it is in chess, where one false move may force us to resign the game, but with the difference that we can start no second game, no return-match. In the realm of fiction we find the plurality of lives which we need. We die with the hero with whom we have identified ourselves; yet we survive him, and are ready to die again just as safely with another hero.

It is evident that war is bound to sweep away this conventional treatment of death. Death will no longer be denied; we are forced to believe in it. People really die; and no longer one by one, but many, often tens of thousands, in a single day. And death is no longer a chance event. To be sure, it still seems a matter of chance whether a bullet hits this man or that; but a second bullet may well hit the survivor; and the accumulation of deaths puts an end to the impression of chance. Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content.

Here a distinction should be made between two groups—those who themselves risk their lives in battle, and those who have stayed at home and have only to wait for the loss of one of their dear ones by wounds, disease or infection. It would be most interesting, no doubt, to study the changes in the psychology of the combatants, but I know too little about it. We

must restrict ourselves to the second group, to which we ourselves belong. I have said already that in my opinion the bewilderment and the paralysis of capacity, from which we suffer, are essentially determined among other things by the circumstance that we are unable to maintain our former attitude towards death, and have not yet found a new one. It may assist us to do this if we direct our psychological enquiry towards two other relations to death—the one which we may ascribe to *primaeval*, prehistoric men, and the one which still exists in every one of us, but which conceals itself, invisible to consciousness, in the deeper strata of our mental life.

What the attitude of prehistoric man was towards death is, of course, only known to us by inferences and constructions, but I believe that these methods have furnished us with fairly trustworthy conclusions.

Primaeval man took up a very remarkable attitude towards death. It was far from consistent; it was indeed most contradictory. On the one hand, he took death seriously, recognized it as the termination of life and made use of it in that sense; on the other hand, he also denied death and reduced it to nothing. This contradiction arose from the fact that he took up radically different attitudes towards the death of other people, of strangers, of enemies, and towards his own. He had no objection to someone else's death; it meant the annihilation of someone he hated, and primitive man had no scruples against bringing it about. He was no doubt a very passionate creature and more cruel and more malignant than other animals. He liked to kill, and killed as a matter of course. The instinct which is said to restrain other animals from killing and devouring their own species need not be attributed to him.

Hence the *primaeval* history of mankind is filled with murder. Even to-day, the history of the world which our children learn at school is essentially a series of murders of peoples. The obscure sense of guilt to which mankind has been subject since prehistoric times, and which in some religions has been condensed into the doctrine of primal guilt, of original sin, is probably the outcome of a blood-guilt incurred by prehistoric man. In my book *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13) I have, following clues given by Robertson Smith, Atkinson and Charles Darwin, tried to guess the nature of this primal guilt, and I believe, too, that the Christian doctrine of to-day enables us to deduce it. If

the Son of God was obliged to sacrifice his life to redeem mankind from original sin, then by the law of talion, the requital of like by like, that sin must have been a killing, a murder. Nothing else could call for the sacrifice of a life for its expiation. And the original sin was an offence against God the Father, the primal crime of mankind must have been a parricide, the killing of the primal father of the primitive human horde, whose mnemonic image was later transfigured into a deity.¹

His own death was certainly just as unimaginable and unreal for *primaeval* man as it is for any one of us to-day. But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided and came into conflict with each other; and this case became highly important and productive of far-reaching consequences. It occurred when *primaeval* man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend—whom he undoubtedly loved as we love ours, for love cannot be much younger than the lust to kill. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission; for each of these loved ones was, after all, a part of his own beloved self. But, on the other hand, deaths such as these pleased him as well, since in each of the loved persons there was also something of the stranger. The law of ambivalence of feeling, which to this day governs our emotional relations with those whom we love most, certainly had a very much wider validity in *primaeval* times. Thus these beloved dead had also been enemies and strangers who had aroused in him some degree of hostile feeling.²

Philosophers have declared that the intellectual enigma presented to *primaeval* man by the picture of death forced him to reflection, and thus became the starting-point of all speculation. I believe that here the philosophers are thinking too philosophically, and giving too little consideration to the motives that were primarily operative. I should like therefore to limit and correct their assertion. In my view, *primaeval* man must have triumphed beside the body of his slain enemy, without being led to rack his brains about the enigma of life and death. What released the spirit of enquiry in man was not the intellectual enigma, and not every death, but the conflict of feeling at the death of loved yet alien and hated persons. Of this conflict of

¹ Cf. *Totem and Taboo*, Essay IV [*Standard Ed.*, 13, 146 ff.].

² *Ibid.*, Essay II [*Standard Ed.*, 13, 60 ff.].

feeling psychology was the first offspring. Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead; but he was nevertheless unwilling to acknowledge it, for he could not conceive of himself as dead. So he devised a compromise: he conceded the fact of his own death as well, but denied it the significance of annihilation—a significance which he had had no motive for denying where the death of his enemy was concerned. It was beside the dead body of someone he loved that he invented spirits, and his sense of guilt at the satisfaction mingled with his sorrow turned these new-born spirits into evil demons that had to be dreaded. The [physical] changes brought about by death suggested to him the division of the individual into a body and a soul—originally several souls. In this way his train of thought ran parallel with the process of disintegration which sets in with death. His persisting memory of the dead became the basis for assuming other forms of existence and gave him the conception of a life continuing after apparent death.

These subsequent existences were at first no more than appendages to the existence which death had brought to a close—shadowy, empty of content, and valued at little until later times; they still bore the character of wretched makeshifts. We may recall the answer made to Odysseus by the soul of Achilles:

‘For of old, when thou wast alive, we Argives honoured thee even as the gods, and now that thou art here, thou rulest mightily over the dead. Wherefore grieve not at all that thou art dead, Achilles.’

So I spoke, and he straightway made answer and said: ‘Nay, seek not to speak soothingly to me of death, glorious Odysseus. I should choose, so I might live on earth, to serve as the hireling of another, of some portionless man whose livelihood was but small, rather than to be lord over all the dead that have perished.’¹

Or in Heine’s powerful and bitter parody:

Der kleinste lebendige Philister
Zu Stuckert am Neckar
Viel glücklicher ist er
Als ich, der Pelide, der tote Held,
Der Schattenfürst in der Unterwelt.²

¹ *Odyssey* XI, 484–91. [Trans. A. T. Murray.]

² [Literally: ‘The smallest living Philistine at Stuckert-am-Neckar is far happier than I, the son of Peleus, the dead hero, the shadow-prince in the underworld.’ The closing lines of ‘Der Scheidende’, one of the very last of Heine’s poems.]

It was only later that religions succeeded in representing this after-life as the more desirable, the truly valid one, and in reducing the life which is ended by death to a mere preparation. After this, it was no more than consistent to extend life backwards into the past, to form the notion of earlier existences, of the transmigration of souls and of reincarnation, all with the purpose of depriving death of its meaning as the termination of life. So early did the denial of death, which we have described [p. 290] as a 'conventional and cultural attitude', have its origin.

What came into existence beside the dead body of the loved one was not only the doctrine of the soul, the belief in immortality and a powerful source of man's sense of guilt, but also the earliest ethical commandments. The first and most important prohibition made by the awakening conscience was: 'Thou shalt not kill.' It was acquired in relation to dead people who were loved, as a reaction against the satisfaction of the hatred hidden behind the grief for them; and it was gradually extended to strangers who were not loved, and finally even to enemies.

This final extension of the commandment is no longer experienced by civilized man. When the furious struggle of the present war has been decided, each one of the victorious fighters will return home joyfully to his wife and children, unchecked and undisturbed by thoughts of the enemies he has killed whether at close quarters or at long range. It is worthy of note that the primitive races which still survive in the world, and are undoubtedly closer than we are to *primaeval* man, act differently in this respect, or did until they came under the influence of our civilization. Savages—Australians, Bushmen, Tierra del Fuegians—are far from being remorseless murderers; when they return victorious from the war-path they may not set foot in their villages or touch their wives till they have atoned for the murders they committed in war by penances which are often long and tedious. It is easy, of course, to attribute this to their superstition: the savage still goes in fear of the avenging spirits of the slain. But the spirits of his slain enemy are nothing but the expression of his bad conscience about his blood-guilt; behind this superstition there lies concealed a vein of ethical sensitiveness which has been lost by us civilized men.¹

Pious souls, no doubt, who would like to believe that our nature is remote from any contact with what is evil and base, will

¹ Cf. *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13) [*Standard Ed.*, 13, 66 ff.].

not fail to use the early appearance and the urgency of the prohibition against murder as the basis for gratifying conclusions as to the strength of the ethical impulses which must have been implanted in us. Unfortunately this argument proves even more for the opposite view. So powerful a prohibition can only be directed against an equally powerful impulse. What no human soul desires stands in no need of prohibition;¹ it is excluded automatically. The very emphasis laid on the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' makes it certain that we spring from an endless series of generations of murderers, who had the lust for killing in their blood, as, perhaps, we ourselves have to-day. Mankind's ethical strivings, whose strength and significance we need not in the least depreciate, were acquired in the course of man's history; since then they have become, though unfortunately only in a very variable amount, the inherited property of contemporary men.

Let us now leave *primaeval* man, and turn to the unconscious in our own mental life. Here we depend entirely upon the psycho-analytic method of investigation, the only one which reaches to such depths. What, we ask, is the attitude of our unconscious towards the problem of death? The answer must be: almost exactly the same as that of *primaeval* man. In this respect, as in many others, the man of prehistoric times survives unchanged in our unconscious. Our unconscious, then, does not believe in its own death; it behaves as if it were immortal. What we call our 'unconscious'—the deepest strata of our minds, made up of instinctual impulses—knows nothing that is negative, and no negation; in it contradictories coincide. For that reason it does not know its own death, for to that we can give only a negative content. Thus there is nothing instinctual in us which responds to a belief in death. This may even be the secret of heroism. The rational grounds for heroism rest on a judgement that the subject's own life cannot be so precious as certain abstract and general goods. But more frequent, in my view, is the instinctive and impulsive heroism which knows no such reasons, and flouts danger in the spirit of Anzengruber's *Steinklopferhans*: 'Nothing can happen to me'.² Or

¹ Cf. Frazer's brilliant argument quoted in *Totem and Taboo* [Standard Ed., 13, 123].

² ['Hans the Stone-Breaker'—a character in a comedy by the Viennese dramatist Ludwig Anzengruber (1839–89).]

else those reasons only serve to clear away the hesitations which might hold back the heroic reaction that corresponds to the unconscious. The fear of death, which dominates us oftener than we know, is on the other hand something secondary, and is usually the outcome of a sense of guilt.¹

On the other hand, for strangers and for enemies we do acknowledge death, and consign them to it quite as readily and unhesitatingly as did *primaeval* man. There is, it is true, a distinction here which will be pronounced decisive so far as real life is concerned. Our unconscious does not carry out the killing; it merely thinks it and wishes it. But it would be wrong so completely to undervalue this psychical reality as compared with factual reality. It is significant and momentous enough. In our unconscious impulses we daily and hourly get rid of anyone who stands in our way, of anyone who has offended or injured us. The expression 'Devil take him!', which so often comes to people's lips in joking anger and which really means 'Death take him!', is in our unconscious a serious and powerful death-wish. Indeed, our unconscious will murder even for trifles; like the ancient Athenian code of Draco, it knows no other punishment for crime than death. And this has a certain consistency, for every injury to our almighty and autocratic ego is at bottom a crime of *lèse-majesté*.

And so, if we are to be judged by our unconscious wishful impulses, we ourselves are, like *primaeval* man, a gang of murderers. It is fortunate that all these wishes do not possess the potency that was attributed to them in *primaeval* times;² in the cross-fire of mutual curses mankind would long since have perished, the best and wisest of men and the loveliest and fairest of women with the rest.

Psycho-analysis finds as a rule no credence among laymen for assertions such as these. They reject them as calumnies which are confuted by conscious experience, and they adroitly overlook the faint indications by which even the unconscious is apt to betray itself to consciousness. It is therefore relevant to point out that many thinkers who could not have been influenced by psycho-analysis have quite definitely accused our unspoken

¹ [Fuller discussions of the fear of death will be found in the closing paragraphs of *The Ego and the Id* (1923*b*) and at the end of Chapter VII of *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxieties* (1926*d*).]

² See *Totem and Taboo*, Essay IV [*Standard Ed.*, 13, 85 f.].

thoughts of being ready, heedless of the prohibition against murder, to get rid of anything which stands in our way. From many examples of this I will choose one that has become famous:

In *Le Père Goriot*, Balzac alludes to a passage in the works of J. J. Rousseau where that author asks the reader what he would do if—without leaving Paris and of course without being discovered—he could kill, with great profit to himself, an old mandarin in Peking by a mere act of will. Rousseau implies that he would not give much for the life of that dignitary. '*Tuer son mandarin*' has become a proverbial phrase for this secret readiness, present even in modern man.

There are also a whole number of cynical jokes and anecdotes which reveal the same tendency—such, for instance, as the words attributed to a husband: 'If one of us two dies, I shall move to Paris.'¹ Such cynical jokes would not be possible unless they contained an unacknowledged truth which could not be admitted if it were expressed seriously and without disguise. In jest—it is well known—one may even tell the truth.

Just as for *primaeval* man, so also for our unconscious, there is one case in which the two opposing attitudes towards death, the one which acknowledges it as the annihilation of life and the other which denies it as unreal, collide and come into conflict. This case is the same as in primal ages: the death, or the risk of death, of someone we love, a parent or a partner in marriage, a brother or sister, a child or a dear friend. These loved ones are on the one hand an inner possession, components of our own ego; but on the other hand they are partly strangers, even enemies. With the exception of only a very few situations, there adheres to the tenderest and most intimate of our love-relations a small portion of hostility which can excite an unconscious death-wish. But this conflict due to ambivalence does not now, as it did then, lead to the doctrine of the soul and to ethics, but to neurosis, which affords us deep insight into normal mental life as well. How often have physicians who practise psycho-analysis had to deal with the symptom of an exaggerated worry over the well-being of relatives, or with entirely unfounded self-reproaches after the death of a loved person. The study of

¹ [This is also quoted in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 485.]

such phenomena has left them in no doubt about the extent and importance of unconscious death-wishes.

The layman feels an extraordinary horror at the possibility of such feelings, and takes this aversion as a legitimate ground for disbelief in the assertions of psycho-analysis. Mistakenly, I think. No depreciation of feelings of love is intended, and there is in fact none. It is indeed foreign to our intelligence as well as to our feelings thus to couple love and hate; but Nature, by making use of this pair of opposites, contrives to keep love ever vigilant and fresh, so as to guard it against the hate which lurks behind it. It might be said that we owe the fairest flowerings of our love to the reaction against the hostile impulse which we sense within us.

To sum up: our unconscious is just as inaccessible to the idea of our own death, just as murderously inclined towards strangers, just as divided (that is, ambivalent) towards those we love, as was *primaeval* man. But how far we have moved from this primal state in our conventional and cultural attitude towards death!

It is easy to see how war impinges on this dichotomy. It strips us of the later accretions of civilization, and lays bare the primal man in each of us. It compels us once more to be heroes who cannot believe in their own death; it stamps strangers as enemies, whose death is to be brought about or desired; it tells us to disregard the death of those we love. But war cannot be abolished; so long as the conditions of existence among nations are so different and their mutual repulsion so violent, there are bound to be wars. The question then arises: Is it not we who should give in, who should adapt ourselves to war? Should we not confess that in our civilized attitude towards death we are once again living psychologically beyond our means, and should we not rather turn back and recognize the truth? Would it not be better to give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due, and to give a little more prominence to the unconscious attitude towards death which we have hitherto so carefully suppressed? This hardly seems an advance to higher achievement, but rather in some respects a backward step—a regression; but it has the advantage of taking the truth more into account, and of making life more tolerable for us once again. To tolerate life remains, after all, the first duty of all living beings. Illusion becomes valueless if it makes this harder for us.

We recall the old saying: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. If you want to preserve peace, arm for war.

It would be in keeping with the times to alter it: *Si vis vitam, para mortem*. If you want to endure life, prepare yourself for death.

APPENDIX

LETTER TO FREDERIK VAN EEDEN

[This letter was written by Freud at the end of 1914, a few months after the outbreak of the first World War and a few months before the composition of his 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death'. Van Eeden, to whom the letter was addressed, was a Dutch psychopathologist, better known, however, as a man of letters. He was a long-standing acquaintance of Freud's, although never accepting his views. The letter was first published in German by van Eeden in an Amsterdam weekly periodical, *De Amsterdammer*,¹ on January 17, 1915 (No. 1960, p. 3). It seems not to have been reprinted in German hitherto. An English translation is included in the second volume of Dr. Ernest Jones's life of Freud (1955, 413), and the version which follows is the same, apart from a few verbal changes.]

Vienna, December 28, 1914.

Dear Dr. van Eeden,

I venture, under the impact of the war, to remind you of two theses which have been put forward by psycho-analysis and which have undoubtedly contributed to its unpopularity.

Psycho-analysis has inferred from the dreams and parapraxes of healthy people, as well as from the symptoms of neurotics, that the primitive, savage and evil impulses of mankind have not vanished in any of its individual members, but persist, although in a repressed state, in the unconscious (to use our technical terms), and lie in wait for opportunities of becoming active once more. It has further taught us that our intellect is a feeble and dependent thing, a plaything and tool of our instincts and affects, and that we are all compelled to behave cleverly or stupidly according to the commands of our [emotional] attitudes and internal resistances.

If you will now observe what is happening in this war—the cruelties and injustices for which the most civilized nations are responsible, the different way in which they judge their own lies

¹ [The periodical's name was later changed to *De Groene Amsterdammer*.]

and wrong-doings and those of their enemies, and the general lack of insight which prevails—you will have to admit that psycho-analysis has been right in both its theses.

It may not have been entirely original in this; many thinkers and students of mankind have made similar assertions. But our science has worked out both of them in detail and has employed them to throw light on many psychological puzzles.

I hope we shall meet again in happier times.

Yours very sincerely,
Sigm. Freud

ON TRANSIENCE
(1916 [1915])

VERGÄNGLICHKEIT

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1916 In *Das Land Goethes 1914-1916*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. Pp. 37-8.
1926 *Almanach 1927*, 39-42.
1928 *G.S.*, 11, 291-4.
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 358-361.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'On Transience'

- 1942 *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 23 (2), 84-5. (Tr. James Strachey.)
1950 *C.P.*, 5, 79-82. (Same translator.)

The present translation is a very slightly altered reprint of the one published in 1950.

This essay was written in November, 1915, at the invitation of the Berliner Goethebund (the Berlin Goethe Society) for a commemorative volume they issued in the following year under the title of *Das Land Goethes* (Goethe's Country). This elaborately produced volume included a large number of contributions from well-known writers and artists past and present, such as von Bülow, von Brentano, Ricarda Huch, Hauptmann and Liebermann. The German original (apart from the picture it gives of Freud's feelings about the war, which was then in its second year) is excellent evidence of his literary powers. It is of interest to note that the essay includes a statement of the theory of mourning contained in 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917e), which Freud had written some months before, but which was not published until two years later.

ON TRANSIENCE

Not long ago I went on a summer walk through a smiling countryside in the company of a taciturn friend and of a young but already famous poet.¹ The poet admired the beauty of the scene around us but felt no joy in it. He was disturbed by the thought that all this beauty was fated to extinction, that it would vanish when winter came, like all human beauty and all the beauty and splendour that men have created or may create. All that he would otherwise have loved and admired seemed to him to be shorn of its worth by the transience which was its doom.

The proneness to decay of all that is beautiful and perfect can, as we know, give rise to two different impulses in the mind. The one leads to the aching despondency felt by the young poet, while the other leads to rebellion against the fact asserted. Not it is impossible that all this loveliness of Nature and Art, of the world of our sensations and of the world outside, will really fade away into nothing. It would be too senseless and too presumptuous to believe it. Somehow or other this loveliness must be able to persist and to escape all the powers of destruction.

But this demand for immortality is a product of our wishes too unmistakable to lay claim to reality: what is painful may none the less be true. I could not see my way to dispute the transience of all things, nor could I insist upon an exception in favour of what is beautiful and perfect. But I did dispute the pessimistic poet's view that the transience of what is beautiful involves any loss in its worth.

On the contrary, an increase! Transience value is scarcity value in time. Limitation in the possibility of an enjoyment raises the value of the enjoyment. It was incomprehensible, I declared, that the thought of the transience of beauty should interfere with our joy in it. As regards the beauty of Nature, each time it is destroyed by winter it comes again next year, so that in relation to the length of our lives it can in fact be regarded as eternal. The beauty of the human form and face vanish for ever

¹ [Freud spent part of August, 1913, in the Dolomites, but the identity of his companions cannot be established.]

in the course of our own lives, but their evanescence only lends them a fresh charm. A flower that blossoms only for a single night does not seem to us on that account less lovely. Nor can I understand any better why the beauty and perfection of a work of art or of an intellectual achievement should lose its worth because of its temporal limitation. A time may indeed come when the pictures and statues which we admire to-day will crumble to dust, or a race of men may follow us who no longer understand the works of our poets and thinkers, or a geological epoch may even arrive when all animate life upon the earth ceases; but since the value of all this beauty and perfection is determined only by its significance for our own emotional lives, it has no need to survive us and is therefore independent of absolute duration.

These considerations appeared to me incontestable; but I noticed that I had made no impression either upon the poet or upon my friend. My failure led me to infer that some powerful emotional factor was at work which was disturbing their judgement, and I believed later that I had discovered what it was. What spoilt their enjoyment of beauty must have been a revolt in their minds against mourning. The idea that all this beauty was transient was giving these two sensitive minds a foretaste of mourning over its decease; and, since the mind instinctively recoils from anything that is painful, they felt their enjoyment of beauty interfered with by thoughts of its transience.

Mourning over the loss of something that we have loved or admired seems so natural to the layman that he regards it as self-evident. But to psychologists mourning is a great riddle, one of those phenomena which cannot themselves be explained but to which other obscurities can be traced back. We possess, as it seems, a certain amount of capacity for love—what we call libido—which in the earliest stages of development is directed towards our own ego. Later, though still at a very early time, this libido is diverted from the ego on to objects, which are thus in a sense taken into our ego. If the objects are destroyed or if they are lost to us, our capacity for love (our libido) is once more liberated; and it can then either take other objects instead or can temporarily return to the ego. But why it is that this detachment of libido from its objects should be such a painful process is a mystery to us and we have not hitherto been able to frame any hypothesis to account for it. We only see that libido clings to its

objects and will not renounce those that are lost even when a substitute lies ready to hand. Such then is mourning.

My conversation with the poet took place in the summer before the war. A year later the war broke out and robbed the world of its beauties. It destroyed not only the beauty of the countrysides through which it passed and the works of art which it met with on its path but it also shattered our pride in the achievements of our civilization, our admiration for many philosophers and artists and our hopes of a final triumph over the differences between nations and races. It tarnished the lofty impartiality of our science, it revealed our instincts in all their nakedness and let loose the evil spirits within us which we thought had been tamed for ever by centuries of continuous education by the noblest minds. It made our country small again and made the rest of the world far remote. It robbed us of very much that we had loved, and showed us how ephemeral were many things that we had regarded as changeless.

We cannot be surprised that our libido, thus bereft of so many of its objects, has clung with all the greater intensity to what is left to us, that our love of our country, our affection for those nearest us and our pride in what is common to us have suddenly grown stronger. But have those other possessions, which we have now lost, really ceased to have any worth for us because they have proved so perishable and so unresistant? To many of us this seems to be so, but once more wrongly, in my view. I believe that those who think thus, and seem ready to make a permanent renunciation because what was precious has proved not to be lasting, are simply in a state of mourning for what is lost. Mourning, as we know, however painful it may be, comes to a spontaneous end. When it has renounced everything that has been lost, then it has consumed itself, and our libido is once more free (in so far as we are still young and active) to replace the lost objects by fresh ones equally or still more precious. It is to be hoped that the same will be true of the losses caused by this war. When once the mourning is over, it will be found that our high opinion of the riches of civilization has lost nothing from our discovery of their fragility. We shall build up again all that war has destroyed, and perhaps on firmer ground and more lastingly than before.

**SOME CHARACTER-TYPES MET WITH
IN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC WORK
(1916)**

EINIGE CHARAKTERTYPEN AUS DER PSYCHOANALYTISCHEN ARBEIT

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1916 *Imago*, 4 (6), 317-336.
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, 4, 521-552. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1924 *G.S.*, 10, 287-314.
1924 *Dichtung und Kunst*, 59-86.
1925 *Almanach 1926*, 21-6. (Section I only.)
1935 *Psychoan. Pädagog.*, 9, 193-4. (Section III only.)
1946 *G.W.*, 10, 364-391.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

- 'Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work'
1925 *C.P.*, 4, 318-344. (Tr. E. C. Mayne.)

The present translation is based on the one published in 1925.

These three essays were published in the last issue of *Imago* for the year 1916. The third of them, although the shortest, has produced as many repercussions as any of Freud's non-medical writings, for it has thrown an entirely fresh light on the problems of the psychology of crime.

Extracts from the translation of this work published in 1925 were included in Rickman's *A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud* (1937, 111-17).

SOME CHARACTER-TYPES MET WITH IN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC WORK

WHEN a doctor carries out the psycho-analytic treatment of a neurotic, his interest is by no means directed in the first instance to the patient's character. He would much rather know what the symptoms mean, what instinctual impulses are concealed behind them and are satisfied by them, and what course was followed by the mysterious path that has led from the instinctual wishes to the symptoms. But the technique which he is obliged to follow soon compels him to direct his immediate curiosity towards other objectives. He observes that his investigation is threatened by resistances set up against him by the patient, and these resistances he may justly count as part of the latter's character. This now acquires the first claim on his interest.

What opposes the doctor's efforts is not always those traits of character which the patient recognizes in himself and which are attributed to him by people round him. Peculiarities in him which he had seemed to possess only to a modest degree are often brought to light in surprisingly increased intensity, or attitudes reveal themselves in him which had not been betrayed in other relations of life. The pages which follow will be devoted to describing and tracing back a few of these surprising traits of character.

I

THE 'EXCEPTIONS'

PSYCHO-ANALYTIC work is continually confronted with the task of inducing the patient to renounce an immediate and directly attainable yield of pleasure. He is not asked to renounce all pleasure; that could not, perhaps, be expected of any human being, and even religion is obliged to support its demand that earthly pleasure shall be set aside by promising that it will provide instead an incomparably greater amount of superior pleasure in another world. No, the patient is only asked to

renounce such satisfactions as will inevitably have detrimental consequences. His privation is only to be temporary; he has only to learn to exchange an immediate yield of pleasure for a better assured, even though a postponed one. Or, in other words, under the doctor's guidance he is asked to make the advance from the pleasure principle to the reality principle by which the mature human being is distinguished from the child. In this educative process, the doctor's clearer insight can hardly be said to play a decisive part; as a rule, he can only tell his patient what the latter's own reason can tell him. But it is not the same to know a thing in one's own mind and to hear it from someone outside. The doctor plays the part of this effective outsider; he makes use of the influence which one human being exercises over another. Or—recalling that it is the habit of psychoanalysis to replace what is derivative and etiolated by what is original and basic—let us say that the doctor, in his educative work, makes use of one of the components of love. In this work of after-education, he is probably doing no more than repeat the process which made education of any kind possible in the first instance. Side by side with the exigencies of life, love is the great educator; and it is by the love of those nearest him that the incomplete human being is induced to respect the decrees of necessity and to spare himself the punishment that follows any infringement of them.

When in this way one asks the patient to make a provisional renunciation of some pleasurable satisfaction, to make a sacrifice, to show his readiness to accept some temporary suffering for the sake of a better end, or even merely to make up his mind to submit to a necessity which applies to everyone, one comes upon individuals who resist such an appeal on a special ground. They say that they have renounced enough and suffered enough, and have a claim to be spared any further demands; they will submit no longer to any disagreeable necessity, for they are *exceptions* and, moreover, intend to remain so. In one such patient this claim was magnified into a conviction that a special providence watched over him, which would protect him from any painful sacrifices of the sort. The doctor's arguments will achieve nothing against an inner confidence which expresses itself as strongly as this; even *his* influence, indeed, is powerless at first, and it becomes clear to him that he must discover the sources from which this damaging prepossession is being fed.

Now it is no doubt true that everyone would like to consider himself an 'exception' and claim privileges over others. But precisely because of this there must be a particular reason, and one not universally present, if someone actually proclaims himself an exception and behaves as such. This reason may be of more than one kind; in the cases I investigated I succeeded in discovering a common peculiarity in the earlier experiences of these patients' lives. Their neuroses were connected with some experience or suffering to which they had been subjected in their earliest childhood, one in respect of which they knew themselves to be guiltless, and which they could look upon as an unjust disadvantage imposed upon them. The privileges that they claimed as a result of this injustice, and the rebelliousness it engendered, had contributed not a little to intensifying the conflicts leading to the outbreak of their neurosis. In one of these patients, a woman, the attitude towards life which I am discussing came to a head when she learnt that a painful organic trouble, which had hindered her from attaining her aims in life, was of congenital origin. So long as she looked upon this trouble as an accidental and late acquisition, she bore it patiently; as soon as she found that it was part of an innate inheritance, she became rebellious. The young man who believed that he was watched over by a special providence had in his infancy been the victim of an accidental infection from his wet-nurse, and had spent his whole later life making claims for compensation, an accident pension, as it were, without having any idea on what he based those claims. In his case the analysis, which constructed this event out of obscure mnemonic residues and interpretations of the symptoms, was confirmed objectively by information from his family.

For reasons which will be easily understood I cannot communicate very much about these or other case histories. Nor do I propose to go into the obvious analogy between deformities of character resulting from protracted sickness in childhood and the behaviour of whole nations whose past history has been full of suffering. Instead, however, I will take the opportunity of pointing to a figure created by the greatest of poets—a figure in whose character the claim to be an exception is closely bound up with and is motivated by the circumstance of congenital disadvantage.

In the opening soliloquy to Shakespeare's *Richard III*, Gloucester, who subsequently becomes King, says:

But I, that am not shaped for sportive tricks,
Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass;
I that am rudely stamp'd, and want love's majesty
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
I, that am curtail'd of this fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling Nature,
Deform'd, unfinish'd, sent before my time
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up,
And that so lamely and unfashionable,
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them;

* * * * *

And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover,
To entertain these fair well-spoken days,
I am determin'd to prove a villain,
And hate the idle pleasures of these days.

At a first glance this tirade may perhaps seem unrelated to our present theme. Richard seems to say nothing more than: 'I find these idle times tedious, and I want to enjoy myself. As I cannot play the lover on account of my deformity, I will play the villain; I will intrigue, murder and do anything else I please.' Such a frivolous motivation could not but stifle any stirring of sympathy in the audience, if it were not a screen for something much more serious. Otherwise the play would be psychologically impossible, for the writer must know how to furnish us with a secret background of sympathy for his hero, if we are to admire his boldness and adroitness without inward protest; and such sympathy can only be based on understanding or on a sense of a possible inner fellow-feeling for him.

I think, therefore, that Richard's soliloquy does not say everything; it merely gives a hint, and leaves us to fill in what it hints at. When we do so, however, the appearance of frivolity vanishes, the bitterness and minuteness with which Richard has depicted his deformity make their full effect, and we clearly perceive the fellow-feeling which compels our sympathy even with a villain like him. What the soliloquy thus means is: 'Nature has done me a grievous wrong in denying me the beauty of form which wins human love. Life owes me reparation for this, and I will see that I get it. I have a right to be an exception, to disregard the scruples by which others let themselves be

held back. I may do wrong myself, since wrong has been done to me.' And now we feel that we ourselves might become like Richard, that on a small scale, indeed, we are already like him. Richard is an enormous magnification of something we find in ourselves as well. We all think we have reason to reproach Nature and our destiny for congenital and infantile disadvantages; we all demand reparation for early wounds to our narcissism, our self-love. Why did not Nature give us the golden curls of Balder or the strength of Siegfried or the lofty brow of genius or the noble profile of aristocracy? Why were we born in a middle-class home instead of in a royal palace? We could carry off beauty and distinction quite as well as any of those whom we are now obliged to envy for these qualities.

It is, however, a subtle economy of art in the poet that he does not permit his hero to give open and complete expression to all his secret motives. By this means he obliges us to supplement them; he engages our intellectual activity, diverts it from critical reflection and keeps us firmly identified with his hero. A bungler in his place would give conscious expression to all that he wishes to reveal to us, and would then find himself confronted by our cool, untrammelled intelligence, which would preclude any deepening of the illusion.

Before leaving the 'exceptions', however, we may point out that the claim of women to privileges and to exemption from so many of the importunities of life rests upon the same foundation. As we learn from psycho-analytic work, women regard themselves as having been damaged in infancy, as having been undeservedly cut short of something and unfairly treated; and the embitterment of so many daughters against their mother derives, ultimately, from the reproach against her of having brought them into the world as women instead of as men.

II

THOSE WRECKED BY SUCCESS

PSYCHO-ANALYTIC work has furnished us with the thesis that people fall ill of a neurosis as a result of *frustration*.¹ What is meant is the frustration of the satisfaction of their libidinal wishes, and some digression is necessary in order to make the thesis intelligible. For a neurosis to be generated there must be a conflict between a person's libidinal wishes and the part of his personality we call his ego, which is the expression of his instinct of self-preservation and which also includes his *ideals* of his personality. A pathogenic conflict of this kind takes place only when the libido tries to follow paths and aims which the ego has long since overcome and condemned and has therefore prohibited for ever; and this the libido only does if it is deprived of the possibility of an ideal ego-syntonic satisfaction. Hence privation, frustration of a real satisfaction, is the first condition for the generation of a neurosis, although, indeed, it is far from being the only one.

So much the more surprising, and indeed bewildering, must it appear when as a doctor one makes the discovery that people occasionally fall ill precisely when a deeply-rooted and long-cherished wish has come to fulfilment. It seems then as though they were not able to tolerate their happiness; for there can be no question that there is a causal connection between their success and their falling ill.

I had an opportunity of obtaining an insight into a woman's history, which I propose to describe as typical of these tragic occurrences. She was of good birth and well brought-up, but as quite a young girl she could not restrain her zest for life; she ran away from home and roved about the world in search of adventures, till she made the acquaintance of an artist who could appreciate her feminine charms but could also divine, in spite of what she had fallen to, the finer qualities she possessed. He took her to live with him, and she proved a faithful companion to him, and seemed only to need social rehabilitation to achieve complete happiness. After many years of life together,

¹ [See 'Types of Onset of Neurosis' (1912c).]

he succeeded in getting his family reconciled to her, and was then prepared to make her his legal wife. At that moment she began to go to pieces. She neglected the house of which she was now about to become the rightful mistress, imagined herself persecuted by his relatives, who wanted to take her into the family, debarred her lover, through her senseless jealousy, from all social intercourse, hindered him in his artistic work, and soon succumbed to an incurable mental illness.

On another occasion I came across the case of a most respectable man who, himself an academic teacher, had for many years cherished the natural wish to succeed the master who had initiated him into his own studies. When this older man retired, and his colleagues informed him that it was he who was chosen as successor, he began to hesitate, depreciated his merits, declared himself unworthy to fill the position designed for him, and fell into a melancholia which unfitted him for all activity for some years.

Different as these two cases are in other respects, they yet agree in this one point: the illness followed close upon the fulfilment of a wish and put an end to all enjoyment of it.

The contradiction between such experiences and the rule that what induces illness is frustration is not insoluble. It disappears if we make a distinction between an *external* and an *internal* frustration. If the object in which the libido can find its satisfaction is withheld *in reality*, this is an external frustration. In itself it is inoperative, not pathogenic, until an internal frustration is joined to it. This latter must proceed from the ego, and must dispute the access by the libido to other objects, which it now seeks to get hold of. Only then does a conflict arise, and the possibility of a neurotic illness, i.e. of a substitutive satisfaction reached circuitously by way of the repressed unconscious. Internal frustration is potentially present, therefore, in every case, only it does not come into operation until external, real frustration has prepared the ground for it. In those exceptional cases in which people are made ill by success, the internal frustration has operated by itself; indeed it has only made its appearance after an external frustration has been replaced by fulfilment of a wish. At first sight there is something strange about this; but on closer consideration we shall reflect that it is not at all unusual for the ego to tolerate a wish as harmless so long as it exists in phantasy alone and seems remote from

fulfilment, whereas the ego will defend itself hotly against such a wish as soon as it approaches fulfilment and threatens to become a reality. The distinction between this and familiar situations in neurosis-formation is merely that ordinarily it is internal intensifications of the libidinal cathexis that turn the phantasy, which has hitherto been thought little of and tolerated, into a dreaded opponent; while in these cases of ours the signal for the outbreak of conflict is given by a real external change.

Analytic work has no difficulty in showing us that it is forces of conscience which forbid the subject to gain the long hoped-for advantage from the fortunate change in reality. It is a difficult task, however, to discover the essence and origin of these judging and punishing trends, which so often surprise us by their existence where we do not expect to find them. For the usual reasons I shall not discuss what we know or conjecture on the point in relation to cases of clinical observation, but in relation to figures which great writers have created from the wealth of their knowledge of the mind.

We may take as an example of a person who collapses on reaching success, after striving for it with single-minded energy, the figure of Shakespeare's Lady Macbeth. Beforehand there is no hesitation, no sign of any internal conflict in her, no endeavour but that of overcoming the scruples of her ambitious and yet tender-minded husband. She is ready to sacrifice even her womanliness to her murderous intention, without reflecting on the decisive part which this womanliness must play when the question afterwards arises of preserving the aim of her ambition, which has been attained through a crime.

Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here
... Come to my woman's breasts,
And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers!
(Act I, Sc. 5.)

... I have given suck, and know
How tender 'tis to love the babe that milks me:
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have pluck'd my nipple from his boneless gums,
And dashed the brains out, had I so sworn as you
Have done to this.

(Act I, Sc. 7.)

One solitary faint stirring of reluctance comes over her before the deed:

... Had he not resembled
My father as he slept, I had done it ...
(Act II, Sc. 2.)

Then, when she has become Queen through the murder of Duncan, she betrays for a moment something like disappointment, something like disillusionment. We cannot tell why.

... Nought's had, all's spent,
Where our desire is got without content:
'Tis safer to be that which we destroy,
Than by destruction dwell in doubtful joy.
(Act III, Sc. 2.)

Nevertheless, she holds out. In the banqueting scene which follows on these words, she alone keeps her head, cloaks her husband's state of confusion and finds a pretext for dismissing the guests. And then she disappears from view. We next see her in the sleep-walking scene in the last Act, fixated to the impressions of the night of the murder. Once again, as then, she seeks to put heart into her husband:

'Fie, my lord, fie! a soldier, and afeard? What need we fear who knows it, when none can call our power to account?'
(Act V, Sc. 1.)

She hears the knocking at the door, which terrified her husband after the deed. But at the same time she strives to 'undo the deed which cannot be undone'. She washes her hands, which are blood-stained and smell of blood, and is conscious of the futility of the attempt. She who had seemed so remorseless seems to have been borne down by remorse. When she dies, Macbeth, who meanwhile has become as inexorable as she had been in the beginning, can only find a brief epitaph for her:

She should have died hereafter;
There would have been a time for such a word.
(Act V, Sc. 5.)

And now we ask ourselves what it was that broke this character which had seemed forged from the toughest metal? Is it only disillusionment—the different aspect shown by the accomplished deed¹—and are we to infer that even in Lady Macbeth

¹ [An allusion to a line in Schiller's *Die Braut von Messina*, III, 5.]

an originally gentle and womanly nature had been worked up to a concentration and high tension which could not endure for long, or ought we to seek for signs of a deeper motivation which will make this collapse more humanly intelligible to us?

It seems to me impossible to come to any decision. Shakespeare's *Macbeth* is a *pièce d'occasion*, written for the accession of James, who had hitherto been King of Scotland. The plot was ready-made, and had been handled by other contemporary writers, whose work Shakespeare probably made use of in his customary manner. It offered remarkable analogies to the actual situation. The 'virginal' Elizabeth, of whom it was rumoured that she had never been capable of child-bearing and who had once described herself as 'a barren stock',¹ in an anguished outcry at the news of James's birth, was obliged by this very childlessness of hers to make the Scottish king her successor. And he was the son of the Mary Stuart whose execution she, even though reluctantly, had ordered, and who, in spite of the clouding of their relations by political concerns, was nevertheless of her blood and might be called her guest.

The accession of James I was like a demonstration of the curse of unfruitfulness and the blessings of continuous generation. And the action of Shakespeare's *Macbeth* is based on this same contrast.²

The Weird Sisters assured Macbeth that he himself should be king, but to Banquo they promised that his children should succeed to the crown. Macbeth is incensed by this decree of destiny. He is not content with the satisfaction of his own ambition. He wants to found a dynasty—not to have murdered for the benefit of strangers. This point is overlooked if Shakespeare's play is regarded only as a tragedy of ambition. It is clear that Macbeth cannot live for ever, and thus there is but one way for him to invalidate the part of the prophecy which opposes him—namely, to have children himself who can succeed

¹ Cf. *Macbeth*, Act III, Sc. 1:

Upon my head they placed a fruitless crown,
And put a barren sceptre in my gripe,
Thence to be wrenched with an unlineal hand,
No son of mine succeeding . . .

² [Freud had already suggested this in the first edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 266.]

him. And he seems to expect them from his indomitable wife:

Bring forth men-children only!
For thy undaunted mettle should compose
Nothing but males . . .

(Act I, Sc. 7.)

And equally it is clear that if he is deceived in this expectation he must submit to destiny; otherwise his actions lose all purpose and are transformed into the blind fury of one doomed to destruction, who is resolved to destroy beforehand all that he can reach. We watch Macbeth pass through this development, and at the height of the tragedy we hear Macduff's shattering cry, which has so often been recognized to be ambiguous and which may perhaps contain the key to the change in Macbeth:

He has no children!

(Act IV, Sc. 3.)

There is no doubt that this means: 'Only because he is himself childless could he murder my children.' But more may be implied in it, and above all it might lay bare the deepest motive which not only forces Macbeth to go far beyond his own nature, but also touches the hard character of his wife at its only weak point. If one surveys the whole play from the summit marked by these words of Macduff's, one sees that it is sown with references to the father-children relation. The murder of the kindly Duncan is little else than parricide; in Banquo's case, Macbeth kills the father while the son escapes him; and in Macduff's, he kills the children because the father has fled from him. A bloody child, and then a crowned one, are shown him by the witches in the apparition scene; the armed head which is seen earlier is no doubt Macbeth himself. But in the background rises the sinister form of the avenger, Macduff, who is himself an exception to the laws of generation, since he was not born of his mother but ripp'd from her womb.

It would be a perfect example of poetic justice in the manner of the talion if the childlessness of Macbeth and the barrenness of his Lady were the punishment for their crimes against the sanctity of generation—if Macbeth could not become a father because he had robbed children of their father and a father of his children, and if Lady Macbeth suffered the unsexing she had demanded of the spirits of murder. I believe Lady Macbeth's

illness, the transformation of her callousness into penitence, could be explained directly as a reaction to her childlessness, by which she is convinced of her impotence against the decrees of nature, and at the same time reminded that it is through her own fault if her crime has been robbed of the better part of its fruits.

In Holinshed's *Chronicle* (1577), from which Shakespeare took the plot of *Macbeth*, Lady Macbeth is only once mentioned as the ambitious wife who instigates her husband to murder in order that she may herself become queen. There is no mention of her subsequent fate and of the development of her character. On the other hand, it would seem that the change of Macbeth's character into a bloodthirsty tyrant is ascribed to the same motives as we have suggested here. For in Holinshed *ten years* pass between the murder of Duncan, through which Macbeth becomes king, and his further misdeeds; and in these ten years he is shown as a stern but just ruler. It is not until after this lapse of time that the change begins in him, under the influence of the tormenting fear that the prophecy to Banquo may be fulfilled just as the prophecy of his own destiny has been. Only then does he contrive the murder of Banquo, and, as in Shakespeare, is driven from one crime to another. It is not expressly stated in Holinshed that it was his childlessness which urged him to these courses, but enough time and room is given for that plausible motive. Not so in Shakespeare. Events crowd upon us in the tragedy with breathless haste so that, to judge by the statements made by the characters in it, the course of its action covers about *one week*.¹ This acceleration takes the ground from under all our constructions of the motives for the change in the characters of Macbeth and his wife. There is no time for a long-drawn-out disappointment of their hopes of offspring to break the woman down and drive the man to defiant rage; and the contradiction remains that though so many subtle interrelations in the plot, and between it and its occasion, point to a common origin of them in the theme of childlessness, nevertheless the economy of time in the tragedy expressly precludes a development of character from any motives but those inherent in the action itself.

What, however, these motives can have been which in so short a space of time could turn the hesitating, ambitious man

¹ Darmesteter (1881, lxxv).

into an unbridled tyrant, and his steely-hearted instigator into a sick woman gnawed by remorse, it is, in my view, impossible to guess. We must, I think, give up any hope of penetrating the triple layer of obscurity into which the bad preservation of the text, the unknown intention of the dramatist, and the hidden purport of the legend have become condensed. But I should not subscribe to the objection that investigations like these are idle in face of the powerful effect which the tragedy has upon the spectator. The dramatist can indeed, during the representation, overwhelm us by his art and paralyse our powers of reflection; but he cannot prevent us from attempting subsequently to grasp its effect by studying its psychological mechanism. Nor does the contention that a dramatist is at liberty to shorten at will the natural chronology of the events he brings before us, if by the sacrifice of common probability he can enhance the dramatic effect, seem to me relevant in this instance. For such a sacrifice is justified only when it merely interferes with probability,¹ and not when it breaks the causal connection; moreover, the dramatic effect would hardly have suffered if the passage of time had been left indeterminate, instead of being expressly limited to a few days.

One is so unwilling to dismiss a problem like that of *Macbeth* as insoluble that I will venture to bring up a fresh point, which may offer another way out of the difficulty. Ludwig Jekels, in a recent Shakespearean study,² thinks he has discovered a particular technique of the poet's, and this might apply to *Macbeth*. He believes that Shakespeare often splits a character up into two personages, which, taken separately, are not completely understandable and do not become so until they are brought together once more into a unity. This might be so with Macbeth and Lady Macbeth. In that case it would of course be pointless to regard her as an independent character and seek to discover the motives for her change, without considering the Macbeth who completes her. I shall not follow this clue any further, but I should, nevertheless, like to point out something which

¹ As in Richard III's wooing of Anne beside the bier of the King whom he has murdered.

² [This does not appear to have been published. In a later paper on *Macbeth* Jekels (1917) barely refers to this theory, apart from quoting the present paragraph. In a still later paper, on 'The Psychology of Comedy', Jekels (1926) returns to the subject, but again very briefly.]

strikingly confirms this view: the germs of fear which break out in Macbeth on the night of the murder do not develop further in *him* but in *her*.¹ It is he who has the hallucination of the dagger before the crime; but it is she who afterwards falls ill of a mental disorder. It is he who after the murder hears the cry in the house: 'Sleep no more! Macbeth does murder sleep . . .' and so 'Macbeth shall sleep no more'; but we never hear that *he* slept no more, while the Queen, as we see, rises from her bed and, talking in her sleep, betrays her guilt. It is he who stands helpless with bloody hands, lamenting that 'all great Neptune's ocean' will not wash them clean, while she comforts him: 'A little water clears us of this deed'; but later it is she who washes her hands for a quarter of an hour and cannot get rid of the bloodstains: 'All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand.' Thus what he feared in his pangs of conscience is fulfilled in her; she becomes all remorse and he all defiance. Together they exhaust the possibilities of reaction to the crime, like two disunited parts of a single psychical individuality, and it may be that they are both copied from a single prototype.

If we have been unable to give any answer to the question why Lady Macbeth should collapse after her success, we may perhaps have a better chance when we turn to the creation of another great dramatist, who loves to pursue problems of psychological responsibility with unrelenting rigour.

Rebecca Gamvik, the daughter of a midwife, has been brought up by her adopted father, Dr. West, to be a freethinker and to despise the restrictions which a morality founded on religious belief seeks to impose on the desires of life. After the doctor's death she finds a position at Rosmersholm, the home for many generations of an ancient family whose members know nothing of laughter and have sacrificed joy to a rigid fulfilment of duty. Its occupants are Johannes Rosmer, a former pastor, and his invalid wife, the childless Beata. Overcome by 'a wild, uncontrollable passion' ² for the love of the high-born Rosmer, Rebecca resolves to remove the wife who stands in her way, and to this end makes use of her 'fearless, free' will, which is restrained by no scruples. She contrives that Beata shall read a

¹ Cf. Darmesteter (1881, lxxv).

² [The quotations are based on William Archer's English translation.]

medical book in which the aim of marriage is represented to be the begetting of offspring, so that the poor woman begins to doubt whether her own marriage is justifiable. Rebecca then hints that Rosmer, whose studies and ideas she shares, is about to abandon the old faith and join the 'party of enlightenment'; and after she has thus shaken the wife's confidence in her husband's moral integrity, gives her finally to understand that she, Rebecca, will soon leave the house in order to conceal the consequences of her illicit intercourse with Rosmer. The criminal scheme succeeds. The poor wife, who has passed for depressed and irresponsible, throws herself from the path beside the mill into the mill-race, possessed by the sense of her own worthlessness and wishing on longer to stand between her beloved husband and his happiness.

For more than a year Rebecca and Rosmer have been living alone at Rosmersholm in a relationship which he wishes to regard as a purely intellectual and ideal friendship. But when this relationship begins to be darkened from outside by the first shadow of gossip, and at the same time tormenting doubts arise in Rosmer about the motives for which his wife put an end to herself, he begs Rebecca to become his second wife, so that they may counter the unhappy past with a new living reality (Act II). For an instant she exclaims with joy at his proposal, but immediately afterwards declares that it can never be, and that if he urges her further she will 'go the way Beata went'. Rosmer cannot understand this rejection; and still less can we, who know more of Rebecca's actions and designs. All we can be certain of is that her 'no' is meant in earnest.

How could it come about that the adventuress with the 'fearless, free will', who forged her way ruthlessly to her desired goal, should now refuse to pluck the fruit of success when it is offered to her? She herself gives us the explanation in the fourth Act: '*This is the terrible part of it: that now, when all life's happiness is within my grasp—my heart is changed and my own past cuts me off from it.*' That is to say, she has in the meantime become a different being; her conscience has awakened, she has acquired a sense of guilt which debars her from enjoyment.

And what has awakened her conscience? Let us listen to her herself, and then consider whether we can believe her entirely. 'It is the Rosmer view of life—or your view of life at any rate—that has infected my will. . . . And made it sick. Enslaved it to

laws that had no power over me before. You—life with you—has ennobled my mind.'

This influence, we are further to understand, has only become effective since she has been able to live alone with Rosmer: 'In quiet—in solitude—when you showed me all your thoughts without reserve—every tender and delicate feeling, just as it came to you—*then* the great change came over me.'

Shortly before this she has lamented the other aspect of the change: 'Because Rosmersholm has sapped my strength. My old fearless will has had its wings clipped here. It is crippled! The time is past when I had courage for anything in the world. I have lost the power of action, Rosmer.'

Rebecca makes this declaration after she had revealed herself as a criminal in a voluntary confession to Rosmer and Rector Kroll, the brother of the woman she has got rid of. Ibsen has made it clear by small touches of masterly subtlety that Rebecca does not actually tell lies, but is never entirely straightforward. Just as, in spite of all her freedom from prejudices, she has understated her age by a year, so her confession to the two men is incomplete, and as a result of Kroll's insistence it is supplemented on some important points. Hence it is open to us to suppose that her explanation of her renunciation exposes one motive only to conceal another.

Certainly, we have no reason to disbelieve her when she declares that the atmosphere of Rosmersholm and her association with the high-minded Rosmer have ennobled—and crippled—her. She is here expressing what she knows and has felt. But this is not necessarily all that has happened in her, nor need she have understood all that has happened. Rosmer's influence may only have been a cloak, which concealed another influence that was operative, and a remarkable indication points in this other direction.

Even after her confession, Rosmer, in their last conversation which brings the play to an end, again beseeches her to be his wife. He forgives her the crime she has committed for love of him. And now she does not answer, as she should, that no forgiveness can rid her of the feeling of guilt she has incurred from her malignant deception of poor Beata; but she charges herself with another reproach which affects us as coming strangely from this freethinking woman, and is far from deserving the importance which Rebecca attaches to it: 'Dear—never speak

of this again! It is impossible! For you must know, Rosmer, I have a—a past behind me.' She means, of course, that she has had sexual relations with another man; and we do not fail to observe that these relations, which occurred at a time when she was free and accountable to nobody, seem to her a greater hindrance to the union with Rosmer than her truly criminal behaviour to his wife.

Rosmer refuses to hear anything about this past. We can guess what it was, though everything that refers to it in the play is, so to speak, subterranean and has to be pieced together from hints. But nevertheless they are hints inserted with such art that it is impossible to misunderstand them.

Between Rebecca's first refusal and her confession something occurs which has a decisive influence on her future destiny. Rector Kroll arrives one day at the house on purpose to humiliate Rebecca by telling her that he knows she is an illegitimate child, the daughter of the very Dr. West who adopted her after her mother's death. Hate has sharpened his perceptions, yet he does not suppose that this is any news to her. 'I really did not suppose you were ignorant of this, otherwise it would have been very odd that you should have let Dr. West adopt you . . .' 'And then he takes you into his house—as soon as your mother dies. He treats you harshly. And yet you stay with him. You know that he won't leave you a halfpenny—as a matter of fact you got only a case of books—and yet you stay on; you bear with him; you nurse him to the last.' . . . 'I attribute your care for him to the natural filial instinct of a daughter. Indeed, I believe your whole conduct is a natural result of your origin.'

But Kroll is mistaken. Rebecca had no idea at all that she could be Dr. West's daughter. When Kroll began with dark hints at her past, she must have thought he was referring to something else. After she has gathered what he means, she can still retain her composure for a while, for she is able to suppose that her enemy is basing his calculations on her age, which she had given falsely on an earlier visit of his. But Kroll demolishes this objection by saying: 'Well, so be it, but my calculation may be right, none the less; for Dr. West was up there on a short visit the year before he got the appointment.' After this new information, she loses her self-possession. 'It is not true!' She walks about wringing her hands. 'It is impossible. You want to

cheat me into believing it. This can never, never be true. It cannot be true. Never in this world!—' Her agitation is so extreme that Kroll cannot attribute it to his information alone.

'KROLL: But, my dear Miss West—why in Heaven's name are you so terribly excited? You quite frighten me. What am I to think—to believe——?

'REBECCA: Nothing. You are to think and believe nothing.

'KROLL: Then you must really tell me how you can take this affair—this possibility—so terribly to heart.

'REBECCA (*controlling herself*): It is perfectly simple, Rector Kroll. I have no wish to be taken for an illegitimate child.'

The enigma of Rebecca's behaviour is susceptible of only one solution. The news that Dr. West was her father is the heaviest blow that can befall her, for she was not only his adopted daughter, but had been his mistress. When Kroll began to speak, she thought that he was hinting at these relations, the truth of which she would probably have admitted and justified by her emancipated ideas. But this was far from the Rector's intention; he knew nothing of the love-affair with Dr. West, just as she knew nothing of Dr. West's being her father. She *cannot* have had anything else in her mind but this love-affair when she accounted for her final rejection of Rosmer on the ground that she had a past which made her unworthy to be his wife. And probably, if Rosmer had consented to hear of that past, she would have confessed half her secret only and have kept silence on the more serious part of it.

But now we understand, of course, that this past must seem to her the more serious obstacle to their union—the more serious crime.

After she has learnt that she has been the mistress of her own father, she surrenders herself wholly to her now overmastering sense of guilt. She makes the confession to Rosmer and Kroll which stamps her as a murderess; she rejects for ever the happiness to which she has paved the way by crime, and prepares for departure. But the true motive of her sense of guilt, which results in her being wrecked by success, remains a secret. As we have seen, it is something quite other than the atmosphere of Rosmersholm and the refining influence of Rosmer.

At this point no one who has followed us will fail to bring forward an objection which may justify some doubts. Rebecca's first refusal of Rosmer occurs before Kroll's second visit, and

therefore before his exposure of her illegitimate origin and at a time when she as yet knows nothing of her incest—if we have rightly understood the dramatist. Yet this first refusal is energetic and seriously meant. The sense of guilt which bids her renounce the fruit of her actions is thus effective before she knows anything of her cardinal crime; and if we grant so much, we ought perhaps entirely to set aside her incest as a source of that sense of guilt.

So far we have treated Rebecca West as if she were a living person and not a creation of Ibsen's imagination, which is always directed by the most critical intelligence. We may therefore attempt to maintain the same position in dealing with the objection that has been raised. The objection is valid: before the knowledge of her incest, conscience was already in part awakened in Rebecca; and there is nothing to prevent our making the influence which is acknowledged and blamed by Rebecca herself responsible for this change. But this does not exempt us from recognizing the second motive. Rebecca's behaviour when she hears what Kroll has to tell her, the confession which is her immediate reaction, leave no doubt that then only does the stronger and decisive motive for renunciation begin to take effect. It is in fact a case of multiple motivation, in which a deeper motive comes into view behind the more superficial one. Laws of poetic economy necessitate this way of presenting the situation, for this deeper motive could not be explicitly enunciated. It had to remain concealed, kept from the easy perception of the spectator or the reader; otherwise serious resistances, based on the most distressing emotions, would have arisen, which might have imperilled the effect of the drama.

We have, however, a right to demand that the explicit motive shall not be without an internal connection with the concealed one, but shall appear as a mitigation of, and a derivation from, the latter. And if we may rely on the fact that the dramatist's conscious creative combination arose logically from unconscious premisses, we may now make an attempt to show that he has fulfilled this demand. Rebecca's feeling of guilt has its source in the reproach of incest, even before Kroll, with analytical perspicacity, has made her conscious of it. If we reconstruct her past, expanding and filling in the author's hints, we may feel sure that she cannot have been without some inkling of the

intimate relation between her mother and Dr. West. It must have made a great impression on her when she became her mother's successor with this man. She stood under the domination of the Oedipus complex, even though she did not know that this universal phantasy had in her case become a reality. When she came to Rosmersholm, the inner force of this first experience drove her into bringing about, by vigorous action, the same situation which had been realized in the original instance through no doing of hers—into getting rid of the wife and mother, so that she might take her place with the husband and father. She describes with a convincing insistence how, against her will, she was obliged to proceed, step by step, to the removal of Beata.

'You think then that I was cool and calculating and self-possessed all the time! I was not the same woman then that I am now, as I stand here telling it all. Besides, there are two sorts of will in us, I believe! I wanted Beata away, by one means or another; but I never really believed that it would come to pass. As I felt my way forward, at each step I ventured, I seemed to hear something within me cry out: No farther! Not a step farther! And yet I *could* not stop. I *had* to venture the least little bit farther. And only one hair's-breadth more. And then one more—and always one more. And then it happened.—That is the way such things come about.'

That is not an embellishment, but an authentic description. Everything that happened to her at Rosmersholm, her falling in love with Rosmer and her hostility to his wife, was from the first a consequence of the Oedipus complex—an inevitable replica of her relations with her mother and Dr. West.

And so the sense of guilt which first causes her to reject Rosmer's proposal is at bottom no different from the greater one which drives her to her confession after Kroll has opened her eyes. But just as under the influence of Dr. West she had become a freethinker and despiser of religious morality, so she is transformed by her love for Rosmer into a being of conscience and nobility. This much of the mental processes within her she herself understands, and so she is justified in describing Rosmer's influence as the motive for her change—the motive that had become accessible to her.

The practising psycho-analytic physician knows how frequently, or how invariably, a girl who enters a household as

servant, companion or governess, will consciously or unconsciously weave a day-dream, which derives from the Oedipus complex, of the mistress of the house disappearing and the master taking the newcomer as his wife in her place.¹ *Rosmersholm* is the greatest work of art of the class that treats of this common phantasy in girls. What makes it into a tragic drama is the extra circumstance that the heroine's day-dream had been preceded in her childhood by a precisely corresponding reality.²

After this long digression into literature, let us return to clinical experience—but only to establish in a few words the complete agreement between them. Psycho-analytic work teaches that the forces of conscience which induce illness in consequence of success, instead of, as normally, in consequence of frustration, are closely connected with the Oedipus complex, the relation to father and mother—as perhaps, indeed, is our sense of guilt in general.³

¹ [Cf. the case of Miss Lucy R. in the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 116 ff.]

² The presence of the theme of incest in *Rosmersholm* has already been demonstrated by the same arguments as mine in Otto Rank's extremely comprehensive *Das Inzest-Motiv in Dichtung und Sage* (1912, [404–5]).

³ [Some twenty years later, in his Open Letter to Romain Rolland describing his first visit to the Acropolis at Athens (1936a) Freud compared the feeling of something being 'too good to be true' with the situation analysed in the present paper.]

III

CRIMINALS FROM A SENSE OF GUILT

IN telling me about their early youth, particularly before puberty, people who have afterwards often become very respectable have informed me of forbidden actions which they committed at that time—such as thefts, frauds and even arson. I was in the habit of dismissing these statements with the comment that we are familiar with the weakness of moral inhibitions at that period of life, and I made no attempt to find a place for them in any more significant context. But eventually I was led to make a more thorough study of such incidents by some glaring and more accessible cases in which the misdeeds were committed while the patients were actually under my treatment, and were no longer so youthful. Analytic work then brought the surprising discovery that such deeds were done principally because they were forbidden, and because their execution was accompanied by mental relief for their doer. He was suffering from an oppressive feeling of guilt, of which he did not know the origin, and after he had committed a misdeed this oppression was mitigated. His sense of guilt was at least attached to something.

Paradoxical as it may sound, I must maintain that the sense of guilt was present before the misdeed, that it did not arise from it, but conversely—the misdeed arose from the sense of guilt. These people might justly be described as criminals from a sense of guilt. The pre-existence of the guilty feeling had of course been demonstrated by a whole set of other manifestations and effects.

But scientific work is not satisfied with the establishment of a curious fact. There are two further questions to answer: what is the origin of this obscure sense of guilt before the deed, and is it probable that this kind of causation plays any considerable part in human crime?

An examination of the first question held out the promise of bringing us information about the source of mankind's sense of guilt in general. The invariable outcome of analytic work was to show that this obscure sense of guilt derived from the Oedipus

complex and was a reaction to the two great criminal intentions of killing the father and having sexual relations with the mother. In comparison with these two, the crimes committed in order to fix the sense of guilt to something came as a relief to the sufferers. We must remember in this connection that parricide and incest with the mother are the two great human crimes, the only ones which, as such, are pursued and abhorred in primitive communities. And we must remember, too, how close other investigations have brought us to the hypothesis that the conscience of mankind, which now appears as an inherited mental force, was acquired in connection with the Oedipus complex.

In order to answer the second question we must go beyond the scope of psycho-analytic work. With children it is easy to observe that they are often 'naughty' on purpose to provoke punishment, and are quiet and contented after they have been punished. Later analytic investigation can often put us on the track of the guilty feeling which induced them to seek punishment. Among adult criminals we must no doubt except those who commit crimes without any sense of guilt, who have either developed no moral inhibitions or who, in their conflict with society, consider themselves justified in their action. But as regards the majority of other criminals, those for whom punitive measures are really designed, such a motivation for crime might very well be taken into consideration; it might throw light on some obscure points in the psychology of the criminal, and furnish punishment with a new psychological basis.

A friend has since called my attention to the fact that the 'criminal from a sense of guilt' was known to Nietzsche too. The pre-existence of the feeling of guilt, and the utilization of a deed in order to rationalize this feeling, glimmer before us in Zarathustra's sayings¹ 'On the Pale Criminal'. Let us leave it to future research to decide how many criminals are to be reckoned among these 'pale' ones.

¹ [In the editions before 1924, 'obscure sayings'.—A hint at the idea of the sense of guilt being a motive for misdeeds is already to be found in the case history of 'Little Hans' (1909*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 42, as well as in that of the 'Wolf Man' (1918*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 17, 28, which, though published later than the present paper, was in fact mostly written in the year before it. In this latter passage the complicating factor of masochism is introduced.]

SHORTER WRITINGS
(1915–1916)

A MYTHOLOGICAL PARALLEL TO A VISUAL OBSESSION¹

(1916)

IN a patient of about twenty-one years of age the products of unconscious mental activity became conscious not only in obsessive thoughts but also in obsessive images. The two could accompany each other or appear independently. At one particular time, whenever he saw his father entering the room, there came into his mind in close connection an obsessive word and an obsessive image. The word was '*Vaterarsch*' ['father-arse']; the accompanying image represented his father as the naked lower part of a body, provided with arms and legs, but without the head or upper part. The genitals were not indicated, and the facial features were painted on the abdomen.

It will help to explain this more than usually absurd symptom if I mention that the patient, who was a man of fully developed intellect and high moral ideals, manifested a very lively anal erotism in the most various ways until after his tenth year. After this had been got over, his sexual life was once again forced back to the preliminary anal stage by his later struggle against genital erotism. He loved and respected his father greatly, and also feared him not a little; judged by his own high standards in regard to asceticism and the suppression of the instincts, however, his father seemed to him a person who stood for debauchery and the pursuit of enjoyment in material things.

'Father-arse' was soon explained as a jocular Teutonizing of the honorific title of 'patriarch'.² The obsessive image is an obvious caricature. It recalls other representations which, with a derogatory end in view, replace a whole person by one of his organs, e.g. his genitals; it reminds us, too, of unconscious

¹ ['Mythologische Parallele zu einer plastischen Zwangsvorstellung', *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 4 (2) (1916), 110; *S.K.S.N.*, 4 (1918), 195 (1922, 2nd ed.); *G.S.*, 10 (1924), 240; *G.W.*, 10 (1946), 398. English translation: *C.P.*, 4 (1925), 345. (Tr. C. M. J. Hubback.) The present translation is based on the one published in 1925.]

² [The two words sound more alike in German than in English. 'Patriarch' is spelt the same in both languages, but pronounced differently.]

phantasies which lead to the identification of the genitals with the whole person, and also of joking figures of speech, such as 'I am all ears'.

The placing of the facial features on the abdomen of the caricature struck me at first as very strange. But I soon remembered having seen the same thing in French caricatures.¹ Chance then brought to my notice an antique representation, which tallied exactly with my patient's obsessive image.

According to the Greek legend, Demeter came to Eleusis in search of her daughter after she had been abducted, and was given lodging by Dysaules and his wife Baubo; but in her great sorrow she refused to touch food or drink. Thereupon her hostess Baubo made her laugh by suddenly lifting up her dress and exposing her body. A discussion of this anecdote, which was probably intended to explain a magic ceremonial which was no longer understood, is to be found in the fourth volume of Salomon Reinach's work, *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, 1912 [115]. In the same passage the author mentions that during the excavations at Priene in Asia Minor some terracottas were found which represented Baubo. They show the body of a woman without a head or chest and with a face drawn on the abdomen: the lifted dress frames this face like a crown of hair (*ibid.*, 117).



¹ Cf. 'L'impudique Albion', a caricature of England drawn in 1901 by Jean Véber, reproduced in Fuchs, 1908 [384].

A CONNECTION BETWEEN A SYMBOL AND A SYMPTOM¹ (1916)

Experience in the analysis of dreams has sufficiently well established the hat as a symbol of the genital organ, most frequently of the male organ.² It cannot be said, however, that the symbol is an intelligible one. In phantasies and in numerous symptoms the head too appears as a symbol of the male genitals, or, if one prefers to put it so, as something standing for them. It will sometimes have been noticed that patients suffering from obsessions express an amount of abhorrence of and indignation against punishment by beheading far greater than they do in the case of any other form of death; and in such cases the analyst may be led to explain to them that they are treating being beheaded as a substitute for being castrated. Instances have often been analysed and published of dreams dreamt by young people or reported as having occurred in youth, which concerned the subject of castration, and in which a round ball was mentioned which could only be interpreted as the head of the dreamer's father. I was recently able to solve a ceremonial performed by a woman patient before going to sleep, in which she had to lay her small top pillow diamond-wise on the other ones used to rest her head exactly in the long diameter of the diamond-shape. The diamond had the meaning that is familiar to us from drawings on walls [*graffiti*]; the head was supposed to represent a male organ.³

It may be that the symbolic meaning of the hat is derived from that of the head, in so far as a hat can be regarded as a

¹ ['Eine Beziehung zwischen einem Symbol und einem Symptom', *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 4 (2) (1916), 111; *S.K.S.N.*, 4 (1918), 198 (1922, 2nd ed.); *G.S.*, 5 (1924), 310; *Psychoanalyse der Neurosen* (1926), 38; *Neurosenlehre und Technik* (1931), 21; *G.W.*, 10 (1946), 394. English translation: *C.P.*, 2 (1924), 162. (Tr. D. Bryan.) The present translation is based on the one published in 1924.]

² [A hat dream is recorded in Chapter VI (E) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 360-2.]

³ [This case is related in detail in Lecture XVII of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17).]

prolonged, though detachable head. In this connection I am reminded of a symptom by means of which obsessional neurotics succeed in causing themselves continual torments. When they are in the street they are constantly on the look-out to see whether some acquaintance will greet them first by taking off his hat, or whether he seems to be waiting for *their* salutation; and they give up a number of their acquaintances after discovering that they no longer greet them or do not return their own salutation properly. There is no end to their difficulties in this connection; they find them everywhere as their mood and fancy dictate. It makes no difference to their behaviour when we tell them, what they all know already, that a salutation by taking off the hat has the meaning of an abasement before the person saluted—that a Spanish grandee, for example, enjoyed the privilege of remaining covered in the king's presence—and that their own sensitiveness on the subject of greeting therefore means that they are unwilling to show themselves less important than the other person thinks he is. The resistance of their sensitiveness to explanations such as this suggests that a motive less familiar to consciousness is at work; and the source of this excess of feeling might easily be found in its relation to the castration complex.

LETTER TO DR. HERMINE VON HUG-HELLMUTH¹ (1919 [1915])

The diary is a little gem. I really believe it has never before been possible to obtain such a clear and truthful view of the mental impulses that characterize the development of a girl in our social and cultural stratum during the years before puberty. We are shown how her feelings grow up out of a childish egoism till they reach social maturity; we learn what form is first assumed by her relations with her parents and with her brothers and sisters and how they gradually gain in seriousness and inward feeling; how friendships are made and broken; how her affection feels its way towards her first objects; and, above all, how the secret of sexual life begins to dawn on her indistinctly and then takes complete possession of the child's mind; how, in the consciousness of her secret knowledge, she at first suffers hurt, but little by little overcomes it. All of this is so charmingly, so naturally, and so gravely expressed in these artless notes that they cannot fail to arouse the greatest interest in educators and psychologists . . . It is your duty, I think, to publish the diary. My readers will be grateful to you for it.

¹ ['Brief an Frau Dr. Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth.' The letter, extracts from which follow, was written by Freud on April 27, 1915. These extracts were included in Frau von Hug-Hellmuth's preface to her edition of the diary to which the letter refers: *Tagebuch eines halb-wüchsigen Mädchens*, published by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag (Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich, 1919; 2nd ed., 1921; 3rd ed., 1922). The extracts were reprinted in *G.S.*, 11 (1928), 261, and *G.W.*, 10 (1946), 456. An English translation of the diary (including the preface), by Eden and Cedar Paul, was published in London by George Allen and Unwin and in New York by Seltzer (1921; 2nd ed., 1936) under the title *A Young Girl's Diary*. It should be added that after its publication suggestions were made that the diary might have been touched up by the unidentified person who confided the manuscript to Frau von Hug-Hellmuth. The German edition was therefore withdrawn from circulation, though the English translation remained in print. The present version is a new one, by James Strachey. It appears by arrangement with Messrs George Allen and Unwin.]

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[Titles of books and periodicals are in italics; titles of papers are in inverted commas. Abbreviations are in accordance with the *World List of Scientific Periodicals* (London, 1952). Further abbreviations used in this volume will be found in the List at the end of this bibliography. Numerals in thick type refer to volumes; ordinary numerals refer to pages. The figures in round brackets at the end of each entry indicate the page or pages of this volume on which the work in question is mentioned. In the case of the Freud entries, the letters attached to the dates of publication are in accordance with the corresponding entries in the complete bibliography of Freud's writings to be included in the last volume of the *Standard Edition*.

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- (1924b) 'Neurose und Psychose', *G.S.*, 5, 418; *G.W.*, 13, 387. (221, 259)
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- (1931b) 'Über die weibliche Sexualität', *G.S.*, 12, 120; *G.W.*, 14, 517. (90)
[*Trans.*: 'Female Sexuality', *C.P.*, 5, 252; *Standard Ed.*, 21.]
- (1932c) 'Meine Berührung mit Josef Popper-Lynkeus', *G.S.*, 12, 415; *G.W.*, 16, 261. (20)
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- G.S.* = Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften* (12 vols.), Vienna, 1924-34
G.W. = Freud, *Gesammelte Werke* (18 vols.), London, from 1940
C.P. = Freud, *Collected Papers* (5 vols.), London, 1924-50
Standard Ed. = Freud, *Standard Edition* (24 vols.), London, from 1953
S.K.S.N. = Freud, *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre* (5 vols.), Vienna, 1906-22
Almanach 1926 = *Almanach für das Jahr 1926*, Vienna, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1925
Almanach 1927 = *Almanach für das Jahr 1927*, Vienna, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1926
Dichtung und Kunst = Freud, *Psychoanalytische Studien an Werken der Dichtung und Kunst*, Vienna, 1924
Neurosenlehre und Technik = Freud, *Schriften zur Neurosenlehre und zur psychoanalytischen Technik (1913-1926)*, Vienna, 1931
Psychoanalyse der Neurosen = Freud, *Studien zur Psychoanalyse der Neurosen aus den Jahren 1913-1925*, Vienna, 1926
Technik und Metapsychol. = Freud, *Zur Technik der Psychoanalyse und zur Metapsychologie*, Vienna, 1924
Theoretische Schriften = Freud, *Theoretische Schriften (1911-1925)*, Vienna, 1931

GENERAL INDEX

This index includes the names of non-technical authors. It also includes the names of technical authors where no reference is made in the text to specific works. For references to specific technical works, the Bibliography should be consulted.—The compilation of the index was undertaken by Mrs. R. S. Partridge.

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